Matter of G-D-M-

Cite as 25 I&N Dec. 82 (BIA 2009) Interim Decision #3655

引用为 25 I&N Dec. 82 (BIA 2009) 临时决定第3655号

Decided October 8, 2009

2009年10月8日裁定

U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals

美国司法部 移民审查执行办公室 移民上诉委员会

An alien who entered the United States pursuant to a crewman’s visa for the purpose of obtaining employment as a crewman is statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal under section 240A(c)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(c)(1) (2006). Matter of Goncalves, 10 I&N Dec. 277 (BIA 1963), followed.

依据《移民与国籍法》第240A(c)(1)条，8 U.S.C. § 1229b(c)(1)（2006），为获得船员工作而持船员签证进入美国的外国人，依法不具备取消递解出境的资格。遵循 Matter of Goncalves, 10 I&N Dec. 277 (BIA 1963)。

FOR RESPONDENT: Anayancy R. Housman, Esquire, Elizabeth, New Jersey

被申请人代理律师：Anayancy R. Housman 律师，新泽西州伊丽莎白

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Joseph Silver, Assistant Chief Counsel

国土安全部代理律师：Joseph Silver，助理首席法律顾问

BEFORE: Board Panel: GRANT, MALPHRUS, and MULLANE, Board Members.

审理：委员会合议庭：GRANT、MALPHRUS 和 MULLANE，委员会成员。

MULLANE, Board Member:

MULLANE，委员会成员：

In a decision dated August 18, 2006, an Immigration Judge found the respondent removable under section 237(a)(1)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) (2006), as a nonimmigrant who remained in the United States longer than permitted. 1 The Immigration Judge also found the respondent ineligible for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (2006), 2 denied his motion to terminate removal proceedings, and granted him the privilege of voluntary departure. The respondent has appealed from the Immigration Judge’s decision. The appeal will be dismissed.

在2006年8月18日的决定中，移民法官认定被申请人依据《移民与国籍法》第237(a)(1)(B)条，8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B)（2006），作为非移民在美国停留超过许可期限而应被递解出境。1 移民法官还认定被申请人不具备依据该法第240A(b)(1)条，8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)（2006），申请取消递解出境的资格，2 驳回了其终止递解出境程序的动议，并给予其自愿离境的特权。被申请人对移民法官的决定提出上诉。上诉将被驳回。

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

I. 事实与程序历史

The respondent is a 46-year-old native and citizen of the Philippines who was admitted to the United States on June 17, 1994, at Los Angeles,

被申请人是46岁的菲律宾本土出生公民，于1994年6月17日在洛杉矶获准进入美国，

1 The respondent, through counsel, conceded the charge of removability at a hearing on December 9, 2004. 2 The respondent filed his application for cancellation of removal in February 2005, and therefore his claim is not governed by the REAL ID Act of 2005, Division B of Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302, which applies to applications filed on or after May 11, 2005.

1 被申请人通过律师在2004年12月9日的听证会上承认了递解出境指控。 2 被申请人于2005年2月提交了取消递解出境申请，因此其主张不受2005年《真实身份法案》（2005年公法第109-13号B编，119 Stat. 302）管辖，该法适用于2005年5月11日或之后提交的申请。

