Matter of Roldan-Santoyo

Decided March 3, 1999

1999年3月3日决定

U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals

美国司法部 移民审查执行办公室 移民上诉委员会

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We have jurisdiction over this timely appeal pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b) (1998). The request for oral argument before this Board is denied. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(e). In an oral decision dated April 27, 1995, the Immigration Judge found the respondent deportable under section 241(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(B)(i) (1994), 1 based on his conviction for a controlled substance violation. 1 Additionally, the Immigration Judge determined that the respondent was ineligible to apply for relief from deportation under section 212(c) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994), because he had not demonstrated lawful unrelinquished domicile of 7 consecutive years. On appeal the respondent contests his deportability and, alternatively, his ineligibility for section 212(c) relief. During the pendency of this appeal there have been significant changes in the law regarding both what constitutes a conviction for immigration pur- poses, and the availability of a section 212(c) waiver for aliens convicted of controlled substance violations. We will separately address these changes below and will dismiss the appeal.

我们根据8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b)（1998）对本及时上诉拥有管辖权。向本委员会提出的口头辩论请求被驳回。8 C.F.R. § 3.1(e)。在1995年4月27日的口头决定中，移民法官认定被申请人根据《移民与国籍法》第241(a)(2)(B)(i)条，8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(B)(i)（1994），1 因其受管制物质违规定罪而可被驱逐。1 此外，移民法官认定被申请人无资格根据该法第212(c)条，8 U.S.C. § 1182(c)（1994）申请驱逐救济，因为他未证明连续7年的合法未放弃住所。在上诉中，被申请人对其可驱逐性提出异议，并备选地对其无资格获得第212(c)条救济提出异议。在本上诉审理期间，关于移民目的何为定罪以及受管制物质违规定罪外国人可获得第212(c)条豁免的法律发生了重大变化。我们将分别在下文讨论这些变化，并将驳回上诉。

The issue before us is whether the respondent, a first offender whose guilty plea was vacated and whose case was dismissed upon the termina- tion of his probation pursuant to an Idaho rehabilitative statute, remains convicted for immigration purposes in light of our decision in Matter of Manrique, 21 I&N Dec. 58 (BIA 1995), and the subsequent passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C of Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (enacted Sept. 30, 1996) (“IIRIRA”), in which Congress provided a statutory definition for the term “conviction” for immigration purposes. 2

我们面前的问题是，被申请人，一名初犯者，其认罪根据爱达荷州康复性法规在缓刑终止后被撤销且案件被驳回，鉴于我们在Matter of Manrique, 21 I&N Dec. 58 (BIA 1995)中的裁决以及随后通过的《1996年非法移民改革与移民责任法》，Pub. L. No. 104-208 C部分，110 Stat. 3009-546（1996年9月30日颁布）（“IIRIRA”），其中国会为移民目的的“定罪”一词提供了法定定义，2 是否在移民目的上仍被视为定罪。

On November 29, 1993, the 27-year-old respondent, a native and citi- zen of Mexico, pleaded guilty to possession of more than 3 ounces of a con-

1993年11月29日，27岁的被申请人，墨西哥本土公民，对持有超过3盎司的受

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trolled substance, marijuana, which was a felony violation of section 37- 2732(e) of the Idaho Code. On January 10, 1994, the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bannock, withheld adjudication of judgment, sentenced him to 3 years’ probation and imposed several monetary penalties. The terms of his probation included restrictions forbidding the respondent to use alcohol or to associate with any individuals not approved by the probation officer. The respondent was also subject to search of his residence, vehicles, and person at his probation offi- cer’s request. Finally, the court ordered that the respondent serve 90 days’ confinement at the discretion of the probation officer. Deportation proceed- ings based on this offense were commenced on March 28, 1994. While in deportation proceedings before the Immigration Court, the respondent filed a motion in the Idaho state court for early release from pro- bation and dismissal of the charge in accordance with the withheld judg- ment. On September 6, 1994, the respondent’s motion was granted. Subsequently, the court granted the respondent’s March 6, 1995, motion requesting that his guilty plea be vacated pursuant to section 19-2604(1) of the Idaho Code. 3 The respondent argued before the Immigration Judge that because the Idaho state court’s actions rendered him no longer convicted of the original charge, he was not deportable under section 241(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act. In his April 27, 1995, oral decision, the Immigration Judge found that all three prongs of the definition for conviction enunciated in Matter of Ozkok, 19 I&N Dec. 546 (BIA 1988), had been met and found the respon- dent deportable based on his original plea of guilt to a controlled substance violation notwithstanding the Idaho court’s subsequent action vacating that plea. This appeal followed.

管制物质大麻认罪，该行为构成违反《爱达荷州法典》第37-2732(e)条的重罪。1994年1月10日，爱达荷州第六司法区地方法院，班诺克县，暂缓判决，判处其3年缓刑并处以若干罚款。其缓刑条件包括禁止被申请人饮酒或与未经缓刑官批准的任何个人交往。被申请人还须应其缓刑官要求接受对其住所、车辆和人的搜查。最后，法院命令被申请人根据缓刑官的自由裁量服刑90天。基于该犯罪的驱逐程序于1994年3月28日开始。 在移民法院的驱逐程序中，被申请人向爱达荷州法院提出动议，要求根据暂缓判决提前解除缓刑并驳回指控。1994年9月6日，被申请人的动议获准。随后，法院批准了被申请人1995年3月6日的动议，要求根据《爱达荷州法典》第19-2604(1)条撤销其认罪。3 被申请人在移民法官面前辩称，由于爱达荷州法院的行为使其不再因原指控而被定罪，他不可根据该法第241(a)(2)(B)(i)条被驱逐。在其1995年4月27日的口头决定中，移民法官认定Matter of Ozkok, 19 I&N Dec. 546 (BIA 1988)中阐述的定罪定义的所有三个要件均已满足，并认定被申请人基于其对受管制物质违规的原始认罪可被驱逐，尽管爱达荷州法院随后撤销了该认罪。本上诉随之而来。

III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE DEFINITION OF “CONVICTION”FOR IMMIGRATION PURPOSES

III. 移民目的“定罪”定义的演变

Until Congress enacted section 322 of the IIRIRA, the definition of “conviction” for immigration purposes had been a fluid one. In the absence

在国会颁布IIRIRA第322条之前，移民目的的“定罪”定义一直是流动的。在缺乏

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of a statutory definition, this Board, with direction from the Supreme Court and the Attorney General, struggled for more than 50 years to reconcile its definition with the increasing numbers of state statutes providing ameliorative procedures affecting the “finality” of a conviction under state law. See, e.g., Pino v. Landon, 349 U.S. 901 (1955); Matter of Ozkok, supra; Matter of G-, 9 I&N Dec. 159 (BIA 1960; A.G. 1961); Matter of A-F-, 8 I&N Dec. 429 (BIA, A.G. 1959); Matter of L-R-, 8 I&N Dec. 269 (BIA 1959); Matter of O-, 7 I&N Dec. 539 (BIA 1957); Matter of F-, 1 I&N Dec. 343, 348 (BIA 1942). By the time of our decision in Matter of Ozkok, supra, we recognized that most states had adopted one or more methods of mitigating the conse- quences of a conviction, and that these methods differed from one another in name and breadth. 4 Some state statutes accord rehabilitative treatment only to first offenders and/or youth offenders and may further restrict such treatment to those individuals determined to be guilty of specified cate- gories of offenses. Others offer rehabilitative relief to any defendant who is able to successfully complete a probationary period, without restriction on the nature of the offense. These rehabilitative measures may be implement- ed either before or after an entry of judgment. For example, some state statutes provide for an initial adjudication of guilt upon a finding, admission, or noncontesting of guilt, but contain proce- dures variously termed as the setting aside, annulling, vacating, cancellation, or expungement of the original adjudication of guilt, which remove subse- quent state consequences for the misconduct upon satisfactory completion of a probationary period. There are also differences regarding whether or not such an erasure is “automatic” or must be applied for, with a grant being a matter of the court’s discretion. Among these state statutes there are further variances regarding the completeness of the erasure. Generally, the original judgment retains its vitality for at least some purpose, despite broad language in some ameliorative statutes suggesting otherwise. 5

法定定义的情况下，本委员会在最高法院和司法部长的指导下，50多年来一直努力将其定义与越来越多的规定改善程序的州法规相协调，这些程序影响州法下定罪的“终局性”。见，例如，Pino v. Landon, 349 U.S. 901 (1955)；Matter of Ozkok, supra；Matter of G-, 9 I&N Dec. 159 (BIA 1960; A.G. 1961)；Matter of A-F-, 8 I&N Dec. 429 (BIA, A.G. 1959)；Matter of L-R-, 8 I&N Dec. 269 (BIA 1959)；Matter of O-, 7 I&N Dec. 539 (BIA 1957)；Matter of F-, 1 I&N Dec. 343, 348 (BIA 1942)。 到我们在Matter of Ozkok, supra中作出裁决时，我们认识到大多数州已采用一种或多种减轻定罪后果的方法，且这些方法在名称和范围上各不相同。4 一些州法规仅对初犯者和/或青少年犯罪者给予康复待遇，并可能进一步将此类待遇限制在被认定犯有特定类别犯罪的个人。其他州则向任何能够成功完成缓刑期的被告提供康复救济，不限制犯罪性质。这些康复措施可在判决作出之前或之后实施。 例如，一些州法规规定在认定、承认或不抗辩有罪后作出初步有罪判决，但包含各种称为撤销、废止、取消、撤销或注销原 guilt 判决的程序，这些程序在令人满意地完成缓刑期后消除后续州级不当行为后果。关于此类消除是“自动的”还是必须申请且批准属于法院自由裁量事项，也存在差异。在这些州法规中，关于消除的完整性还有进一步差异。一般来说，原判决至少在某些目的上仍保持效力，尽管一些改善性法规中的宽泛语言暗示相反。5

