Matter of Delcarmen-Lara

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 830 (BIA 2026) Interim Decision #4233

引用为 29 I&N Dec. 830 (BIA 2026) 临时决定 #4233

Decided August 13, 2026

2026年8月13日决定

U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals

美国司法部 移民审查执行办公室 移民上诉委员会

A departure from the United States pursuant to a grant of advance parole is a “departure” within the meaning of section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II). Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly, 25 I&N Dec. 771 (BIA 2012), overruled.

根据提前假释批准而离开美国，属于《移民与国籍法》第212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)条、8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)所指的“离开”。Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly, 25 I&N Dec. 771 (BIA 2012)，被推翻。

FOR THE RESPONDENT: Idalis Perez, Esquire, Miami, Florida

代表被申请人：Idalis Perez，律师，佛罗里达州迈阿密

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Milor D. Perdomo, Counsel

代表国土安全部：Milor D. Perdomo，律师

BEFORE: Board Panel: GORMAN, Deputy Chief Appellate Immigration Judge; MONTANTE and GALLOW, Appellate Immigration Judges.

审理：委员会合议庭：GORMAN，副首席上诉移民法官；MONTANTE 和 GALLOW，上诉移民法官。

GORMAN, Deputy Chief Appellate Immigration Judge:

GORMAN，副首席上诉移民法官：

The respondent has filed a motion to reopen proceedings to pursue adjustment of status under section 245(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2024). In support of the motion, the respondent submitted evidence that she was paroled into the United States on January 1, 2024, pursuant to a grant of advance parole. In denying the respondent’s motion, we overrule Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly, 25 I&N Dec. 771 (BIA 2012), which held that an alien who leaves the United States temporarily pursuant to a grant of advance parole does not thereby make a “departure . . . from the United States” within the meaning of section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) (2024). We now clarify that the term “departure” under this section of the INA does not include an exception for aliens who leave the country temporarily under a grant of advance parole.

被申请人提交了一份重新开放程序的动议，以寻求根据《移民与国籍法》（“INA”）第245(a)条、8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2024) 调整身份。为支持该动议，被申请人提交了证据，证明她于2024年1月1日根据提前假释批准被假释进入美国。在驳回被申请人的动议时，我们推翻了 Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly, 25 I&N Dec. 771 (BIA 2012)，该案裁定，根据提前假释批准临时离开美国的外国人，不因此构成INA第212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)条、8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) (2024)所指的“离开……美国”。我们现在澄清，INA该条中的“离开”一词不包括对根据提前假释批准临时离开该国的外国人的例外。

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

一、事实和程序背景

The respondent is a native and citizen of El Salvador. In a decision dated December 7, 2006, an Immigration Judge found the respondent removable as charged under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (2006), determined that she was ineligible for Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”), and ordered her removed from the United States. The Board affirmed the Immigration Judge’s decision on June 17, 2008. In

被申请人是萨尔瓦多国民和公民。在2006年12月7日的决定中，一名移民法官认定被申请人根据INA第212(a)(6)(A)(i)条、8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (2006)的指控可被驱逐，裁定她不符合临时保护身份（“TPS”）资格，并命令将她驱逐出美国。委员会于2008年6月17日维持了移民法官的决定。在

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2013, the respondent was granted Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”).

2013年，被申请人获得了童年抵美者暂缓行动（“DACA”）。

On June 30, 2015, the respondent filed a motion to reopen proceedings because she sought to submit an Application for Provisional Unlawful Presence Waiver (Form I-601A) in order to waive her inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B), and obtain an immigrant visa through consular processing. With this motion, she submitted evidence that her husband filed a Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130) on her behalf and that United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) approved the petition on July 9, 2014. The Board denied the motion on August 6, 2015, because it was untimely and the respondent was ineligible for the waiver as a result of her final order of removal.