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California. He resides with his 10-year-old United States citizen daughter and her mother, who is also a native and citizen of the Philippines. The record reflects that the respondent was issued a Form I-94 (Arrival-Departure Record) that classified him as a C-1 nonimmigrant in transit, and his passport included a “C-1/D” visa. The “D” on his visa indicated that he had been accorded “alien crewman” status under section 101(a)(15)(D) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(D) (1994). 3 At the time of his entry, he possessed a Seaman’s Service Record Book issued by the Philippine Coast Guard on May 19, 1994. 4 The respondent identified himself as a “crewman” in the entry for “current immigration status” in an asylum application dated August 10, 1994. He subsequently withdrew the asylum application at a hearing on August 18, 2004. The respondent testified at his hearing in 2006 that when he was admitted to the United States, he was planning to work on a ship. Although he came to the United States for that purpose, he did not have a license for employment aboard a specific ship on his arrival. According to the respondent, he had never been employed as a crewman and had not received any formal training as a seaman. After he entered the United States, he was never employed as a crewman. In her decision, the Immigration Judge found the respondent removable for remaining in the United States longer than permitted following his admission as a nonimmigrant under section 101(a)(15) of the Act. Because the Immigration Judge found the respondent to be a crewman, she concluded that he was statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal under section 240A(c)(1), which states that cancellation of removal is not available to “[a]n alien who entered the United States as a crewman subsequent to June 30, 1964.” She also denied the respondent’s motion to terminate, finding no issue regarding possible improper notice in the Notice to Appear (Form I-862), which reflected an incorrect date and status of admission but nevertheless properly informed the respondent that he was charged with remaining in the United States longer than his nonimmigrant status allowed. In finding the respondent ineligible for cancellation of removal, the Immigration Judge relied on our decision in Matter of Goncalves, 10 I&N Dec. 277 (BIA 1963), which concerned an alien who had been employed on an

加利福尼亚州。他与10岁的美国公民女儿及其母亲同住，后者也是菲律宾本土出生公民。 记录显示，被申请人获发I-94表（入境-离境记录），将其归类为过境C-1非移民，其护照包含“C-1/D”签证。其签证上的“D”表明他依据该法第101(a)(15)(D)条，8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(D)（1994），被赋予“外国船员”身份。3 入境时，他持有菲律宾海岸警卫队于1994年5月19日签发的《海员服务记录簿》。4 被申请人在1994年8月10日的庇护申请中，在“当前移民身份”一栏自称为“船员”。他随后在2004年8月18日的听证会上撤回了庇护申请。 被申请人在2006年的听证会上作证称，当他获准进入美国时，他计划在船上工作。尽管他为此目的来到美国，但抵达时他并未持有在特定船舶上就业的执照。据被申请人称，他从未受雇为船员，也未接受过任何正式的海员培训。进入美国后，他从未受雇为船员。 在其决定中，移民法官认定被申请人作为该法第101(a)(15)条项下的非移民获准入境后，因在美国停留超过许可期限而应被递解出境。由于移民法官认定被申请人为船员，她得出结论认为，依据第240A(c)(1)条，他依法不具备取消递解出境的资格，该条规定取消递解出境不适用于“1964年6月30日之后作为船员进入美国的外国人”。她还驳回了被申请人终止程序的动议，认定出庭通知（I-862表）中关于可能通知不当的问题不存在，该通知虽反映了错误的入境日期和身份，但仍适当告知了被申请人其被指控在美国停留超过非移民身份允许的期限。 在认定被申请人不具备取消递解出境资格时，移民法官依据了我们在 Matter of Goncalves, 10 I&N Dec. 277 (BIA 1963) 中的裁决，该案涉及一名曾在

3 Under section 101(a)(10) of the Act, the term “crewman” is defined as “a person serving in any capacity on board a vessel or aircraft.” The phrase “any capacity” encompasses a wide range of jobs aboard a vessel and is not limited to operation of the vessel. 4 The Seaman’s Service Record Book states that the “Seaman’s Service Record Book is a SEAFARER’S IDENTITY DOCUMENT issued for the purpose of providing the holder with Identity papers for travel to or from an assigned vessel, and of providing a record of the holder’s sea service.”