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Other states have implemented the same rehabilitative policy objectives by enacting statutes which simply defer or withhold adjudication of guilt, allowing for a final dismissal or discharge of proceedings upon satisfaction of the terms of probation. In effect, rather than providing measures which would “erase” a conviction, these statutes provide that a judgment is not to be entered in the first instance so long as the transgressor fully complies with the conditions set by the state court. Despite there never having been a conviction as far as these states are concerned, some states further provide for “expungement” of the records relating to the original charge. Out of concern that a more uniform approach was needed for deter- mining what will constitute a conviction for immigration purposes, we con- cluded in Matter of Ozkok, supra, that the time had come for us to revise the definition we had crafted in Matter of L-R-, supra, which required that the state action be considered a conviction by the state for at least some pur- pose. In so doing, we noted a long-standing rule that the determination of whether or not a conviction exists for immigration purposes is a question of federal law and is not dependent on the vagaries of state law. Matter of Ozkok, supra, at 551 n.6. In Ozkok, we stated that we found no rational or legal reason to attach different immigration consequences to the same criminal conduct because of differences in the state law. As we discussed in Ozkok, under our defini- tion in Matter of L-R-, an alien could escape the immigration consequences of his or her criminal misconduct, despite a plea or finding of guilt and the actual imposition of punishment, if the alien was prosecuted in a state where the rehabilitative statute provided for the deferral of entry of judg- ment subject to successful completion of probation. By way of contrast, an alien who committed the same offense in a state where the statute provided for the entry of judgment upon the plea or finding of guilt, but deferred the imposition of any punishment conditioned on compliance with the terms of probation, would be considered convicted for immigration purposes if the state considered him or her convicted for some purpose. Accordingly, we revised our definition of conviction to avoid these anomalous and unfair results. The definition we adopted in Matter of Ozkok, supra, at 551-52, pro- vided that, in cases where adjudication of guilt was withheld, an alien was considered convicted for immigration purposes when:

其他州通过颁布仅推迟或暂缓裁定有罪的法规，实施了相同的康复政策目标，允许在满足缓刑条件后最终驳回或终止诉讼程序。实际上，这些法规并非提供“抹去”定罪的措施，而是规定只要违法者完全遵守州法院设定的条件，就不得从一开始就作出判决。尽管就这些州而言从未有过定罪，但一些州进一步规定对与原始指控相关的记录进行“销案”。 出于对需要一种更统一的方法来确定什么构成移民目的下的定罪的关切，我们在 Matter of Ozkok, supra 中得出结论，认为修改我们在 Matter of L-R-, supra 中制定的定义的时候到了，该定义要求州的行为至少出于某种目的被州视为定罪。在这样做时，我们注意到一项长期规则，即确定是否存在移民目的下的定罪是一个联邦法律问题，不依赖于州法律的变幻莫测。Matter of Ozkok, supra, at 551 n.6。 在 Ozkok 中，我们指出，我们认为没有理性或法律上的理由因州法律差异而对相同的犯罪行为附加不同的移民后果。正如我们在 Ozkok 中讨论的那样，根据我们在 Matter of L-R- 中的定义，如果外国人在一个康复法规规定在成功完成缓刑的前提下推迟作出判决的州被起诉，那么尽管有认罪或有罪认定以及实际施加的惩罚，该外国人仍可逃避其犯罪行为的移民后果。相比之下，在法规规定在认罪或有罪认定时作出判决但推迟施加任何惩罚并以遵守缓刑条款为条件的情况下，如果州出于某种目的认为该外国人已被定罪，则该外国人将被视为移民目的下的定罪。因此，我们修订了我们的定罪定义，以避免这些异常和不公平的结果。 我们在 Matter of Ozkok, supra, at 551-52 中采用的定义规定，在暂缓裁定有罪的案件中，外国人在以下情况下被视为移民目的下的定罪：

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Some circuit courts of appeals specifically approved Ozkok’s federal approach to defining when an alien stands convicted for immigration pur- poses. See, e.g., Wilson v. INS, 43 F.3d 211 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 811 (1995); Yanez-Popp v. INS, 998 F.2d 231 (4th Cir. 1993); Molina v. INS, 981 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1992); Chong v. INS, 890 F.2d 284 (11th Cir. 1989). Nonetheless, questions remained. Despite our quest for a definition that would achieve uniform results, in states providing for deferral or withhold- ing of adjudication of guilt, we were still obliged under the Ozkok defini- tion to examine the individual state’s statute to determine the nature of any proceedings that may be convened, if the alien did not conform with the conditions of his probation. Therefore, how the state set up its ameliorative statute still determined to some extent whether aliens who had committed the same criminal misconduct were considered “convicted” for immigration purposes. See generally Martinez-Montoya v. INS, 904 F.2d 1018 (5th Cir. 1990). For example, an alien, whose guilt was established in a state where the proceedings, convened upon a possible probation violation, addressed only whether probation should be revoked and what sentence should be imposed, would be considered convicted under the Ozkok definition, and thus subject to deportation. See Matter of Chairez, 21 I&N Dec. 44 (BIA 1995). However, an alien who had pleaded guilty to the same offense, but in a state where these proceedings addressed his guilt or innocence of the original charge, would escape immigration consequences stemming from his admitted guilt. Additionally, issues have remained unresolved regarding the application of the definition in cases, such as the one before us, where the alien has already complied with the terms of his probation and has suc- cessfully had his guilty plea vacated and proceedings finally dismissed. See, e.g., Wilson v. INS, supra (finding that the Ozkok definition had been satis- fied where the alien had satisfactorily completed and been discharged from probation, his indictment had been dismissed, and the judgment of convic- tion had been set aside). Congress decided that the Ozkok definition did not go far enough toward achieving a uniform federal approach and, with the passage of the IIRIRA, provided a statutory definition for the term “conviction,” to be applied to aliens in immigration proceedings. Section 322(c) of the IIRIRA states that the definition applies “to convictions and sentences entered before, on, or after the date of the enactment” of the Act. IIRIRA § 322(c), 110 Stat. at 3009-629. Consequently, the new definition, in section 101(a)(48) of the Act, is applicable to the respondent’s conviction. See Matter of Punu, 22 I&N Dec. 224 (BIA 1998).

一些巡回上诉法院明确批准了 Ozkok 的联邦方法，以界定外国人何时在移民目的下被定罪。参见，例如，Wilson v. INS, 43 F.3d 211 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 811 (1995); Yanez-Popp v. INS, 998 F.2d 231 (4th Cir. 1993); Molina v. INS, 981 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1992); Chong v. INS, 890 F.2d 284 (11th Cir. 1989)。尽管如此，问题仍然存在。尽管我们寻求一种能够实现统一结果的定义，但在规定推迟或暂缓裁定有罪的州，根据 Ozkok 定义，我们仍然有义务审查个别州的法规，以确定如果外国人不遵守其缓刑条件，可能召集的任何程序的性质。因此，州如何设置其改良法规仍然在一定程度上决定了犯有相同犯罪行为的外国人是否被视为移民目的下的“定罪”。参见一般性 Martinez-Montoya v. INS, 904 F.2d 1018 (5th Cir. 1990)。例如，在一个程序中，因可能违反缓刑而召集的程序仅涉及是否应撤销缓刑以及应施加何种刑罚，在该州确立有罪的外国人将根据 Ozkok 定义被视为定罪，从而可被驱逐出境。参见 Matter of Chairez, 21 I&N Dec. 44 (BIA 1995)。然而，对相同罪行认罪的外国人，但在这些程序涉及其对原始指控的有罪或无罪的州，将逃避因其承认有罪而产生的移民后果。此外，关于该定义在案件中的适用问题仍未解决，例如本案，外国人已遵守其缓刑条款并成功撤销其认罪且程序最终驳回。参见，例如，Wilson v. INS, supra（认定在外国人令人满意地完成缓刑并被解除、其起诉书被驳回且定罪判决被撤销的情况下，Ozkok 定义已得到满足）。 国会认为 Ozkok 定义在实现统一的联邦方法方面走得不够远，并且随着 IIRIRA 的通过，为“定罪”一词提供了法定定义，适用于移民程序中的外国人。IIRIRA 第 322(c) 条规定，该定义适用于“本法颁布之日之前、之日或之后作出的定罪和判决”。IIRIRA § 322(c), 110 Stat. at 3009-629。因此，本法第 101(a)(48) 条中的新定义适用于受访人的定罪。参见 Matter of Punu, 22 I&N Dec. 224 (BIA 1998)。

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Section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act states:

本法第 101(a)(48)(A) 条规定：

In the new definition, Congress definitively excised the third prong of Ozkok, eliminating the need to refer to the vagaries of the states’ ameliora- tive statutes in order to determine if an alien has been convicted. The leg- islative history of section 322 of the IIRIRA underscores the breadth of the new definition:

在新定义中，国会明确删除了 Ozkok 的第三项要件，消除了为确定外国人是否已被定罪而需要参考各州改良法规变幻莫测之处的必要。IIRIRA 第 322 条的立法历史强调了新定义的广度：

See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-828, at 224 (1996) (“Joint Explanatory Statement”) (emphasis added). Thus, it is clear that Congress intends that an alien be considered convicted, based on an initial finding or admission of guilt coupled with the imposition of some punishment, even in a state where further proceedings relating to the alien’s actual guilt or innocence may be required upon his violation of probation in order for him to be con- sidered convicted under the state law. See Matter of Punu, supra. Both the language of the statute and its legislative history implicitly recognize that the term “conviction” may have a different meaning for an alien from that which it has for others. It cannot be disputed that this respondent, for whom judgment was withheld, but who pleaded guilty and was ordered by the judge to be pun- ished for his offense, was convicted under the statutory definition. It is equally clear that at any point during his probationary period the respondent would have been considered convicted for immigration purposes. The ques- tion that remains to be answered, however, is whether Congress intends to give effect in immigration proceedings to a state’s rehabilitative action which technically erases the record of what would otherwise be considered a “conviction” under section 101(a)(48) of the Act. The situation presented