2015年6月30日，被申请人提交了一份重新开放程序的动议，因为她寻求提交临时非法居留豁免申请（表格I-601A），以豁免其在INA第212(a)(9)(B)条、8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)下的不可入境性，并通过领事处理获得移民签证。随该动议，她提交了证据，证明其丈夫代表她提交了外籍亲属申请（表格I-130），且美国公民及移民服务局（“USCIS”）于2014年7月9日批准了该申请。委员会于2015年8月6日驳回了该动议，因为该动议不及时，且由于被申请人的最终驱逐令，她不符合豁免资格。

On May 27, 2025, the respondent filed a second motion to reopen proceedings to pursue adjustment of status under section 245(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a), based on the approved visa petition filed on her behalf by her husband. In support of the motion, the respondent provided documentation that shows she temporarily departed the United States and was paroled back into the country on January 1, 2024, pursuant to a grant of advance parole.

2025年5月27日，被申请人提交了第二份重新开放程序的动议，以寻求根据INA第245(a)条、8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)调整身份，依据是其丈夫代表她提交的已批准签证申请。为支持该动议，被申请人提供了文件，显示她临时离开美国，并于2024年1月1日根据提前假释批准被假释回该国。

We requested and received supplemental briefing from the parties on the issue of whether the Board should reconsider its interpretation of the term “departure” within the meaning of section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), as articulated in Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly, as well as whether an alien who leaves the United States temporarily pursuant to a grant of advance parole makes such a “departure.”

我们要求并收到了双方关于以下问题的补充简报：委员会是否应重新考虑其在 Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly 中阐述的对INA第212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)条、8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)中“离开”一词的解释，以及根据提前假释批准临时离开美国的外国人是否构成此种“离开”。

II. ANALYSIS

二、分析

A. Inadmissibility Under Section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the INA

A. INA第212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)条下的不可入境性

The INA provides that an alien who “has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien’s departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.” INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II). The INA requires an applicant for adjustment of status to prove that he or she is “admissible to the United States for permanent residence.” INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a).

INA规定，外国人“在美国非法居留一年或以上，且在该外国人离开或驱逐出美国之日起10年内再次寻求入境的，不可入境。”INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)。INA要求调整身份申请人证明其“可入境美国永久居留”。INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)。

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In Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly, 25 I&N Dec. at 779, we held in a split decision that an alien who temporarily leaves the United States pursuant to a grant of advance parole does not make a “departure” under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II). We reasoned that an alien’s departure under a grant of advance parole is “qualitatively different from other departures, because it presupposes both that he [or she] will be permitted to return to the United States thereafter and that he [or she] will, upon return, continue to pursue the adjustment of status application he [or she] filed before departing.” Id. at 778.

在 Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly, 25 I&N Dec. at 779 中，我们以分歧决定裁定，根据提前假释批准临时离开美国的外国人，不构成INA第212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)条、8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)下的“离开”。我们的理由是，外国人根据提前假释批准离开“与其他离开有质的不同，因为它既预设他[或她]此后将被允许返回美国，又预设他[或她]在返回后将继续寻求其在离开前提交的调整身份申请。”Id. at 778。

This decision sought to clarify prior Board precedent. In Matter of Lemus, 24 I&N Dec. 373 (BIA 2007) (“Lemus I”), we held that an alien is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(B)(i)(II), even if the alien’s departure was not made pursuant to an order of removal and was not a voluntary departure in lieu of being subject to removal proceedings or at the conclusion of removal proceedings. We examined the plain language of the statutory text to conclude that Congress did not intend to limit the definition of “departure” in this manner. Id. at 376–77. We reaffirmed this holding in Matter of Lemus, 25 I&N Dec. 734 (BIA 2012) (“Lemus II”).

