Matter of Jennifer Adassa Davey

Cite as 26 I&N Dec. 37 (BIA 2012) Interim Decision #3770

引用为 26 I&N Dec. 37 (BIA 2012) 临时决定第3770号

Decided October 23, 2012

2012年10月23日决定

U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review

美国司法部 移民审查执行办公室

Board of Immigration Appeals

移民上诉委员会

(1) For purposes of section 237(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006), the phrase “a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of thirty grams or less of marijuana” calls for a circumstance-specific inquiry into the character of the alien’s unlawful conduct on a single occasion, not a categorical inquiry into the elements of a single statutory crime.

(1) 就《移民与国籍法》第237(a)(2)(B)(i)条，8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006) 而言，“一项涉及为本人使用而持有三十克或以下大麻的单一罪行”这一表述要求对外国人在单一场合下违法行为性质进行特定情形调查，而非对单一法定犯罪构成要件进行类别调查。

(2) An alien convicted of more than one statutory crime may be covered by the exception

(2) 被判定犯有一项以上法定犯罪的外国人，如果其所有犯罪均与外国人持有30克或以下大麻供本人使用的单一事件密切相关或相关联，且这些犯罪中没有任何一项在性质上比单纯持有更为严重，则可以适用“一项涉及为本人使用而持有三十克或以下大麻的单一罪行”的外国人驱逐出境例外。

to deportability for an alien convicted of “a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of thirty grams or less of marijuana” if all the alien’s crimes were closely related to or connected with a single incident in which the alien possessed 30 grams or less of marijuana for his or her own use, provided that none of those crimes was inherently more serious than simple possession.

如果所有犯罪均与外国人持有30克或以下大麻供本人使用的单一事件密切相关或相关联，且这些犯罪中没有任何一项在性质上比单纯持有更为严重，则被判定犯有一项以上法定犯罪的外国人可以适用“一项涉及为本人使用而持有三十克或以下大麻的单一罪行”的驱逐出境例外。

FOR RESPONDENT: John M. Pope, Esquire, Phoenix, Arizona

被申请人代理律师：John M. Pope 律师，亚利桑那州凤凰城

FORTHEDEPARTMENTOFHOMELANDSECURITY: Dominique J. Honea, Assistant Chief Counsel

国土安全部代理律师：Dominique J. Honea，助理首席法律顾问

BEFORE: Board Panel: COLE, PAULEY, and GREER, Board Members.

审理法官：委员会成员 COLE、PAULEY 和 GREER。

PAULEY, Board Member:

PAULEY，委员会成员：

In a decision dated February 3, 2011, an Immigration Judge ordered the respondent releasedfromthe custodyof the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) upon payment of a $2,000 bond.1 The DHS has appealed from that decision,arguingthattheImmigrationJudgelackedjurisdictiontoredetermine the respondent’s custody status. The appeal will be dismissed.

在2011年2月3日的决定中，一名移民法官下令在支付2,000美元保证金后释放被申请人，解除国土安全部（“DHS”）的羁押。1 DHS 对该决定提出上诉，主张移民法官缺乏重新裁定被申请人羁押状态的管辖权。上诉将被驳回。

The issue in this case is whether the respondent, a native and citizen of Jamaica, is subject to mandatorydetention during the pendencyof her ongoing removal proceedings. According to the DHS, the respondent is covered

本案的问题是，被申请人——牙买加本土公民——在其正在进行的遣返程序期间是否应受强制羁押。据 DHS 称，被申请人属于

1 The reasons for the Immigration Judge’s decision are set forth in a bond memorandum dated March 28, 2011.

1 移民法官决定的原因载于2011年3月28日的保证金备忘录中。

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by section 236(c)(1)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B) (2006), which requires the mandatory detention of “any alien who . . . is deportable by reason of having committed any offense covered in section [237(a)(2)(B)].” In support of that assertion, the DHS points out that the respondent was convicted in 2010 of possessing marijuana and drug paraphernalia in violation of sections 13-3405(A)(1) and 13-3415(A) of the ArizonaRevisedStatutes,respectively. AccordingtotheDHS,thatconviction renders the respondent deportable under section 237(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006), as an alien convicted of a violation of State law relating to a controlled substance.