参见 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-828, at 224 (1996)（“联合解释性声明”）（强调为后加）。因此，很明显，国会意图是，基于最初的认定或承认有罪加上施加某种惩罚，外国人应被视为定罪，即使在某个州，为了根据该州法律被视为定罪，可能需要在其违反缓刑时进行与外国人实际有罪或无罪有关的进一步程序。参见 Matter of Punu, supra。法规的语言及其立法历史都隐含地承认，“定罪”一词对外国人可能具有与对其他人不同的含义。 无可争议的是，本案受访人，其判决被暂缓，但认罪并被法官命令因其罪行受到惩罚，根据法定定义已被定罪。同样清楚的是，在其缓刑期内的任何时间点，受访人都将被视为移民目的下的定罪。然而，仍有待回答的问题是，国会是否打算在移民程序中赋予州的康复行动以效力，该行动在技术上抹去了根据本法第 101(a)(48) 条原本会被视为“定罪”的记录。所呈现的情况

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here is similar to that addressed in Matter of Nolan, 19 I&N Dec. 539 (BIA 1988), where a respondent argued that a “pardon,” which was automatical- ly granted to him by operation of Louisiana law upon the successful com- pletion of his sentence, exempted his conviction for a crime of moral turpi- tude from serving as a basis of deportability. In that case, we disagreed with the respondent’s contention that the “pardon” he received satisfied the requirements for a gubernatorial or Presidential pardon under what was then section 241(b)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(1) (1982), and is now found in section 237(a)(2)(A)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(v) (Supp. II 1996). 6 Matter of Nolan is illustrative of the inconsistent immi- gration consequences that may result when state rehabilitative actions are examined to determine if an alien remains convicted for immigration pur- poses. If the State of Louisiana had called its rehabilitative action an “expungement” as opposed to a “pardon,” or if the respondent had argued that his “pardon” was the equivalent of an “expungement,” he may have been found to no longer have a conviction which would support his deportability.

此处与Matter of Nolan, 19 I&N Dec. 539 (BIA 1988)中所处理的问题类似，在该案中，一名答复人主张，根据路易斯安那州法律，在其成功服完刑期后自动授予他的“赦免”，使其道德败坏犯罪的定罪免于作为驱逐出境的基础。在该案中，我们不同意答复人的主张，即他所获得的“赦免”满足了当时《移民与国籍法》第241(b)(1)条、8 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(1) (1982)（现见于《移民与国籍法》第237(a)(2)(A)(v)条、8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(v) (Supp. II 1996)）所规定的州长或总统赦免的要求。6 Matter of Nolan说明了当审查州康复性措施以确定外国人是否仍为移民目的而被定罪时可能产生的不一致的移民后果。如果路易斯安那州将其康复性措施称为“expungement”（消除犯罪记录）而非“pardon”（赦免），或者如果答复人主张其“pardon”等同于“expungement”，则他可能被认定不再具有可支持其驱逐出境的定罪。

IV. REEXAMINATION OF OUR TREATMENT OF STATE EXPUNGEMENTS IN LIGHT OF THE NEW DEFINITION

IV. 根据新定义重新审视我们对州消除犯罪记录的处理

Throughout the decades of struggling with the increasing numbers of state rehabilitative statutes and their varying methods of avoiding the state consequences of a conviction by either deferring or erasing the recording of judgment, aliens have generally been allowed to escape immigration con- sequences for their criminal misconduct once the conviction has been “expunged.” Because of the semantic differences among the various states’ methods for erasing criminal records, aliens have also not been considered convicted for immigration purposes where the state’s action has been deemed “tantamount” to an expungement. The general rule has remained that a criminal conviction that has been expunged will not support an order of deportation. See Matter of Luviano, 21 I&N Dec. 235 (BIA 1996); Matter of Ibarra-Obando, 12 I&N Dec. 576 (BIA 1966; A.G. 1967); Matter of G-, supra, and cases cited therein. In Matter of A-F-, supra, the Attorney General departed from what was already long-standing Board precedent and ruled that a conviction for a drug offense will render an alien deportable, notwithstanding the expunge-

在数十年来与日益增多的州康复性法规及其通过推迟或抹除判决记录来避免定罪的州后果的各种不同方法作斗争的过程中，一旦定罪被“expunged”（消除），外国人通常被允许逃避其犯罪行为的移民后果。由于各州抹除犯罪记录的方法在语义上存在差异，当州的行为被视为“tantamount”（等同于）消除犯罪记录时，外国人在移民目的上也不被视为被定罪。一般规则仍然是，已被消除的刑事定罪不能支持驱逐出境令。见Matter of Luviano, 21 I&N Dec. 235 (BIA 1996)；Matter of Ibarra-Obando, 12 I&N Dec. 576 (BIA 1966; A.G. 1967)；Matter of G-, supra，及其中引用的案件。 在Matter of A-F-, supra中，司法部长背离了早已长期存在的委员会先例，裁定毒品犯罪的定罪将使外国人可被驱逐出境，尽管该定罪已根据州康复性法规被消除。

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ment of that conviction under a state rehabilitative statute. The Attorney General’s reasoning in Matter of A-F- was that an alien’s deportability should not be controlled by the “vagaries of state law.” Id. at 446. The Attorney General stated:

司法部长在Matter of A-F-中的理由是，外国人的可驱逐性不应受“州法律的变幻无常”所控制。Id. at 446。司法部长表示：

Id. The Attorney General expressly limited his ruling in Matter of A-F- to narcotics convictions. Shortly thereafter, the Attorney General in Matter of G-, supra, declined to extend the rule of Matter of A-F- to nonnarcotics cases, citing the absence of a congressional signpost pointing in the oppo- site direction. Accordingly, we have continued to apply Matter of G-, supra, as the controlling precedent in nonnarcotics cases. See Matter of Luviano, supra; Matter of Ibarra-Obando, supra. Although the case before us concerns a narcotics “conviction,” the expungement of which would not have defeated deportability under the rule of Matter of A-F-, the matter does not end there. In the intervening years, “exceptions” to the treatment of expunged drug convictions under the rule of Matter of A-F- have been administratively and judicially created. As we will discuss at greater length below, our decision in Matter of Manrique, supra, created such an exception for a first offender, such as this respon- dent, whose offense was for simple possession of a controlled substance, and who was the beneficiary of a state rehabilitative statute. To determine the continued viability of Matter of Manrique, we find it necessary to reconsider first, in light of the new definition at section 101(a)(48) of the Act, the effect to be given to any state action, whether it is called setting aside, annulling, vacating, cancellation, expungement, dismissal, discharge, etc., of the conviction, proceedings, sentence, charge, or plea, that purports to erase the record of guilt of an offense pursuant to a state rehabilitative statute. We note that even before the passage of the IIRIRA, some members of this Board felt that reconsideration of the effect to be given to all state expungements in immigration proceedings was warranted. See Matter of Luviano, supra (Heilman, concurring, joined by Filppu and Cole; Hurwitz, dissenting, joined by Vacca). In the wake of the IIRIRA, this examination can no longer be post- poned. The body of case law and administrative rulings that sought to bal- ance various policy interests and provide a uniform rule for when an alien is considered convicted for immigration purposes has now been superseded by Congress’ enactment of the statutory definition set forth in section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act. Now that Congress has spoken on the matter of

Id. 司法部长明确将其在Matter of A-F-中的裁决限于毒品定罪。此后不久，司法部长在Matter of G-, supra中拒绝将Matter of A-F-的规则扩展至非毒品案件，理由是缺乏指向相反方向的国会标志。因此，我们继续将Matter of G-, supra作为非毒品案件中的控制性先例适用。见Matter of Luviano, supra；Matter of Ibarra-Obando, supra。 尽管我们面前的案件涉及毒品“定罪”，根据Matter of A-F-的规则，其消除本不会使可驱逐性不成立，但事情并未就此结束。在此后数年间，根据Matter of A-F-规则对已消除毒品定罪处理的“例外”已在行政和司法上被创设。正如我们将在下文更详细讨论的，我们在Matter of Manrique, supra中的裁决为初犯（如本答复人，其罪行仅为简单持有受管制物质，且是州康复性法规的受益人）创设了此类例外。为确定Matter of Manrique是否继续有效，我们认为有必要首先根据《移民与国籍法》第101(a)(48)条的新定义，重新考虑对任何州行为（无论其被称为撤销、废止、撤销、取消、消除、驳回、解除等）应赋予的效力，该行为涉及定罪、程序、刑罚、指控或答辩，并旨在根据州康复性法规抹除某一罪行的有罪记录。我们注意到，甚至在IIRIRA通过之前，本委员会的一些成员就认为有必要重新考虑在移民程序中对所有州消除犯罪记录应赋予的效力。见Matter of Luviano, supra（Heilman concurring, joined by Filppu and Cole；Hurwitz dissenting, joined by Vacca）。 在IIRIRA之后，这一审查不能再推迟。那些试图平衡各种政策利益并就外国人何时被视为为移民目的而被定罪提供统一规则的判例法和行政裁决体系，现已被国会颁布的《移民与国籍法》第101(a)(48)(A)条所规定的法定定义取代。既然国会已就