该决定旨在澄清委员会先前的判例。在 Matter of Lemus, 24 I&N Dec. 373 (BIA 2007)（“Lemus I”）中，我们裁定，外国人根据INA第212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)条、8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(B)(i)(II)不可入境，即使该外国人的离开并非根据驱逐令作出，也不是替代接受驱逐程序或驱逐程序结束时自愿离开。我们审查了法定文本的平实语言，得出结论认为国会无意以此种方式限制“离开”的定义。Id. at 376–77。我们在 Matter of Lemus, 25 I&N Dec. 734 (BIA 2012)（“Lemus II”）中重申了这一裁定。

The issue before us—the meaning of “departure” under the INA—is a matter of statutory construction. See, e.g., Lemus II, 25 I&N Dec. at 740. Based on our interpretation of the plain statutory language, we now conclude that a departure from the United States pursuant to a grant of advance parole is a “departure” within the meaning of section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II). We will overrule Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly.

我们面前的问题——INA下“离开”的含义——是一个法律解释问题。See, e.g., Lemus II, 25 I&N Dec. at 740。基于我们对平实法定语言的理解，我们现在得出结论，根据提前假释批准离开美国，属于INA第212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)条、8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)所指的“离开”。我们将推翻 Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly。

To determine whether an alien has effected a “departure” under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), we begin by assessing the plain language of the statute. Lamie v. United States Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004). We presume that Congress “says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.” Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992). Adjudicators must adhere to the unambiguous meaning of statutory language, unless doing so would lead to an absurd or bizarre result that is “demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.” Matter of Forjoe, 29 I&N Dec. 463, 467 (BIA 2026) (quoting Matter of Briones, 24 I&N Dec. 355, 361 (BIA 2007)).

为确定外国人是否构成INA第212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)条、8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)下的“离开”，我们首先评估法规的平实语言。Lamie v. United States Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004)。我们推定国会“在法规中表达其意，并在法规中表达其言”。Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992)。裁决者必须遵守法定语言明确无误的含义，除非这样做会导致荒谬或怪异的结果，且该结果“明显与起草者的意图相悖”。Matter of Forjoe, 29 I&N Dec. 463, 467 (BIA 2026)（引用 Matter of Briones, 24 I&N Dec. 355, 361 (BIA 2007)）。

In examining the plain meaning of the statutory text, we find insufficient evidence that Congress intended to limit the definition of the word “departure.” Neither “depart” nor “departure” is defined in the INA. Matter

在审查法定文本的平实含义时，我们认定没有足够证据表明国会意图限制“离开”一词的定义。INA中既未定义“离开”也未定义“departure”。Matter

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of Arrabally and Yerrabelly, 25 I&N Dec. at 774. To ascertain the ordinary meaning of an undefined statute, adjudicators may consult dictionary definitions for guidance. United States v. Lopez, 590 F.3d 1238, 1248 (11th Cir. 2009). We observe, as we did at the time we issued Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly, that “depart” is defined as “to go away: leave.” Depart, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/depart (last visited Aug. 13, 2026). The statutory text does not contain limiting language that exempts certain departures from this definition.

of Arrabally and Yerrabelly, 25 I&N Dec. at 774。为确定未定义法规的通常含义，裁决者可参考词典定义作为指导。United States v. Lopez, 590 F.3d 1238, 1248 (11th Cir. 2009)。我们注意到，正如我们在发布 Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly 时所指出的，“depart”被定义为“to go away: leave”。Depart, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/depart（最后访问于2026年8月13日）。法定文本不包含将某些离开排除在此定义之外的限制性语言。

The legislative history also lacks any indication that Congress intended to exclude departures pursuant to advance parole from the meaning of “departure.” See Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly, 25 I&N Dec. at 776 (noting that the legislative history of section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), is “rather sparse”). The pertinent statutory text was enacted pursuant to section 301(b) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C of Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-575 (effective Apr. 1, 1997) (“IIRIRA”). We have noted that “[t]he unifying theme of section 212(a)(9) is that all its subparagraphs seek to compound the adverse consequences of immigration violations by making it more difficult for individuals who have left the United States after committing such violations to be lawfully readmitted thereafter.” Matter of Rodarte, 23 I&N Dec. 905, 909 (BIA 2006). Although Congress granted the Attorney General of the United States discretion to waive inadmissibility in certain circumstances under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v), there is insufficient evidence that Congress sought to exempt departures pursuant to advance parole from the definition of “departure.” See Cheruku v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 662 F.3d 198, 207 (3d Cir. 2011) (acknowledging that such departures may lead to “a harsh result”).