3 依据该法第101(a)(10)条，“船员”一词定义为“在船舶或航空器上以任何身份服务的人”。“任何身份”一词涵盖船上广泛的工作范围，不限于船舶操作。 4 《海员服务记录簿》载明：“《海员服务记录簿》是海员身份文件，签发的目的是为持有人提供往返指定船舶的旅行身份证明，并提供持有人海上服务记录。”

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American vessel that was sold abroad and who entered the United States in transit to reship but subsequently became unemployed while in the United States. We held that the alien was ineligible for suspension of deportation and adjustment of status because his entry in transit to ship on another vessel constituted an entry as a crewman. We noted that he entered the United States in pursuit of his calling as a seaman, which was evidenced by his testimony that he entered to ship out as a seaman and by his record of entry reflecting that he entered as a crewman and was a seaman intending to reship foreign. Id. at 279-80. On appeal, the respondent challenges the conclusion that he was a crewman upon his admission to the United States. Although he acknowledges that he was admitted to the United States with a C1/D visa indicating he was a crewman, he claims that he should not be formally classified as a crewman because he did not enter the United States with current employment aboard a ship. Consequently, he argues that he is eligible for cancellation of removal.

美国船舶上受雇、该船在海外被出售，该外国人以过境身份进入美国以便重新上船，但随后在美国期间失业。我们裁定，该外国人不具备暂停递解出境和调整身份的资格，因为他以过境身份进入美国以便在另一艘船上工作，构成作为船员入境。我们指出，他进入美国是为了从事其海员职业，这可由其证词证明——他入境是为了作为海员上船工作，以及其入境记录显示他作为船员入境且是打算重新上外国船舶的海员。Id. at 279-80。 在上诉中，被申请人质疑其获准进入美国时是船员的结论。尽管他承认持表明其为船员的C1/D签证获准进入美国，但他声称不应被正式归类为船员，因为他进入美国时并未在船上拥有当前就业。因此，他主张自己有资格获得取消递解出境。

II. ANALYSIS

II. 分析

We review the Immigration Judge’s findings of fact under the “clearly erroneous” standard, while we review de novo all other issues, including those regarding burden of proof and the exercise of discretion. Matter of V-K-, 24 I&N Dec. 500 (BIA 2008); Matter of A-S-B-, 24 I&N Dec. 493 (BIA 2008); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i)-(ii) (2009). We conclude that the Immigration Judge’s decision is correct under Matter of Goncalves, 10 I&N Dec. 277, because the respondent received his visa and entered the United States in pursuit of employment as a crewman. As we held in that case, “[W]e believe it was the intent of Congress to bar all occupational seamen who entered by reason of their occupation.” Id. at 279. In this connection, we note that the respondent entered the United States on a C-1/D visa; he possessed a Seaman’s Service Record Book that was recently issued by the Philippine Coast Guard; he identified himself as a “crewman” in an asylum application submitted shortly after his entry; and he testified that he was planning to work on a ship. Under these circumstances, we agree that the respondent entered the United States by reason of his occupation as a seaman, regardless of whether he ever had been employed as a crewman, had any prior training or experience in this occupation, or had located future employment aboard a specific vessel. By choosing to seek entry to the United States as a crewman, the respondent agreed to the limitations associated with that status.

我们依据“明显错误”标准审查移民法官的事实认定，同时对包括举证责任和自由裁量权行使在内的所有其他问题进行重新审查。Matter of V-K-, 24 I&N Dec. 500 (BIA 2008)；Matter of A-S-B-, 24 I&N Dec. 493 (BIA 2008)；8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i)-(ii)（2009）。 我们得出结论，依据 Matter of Goncalves, 10 I&N Dec. 277，移民法官的决定是正确的，因为被申请人获得签证并进入美国是为了从事船员工作。正如我们在该案中裁定的，“我们认为国会的意图是禁止所有因职业而入境的职业海员。”Id. at 279。就此而言，我们注意到被申请人持C-1/D签证进入美国；他持有菲律宾海岸警卫队近期签发的《海员服务记录簿》；他在入境后不久提交的庇护申请中自称为“船员”；且他作证称计划在船上工作。在此情况下，我们同意被申请人因海员职业而进入美国，无论他是否曾受雇为船员、是否曾在该职业中接受过任何培训或经验，或是否已在特定船舶上找到未来就业。通过选择以船员身份寻求进入美国，被申请人同意了与该身份相关的限制。