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what constitutes a conviction for immigration purposes, we must interpret the statutory definition in such a way that we give effect to the clearly expressed intent of Congress. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). In doing so, we “must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.” K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988). To ensure that our interpretation is consistent with congressional intent, it is appropriate for us to further examine the legislative history of the statutory definition. See Matter of Punu, supra. The Joint Explanatory Statement clarifies Congress’ intent that, under the new definition, an alien is considered convicted upon “the original find- ing or confession of guilt” even in a state where further proceedings addressing the alien’s guilt or innocence of the original charge would be required before the state would consider him convicted. Joint Explanatory Statement, supra, at 224. We thus have a clear indication that Congress intends that the determination of whether an alien is convicted for immi- gration purposes be fixed at the time of the original determination of guilt, coupled with the imposition of some punishment. Under the statutory defi- nition, an alien for whom entry of judgment has been deferred may be found convicted for immigration purposes despite the fact that the state in which his proceedings were held has never considered him convicted. It simply would defy logic for us, in a case concerning a conviction in a state which effects rehabilitation through the technical erasure of the record of conviction, to provide greater deference to that state’s determination that a conviction no longer exists. Under either scenario, the state has decided that it does not consider the individual convicted based on the application of a rehabilitative statute. We find that the language of the statutory definition and its legislative history provide clear direction that this Board and the federal courts are not to look to the various state rehabilitative statutes to determine whether a conviction exists for immigration purposes. Congress clearly does not intend that there be different immigration consequences accorded to crimi- nals fortunate enough to violate the law in a state where rehabilitation is achieved through the expungement of records evidencing what would oth- erwise be considered a conviction under section 101(a)(48)(A), rather than in a state where the procedure achieves the same objective simply through deferral of judgment. It could be argued that, as the third prong of Ozkok dealt only with the nature of state procedures convened upon a violation of probation, Congress’ elimination of that prong has no bearing on the effectiveness of an expungement for immigration purposes. However, such an approach would ignore the clear message from Congress that the “original finding or confession of guilt is sufficient to establish a ‘conviction’ for purposes of

何为移民目的上的定罪作出规定，我们必须以赋予国会明确表达的意图以效力的方式解释该法定定义。Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)。在这样做时，我们“必须着眼于所涉具体法定语言，以及整个法律的语言和设计。”K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988)。为确保我们的解释与国会意图一致，我们进一步审查该法定定义的立法历史是适当的。见Matter of Punu, supra。 《联合解释声明》澄清了国会的意图：根据新定义，外国人应被视为在“最初的 guilt 认定或认罪”时即被定罪，即使在某个州，在州认为其被定罪之前还需要就外国人对原指控的有罪或无罪进行进一步程序。Joint Explanatory Statement, supra, at 224。因此，我们有明确迹象表明，国会意图使外国人是否为移民目的而被定罪的确定固定在最初 guilt 认定之时，并加上某种刑罚的施加。根据该法定定义，即使举行其程序的州从未认为其被定罪，判决录入被推迟的外国人也可被认定为为移民目的而被定罪。在涉及某州通过技术性抹除定罪记录来实现康复的案件中，我们若对该州关于定罪已不存在的认定给予更大尊重，那简直有悖逻辑。在任一情形下，州都已决定，基于康复性法规的适用，其不认为该个人被定罪。 我们认为，该法定定义的语言及其立法历史提供了明确指引，即本委员会和联邦法院不应求助于各种州康复性法规来确定是否为移民目的存在定罪。国会显然不打算对罪犯给予不同的移民后果，仅仅因为其幸运地在通过消除本根据第101(a)(48)(A)条会被视为定罪的记录来实现康复的州违法，而不是在仅通过推迟判决实现同样目标的程序的州违法。 可以争辩说，由于Ozkok的第三项要件仅涉及在违反缓刑后召集的州程序的性质，国会取消该要件对消除犯罪记录在移民目的上的效力没有影响。然而，这种做法将忽视国会发出的明确信息，即“最初的 guilt 认定或认罪足以确立……的‘定罪’

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the immigration laws.” 7 Joint Explanatory Statement, supra, at 224. By pro- viding a legislative definition applicable to all aliens regardless of the juris- diction in which they have been charged, Congress has approved the feder- al approach taken in Ozkok, but has gone even further than Ozkok by elim- inating the one prong of our former definition which required an examina- tion of how a specific state structured its rehabilitative statute. An approach in which we would continue to recognize a state expungement, by whatev- er name a state chooses to call it, as eliminating a conviction for immigra- tion purposes would be inconsistent with both Congress’ focus on the orig- inal determination of guilt and on its clear desire to implement a uniform federal approach. If we were to continue to give effect to state expungements, we would be forced to examine the vagaries of each state’s statute to determine if the orig- inal determination of guilt survived for some purposes, or whether it was a complete expungement. We do not believe that Congress intends for the exis- tence of a “conviction” to depend on whether or not an individual state would give continuing effect to the original determination of guilt for such purposes as approval or revocation of business or professional licenses, weapons per- mits, etc. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has previ- ously criticized such an approach when applying federal law. See generally United States v. Bergeman, 592 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1979). The result of such an approach would be different treatment, based solely on where the offense occurred, of aliens guilty of the same misconduct, a result which was also expressly disapproved by the Ninth Circuit in Garberding v. INS, 30 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 1994). We agree with the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Garberding that the focus should be on the alien’s misconduct rather than the breadth of a state’s rehabilitative statute. Id. at 1191. Moreover, when Congress has intended for state law to control in defining when a conviction exists for a federal purpose, it has expressly said so. To clarify its intent regarding whether state expungements should be recognized for the purposes of applying its federal gun control laws, it passed the Firearm Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986), in which it clearly provided that for purposes of that statute a “conviction” should be defined under the law of the state where the offense occurred. See generally United States v. Bergeman, supra. 8 By

移民法。”7 联合解释声明，前引，第224页。通过提供一个适用于所有外国人的立法定义，不论其被指控的司法管辖区为何，国会已认可了Ozkok案中采取的联邦路径，但比Ozkok案走得更远，取消了我国先前定义中要求审查某一特定州如何构建其康复性法规的那一项要件。如果我们继续承认州撤销记录——无论州选择如何称呼它——作为在移民目的上消除定罪的依据，这种路径将与国会关注原始罪责认定以及明确希望实施统一联邦路径的意图不一致。 如果我们继续赋予州撤销记录以效力，我们将被迫审查各州法规的变幻莫测之处，以确定原始罪责认定是否在某些目的上仍然存续，或者是否为完全撤销。我们认为国会并不意图使“定罪”的存在取决于某一州是否会在诸如批准或撤销商业或专业执照、武器许可等目的上赋予原始罪责认定持续效力。美国第9巡回上诉法院此前在适用联邦法律时已批评过这种路径。参见 generally United States v. Bergeman, 592 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1979)。这种路径的结果将是仅基于犯罪发生地对犯有相同不当行为的外国人给予不同待遇，这一结果也已被第9巡回法院在 Garberding v. INS, 30 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 1994) 中明确否定。我们同意第9巡回法院在 Garberding 案中的推理，即重点应放在外国人的不当行为上，而非州康复性法规的广度。Id. at 1191。 此外，当国会意图由州法律控制在界定联邦目的上是否存在定罪时，它已明确如此表示。为澄清其关于州撤销记录是否应被承认以适用其联邦枪支管制法律的意图，它通过了《枪支拥有者保护法》，Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986)，其中明确规定，为该法规之目的，“定罪”应根据犯罪发生州的法律界定。参见 generally United States v. Bergeman, supra。8 通过

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providing the federal definition at section 101(a)(48) of the Act, Congress has most decidedly taken the opposite approach to defining a conviction for immigration purposes. We also find it significant that, under the new definition, an alien is considered convicted for immigration purposes despite the fact that fur- ther proceedings addressing the merits of the original charge might be required before the state would consider him convicted. It would be incongruous for us to interpret the definition to allow an alien, who dur- ing the entire period of his probation would have been considered con- victed for immigration purposes, to be relieved of the immigration conse- quences of his misconduct as of the date of a subsequent rehabilitative state action having absolutely no relation to the merits of the charge. Congress has focused on the original determination of guilt and has expressed clear disinterest regarding subsequent state rehabilitative meas- ures. We therefore interpret the new definition to provide that an alien is considered convicted for immigration purposes upon the initial satisfac- tion of the requirements of section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act, and that he remains convicted notwithstanding a subsequent state action purporting to erase all evidence of the original determination of guilt through a rehabil- itative procedure. Our decision is limited to those circumstances where an alien has been the beneficiary of a state rehabilitative statute which purports to erase the record of guilt. It does not address the situation where the alien has had his or her conviction vacated by a state court on direct appeal, wherein the court determines that vacation of the conviction is warranted on the merits, or on grounds relating to a violation of a fundamental statu- tory or constitutional right in the underlying criminal proceedings. We also do not reach the issue of the effect of noncollateral challenges to a conviction on these grounds that are pending in state court while an alien is in deportation proceedings.