立法历史也没有任何迹象表明国会意图将根据提前假释的离开排除在“离开”的含义之外。See Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly, 25 I&N Dec. at 776（指出INA第212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)条、8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)的立法历史“相当稀少”）。相关法定文本是根据《1996年非法移民改革和移民责任法》第301(b)条、Pub. L. No. 104-208 分部C、110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-575（1997年4月1日生效）（“IIRIRA”）颁布的。我们曾指出，“第212(a)(9)条的统一主题是，其所有各项都试图通过使在实施此类违法行为后离开美国的人员更难在此后合法重新入境，来加重移民违法行为的 adverse 后果。”Matter of Rodarte, 23 I&N Dec. 905, 909 (BIA 2006)。尽管国会授予美国司法部长在INA第212(a)(9)(B)(v)条、8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v)下于某些情况下豁免不可入境性的自由裁量权，但没有足够证据表明国会试图将根据提前假释的离开排除在“离开”的定义之外。See Cheruku v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 662 F.3d 198, 207 (3d Cir. 2011)（承认此类离开可能导致“严厉的结果”）。

As we previously recognized in Lemus I, “in every case where Congress has extended eligibility for adjustment of status to inadmissible aliens, it has done so unambiguously.” Lemus I, 24 I&N Dec. at 378. For example, Congress expressly created a waiver of the inadmissibility grounds in section 212(a)(9)(B) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B), for aliens seeking adjustment of status under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 105-100, 111 Stat. 2193 (“NACARA”), as amended by Pub. L. No. 105-139, 111 Stat. 2644 (1997), and the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998, tit. IX, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-538 (“HRIFA”). See id. Congress’s express provision of waivers of inadmissibility for NACARA and HRIFA adjustment applicants supports a conclusion that Congress did not intend a “departure” under section

正如我们先前在 Lemus I 中所承认的，“在国会将调整身份的资格扩展至不可入境外国人的每一个案件中，它都明确无误地这样做了。”Lemus I, 24 I&N Dec. at 378。例如，国会明确为根据《尼加拉瓜调整和中美洲救济法》、Pub. L. No. 105-100, 111 Stat. 2193（“NACARA”）（经 Pub. L. No. 105-139, 111 Stat. 2644 (1997) 修订）和《1998年海地难民移民公平法》、tit. IX, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-538（“HRIFA”）寻求调整身份的外国人，创设了INA第212(a)(9)(B)条、8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)中不可入境理由的豁免。See id。国会为NACARA和HRIFA调整申请人明确提供不可入境性豁免，支持以下结论：国会不打算将第

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212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), to exclude advance parolees. Id.; see also Matter of Briones, 24 I&N Dec. at 367–68.

《移民与国籍法》第212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)条，8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)，以排除提前离境许可人。Id.；另见Matter of Briones，24 I&N Dec. at 367–68。

We also deem it significant that Congress has clarified the consequences of departures for advance parolees in portions of the INA outside section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II). See, e.g., INA § 201(c)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(c)(4)(A) (2024) (specifying that numerical limitations for family-sponsored immigrants include aliens who were paroled into the United States “who did not depart from the United States (without advance parole) within 365 days” or meet certain other conditions); INA § 245A(g)(2)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(g)(2)(B)(ii) (2024) (providing that periods outside the United States pursuant to advance parole procedures shall not be considered as a period outside the country for purposes of continuous physical presence required for legalization). “[Where] Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (citation omitted).