《移民与国籍法》第236(c)(1)(B)条，8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B) (2006) 的适用范围，该条要求对“任何……因实施第[237(a)(2)(B)]条所涵盖的任何罪行而可被驱逐出境的外国人”实行强制羁押。为支持该主张，DHS 指出，被申请人于2010年因违反《亚利桑那州修订法规》第13-3405(A)(1)条和第13-3415(A)条分别持有大麻和吸毒用具而被定罪。据 DHS 称，该定罪使被申请人作为因违反州管制物质相关法律而被定罪的外国人，依据该法第237(a)(2)(B)(i)条，8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006) 可被驱逐出境。

TheImmigrationJudgedisagreedandconcludedthattherespondentis“not properly included” in the section 236(c)(1)(B) mandatory detention category because the DHS is “substantially unlikely” to prove that her 2010 conviction supports a section 237(a)(2)(B)(i) charge, citing Matter of Joseph, 22 I&N Dec. 799 (BIA 1999), and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(ii) (2011). To be precise, the Immigration Judge concluded that the respondent’s 2010 conviction is excepted from deportability under section 237(a)(2)(B)(i) because it was for “a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of thirty grams or less of marijuana.” On appeal, the DHS counters that the respondent’s two offenses—possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia—cannot constitute a single offense for purposes of the exception. Furthermore, the DHS maintains that the respondent may have been convicted of possessing marijuana for sale rather than for her own use.

移民法官不同意，并认定被申请人“未被适当纳入”第236(c)(1)(B)条强制羁押类别，因为 DHS“实质上不太可能”证明其2010年定罪支持第237(a)(2)(B)(i)条指控，援引 Matter of Joseph, 22 I&N Dec. 799 (BIA 1999) 和 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(ii) (2011)。准确地说，移民法官认定，被申请人2010年定罪属于第237(a)(2)(B)(i)条驱逐出境例外，因为该定罪系因“一项涉及为本人使用而持有三十克或以下大麻的单一罪行”。在上诉中，DHS 反驳称，被申请人的两项罪行——持有大麻和持有吸毒用具——不能构成该例外意义上的单一罪行。此外，DHS 主张，被申请人可能系因持有大麻用于出售而非供本人使用而被定罪。

Under section 237(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act, an alien with a drug conviction is excepted from deportability if he or she was convicted of a certain kind of marijuanapossession“offense,”namely,asingleoffenseinvolvingpossession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana. In interpreting this statutory language, we are mindful that “words such as . . . ‘offense’ . . . sometimes refer to a generic crime . . . and sometimes refer to the specific acts in which an offender engaged on a specific occasion.” Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 33-34 (2009).

根据该法第237(a)(2)(B)(i)条，有毒品定罪的外国人如果系因特定类型的大麻持有“罪行”而被定罪，即一项涉及为本人使用而持有30克或以下大麻的单一罪行，则属于驱逐出境例外。在解释该法定语言时，我们注意到“诸如……‘罪行’……等词语有时指一般犯罪……有时指罪犯在特定场合实施的具体行为。”Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 33-34 (2009)。

What “offense” means here is important because it determines the type of inquiry an Immigration Judge must conduct when seeking to determine whether an alien is covered by the exception. If the phrase “single offense” denotes a single generic crime, then an alien convicted of more than one statutory offense would be categorically ineligible for the exception, even if the conduct underlying the offenses occurred simultaneously. This is the interpretation favored by the DHS on appeal. Yet if the phrase “single offense” refers to the totality of an alien’s specific acts on a single occasion, then the exception could be available to an alien convicted of more than one statutory offense, provided that each crime “involved” a single incident in

此处“罪行”的含义很重要，因为它决定了移民法官在确定外国人是否属于该例外范围时必须进行的调查类型。如果“单一罪行”一语指单一一般犯罪，则被判定犯有一项以上法定犯罪的外国人将类别性地不符合该例外资格，即使这些犯罪所依据的行为同时发生。这是 DHS 在上诉中主张的解释。然而，如果“单一罪行”一语指外国人在单一场合下具体行为的总体，则该例外可适用于被判定犯有一项以上法定犯罪的外国人，只要每项犯罪均“涉及”外国人持有少量大麻供个人使用的单一事件。这是移民法官采纳且被申请人主张的解释。

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which the alien possessed a small amount of marijuana for personal use. This is the interpretation adopted by the Immigration Judge and favored by the respondent.