通过在该法第101(a)(48)条提供联邦定义，国会已最明确地采取了相反路径来界定移民目的上的定罪。 我们还认为具有重要意义的是，根据新定义，外国人被视为在移民目的上已被定罪，尽管在州认为其已被定罪之前，可能需要对原始指控的实质进行进一步程序。如果我们将该定义解释为允许一个在整个缓刑期间本应被视为在移民目的上已被定罪的外国人，自后续州康复性措施之日起免除其不当行为的移民后果——而该措施与指控的实质完全无关——那将是不协调的。国会关注的是原始罪责认定，并对后续州康复性措施表达了明确的不关心。因此，我们将新定义解释为：外国人在最初满足该法第101(a)(48)(A)条要求时即被视为在移民目的上已被定罪，并且尽管后续州措施声称通过康复性程序抹去原始罪责认定的所有证据，其仍保持被定罪状态。 我们的裁决仅限于外国人受益于声称抹去罪责记录的州康复性法规的情形。它不涉及外国人的定罪被州法院在直接上诉中撤销的情形，即法院认定基于实质理由撤销定罪是正当的，或基于与 underlying 刑事诉讼中违反基本法定或宪法权利有关的理由。我们也不触及在外国人处于驱逐程序期间，州法院待决的基于这些理由对定罪提出的非附带性挑战的效力问题。

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V. THE CONTINUING VIABILITY OF OUR DECISION IN MATTER OF MANRIQUE IN LIGHT OF RECENT AMENDMENTS TO THE ACT

V. 鉴于该法近期修正案，我们在 MATTER OF MANRIQUE 案中裁决的持续有效性

We conclude that Congress did not intend for the various state rehabil- itative measures designed to avoid or erase the stigma of a conviction to be considered in determining whether an alien has been convicted for purpos- es of applying the immigration laws. We must therefore reconsider our deci- sion in Matter of Manrique, supra, which provided that first offenders guilty of simple possession offenses may escape the immigration conse- quences of their conviction based on their having been the beneficiary of such a state rehabilitative action. In Matter of Manrique we extended the policy of leniency toward first time drug offenders provided in the federal first offender statute at 18 U.S.C. § 3607(a) (1988) to aliens prosecuted under state law upon a demon- stration of the following criteria:

我们得出结论，国会不意图在确定外国人是否为适用移民法之目的已被定罪时，考虑旨在避免或抹去定罪污名的各种州康复性措施。因此，我们必须重新考虑我们在 Matter of Manrique 案（前引）中的裁决，该裁决规定犯有简单持有罪行的初犯者可以基于其受益于此类州康复性措施而免除其定罪的移民后果。 在 Matter of Manrique 案中，我们将18 U.S.C. § 3607(a) (1988) 联邦初犯法规中对初次毒品犯罪者的宽大政策延伸适用于根据州法律被起诉的外国人，前提是证明以下标准：

Matter of Manrique, supra, at 16. There is no issue in this case regarding this respondent’s satisfaction of each of the four Manrique requirements. However, as Congress has now removed state rehabilitative actions as a factor in determining whether an alien is considered convicted for immigration purposes, this respondent’s satisfaction of the fourth Manrique requirement should be given no effect in determining his deportability. 9 Accordingly, we must decide whether our decision in Matter of Manrique has any continuing viability in light of the approach Congress has taken in the IIRIRA toward aliens guilty of criminal misconduct. The parties provided briefs on this issue upon our request. The respon- dent, through counsel, takes the position that it cannot be determined from

Matter of Manrique, supra, at 16。 本案中，关于该 respondent 是否满足 Manrique 案四项要求中的每一项不存在争议。然而，由于国会现已将州康复性措施从确定外国人是否被视为在移民目的上已被定罪的因素中移除，该 respondent 对第四项 Manrique 要求的满足在确定其可驱逐性时不应赋予任何效力。9 因此，我们必须裁决，鉴于国会在 IIRIRA 中对犯有刑事不当行为的外国人所采取的路径，我们在 Matter of Manrique 案中的裁决是否具有任何持续有效性。 应我们的要求，各方就此问题提交了书状。该 respondent 通过律师主张，无法从

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the legislative history of section 322 of the IIRIRA that Congress has specifically abrogated the holding in Manrique, but argues that even if the new definition of “conviction” overrules Manrique, the respondent is not deportable because his conviction has already been vacated. The Immigration and Naturalization Service contends that the administratively created rulings defining “conviction” for immigration purposes, including our decision in Manrique exempting aliens who would be eligible for first offender treatment under 18 U.S.C. § 3607 from that definition, have been expressly overturned by the new statutory definition of “conviction.” The special treatment accorded in Matter of Manrique to first offender aliens who have been the beneficiaries of a state rehabilitative statute did not arise from a statutory provision within the Act. Rather, Matter of Manrique evolved from a series of decisions in which several federal courts of appeals, the Attorney General, and this Board, in the absence of specific direction from Congress as to the effect to be given to state rehabilitative actions, have addressed the immigration consequences of drug convictions based on inter- pretations of competing congressional policies. As background, we will sum- marize how we arrived at the holding in Matter of Manrique. As we have discussed, Matter of A-F-, supra, represented a departure from long-standing precedent holding that deportability could not be estab- lished by a conviction that had been expunged under a state statute. The Attorney General reasoned in Matter of A-F- that the progressive strength- ening of the deportation laws relating to drug offenses and other relevant statutory changes demonstrated a strong congressional policy that was inconsistent with giving effect to state expungement provisions in drug cases. A drug offender was thus considered to be convicted for immigration purposes, despite having been the beneficiary of a state rehabilitative statute that expunged his or her conviction. However, many years later, the First Circuit found a competing federal policy evidenced in the Federal Youth Corrections Act, ch. 1115, §2, 64 Stat. 1086 (1950) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026), 10 which provided juvenile offenders the chance to make a fresh start following their violations of the law. Mestre Morera v. United States INS, 462 F.2d 1030 (1st Cir. 1972). In Matter of Zingis, 14 I&N Dec. 621 (BIA 1974), we agreed with the First Circuit that convictions set aside pursuant to the Federal Youth Corrections Act could not support a finding of deportability. We then extended this rule, upon a motion by the Service, to juvenile drug offenders convicted under a comparable state law. Matter of Andrade, 14 I&N Dec. 651 (BIA 1974).

IIRIRA第322条的立法历史表明，国会已明确废止Manrique案中的裁决，但主张即使新的“定罪”定义推翻了Manrique案，被申请人也不应被驱逐，因为其定罪已被撤销。移民和归化局则主张，为移民目的界定“定罪”的行政创设裁决——包括本院在Manrique案中作出的、将根据18 U.S.C. § 3607有资格获得初犯者处理的的外国人排除在该定义之外的裁决——已被新的“定罪”法定定义明确推翻。 Matter of Manrique案中给予作为州康复性法规受益人的初犯外国人的特殊待遇，并非源于该法内的某项法定条款。相反，Matter of Manrique源于一系列裁决，在这些裁决中，数个联邦上诉法院、司法部长和本委员会在国会未就州康复性处置应赋予何种效力作出具体指示的情况下，基于对相互竞争的国会政策的解释，处理了毒品定罪的移民后果。作为背景，我们将概述我们是如何得出Matter of Manrique案裁决的。 如我们已讨论的，Matter of A-F-案（同上）背离了长期存在的先例，该先例认定，不能以根据州法规被注销的定罪来确立可驱逐性。司法部长在Matter of A-F-案中推理认为，与毒品犯罪有关的驱逐法律逐步加强以及其他相关法定变化，表明国会存在强烈的政策，该政策与在毒品案件中赋予州注销条款效力不相一致。因此，毒品犯罪者尽管是注销其定罪的州康复性法规的受益人，为移民目的仍被视为已被定罪。 然而，许多年之后，第一巡回法院在《联邦青年矫正法》中发现了一项相互竞争的联邦政策，该法第1115章第2节，64 Stat. 1086（1950年）（编纂于18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026），10 该法为青少年犯罪者提供了在违法后重新开始的机会。Mestre Morera v. United States INS, 462 F.2d 1030 (1st Cir. 1972)。在Matter of Zingis, 14 I&N Dec. 621 (BIA 1974)案中，我们同意第一巡回法院的意见，即根据《联邦青年矫正法》被撤销的定罪不能支持可驱逐性的认定。随后，经移民局动议，我们将该规则扩展适用于根据类似州法律被定罪的青少年毒品犯罪者。Matter of Andrade, 14 I&N Dec. 651 (BIA 1974)。

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In Matter of Werk, 16 I&N Dec. 234 (BIA 1977), we agreed with the Service’s position that the federal first offender statute is for first offenders the equivalent of the Federal Youth Corrections Act, and we held that a drug conviction “expunged” under a state counterpart of the federal first offend- er statute may not be used as a basis for deportability. See also Matter of Kaneda, 16 I&N Dec. 677 (BIA 1979); Matter of Haddad, 16 I&N Dec. 253 (BIA 1977). However, in Matter of Deris, 20 I&N Dec. 5 (BIA 1989), we interpreted the terms “equivalent” and “counterpart” narrowly, holding that drug offenders who were provided rehabilitative treatment under state statutes that are broader in scope than the federal first offender statute would not be relieved of the immigration consequences of their misconduct, despite their first offender treatment under the state law. In Garberding v. INS, supra, the Ninth Circuit rejected the narrow approach we had taken in Matter of Deris, supra, citing due process grounds. The Ninth Circuit found no rational basis for treating aliens who have committed their drug offense in a jurisdiction whose rehabilitative statute mirrored the federal first statute differently from those subject to a statute with broader application. In light of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Garberding, we reexamined our position on this issue and held that the policy of leniency shown toward first offenders under the federal first offender statute would uniformly be accorded to aliens who were the beneficiaries of a state rehabilitative statute regardless of how closely that statute was aligned with the federal law, so long as each of the four enumerated elements was satisfied. Matter of Manrique, supra, at 64. If our decision in Manrique were to stand, this respondent’s conviction could not be used as the basis for his deportation. 11 It cannot be forgotten that Manrique and its predecessors were all decided in the absence of any indication from Congress as to whether a state rehabilitative action should be given any effect in immigration proceedings. By providing a federal definition for what shall constitute a conviction for