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Therefore, he cannot now avoid the consequences of those restrictions in removal proceedings by claiming not to be a crewman. 5 Our general approach, which we reaffirm in this case, has been to examine an alien’s visa and the circumstances surrounding his entry into the United States to determine if he entered as a crewman. If it is apparent, as it is in the respondent’s case, that the alien was issued a visa as a crewman and entered the United States in pursuit of his occupation as a seaman, then he is to be regarded as an alien crewman. See Matter of Tzimas, 10 I&N Dec. 101 (BIA 1962) (holding that an alien who was admitted with a C-1 in transit visa was ineligible for adjustment of status because he had entered to serve as an alien crewman). A review of our precedent decisions indicates that we have consistently examined the type of visa an alien possessed, as well as the nature of his admission, to determine whether he should be considered a crewman. For example, we have concluded in other contexts that an alien is not a “crewman” even if his means of arrival in the United States was as a crewman or he had previously entered as a crewman, provided that his most recent admission was not as a crewman. See Matter of Rebelo, 13 I&N Dec. 84 (BIA 1968) (holding that an alien admitted with a B-2 nonimmigrant visitor’s visa was not entering as a crewman, even though he was serving as a ship’s engineer); Matter of Quintero-Correa, 11 I&N Dec. 343 (BIA 1964) (finding that an alien admitted with a B-2 nonimmigrant visitor’s visa was not entering as crewman arriving aboard a freighter, although he earned half his fare by serving meals to the crew and washing dishes). On the other hand, we have held that an alien entering the United States as a B-2 nonimmigrant visitor for pleasure can be considered a crewman where he “intended to pursue his calling as a crewman aboard [a ship].” Matter of Campton, 13 I&N Dec. 535, 538 (BIA 1970) (concluding that “the respondent’s last entry . . . was sought and gained solely in pursuit of his occupation”).

因此，他现在不能在递解出境程序中声称自己不是船员，以规避这些限制的后果。5 我们在本案中重申的一般做法是，审查外国人的签证及其进入美国的相关情况，以确定其是否作为船员入境。如果明显——如被申请人案件所示——该外国人作为船员获得签证并因海员职业而进入美国，则应将其视为外国船员。See Matter of Tzimas, 10 I&N Dec. 101 (BIA 1962)（裁定持C-1过境签证获准入境的外国人不具备调整身份资格，因为他入境是为了作为外国船员服务）。 对我们先例裁决的审查表明，我们一贯审查外国人持有的签证类型及其入境性质，以确定是否应将其视为船员。例如，我们在其他语境中得出结论，即使外国人抵达美国的方式是作为船员，或他此前曾作为船员入境，只要其最近一次入境不是作为船员，他就不是“船员”。See Matter of Rebelo, 13 I&N Dec. 84 (BIA 1968)（裁定持B-2非移民访客签证获准入境的外国人不是作为船员入境，即使他担任船舶工程师）；Matter of Quintero-Correa, 11 I&N Dec. 343 (BIA 1964)（认定持B-2非移民访客签证获准入境的外国人不是作为船员乘货轮抵达入境，尽管他通过为船员供餐和洗碗赚取了一半旅费）。另一方面，我们裁定，作为B-2非移民访客以休闲为目的进入美国的外国人，如果其“打算在[船舶]上从事其船员职业”，则可被视为船员。Matter of Campton, 13 I&N Dec. 535, 538 (BIA 1970)（结论为“被申请人的最后一次入境……是仅为从事其职业而寻求和获得的”）。

5 The respondent contends that his case may be distinguished from Matter of Goncalves, and he relies on an unpublished Board order issued in 2005. In that case, an unemployed alien who previously had served as a crewman was admitted into the United States on a C-1 in transit visa. An Immigration Judge found that the alien was subject to removal under sections 237(a)(1)(B) and (C)(i) of the Act and determined that he was a crewman who was not eligible for cancellation of removal or adjustment of status. We held that the alien’s entry in transit did not constitute entry as a crewman and that he was in effect an “intending” crewman who was eligible for relief. However, we have determined that Matter of Goncalves applies to the respondent’s case. Moreover, an unpublished Board decision does not serve as controlling precedent. Matter of Medrano, 20 I&N Dec. 216, 220 (BIA 1990, 1991); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (2009).