外国人持有少量大麻供个人使用的单一事件。这是移民法官采纳且被申请人主张的解释。

We have not previouslydecided which understanding of the phrase “single offense” is more appropriate when applied to section 237(a)(2)(B)(i), but we have construed that phrase as it appears in section 212(h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2006), which provides that “[t]he Attorney General may, in his discretion, waive the application of . . . [section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II)] insofar as it relates to a single offense of simple possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana.”2 (Emphasis added.) InMatterofMartinezEspinoza,25 I&N Dec. 118, 124 (2009), we concluded for a variety of reasons that the term “offense” used in section 212(h) was best understood as “refer[ring] to the specific unlawful acts that made the alien inadmissible, rather than to any generic crime.” Thus, we held that an alien convicted of possessing drug paraphernalia (namely, a marijuana pipe) could qualify for a section 212(h) waiver if the Immigration Judge determined that his “criminal conduct bore such a close relationship to the simple possession of a minimal quantity of marijuana that it should be treated with the same degree of forbearance under the immigration laws as the simple possession offense itself.” Id. at 124-25.

我们此前未曾裁定，在适用于第237(a)(2)(B)(i)条时，“单一犯罪”这一表述的哪种理解更为适当，但我们对《移民与国籍法》第212(h)条、8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)（2006年）中出现的该表述作了解释，该条规定：“司法部长可以酌情豁免……[第212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II)条]的适用，只要其涉及单一犯罪，即简单持有30克或以下大麻。”2（着重号为原文所加。）在Matter of Martinez Espinoza案，25 I&N Dec. 118, 124（2009年）中，我们基于多种理由认定，第212(h)条中使用的“犯罪”一词最好理解为“指使该外国人不可入境的具体非法行为，而非任何一般性罪行”。因此，我们裁定，如果移民法官认定某外国人的“犯罪行为与简单持有最低数量大麻具有如此密切的关系，以至于在移民法下应与简单持有犯罪本身受到同等程度的宽宥”，则该外国人即使因持有毒品用具（即大麻烟斗）而被定罪，也可以符合第212(h)条豁免的条件。Id. at 124-25。

The Immigration Judge concluded that the rationale underlying Martinez Espinoza applied with the same force in the context of section 237(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act. Thus, although the respondent was convicted of two generic offenses with discrete elements (namely, possession of marijuana and possessionof drugparaphernalia),theImmigrationJudgeconcludedthatthose two generic crimes amounted to a “single offense” in the relevant sense because they were constituent parts of a single act of simple marijuana possession. We agree with that interpretation.

移民法官认定，Martinez Espinoza 案所依据的理由在该法第237(a)(2)(B)(i)条语境下具有同等效力。因此，尽管被申请人被判定犯有两项具有不同要件的一般罪行（即持有大麻和持有吸毒用具），移民法官认定，这两项一般犯罪在相关意义上构成“单一罪行”，因为它们是单纯持有大麻单一行为的组成部分。我们同意该解释。

The language of the section 237(a)(2)(B)(i) exception is exceedingly narrow and fact-specific. It refers not to a common generic crime but rather to a specific type of conduct (possession for one’s own use) committed on a specific number of occasions (a “single” offense) and involving a specific quantity (30 grams or less) of a specific substance (marijuana). Read in its most natural sense, this narrow language calls for what the Supreme Court has referred to as a “circumstance-specific” inquiry, that is, an inquiry into the nature of the alien’s conduct. Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. at 34. It does not suggest a focus on the formal elements of generic offenses.