我们还认为具有重要意义的是，国会在《移民与国籍法》第212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)条，8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)之外的《移民与国籍法》部分中，已澄清了提前离境许可人离境后果。见，例如，《移民与国籍法》第201(c)(4)(A)条，8 U.S.C. § 1151(c)(4)(A) (2024)（规定亲属移民的数额限制包括被假释进入美国的外国人，“该外国人未在365天内（未经提前离境许可）离开美国”或满足某些其他条件）；《移民与国籍法》第245A(g)(2)(B)(ii)条，8 U.S.C. § 1255a(g)(2)(B)(ii) (2024)（规定根据提前离境许可程序在美国境外的时间，就合法化所需的连续实际居住而言，不应被视为在国外的时间）。“[当]国会在一部法律的某一条款中列入特定语言，但在同一法律的另一条款中省略该语言时，通常推定国会在此种不同的列入或省略中是故意和有目的地行事。”Russello v. United States，464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)（引注省略）。

Congress has also clarified the effects of brief departures in other portions of the INA where these departures may have adverse consequences. See INA § 240A(d)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(2) (2024) (providing that a departure from the United States “for any period in excess of 90 days or for any periods in the aggregate exceeding 180 days” will trigger a finding that an alien has failed to maintain continuous physical presence in the United States for certain cancellation of removal applicants); see also INA § 244(c)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(4) (2024) (stating that continuous physical presence in the United States for aliens eligible for TPS will not be affected by “brief, casual, and innocent” absences). We presume that Congress acted intentionally in treating departures pursuant to advance parole differently throughout the INA. It is therefore important that Congress did not explicitly exempt advance parolees from the definition of “departure” in section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II).

国会还在《移民与国籍法》的其他部分澄清了短暂离境的影响，在这些部分中，这些离境可能产生不利后果。见《移民与国籍法》第240A(d)(2)条，8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(2) (2024)（规定离开美国“超过90天的任何期间或累计超过180天的任何期间”将触发认定某些取消递解出境申请人未能保持在美国的连续实际居住）；另见《移民与国籍法》第244(c)(4)条，8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(4) (2024)（规定有资格获得临时保护身份的外国人在美国的连续实际居住不受“短暂、随意和无辜”缺席的影响）。我们推定国会在整个《移民与国籍法》中以不同方式对待根据提前离境许可的离境是有意为之。因此，重要的是，国会没有在《移民与国籍法》第212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)条，8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)中明确将提前离境许可人排除在“离境”定义之外。

Prior to Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly, it was widely recognized that a departure pursuant to advance parole may have significant, adverse consequences. Between the enactment of IIRIRA and the issuance of Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly, internal policy memoranda of DHS and the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) interpreted a departure under a grant of advance parole as a “departure” within the meaning of section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II). See Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly, 25 I&N Dec.

在Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly之前，普遍认为根据提前离境许可的离境可能产生重大不利后果。在IIRIRA颁布至Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly发布期间，国土安全部和前移民归化局（“INS”）的内部政策备忘录将根据提前离境许可批准的离境解释为《移民与国籍法》第212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)条，8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)含义内的“离境”。见Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly，25 I&N Dec.

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at 781–82 (Pauley, dissenting). Documents authorizing advance parole also explicitly warned that parolees may be deemed inadmissible and ineligible for adjustment of status without a valid waiver. See Cheruku, 662 F.3d at 208 (discussing advance parole warnings); see also Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly, 25 I&N Dec. at 779 n.7 (same). This evidence further supports a conclusion that the Board impermissibly construed the definition of “departure” under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), to include an exception for aliens who left the country pursuant to a grant of advance parole.

at 781–82 (Pauley, dissenting)。授权提前离境许可的文件也明确警告，假释者可能被认定不可入境且无有效豁免则无资格调整身份。见Cheruku，662 F.3d at 208（讨论提前离境许可警告）；另见Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly，25 I&N Dec. at 779 n.7（同上）。这一证据进一步支持以下结论：委员会将《移民与国籍法》第212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)条，8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)下的“离境”定义解释为包括对根据提前离境许可批准而离开该国的外国人的例外，是不允许的。