在Matter of Werk, 16 I&N Dec. 234 (BIA 1977)案中，我们同意移民局的立场，即联邦初犯者法规对初犯者而言等同于《联邦青年矫正法》，并裁定根据联邦初犯者法规的州对应法规被“注销”的毒品定罪不得作为可驱逐性的依据。另见Matter of Kaneda, 16 I&N Dec. 677 (BIA 1979)；Matter of Haddad, 16 I&N Dec. 253 (BIA 1977)。然而，在Matter of Deris, 20 I&N Dec. 5 (BIA 1989)案中，我们对“等同”和“对应”二词作狭义解释，裁定根据范围宽于联邦初犯者法规的州法规获得康复性处理的毒品犯罪者，尽管根据州法律获得了初犯者处理，仍不能免除其不当行为的移民后果。 在Garberding v. INS案（同上）中，第九巡回法院以正当程序为由，拒绝了我们曾在Matter of Deris案（同上）中采取的狭义做法。第九巡回法院认为，对于在一个康复性法规与联邦初犯法规完全相同的司法管辖区实施毒品犯罪的外国人，与受范围更广法规约束的外国人区别对待，不存在合理依据。 鉴于第九巡回法院在Garberding案中的裁决，我们重新审视了在此问题上的立场，并裁定，对根据联邦初犯者法规给予初犯者的宽大政策，应统一给予作为州康复性法规受益人的外国人，无论该法规与联邦法律多么一致，只要四项列举要件均得到满足即可。Matter of Manrique案，同上，第64页。如果我们在Manrique案中的裁决得以维持，被申请人的定罪就不能作为其驱逐的依据。11 不能忘记的是，Manrique案及其前身裁决均是在国会未就州康复性处置在移民程序中应否赋予任何效力作出任何表示的情况下作出的。通过为构成移民目的定罪的要素提供联邦定义，

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immigration purposes, Congress has now spoken on this issue. In interpret- ing this definition, we have determined that a state action that purports to abrogate what would otherwise be considered a conviction, as the result of the application of a state rehabilitative statute, rather than as the result of a procedure that vacates a conviction on the merits or on grounds relating to a statutory or constitutional violation, has no effect in determining whether an alien has been convicted for immigration purposes. With the statutory definition of conviction in place, the prior case law and administrative rulings that attempted to reconcile the competing feder- al policies discussed in Matter of A-F-, supra, and Matter of Werk, supra, and its progeny are no longer controlling. Congress has stated what a con- viction is for immigration purposes, and it has not provided any exception for aliens who have been accorded rehabilitative treatment under state law. While it was within the authority of this Board and the federal courts to craft exceptions to administratively created definitions of conviction, to continue to apply a policy exception providing federal first offender treat- ment to certain drug offenders who have received state rehabilitative treat- ment, in the face of the definition provided by Congress, would be tanta- mount to creating a new form of relief that is not provided for in the Act. This we cannot do. We must presume that Congress is aware of the administrative excep- tion to deportability for a controlled substance conviction that we created in Manrique, as well as its own treatment of first offenders under 18 U.S.C. § 3607. Yet Congress failed to provide any exception in section 101(a)(48) of the Act to exempt first offenders determined to be guilty of simple possession of a controlled substance from being considered “con- victed” under the Act. Furthermore, despite the expansive sweep of the new legislation affecting criminal aliens, Congress did not amend section 237(a)(2)(B)(i) (formerly section 241(a)(2)(B)(i)) to forgive any drug offense other than the previously stated exception for a single offense of possession for personal use of 30 grams or less of marijuana. If Congress wished to exempt any other drug convictions as a basis of deportability, it would have done so in the course of such sweeping amendments to the Act. We also note that the expansive definition in section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act is consistent with the prevailing congressional policy of strict treat- ment toward criminal aliens in deportation proceedings. Congress may con- dition the status of an alien upon the absence of a “conviction” as it choos- es to define that term. See Molina v. INS, supra, at 19. In Coronado-Durazo v. INS, 123 F.3d 1322, 1326 (9th Cir. 1997), the Ninth Circuit pointed out that Congress has “clearly spoken against aliens who abuse the hospitality of the United States by committing drug related crimes.” For example, recent legislation has denied judicial review to aliens who have committed a controlled substance offense and has eliminated the availability of section

国会现已就此问题表态。在解释该定义时，我们认定，一项州处置若旨在废止本应被视为定罪的行为，且该处置系因适用州康复性法规而非因基于实体理由或基于与违反法律或宪法有关的理由撤销定罪的程序所致，则在确定外国人是否为移民目的已被定罪时不具有任何效力。 在定罪法定定义已确立的情况下，先前试图调和Matter of A-F-案（同上）和Matter of Werk案（同上）及其后续裁决中所讨论的相互竞争的联邦政策的判例法和行政裁决不再具有控制力。国会已规定何为移民目的的定罪，且未为根据州法律获得康复性处理的外国人提供任何例外。虽然本委员会和联邦法院有权对行政创设的定罪定义制定例外，但在国会已提供定义的情况下，继续适用一项政策例外，将联邦初犯者处理给予某些已获得州康复性处理的毒品犯罪者，无异于创设该法未规定的新救济形式。此为我们所不能为。 我们必须推定国会知悉我们在Manrique案中创设的、针对管制物质定罪的可驱逐性行政例外，以及其自身根据18 U.S.C. § 3607对初犯者的处理。然而，国会未在该法第101(a)(48)条中提供任何例外，将经认定犯有简单持有管制物质罪的初犯者豁免于该法下的“定罪”认定。此外，尽管影响犯罪外国人的新立法范围广泛，国会并未修订第237(a)(2)(B)(i)条（原第241(a)(2)(B)(i)条），以宽恕除先前所述针对单一持有30克或以下大麻供个人使用罪的例外之外的任何毒品犯罪。如果国会希望将任何其他毒品定罪豁免于可驱逐性的依据，它本会在对该法进行如此广泛修订的过程中予以规定。 我们还注意到，该法第101(a)(48)(A)条中的宽泛定义与国会在驱逐程序中对犯罪外国人从严处理的现行政策相一致。国会可以按其选择界定的“定罪”之不存在作为外国人身份的条件。见Molina v. INS案，同上，第19页。在Coronado-Durazo v. INS, 123 F.3d 1322, 1326 (9th Cir. 1997)案中，第九巡回法院指出，国会已“明确表态反对滥用美国慷慨从事毒品相关犯罪的外国人”。例如，近期立法已剥夺实施管制物质犯罪的外国人的司法审查，并取消了第

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212(c) relief to those who have been convicted of controlled substance vio- lations. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 440(a), (d), 110 Stat. 1213-14 (“AEDPA”); see also Coronado-Durazo v. INS, supra; Ayala-Chavez v. INS, 944 F.2d 638, 641 (9th Cir. 1991). We find no evidence in Congress’ recent enactments that it intends to accord special treatment in the application of its immigration laws to first- time drug offenders who have been accorded rehabilitative treatment under a state law. Congress has chosen, consistent with other new provisions in the immigration laws reflecting a strict policy toward criminal aliens, to define the term “conviction,” “with respect to an alien,” to encompass actions which would not generally be considered convictions. We recog- nize that failing to give effect to state expungements or other state rehabil- itative measures in immigration proceedings will necessarily result in unequal treatment of aliens and citizens. An alien who has been the bene- ficiary of a state rehabilitative statute may continue to be subject to a severe consequence for his misconduct, that of deportation from this coun- try; whereas a citizen accorded similar rehabilitative treatment after the same misconduct may be able to avoid any further consequences of his conviction. However, section 101(a)(48) of the Act does not impose a more severe standard of conduct on aliens than is imposed on citizens of our country. The conduct this respondent has admitted would be a violation of the controlled substance statute for aliens and citizens alike. An alien is subject to additional consequences as a result of this misconduct. However, the different treatment of aliens seeking the hospitality of our country is precisely the subject of the body of laws codified in the Immigration and Nationality Act. We find no room in the present statutory scheme for recognizing state rehabilitative actions in the context of immigration proceedings, or other- wise applying a first offender exception to the definition of “conviction” to an alien who has been the subject of such an action. State rehabilitative actions which do not vacate a conviction on the merits or on any ground related to the violation of a statutory or constitutional right in the underly- ing criminal proceeding are of no effect in determining whether an alien is considered convicted for immigration purposes. We conclude that Matter of Manrique, supra, and its predecessors, which sought to balance conflicting policy interests in the absence of direction from Congress as to when an alien is considered to be convicted for immigration purposes, have been superseded by section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act. Accordingly, we find that this respondent was convicted within the meaning of section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act upon his guilty plea and the imposition of punishment. We fur- ther find that he remains convicted despite the state court’s rehabilitative action and that he is therefore deportable under section 241(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act.

对已被判定犯有受管制物质违规行为的人给予212(c)救济。见《1996年反恐怖主义与有效死刑法》，Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 440(a), (d), 110 Stat. 1213-14（“AEDPA”）；另见Coronado-Durazo v. INS, supra；Ayala-Chavez v. INS, 944 F.2d 638, 641（第9巡回，1991年）。 我们在国会近期的立法中未发现任何证据表明，国会意图在其移民法的适用中对根据州法律已获得康复治疗的初次毒品犯罪者给予特殊待遇。国会已选择——与移民法中反映对犯罪外国人严格政策的其他新条款相一致——将“定罪”一词“就外国人而言”界定为涵盖一般不被视为定罪的行为。我们认识到，在移民程序中不赋予州撤销记录或其他州康复措施以效力，必然会导致对外国人和公民的不平等待遇。作为州康复法规受益人的外国人，可能继续因其不当行为而承受严厉后果，即被驱逐出本国；而公民在相同不当行为后获得类似康复治疗的，则可能能够避免其定罪的任何进一步后果。然而，该法第101(a)(48)条并未对外国人施加比对我国公民所施加的更为严苛的行为标准。本答辩人承认的行为，对外国人和公民而言均构成违反受管制物质法规。外国人因该不当行为而承受额外后果。然而，对外国人寻求我国接纳时的不同待遇，恰恰是编纂于《移民与国籍法》中的整套法律的主题。 我们认为，现行法定框架中没有空间在移民程序背景下承认州康复措施，或以其他方式对已成为此类措施对象的外国人适用“初次犯罪者例外”于“定罪”的定义。州康复措施若未基于实体理由或基于与基础刑事程序中违反法定或宪法权利相关的任何理由撤销定罪，则在确定外国人是否被视为因移民目的而定罪时无效力。我们得出结论：Matter of Manrique, supra及其前身判例——其在国会未就外国人何时被视为因移民目的而定罪作出指示的情况下寻求平衡相互冲突的政策利益——已被该法第101(a)(48)(A)条取代。因此，我们认定，本答辩人在其认罪及判处刑罚后，即属于该法第101(a)(48)(A)条意义上的定罪。我们进一步认定，尽管州法院采取了康复措施，他仍属定罪，因此根据该法第241(a)(2)(B)(i)条应予驱逐。