第237(a)(2)(B)(i)条例外的语言极为狭窄且高度特定于事实。它并非指一般犯罪，而是指在特定次数（“单一”罪行）实施的特定类型行为（为本人使用而持有），并涉及特定物质（大麻）的特定数量（30克或以下）。按其最自然的含义理解，这一狭窄语言要求进行最高法院所称的“特定情形”调查，即对外国人行为性质的调查。Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. at 34。它并不表明应关注一般犯罪的正式要件。

2 Sections 212(h) and 237(a)(2)(B)(i) are not unique. As we have noted elsewhere, the Act contains numerous provisions—most of which use language substantially similar to that at issue here—reflecting Congress’ policy of leniency toward aliens convicted of a single offense involving possession of a personal-use quantity of marijuana. See Matter of Moncada, 24 I&N Dec. 62, 65-66 & n.4 (BIA 2007) (enumerating the relevant provisions).

2 第212(h)条和第237(a)(2)(B)(i)条并非独一无二。正如我们在其他地方所指出的，该法包含众多条款——其中大多数使用与本案所涉语言实质相似的措辞——反映了国会对于被判定犯有涉及持有个人使用数量大麻的单一罪行的外国人从宽处理的政策。See Matter of Moncada, 24 I&N Dec. 62, 65-66 & n.4 (BIA 2007)（列举相关条款）。

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Furthermore, the plain language of section 237(a)(2)(B)(i) does not limit the availability of the exception to aliens convicted of simple marijuana possession per se. Rather, it makes the exception available to an alien whose conviction was for a single offense “involving” the simple possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana. Had Congress wished to make the exception available only to those convicted of generic marijuana possession, using an expression like “involving” (as opposed to “of,” for instance) would be an unlikely choice of words. Indeed, in analogous contexts, the Federal courts of appeals have construed the term “involving” broadly, to encompass any offense or act that is closely related or closely connected to its object of reference.

此外，第237(a)(2)(B)(i)条的平实语言并未将该例外的适用限于被判定犯有单纯大麻持有本身的外国人。相反，它使该例外适用于其定罪系因一项“涉及”单纯持有30克或以下大麻的单一罪行的外国人。如果国会希望该例外仅适用于被判定犯有一般大麻持有罪的人，使用诸如“涉及”（而非例如“of”）这样的表述将是不太可能的选择。事实上，在类似语境中，联邦上诉法院已对“涉及”一词作广义解释，以涵盖与其参照对象密切相关的任何罪行或行为。

For instance, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) (2006) defines the term “serious drug offense” to mean, in pertinent part, “an offense under State law, involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance.” (Emphasis added.) In deciding whether particular predicate offenses “involved” the distribution of controlled substances under this provision, courts have not required that the offense include distribution as a formal element. Rather, they have required only that the offender’s conduct be closely “related to or connected with” the offending activity. United States v. King, 325 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2003); see also, e.g., United States v. Bynum, 669 F.3d 880, 886-87 & n.4 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding that knowingly offering to sell drugs in violation of Minnesota law “involves” distribution under § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii)); United States v. Gibbs, 656 F.3d 180, 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that wearing body armor while committing a felony in violation of Delaware law “involves” distribution under § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) where the underlying felony was a drug sale); United States v. McKenney, 450 F.3d 39, 43, 45 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that conspiracy to possess or manufacture a controlled substance for sale in violation of Rhode Island law “involves” drug distribution under § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii)).

例如，18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) (2006) 将“严重毒品罪行”一词定义为，在相关部分指“违反州法律的、涉及制造、分销或持有并意图制造或分销管制物质的罪行”。（着重号为原文所加。）在裁定特定前置罪行是否“涉及”该条款下的管制物质分销时，法院并未要求该罪行将分销作为正式要件。相反，它们仅要求罪犯的行为与犯罪活动密切“相关或关联”。United States v. King, 325 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2003)；另见，例如，United States v. Bynum, 669 F.3d 880, 886-87 & n.4 (8th Cir. 2012)（裁定明知而要约出售毒品违反明尼苏达州法律“涉及”§ 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) 下的分销）；United States v. Gibbs, 656 F.3d 180, 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2011)（裁定在实施重罪时穿着防弹衣违反特拉华州法律“涉及”§ 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) 下的分销，其中基础重罪为毒品销售）；United States v. McKenney, 450 F.3d 39, 43, 45 (1st Cir. 2006)（裁定共谋持有或制造管制物质用于出售违反罗德岛州法律“涉及”§ 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) 下的毒品分销）。