5 被申请人主张其案件可与Matter of Goncalves相区分，并援引2005年作出的一项未公布的委员会裁定。在该案中，一名此前曾担任船员的失业外国人持C-1过境签证获准进入美国。一名移民法官认定该外国人依据《移民与国籍法》第237(a)(1)(B)条和第(C)(i)条应被驱逐，并认定其系船员，不符合取消驱逐或调整身份的资格。本院裁定，该外国人的过境入境不构成以船员身份的入境，其实际上是一名符合救济资格的“意图”船员。然而，本院已认定Matter of Goncalves适用于被申请人的案件。此外，未公布的委员会裁定不构成具有约束力的先例。Matter of Medrano, 20 I&N Dec. 216, 220 (BIA 1990, 1991); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (2009)。

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We note that this approach has been upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. In Parzagonis v. INS, 747 F.2d 1389 (11th Cir. 1984), the alien had never worked as a crewman before he traveled to the United States to begin his employment aboard a ship at Panama City, Florida. He served as a crewman for 1 week before leaving the ship and remained illegally in the United States for 12 years. Relying on Matter of Goncalves, the Immigration Judge found the alien ineligible for suspension of deportation and rejected his contention that he did not enter as a crewman because he only became a crewman after his entry into the United States. We affirmed, noting the respondent’s testimony that he entered to ship out as a seaman. The Eleventh Circuit agreed with our decision, holding that the dispositive issue was whether the alien had entered the United States in pursuit of his calling as a seaman, regardless of whether he had previously been employed as a crewman. Accordingly, in this case, where the respondent secured a visa as a crewman, entered the United States pursuant to that visa, arrived with the intention of working as a seaman, and identified himself as a crewman on his asylum application, we conclude that he entered as a crewman for purposes of section 240A(c)(1) of the Act. 6 The respondent argues in the alternative that if he is determined to have entered the United States as a crewman, his motion to terminate removal proceedings should have been granted. Citing section 235(b)(2)(B)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(B)(i) (2006), he asserts that as a crewman, he would not be entitled to a removal hearing under section 240 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2006). 7 We disagree. The respondent was admitted to the United States in 1994. Consequently, he is not subject to the provisions of section 235(b), which went into effect in 1997 after he was admitted and relate only to applicants for admission. 8 We therefore conclude that the respondent

本院注意到，这一处理方式已获美国第11巡回上诉法院支持。在Parzagonis v. INS, 747 F.2d 1389 (11th Cir. 1984)案中，该外国人在前往美国、准备在佛罗里达州巴拿马城登船开始工作之前，从未担任过船员。他在离船前担任船员1周，并在美国非法滞留12年。移民法官依据Matter of Goncalves认定该外国人不符合暂停驱逐的资格，并驳回了其关于自己并非以船员身份入境、因为其仅是在入境美国之后才成为船员的主张。本院维持原裁定，并注意到被申请人关于其入境是为了作为海员出海的证词。第11巡回法院同意本院的裁定，认为具有决定性的问题在于该外国人是否为了从事其海员职业而进入美国，而无论其此前是否曾受雇为船员。因此，在本案中，被申请人以船员身份取得签证，依据该签证进入美国，抵达时具有作为海员工作的意图，并在其庇护申请中自称为船员，本院据此认定，就《移民与国籍法》第240A(c)(1)条而言，其系以船员身份入境。6 被申请人另主张，如果认定其系以船员身份进入美国，则其终止驱逐程序的动议本应获准。其援引《移民与国籍法》第235(b)(2)(B)(i)条，8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(B)(i) (2006)，主张作为船员，其无权依据《移民与国籍法》第240条，8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2006)获得驱逐听证。7 本院不同意。被申请人于1994年获准进入美国。因此，其不受第235(b)条规定的约束，该条规定于其获准入境后的1997年生效，且仅涉及入境申请人。8 本院因此认定，被申请人