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VI. ELIGIBILITY FOR SECTION 212(c) RELIEF

VI. 第212(c)条救济的资格

Having determined that the respondent is deportable, we turn to the question of his eligibility for relief under section 212(c) of the Act. The respondent argues that the Immigration Judge erred in calculating the peri- od he had maintained lawful unrelinquished domicile. However, even if the domicile requirement had been met, recent amendments to the Act have made the respondent ineligible for a section 212(c) waiver. The AEDPA was signed by the President during the pendency of this appeal. Section 440(d) of the AEDPA amended section 212(c) of the Act by eliminating the avail- ability of a waiver to aliens who are deportable by reason of having been convicted of criminal offenses, such as this respondent’s, that fall within the parameters of section 241(a)(2)(B) of the Act. The Attorney General has issued a decision applying the amendment to cases pending before this Board on the date that the AEDPA was signed into law. 12 Matter of Soriano, 21 I&N Dec. 516 (BIA 1996, A.G. 1997). We have determined that the respondent is deportable because he has a “conviction” for a controlled sub- stance violation, as that term is defined for immigration purposes. His con- viction also bars him from relief from deportation under section 212(c). Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed. ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

在认定答辩人应予驱逐后，我们转而处理其根据该法第212(c)条获得救济的资格问题。答辩人主张，移民法官在计算其维持合法未放弃住所的期间时存在错误。然而，即使住所要求已满足，该法的近期修正案也已使答辩人不符合第212(c)条豁免的资格。AEDPA在本上诉审理期间由总统签署。AEDPA第440(d)条修订了该法第212(c)条，取消了因被判犯有属于该法第241(a)(2)(B)条范围的刑事犯罪（如本答辩人的犯罪）而应予驱逐的外国人获得豁免的可能性。司法部长已作出一项决定，将该修正案适用于AEDPA签署成为法律之日待决于本委员会的案件。12 Matter of Soriano, 21 I&N Dec. 516 (BIA 1996, A.G. 1997)。我们已认定，答辩人因就受管制物质违规行为具有“定罪”（该术语就移民目的而言的定义）而应予驱逐。其定罪也使其无法根据第212(c)条获得免于驱逐的救济。因此，上诉将被驳回。 命令： 上诉驳回。

Board Member Anthony C. Moscato did not participate in the decision in this case.

委员会成员Anthony C. Moscato未参与本案决定。

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION: Gustavo D. Villageliu, Board Member, in which Paul W. Schmidt, Chairman; Lory Diana Rosenberg and John Guendelsberger, Board Members, joined

协同与异议意见：Gustavo D. Villageliu，委员会成员，Paul W. Schmidt（主席）、Lory Diana Rosenberg和John Guendelsberger（委员会成员）加入

I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part from the majority’s decision. I agree with the majority’s decision that the definition of a “conviction,” as expressed in section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (Supp. II 1996), covers convictions that have been technically withheld or deferred pursuant to a rehabilitative statute. Section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act; Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C of Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 322, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-628 (“IIRIRA”). However, I disagree with

我谨对多数意见的决定部分协同、部分异议。 我同意多数意见的认定，即《移民与国籍法》第101(a)(48)(A)条，8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A)（Supp. II 1996）所表述的“定罪”定义，涵盖依据康复法规在技术上被暂缓或推迟的定罪。该法第101(a)(48)(A)条；《1996年非法移民改革与移民责任法》，Pub. L. No. 104-208之C部分，§ 322, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-628（“IIRIRA”）。然而，我不同意

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the majority’s dicta that the scope of section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act is also designed to cover all convictions that have been either vacated or expunged. My disagreement with the majority stems from the express, legislative his- tory of section 101(a)(48)(A), which does not evince any congressional intent to alter the way this Board has treated vacated convictions or non- narcotics convictions that have been expunged pursuant to section 1203.4 of the California Penal Code. See Matter of Luviano, 21 I&N Dec. 235 (BIA 1996); Matter of Sirhan, 13 I&N Dec. 592 (BIA 1970). In my opin- ion, the majority’s broad construction of section 101(a)(48)(A) is without a sound basis and leads to a result that is far beyond the express intent of Congress.

多数意见的附带意见，即该法第101(a)(48)(A)条的范围也旨在涵盖所有已被撤销或注销的定罪。我与多数意见的分歧源于第101(a)(48)(A)条的明确立法历史，该历史并未表明国会有任何意图改变本委员会对待被撤销定罪或依据《加利福尼亚州刑法典》第1203.4条被注销的非毒品定罪的方式。见Matter of Luviano, 21 I&N Dec. 235 (BIA 1996)；Matter of Sirhan, 13 I&N Dec. 592 (BIA 1970)。在我看来，多数意见对第101(a)(48)(A)条的宽泛解释缺乏可靠依据，并导致远超国会明确意图的结果。

I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 101(a)(48)(A) OF THE ACT

I. 该法第101(a)(48)(A)条的立法历史

The majority’s conclusion and reasoning for which it found “clear direction” and “a clear indication that Congress intends that the determina- tion of whether an alien is convicted for immigration purposes be fixed at the time of the original determination of guilt, coupled with the imposition of some punishment” is unconvincing. Matter of Roldan, 21 I&N Dec. 512, at 521 (BIA 1999). It is clear from the legislative history of section 101(a)(48)(A) that it was primarily designed to address Congress’ disen- chantment with our definition of a conviction under Matter of Ozkok, 19 I&N Dec. 546 (BIA 1988), as well as our practice of not considering a sus- pended imposition of a sentence as constituting a “sentence imposed.” See generally Matter of Punu, 21 I&N Dec. 3364 (BIA 1998); Matter of Esposito, 21 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1995); Matter of Castro, 19 I&N Dec. 692 (BIA 1988). Rather than quoting selectively from the legislative history of section 101(a)(48)(A) to determine its intended scope, it is both appropriate and necessary to rely on the entire legislative history underlying the statute which provides the following:

多数意见的结论及其据以认定存在“明确指示”和“明确表明国会意图将外国人是否因移民目的而定罪的判定固定于最初认定有罪并施加某种惩罚之时”的推理，缺乏说服力。Matter of Roldan, 21 I&N Dec. 512, at 521 (BIA 1999)。从第101(a)(48)(A)条的立法历史可以清楚看出，该条主要旨在回应国会对我们在Matter of Ozkok, 19 I&N Dec. 546 (BIA 1988)中对定罪的定义，以及我们不考虑暂缓量刑即构成“所判刑罚”的做法的不满。见一般Matter of Punu, 21 I&N Dec. 3364 (BIA 1998)；Matter of Esposito, 21 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1995)；Matter of Castro, 19 I&N Dec. 692 (BIA 1988)。与其选择性地引用第101(a)(48)(A)条的立法历史以确定其预期范围，适当且必要的是依据该法条背后的全部立法历史，其内容如下：

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H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-828, at 224 (1996) (“Joint Explanatory Statement”). As can be discerned from the above text, Congress specifically consid- ered the myriad of provisions for ameliorating the effects of a conviction and acted only to remove the last prong of our requirements for finality pre- scribed in Matter of Ozkok, supra. Nothing in the aforementioned legisla- tive history supports a congressional intent beyond its expressed purpose “to overturn current administrative rulings holding that a sentence is not ‘actually imposed’ in such cases.” Joint Explanatory Statement, supra, at 224. The majority’s conclusion that section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act should also be applied to situations where the conviction has been properly vacat- ed or expunged is not supported by the text or legislative history of that sec- tion, which has a much narrower scope. In interpreting the scope and breadth of section 322 of the IIRIRA, our task is to interpret the express language and legislative history surrounding the enactment of the statute in a fashion that is both reasonable and logical. When Congress acts to explain in detail its intent behind a statute it enacts, we should proceed with caution and be extremely wary of construing addi- tional intent not already expressed. See generally Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984) (stating that if Congress has spoken to the precise question at issue and its intent is clear, both the court and the agency must give effect to congressional intent and “that is the end of the matter”). It is compelling, therefore, that the lim- ited congressional history before us does not expressly evince any will on

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-828, at 224 (1996)（“联合解释声明”）。 从上述文本可以看出，国会具体考虑了众多减轻定罪影响的条款，并仅采取行动删除了我们在Matter of Ozkok, supra案中规定的终局性要求的最后一个要件。上述立法历史中没有任何内容支持国会意图超出其明示目的“推翻当前行政裁决中认定在此类案件中刑罚未被‘实际施加’的裁定”。联合解释声明，supra，第224页。多数意见认为该法第101(a)(48)(A)条也应适用于定罪已被适当撤销或注销的情形，这一结论既无该条的文本支持，也无其立法历史支持，该条的范围要窄得多。 在解释IIRIRA第322条的范围和广度时，我们的任务是以既合理又合乎逻辑的方式解释该法规颁布时的明确语言和立法历史。当国会采取行动详细解释其颁布法规背后的意图时，我们应当谨慎行事，并对解释尚未表达的额外意图极为警惕。一般见Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984)（指出如果国会已就所涉具体问题表态且其意图明确，法院和机构都必须实现国会意图，“事情到此为止”）。因此，令人信服的是，我们面前的有限国会历史并未明确表明国会方面有任何意愿

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the part of Congress to include all vacated or expunged criminal convictions within the definition of a conviction. Neither the language of section 322 of the IIRIRA, nor its underlying legislative history, requires this Board to find that a properly vacated conviction or one expunged pursuant to section 1203.4 of the California Penal Code constitutes a conviction under section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act. Notwithstanding the language and express leg- islative history of section 101(a)(48)(A), however, the majority has elected to engage in a course of statutory construction that leads to an unreasonably broad interpretation that is out of step with the will of Congress. Furthermore, the majority’s interpretation violates the rule of statutory interpretation that ambiguities in our immigration laws should be interpret- ed in a light most favorable to the alien because of the drastic consequences of a deportation order. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987); INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 225 (1966); Barber v. Gonzalez, 347 U.S. 637, 642-43 (1954); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948).