Likewise, we conclude that for purposes of section237(a)(2)(B)(i),acrime “involves” possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana for personal use if the particular acts that led to the alien’s conviction were closely related to such conduct.3 The possession of drug paraphernalia would thus be covered by the exception where the paraphernalia in question was merely an adjunct to the

同样，我们认定，就第237(a)(2)(B)(i)条而言，如果导致该外国人被定罪的特定行为与为个人使用而持有30克或以下大麻密切相关，则一项犯罪“涉及”该持有行为。3 因此，在所涉吸毒用具仅系上述行为的附属物的情况下，持有吸毒用具将属于该例外的涵盖范围，而

3Acrime cannot “involve” simple possession of a personal-use quantity of marijuana unless it bears a direct relationship to that conduct. Furthermore, it would defeat the purpose of the exception to interpret it as encompassing an offense that is inherently more serious than simple possession, such as distributing, manufacturing, transporting, or being under the influence of marijuana, or possessing marijuana in a prison or near a school. See Matter of Moncada, 24 I&N Dec. 62; see also Matter of Martinez Espinoza, 25 I&N Dec. at 125.

3 一项犯罪不能“涉及”为个人使用数量的简单持有大麻，除非它与该行为具有直接关系。此外，若将该例外解释为涵盖本质上比简单持有更为严重的犯罪，例如分销、制造、运输大麻，或受大麻影响，或在监狱内或学校附近持有大麻，则将违背该例外的目的。见 Matter of Moncada, 24 I&N Dec. 62；另见 Matter of Martinez Espinoza, 25 I&N Dec. at 125。

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offender’s simple possession or ingestion of 30 grams or less of marijuana. We can conceive of no reason why Congress would except an alien from deportability for actually possessing a small amount of marijuana for personal use, yet deny such leniency simply because, for example, the marijuana was found in a baggie.

违法者的简单持有或吸食30克或以下大麻。我们无法设想国会为何会因实际为个人使用而持有少量大麻而将该外国人排除于驱逐出境之外，却仅因例如大麻被发现于一个塑料袋中而拒绝给予此种宽宥。

The possession of drug paraphernalia would not “involve” simple marijuanapossession,however,if theparaphernaliainquestionwasassociated with the manufacture, smuggling, or distribution of marijuana or with the possession of a drug other than marijuana. Because the term “drug paraphernalia” covers a broad range of objects, many of which have no relationship to simple drug possession, the inquiry will necessarily be fact intensive. An alien who possessed a marijuana pipe or rolling papers may be covered bythe exception; an alien who possessed a drug scale or a hypodermic syringe would not.

然而，如果所涉吸毒用具与制造、走私或分销大麻有关，或与持有大麻以外的毒品有关，则持有吸毒用具不会“涉及”简单持有大麻。由于“吸毒用具”一词涵盖范围广泛的物品，其中许多与简单持有毒品无关，因此该调查必然以事实为重点。持有大麻烟斗或卷烟纸的外国人可能属于该例外的涵盖范围；持有毒品秤或皮下注射针头的外国人则不属于。

Applying the foregoing standards to the present facts, we find no error in the Immigration Judge’s determination that the respondent is covered by the section 237(a)(2)(B)(i) exception. Looking to the respondent’s plea colloquy transcript, the Immigration Judge found that the respondent’s two offenses of conviction were committed simultaneously, that they involved the simple possession of less than 10 grams of marijuana, and that the drug paraphernalia the respondent possessed was a plastic baggie in which the marijuana was contained. Those facts describe a “single offense involving possession for one’s own use of thirty grams or less of marijuana.” Section 237(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act.