6 In this connection, the respondent contends that he cannot be considered a crewman because he allegedly was not issued a conditional landing permit. The absence of a conditional landing permit does not preclude a finding that he entered as a crewman. As noted above, the pertinent inquiry is whether the respondent was issued a visa as an alien crewman and entered the United States as a crewman. This inquiry is not governed by the existence of any forms that the Government did or did not issue to the respondent. As we have previously stated, “[I]t is substance rather than form which controls . . . .” Matter of Campton, 13 I&N Dec. at 538. 7 This appears to be a peculiar argument for the respondent to advance because he is only eligible for cancellation of removal if he is in removal proceedings under section 240 of the Act. 8 We note in this regard that section 237(a) of the Act provides that “[a]ny alien (including an alien crewman) in and admitted to the United States shall, upon the order of the Attorney General, be removed if the alien is within one or more of the . . . classes of (continued...)

6 就此而言，被申请人主张，由于其据称未获发有条件登陆许可，故不能被视为船员。未持有有条件登陆许可并不妨碍认定其系以船员身份入境。如上所述，相关的调查问题在于被申请人是否以外国船员身份取得签证并以船员身份进入美国。该调查不受政府是否向被申请人签发任何表格的约束。正如本院此前所述，“起决定作用的是实质而非形式……。”Matter of Campton, 13 I&N Dec. 第538页。 7 被申请人提出这一论点似乎颇为奇特，因为其只有在依据《移民与国籍法》第240条处于驱逐程序之中时，才有资格获得取消驱逐。 8 本院就此注意到，《移民与国籍法》第237(a)条规定，“任何外国人（包括外国船员）在进入并获准进入美国后，如属于……可驱逐外国人类别中的一类或多类，则应当依据司法部长的命令被驱逐。”（续……）

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was properly placed in removal proceedings and that the Immigration Judge’s denial of the respondent’s motion to terminate was correct in these circumstances. Accordingly, his appeal will be dismissed. ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. FURTHER ORDER: Pursuant to the Immigration Judge’s order and conditioned upon compliance with conditions set forth by the Immigration Judge and the statute, the respondent is permitted to voluntarily depart the United States, without expense to the Government, within 60 days from the date of this order or any extension beyond that time as may be granted by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). See section 240B(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b) (2006); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.26(c), (f) (2009). In the event the respondent fails to voluntarily depart the United States, the respondent shall be removed as provided in the Immigration Judge’s order. NOTICE: If the respondent fails to voluntarily depart the United States within the time period specified, or any extensions granted by the DHS, the respondent shall be subject to a civil penalty as provided by the regulations and the statute and shall be ineligible for a period of 10 years for any further relief under section 240B and sections 240A, 245, 248, and 249 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b, 1255, 1258, and1259 (2006). See section 240B(d) of the Act. WARNING: If the respondent files a motion to reopen or reconsider prior to the expiration of the voluntary departure period set forth above, the grant of voluntary departure is automatically terminated; the period allowed for voluntary departure is not stayed, tolled, or extended. If the grant of voluntary departure is automatically terminated upon the filing of a motion, the penalties for failure to depart under section 240B(d) of the Act shall not apply. See Voluntary Departure: Effect of a Motion To Reopen or Reconsider or a Petition for Review, 73 Fed. Reg. 76,927, 76,937-38 (Dec. 18, 2008) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.26(c)(3)(iii), (e)(1)). WARNING: If, prior to departing the United States, the respondent files any judicial challenge to this administratively final order, such as a petition for review pursuant to section 242 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2006), the grant of voluntary departure is automatically terminated, and the alternate order of removal shall immediately take effect. However, if the respondent files a