The respondent has not identified, and we do not discern, evidence that another interpretation of “departure” is merited to avoid absurd or bizarre consequences in the case of an alien who has been granted advance parole. This Board previously expressed concern that an expansive definition of “departure” may include departures that occur by accident, deception, threat, or violence. Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly, 25 I&N Dec. at 775. We emphasize that our holding applies to aliens who become inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), after a temporary trip abroad undertaken pursuant to a grant of advance parole. Our decision does not consider these additional scenarios contemplated in Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly, which are beyond the scope of this matter. In the absence of demonstrated absurd or bizarre consequences for advance parolees, we are not permitted to reject the plain language of the statutory text. See generally Jian Le Lin v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 681 F.3d 1236, 1240 (11th Cir. 2012).

被申请人未指出，我们也未发现，有证据表明对于已获提前离境许可的外国人，为避免荒谬或怪异后果而需要另一种“离境”解释。委员会此前曾担心，“离境”的宽泛定义可能包括因事故、欺骗、威胁或暴力而发生的离境。Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly，25 I&N Dec. at 775。我们强调，我们的裁定适用于根据提前离境许可批准进行临时海外旅行后，根据《移民与国籍法》第212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)条，8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)变得不可入境的外国人。我们的决定不考虑Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly中设想的这些额外情形，这些情形超出本事项的范围。在没有证明对提前离境许可人产生荒谬或怪异后果的情况下，我们不允许拒绝法律文本的平实语言。一般见Jian Le Lin v. U.S. Att’y Gen.，681 F.3d 1236, 1240 (11th Cir. 2012)。

We now clarify that the term “departure,” as provided in section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), does not include an exception for aliens who leave the country temporarily under a grant of advance parole. This holding comports with the natural meaning of “departure,” as well as the Government’s longstanding interpretation of the term prior to Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly. Accordingly, Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly is overruled.1

我们现在澄清，《移民与国籍法》第212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)条，8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)中规定的“离境”一词，不包括对根据提前离境许可批准临时离开该国的外国人的例外。这一裁定符合“离境”的自然含义，也符合政府在Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly之前对该术语的长期解释。因此，Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly被推翻。1

1 We recognize that the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the controlling jurisdiction in this case, has applied the then-definition of “departure” as articulated in Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly. See Ortiz-Bouchet v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 714 F.3d 1353, 1357 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). We do not construe the language in Ortiz-Bouchet to preclude the Board from revisiting the definition of “departure” under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II).

1 我们认识到，美国第十一巡回上诉法院作为本案的管辖法院，已适用Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly中阐述的当时“离境”定义。见Ortiz-Bouchet v. U.S. Att’y Gen.，714 F.3d 1353, 1357 (11th Cir. 2013)（per curiam）。我们不将Ortiz-Bouchet中的语言解释为阻止委员会重新审视《移民与国籍法》第212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)条，8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)下的“离境”定义。

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B. Retroactivity

B. 溯及力

We must undertake a retroactivity analysis because we are explicitly overruling Board precedent. Matter of Forjoe, 29 I&N Dec. at 472. The test for retroactivity requires the Board to consider the following factors:

我们必须进行溯及力分析，因为我们明确推翻了委员会先例。Matter of Forjoe，29 I&N Dec. at 472。溯及力检验要求委员会考虑以下因素：

(1) whether the particular case is one of first impression, (2) whether the new rule represents an abrupt departure from well established practice or merely attempts to fill a void in an unsettled area of law, (3) the extent to which the party against whom the new rule is applied relied on the former rule, (4) the degree of the burden which a retroactive order imposes on a party, and (5) the statutory interest in applying a new rule despite the reliance of a party on the old standard.

(1) 特定案件是否为初次印象案件，(2) 新规则是否代表对既定实践的突然偏离，或仅试图填补未确定法律领域的空白，(3) 新规则适用对象对前规则的依赖程度，(4) 溯及性命令对一方施加的负担程度，以及(5) 尽管一方依赖旧标准，适用新规则的法定利益。

Matter of Cordero-Garcia, 27 I&N Dec. 652, 658 (BIA 2019) (citation omitted). This case is not one of first impression. However, we determine that the first three factors in the test articulated above support applying our holding prospectively because we are explicitly overruling Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly, a longstanding Board precedent.