将上述标准适用于本案事实，我们认定移民法官关于答辩人属于第237(a)(2)(B)(i)条例外涵盖范围的裁定并无错误。移民法官查阅了答辩人的认罪问答笔录，认定答辩人的两项定罪罪行系同时实施，涉及简单持有少于10克的大麻，且答辩人所持有的吸毒用具是盛装大麻的塑料袋。这些事实描述的是“一项涉及为个人使用而持有三十克或以下大麻的单一罪行”。该法第237(a)(2)(B)(i)条。

The DHS argues that the respondent’s conviction record contains no clear judicial finding that the respondent possessed the marijuana for personal use, therebyleavingopenthepossibilitythatthebaggieof marijuanawaspossessed for the purpose of sale. We find that argument unpersuasive. The relevant question in a Joseph hearing is whether the DHS is substantially unlikely to prove a charge that would justify mandatory detention. Matter of Joseph, 22 I&N Dec. at 800. To prove a charge under section 237(a)(2)(B)(i), the DHS bears the burden of proving that the respondent’s conviction does not fall within the “possession for personal use” exception. See Matter of Moncada, 24 I&N Dec. 62, 67 n.5 (BIA 2007). It cannot meet that burden unless the record establishes that the respondent possessed marijuana for some reason other than personal use; an inconclusive record is not sufficient.

国土安全部（DHS）主张，答辩人的定罪记录中并无明确的司法认定表明答辩人持有大麻系为个人使用，从而留有该袋大麻系为出售目的而持有的可能性。我们认定该主张不具说服力。Joseph听证中的相关问题是，DHS是否实质上不可能证明一项足以支持强制拘留的指控。Matter of Joseph, 22 I&N Dec. at 800。为证明第237(a)(2)(B)(i)条下的指控，DHS负有举证责任，证明答辩人的定罪不属于“为个人使用而持有”的例外。见 Matter of Moncada, 24 I&N Dec. 62, 67 n.5 (BIA 2007)。除非记录证明答辩人持有大麻系出于个人使用以外的某种原因，否则DHS无法履行该举证责任；无定论的记录并不充分。

In this instance, the Immigration Judge issued his bond order after he had alreadyconsideredtheentiretyof the DHS’s evidence at a removal hearingand dismissed the section 237(a)(2)(B)(i) charge on the merits. This is therefore not a case where the Immigration Judge was obliged to assess the DHS’s likelihood of success on the basis of an incomplete record. See Matter of Joseph, 22 I&N Dec. at 806-07 (noting that when the propriety of mandatory

在本案中，移民法官是在驱逐听证中已审议DHS的全部证据并基于实体理由驳回了第237(a)(2)(B)(i)条指控之后，才签发其保释令的。因此，本案并非移民法官必须基于不完整记录评估DHS胜诉可能性的案件。见 Matter of Joseph, 22 I&N Dec. at 806-07（指出当强制

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Cite as 26 I&N Dec. 37 (BIA 2012) Interim Decision #3770

引用为 26 I&N Dec. 37 (BIA 2012) 临时决定第3770号

detention is being reviewed after a removal charge has been dismissed on the merits, the Immigration Judge is entitled to rely on that merits determination when assessing the DHS’s likelihood of success).

拘留的适当性是在驱逐指控已基于实体理由被驳回后接受审查时，移民法官在评估DHS胜诉可能性时有权依据该实体裁定）。

In light of the foregoing, we see no basis to disturb the Immigration Judge’s determination that the DHS is substantially unlikely to prove the respondent’s deportability under section 237(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act. Thus, the Immigration Judge properly exercised jurisdiction over the respondent’s request for a change in his custody status. Furthermore, the DHS does not challengetheImmigrationJudge’sconclusionthata$2,000bondisreasonably calculated to ensure the respondent’s appearance for future hearings. Accordingly, the DHS’s appeal will be dismissed.

鉴于上述情况，我们认为没有依据推翻移民法官关于DHS实质上不可能证明答辩人依该法第237(a)(2)(B)(i)条可被驱逐出境的裁定。因此，移民法官对答辩人请求变更其羁押状态恰当地行使了管辖权。此外，DHS并未质疑移民法官关于2,000美元保释金经合理计算足以确保答辩人出席未来听证的结论。据此，DHS的上诉将被驳回。

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