被适当置于驱逐程序中，且移民法官在此情形下驳回被申请人终止程序动议的裁定是正确的。因此，其上诉将被驳回。 命令：上诉驳回。 进一步命令：依据移民法官的命令，并在遵守移民法官及法规所规定条件的条件下，准许被申请人在本命令作出之日起60日内，或国土安全部（“DHS”）可能批准的任何延长期限内，自费自愿离境，不增加政府开支。参见《移民与国籍法》第240B(b)条，8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b) (2006)；另参见8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.26(c), (f) (2009)。如被申请人未能自愿离境，则应依据移民法官的命令将其驱逐。 通知：如被申请人未在规定期限内或DHS批准的任何延长期限内自愿离境，则被申请人应受法规及法规所规定的民事处罚，并在10年内无资格依据《移民与国籍法》第240B条及第240A、245、248和249条，8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b, 1255, 1258和1259 (2006)获得任何进一步救济。参见《移民与国籍法》第240B(d)条。 警告：如被申请人在上述自愿离境期限届满前提出重新开案或重新考虑的动议，自愿离境的批准自动终止；自愿离境所允许的期限不中止、不停止计算、也不延长。如因提出动议而自动终止自愿离境的批准，则《移民与国籍法》第240B(d)条规定的未离境处罚不适用。参见Voluntary Departure: Effect of a Motion To Reopen or Reconsider or a Petition for Review, 73 Fed. Reg. 76,927, 76,937-38 (2008年12月18日)（将编纂于8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.26(c)(3)(iii), (e)(1)）。 警告：如在离境美国之前，被申请人对本行政终局命令提出任何司法挑战，例如依据《移民与国籍法》第242条，8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2006)提出复审申请，则自愿离境的批准自动终止，替代驱逐命令立即生效。但是，如被申请人提出

(...continued) deportable aliens.” Aliens charged with grounds of deportability under section 237(a) are properly in section 240 removal proceedings. See section 240(a)(2) of the Act; see also 8 C.F.R. § 252.2(b) (2009) (providing that a crewman who was granted landing privileges prior to April 1, 1997, and who has not departed is subject to removal proceedings under section 240 of the Act).

（……续） 可驱逐外国人。”依据第237(a)条被指控具有可驱逐理由的外国人，适当处于第240条驱逐程序中。参见《移民与国籍法》第240(a)(2)条；另参见8 C.F.R. § 252.2(b) (2009)（规定在1997年4月1日之前获准登陆特权且尚未离境的船员，应受《移民与国籍法》第240条驱逐程序的约束）。

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petition for review and then departs the United States within 30 days of such filing, the respondent will not be deemed to have departed under an order of removal if the alien provides to the DHS such evidence of his or her departure that the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Field Office Director of the DHS may require and provides evidence DHS deems sufficient that he or she has remained outside of the United States. The penalties for failure to depart under section 240B(d) of the Act shall not apply to an alien who files a petition for review, notwithstanding any period of time that he or she remains in the United States while the petition for review is pending. See 73 Fed. Reg. at 76,938 (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(i)).

复审申请，并在提出该申请后30日内离境美国，则只要该外国人向DHS提供DHS移民与海关执法局外地办事处主任可能要求的离境证据，并提供DHS认为足以证明其已留在美国境外的证据，该被申请人将不被视为依据驱逐命令离境。《移民与国籍法》第240B(d)条规定的未离境处罚不适用于提出复审申请的外国人，无论其在复审申请待决期间留在美国多长时间。参见73 Fed. Reg. 第76,938页（将编纂于8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(i)）。

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