Matter of Cordero-Garcia，27 I&N Dec. 652, 658 (BIA 2019)（引注省略）。本案并非初次印象案件。然而，我们认定上述检验中的前三个因素支持前瞻性适用我们的裁定，因为我们明确推翻了Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly这一长期存在的委员会先例。

Regarding the fourth factor in the retroactivity test, we note that our holding will constitute a significant change with respect to the meaning of “departure” under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), as well as eligibility for adjustment of status under section 245(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). We also conclude that the Board’s interest in applying the newly articulated rule does not outweigh past expectations based on the prior rule.

关于溯及力检验中的第四个因素，我们注意到，我们的裁定将对《移民与国籍法》第212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)条，8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)下“离境”的含义，以及《移民与国籍法》第245(a)条，8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)下调整身份的资格构成重大变化。我们还认定，委员会适用新阐述规则的利益不超过基于先前规则的过去期望。

In consideration of the foregoing, we will apply this new holding prospectively. As our holding is prospective, we will not determine whether the respondent’s temporary trip constitutes a “departure” within the meaning of section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), which would render her inadmissible and ineligible for adjustment of status. Instead, we must address the respondent’s motion to reopen proceedings to apply for adjustment of status pursuant to the parties’ remaining arguments.

鉴于上述考虑，我们将前瞻性适用这一新裁定。由于我们的裁定具有前瞻性，我们不会确定被申请人的临时旅行是否构成《移民与国籍法》第212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)条，8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)含义内的“离境”，从而使其不可入境且无资格调整身份。相反，我们必须根据双方剩余论点处理被申请人重新开放程序以申请调整身份的动议。

C. Motion to Reopen

C. 重新开放动议

We will deny the respondent’s motion to reopen. Generally, an alien may file one motion to reopen, no later than 90 days after the entry of the final administrative order. INA § 240(c)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) (2024); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2026). The respondent’s May 27, 2025, motion to reopen was filed more than 16 years after we entered the final administrative order in this case on June 17, 2008. Therefore, her motion is untimely. The respondent’s motion is also number barred because it is her second motion

我们将驳回被申请人的重新开放动议。一般而言，外国人可以在最终行政命令作出后90天内提交一份重新开放动议。《移民与国籍法》第240(c)(7)条，8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) (2024)；8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2026)。被申请人于2025年5月27日提交的重新开放动议，是在我们于2008年6月17日作出本案最终行政命令后超过16年才提交的。因此，其动议不及时。被申请人的动议也因数量限制而被禁止，因为这是其第二次动议

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to reopen these proceedings. The respondent has not shown that her motion falls within any exception to the motion to reopen time and number limitations enumerated in the section 240(c)(7)(C) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C), or 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3) (2026).

重新开放这些程序。被申请人未证明其动议属于《移民与国籍法》第240(c)(7)(C)条，8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)或8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3) (2026)所列重新开放动议时间和数量限制的任何例外。

The respondent’s circumstances also do not present an exceptional situation that warrants the exercise of our sua sponte reopening authority in these proceedings. See Matter of G-D-, 22 I&N Dec. 1132, 1133–34 (BIA 1999) (stating that generally “we invoke our sua sponte authority sparingly”); see also Matter of J-J-, 21 I&N Dec. 976, 984 (BIA 1997) (recognizing that the power to sua sponte reopen proceedings is limited to exceptional situations and is not meant to cure filing defects or “to otherwise circumvent the regulations, where enforcing them might result in hardship”). Becoming potentially eligible for relief from removal years after a final administrative removal order does not, in itself, constitute an exceptional situation. See Matter of Yauri, 25 I&N Dec. 103, 105 (BIA 2009) (indicating that becoming potentially eligible for adjustment of status is generally not a basis for granting an untimely motion to reopen); see also Matter of H-Y-Z-, 28 I&N Dec. 156, 161 (BIA 2020) (recognizing that equities acquired while remaining unlawfully in the United States after being ordered removed generally do not warrant discretionary reopening). In sum, we will deny the respondent’s untimely and number-barred motion to reopen these proceedings.2

被申请人的情况也不构成需要我们在这些程序中行使自行重新开放权力的特殊情形。见Matter of G-D-，22 I&N Dec. 1132, 1133–34 (BIA 1999)（指出一般而言“我们谨慎行使自行权力”）；另见Matter of J-J-，21 I&N Dec. 976, 984 (BIA 1997)（承认自行重新开放程序的权力仅限于特殊情形，并非旨在纠正提交缺陷或“在其他方面规避法规，而执行法规可能导致困难”）。在最终行政递解出境令多年后变得可能获得免于递解出境的救济，本身并不构成特殊情形。见Matter of Yauri，25 I&N Dec. 103, 105 (BIA 2009)（指出变得可能符合调整身份资格通常不是批准不及时重新开放动议的依据）；另见Matter of H-Y-Z-，28 I&N Dec. 156, 161 (BIA 2020)（承认在被命令递解出境后非法留在美国期间获得的衡平因素通常不值得酌情重新开放）。总之，我们将驳回被申请人不及时且受数量限制的重新开放这些程序的动议。2

III. CONCLUSION

III. 结论

Based on the foregoing, the respondent has not shown that reopening of proceedings is warranted. We overrule the holding in Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly, 25 I&N Dec. at 779, that an alien who leaves the United States temporarily pursuant to a grant of advance parole does not thereby make a “departure . . . from the United States” within the meaning of section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II). We also clarify that an alien may become inadmissible under this section of the INA by virtue of a trip abroad undertaken pursuant to a grant of advance parole.

基于上述，被申请人未能证明有理由重新开启程序。我们推翻Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly, 25 I&N Dec. at 779一案中的裁定，即外国人依据提前假释的批准临时离开美国，并不因此构成《移民与国籍法》第212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)条、8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)所指的“离开……美国”。我们还澄清，外国人可以因依据提前假释的批准而进行的出国旅行，依据《移民与国籍法》该条而成为不可入境。

2 Because the foregoing issues are dispositive of the respondent’s motion to reopen, we will not address the parties’ additional arguments. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (per curiam) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).

2 由于上述问题对被申请人的重新开启动议具有决定性，我们将不处理双方的额外论点。见INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976)（per curiam）（“作为一般规则，法院和机构无需对其决定对所得结果并非必要的问题作出认定。”）。

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order, to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents necessary to depart the United States, or to present himself or herself at the time and place required for removal by DHS, or conspires to or takes any action designed to prevent or hamper the respondent’s departure pursuant to the order of removal, the respondent shall be subject to a civil monetary penalty of up to $998 for each day the respondent is in violation. See section 274D of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1324d (2024); 8 C.F.R. § 280.53(b)(14) (2026). Further, any respondent that has been denied admission to, removed from, or has departed the United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or removal is outstanding and thereafter enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in the United States shall be fined or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both. See INA § 276(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2024).

命令离开美国，为离开美国所需的旅行或其他文件及时善意提出申请，或在DHS要求的驱逐时间和地点到场，或共谋或采取任何旨在阻止或妨碍被申请人依据驱逐令离开美国的行动，则被申请人应就违反规定的每一天受到最高998美元的民事罚款。见《移民与国籍法》第274D条，8 U.S.C. § 1324d (2024)；8 C.F.R. § 280.53(b)(14) (2026)。此外，任何在排除、驱逐出境或驱逐令未决期间被拒绝入境、被驱逐或已离开美国，此后又进入、试图进入或任何时候被发现身处美国的被申请人，应被处以罚款或不超过2年的监禁，或两者并罚。见《移民与国籍法》第276(a)条，8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2024)。

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