将所有被撤销或注销的刑事定罪纳入定罪定义。无论是IIRIRA第322条的语言，还是其背后的立法历史，都不要求本委员会认定，被适当撤销的定罪或依据《加利福尼亚州刑法典》第1203.4条注销的定罪构成该法第101(a)(48)(A)条下的定罪。然而，尽管有第101(a)(48)(A)条的语言和明示立法历史，多数意见仍选择进行一种法规解释，导致产生与国会意愿不符的过于宽泛的解释。 此外，多数意见的解释违反了以下法规解释规则：由于驱逐令的严厉后果，我们移民法中的模糊之处应以最有利于外籍人士的方式解释。INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987); INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 225 (1966); Barber v. Gonzalez, 347 U.S. 637, 642-43 (1954); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948)。

II. THIS BOARD’S PAST TREATMENT OF VACATED AND CERTAIN EXPUNGED CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS

II. 本委员会过去对被撤销和某些被注销刑事定罪的处理

This Board has long been faced with the daunting task of determining what state court actions constitute a “conviction” with sufficient finality for federal immigration purposes. See Matter of Ozkok, supra; Matter of L-R-, 8 I&N Dec. 269 (BIA 1959). It is significant that despite our administrative alterations to the definition of a conviction, both this Board and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit have always treated vacated convictions differently from convictions that have been technically erased, withheld, or deferred. In Matter of Sirhan, supra, we held that because an alien’s vacated conviction no longer existed, it could not form a basis for deportability under former section 241(a)(11) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11) (1970). Matter of Sirhan, supra. In arriving at our decision, we found that

本委员会长期以来一直面临一项艰巨任务：确定哪些州法院行为构成具有足够终局性的“定罪”，以适用于联邦移民目的。见Matter of Ozkok, supra; Matter of L-R-, 8 I&N Dec. 269 (BIA 1959)。值得注意的是，尽管我们对定罪定义进行了行政修改，本委员会和美国第九巡回上诉法院始终将被撤销的定罪与技术性消除、保留或推迟的定罪区别对待。在Matter of Sirhan, supra案中，我们裁定，由于外籍人士被撤销的定罪已不复存在，它不能作为该法前第241(a)(11)条（8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11) (1970)）下驱逐出境的基础。Matter of Sirhan, supra。在作出裁决时，我们认定

Matter of Sirhan, supra, at 600. Our view that a vacated conviction does not constitute a conviction for immigration purposes has been reiterated in other published Board deci- sions. See, e.g., Matter of Varagianis, 16 I&N Dec. 48, 50 (BIA 1976) (find- ing that under New Hampshire law, a drug conviction was merely annulled and not vacated and thus could still be used to establish deportability pur- suant to section 241(a)(11) of the Act); Matter of Tucker, 15 I&N Dec. 337

Matter of Sirhan, supra, 第600页。 我们认为被撤销的定罪不构成移民目的下的定罪，这一观点在其他公布的委员会裁决中得到了重申。见，例如，Matter of Varagianis, 16 I&N Dec. 48, 50 (BIA 1976)（认定根据新罕布什尔州法律，毒品定罪仅被废止而非撤销，因此仍可用于依据该法第241(a)(11)条确立驱逐出境）；Matter of Tucker, 15 I&N Dec. 337

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(BIA 1975) (holding the same with regard to a California statute); see also Matter of O’Sullivan, 10 I&N Dec. 320 (BIA 1963) (holding that a convic- tion that was dismissed nolle prosequi did not constitute a conviction for purposes of establishing deportability under the Act). The Ninth Circuit has similarly held that vacated convictions cannot be used to establish deporta- bility. See Wiedersperg v. INS, 896 F.2d 1179 (9th Cir. 1990). In Wieder- sperg, the court held that an alien whose conviction was vacated on the ground that he had entered his plea of guilty in ignorance of the collateral consequence of deportation could not have evidence of his vacated convic- tion used against him to establish deportability. Wiedersperg v. INS, supra, at 1181-82; see also Estrada-Rosales v. INS, 645 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding that the vacation of a conviction based on a procedural error did not constitute a judicial pardon or a technical expungement of the record fol- lowing a probationary period and, therefore, the conviction could not be used to establish deportability). With regard to expunged convictions, this Board has consistently held that nonnarcotics convictions expunged pursuant to section 1203.4 of the California Penal Code are not convictions for immigration purposes. See Matter of Luviano, supra; Matter of Ibarra-Obando, 12 I&N Dec. 576 (BIA 1966; A.G. 1967); Matter of G-, 9 I&N Dec. 159 (BIA 1960; A.G. 1961); Matter of A-F-, 8 I&N Dec. 429 (BIA, A.G. 1959). It is notewor- thy that we certified our decision in Matter of Luviano, supra, to the Attorney General for review pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(h)(ii) (1995). Such review remains pending. Moreover, since the enactment of section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act, we certified an unpublished decision to the Attorney General in which we held that our decision in Matter of Luviano, supra, regarding expunged convictions, was not affected by the new defi- nition of a conviction or the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Carr v. INS, 86 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 1996). That decision also remains pending before the Attorney General. Accordingly, by interpreting section 101(a)(48)(A) in an overly broad fashion, the majority has not only contravened our past treatment of certain expunged convictions, it has, in effect, also circum- vented the pending review of the Attorney General in the two aforemen- tioned cases. After amending our definition of a conviction in Matter of Ozkok, supra, we expressly overruled our decisions in Matter of Garcia, 19 I&N Dec. 270 (BIA 1985); Matter of Zangwill, 18 I&N Dec. 22 (BIA 1981); Matter of Seda, 17 I&N Dec. 550 (BIA 1980); Matter of Robinson, 16 I&N Dec. 762 (BIA 1979); Matter of Varagianis, supra; and Matter of Pikkarainen, 10 I&N Dec. 401 (BIA 1963), to the extent that they relied on the former definition of a conviction expressed in Matter of L-R-, supra. It is significant that we did not overrule our holdings in Matter of Sirhan, supra; Matter of Varagianis, supra; Matter of Tucker, supra; Matter of Ibarra-Obando, supra; and Matter of G-, supra, that vacated criminal con-

(BIA 1975)（就加利福尼亚州法规作出相同认定）；另见Matter of O’Sullivan, 10 I&N Dec. 320 (BIA 1963)（认定因不起诉而驳回的定罪不构成该法下确立驱逐出境目的下的定罪）。第九巡回法院同样裁定，被撤销的定罪不能用于确立驱逐出境。见Wiedersperg v. INS, 896 F.2d 1179 (9th Cir. 1990)。在Wiedersperg案中，法院裁定，一名外籍人士因在不知驱逐出境这一附带后果的情况下作出认罪答辩而使其定罪被撤销，其被撤销定罪的证据不得用于对其确立驱逐出境。Wiedersperg v. INS, supra, 第1181-82页；另见Estrada-Rosales v. INS, 645 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1981)（认定基于程序错误撤销定罪不构成司法赦免或缓刑期后记录的技术性注销，因此该定罪不能用于确立驱逐出境）。 关于被注销的定罪，本委员会一贯认定，依据《加利福尼亚州刑法典》第1203.4条注销的非毒品定罪不是移民目的下的定罪。见Matter of Luviano, supra; Matter of Ibarra-Obando, 12 I&N Dec. 576 (BIA 1966; A.G. 1967); Matter of G-, 9 I&N Dec. 159 (BIA 1960; A.G. 1961); Matter of A-F-, 8 I&N Dec. 429 (BIA, A.G. 1959)。值得注意的是，我们依据8 C.F.R. § 3.1(h)(ii) (1995)将Matter of Luviano, supra案的裁决提交司法部长审查。该审查仍在进行中。此外，自该法第101(a)(48)(A)条颁布以来，我们将一项未公布裁决提交司法部长，其中我们认定，Matter of Luviano, supra案中关于被注销定罪的裁决不受新定罪定义或第九巡回法院在Carr v. INS, 86 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 1996)案中裁决的影响。该裁决也仍在司法部长面前待决。因此，多数意见通过以过于宽泛的方式解释第101(a)(48)(A)条，不仅违背了我们过去对某些被注销定罪的处理，实际上还规避了司法部长在上述两案中的待决审查。 在Matter of Ozkok, supra案中修改我们的定罪定义后，我们明确推翻了Matter of Garcia, 19 I&N Dec. 270 (BIA 1985); Matter of Zangwill, 18 I&N Dec. 22 (BIA 1981); Matter of Seda, 17 I&N Dec. 550 (BIA 1980); Matter of Robinson, 16 I&N Dec. 762 (BIA 1979); Matter of Varagianis, supra; 和Matter of Pikkarainen, 10 I&N Dec. 401 (BIA 1963)案的裁决，前提是这些裁决依赖于Matter of L-R-, supra案中表述的先前定罪定义。值得注意的是，我们并未推翻Matter of Sirhan, supra; Matter of Varagianis, supra; Matter of Tucker, supra; Matter of Ibarra-Obando, supra; 和Matter of G-, supra案中关于被撤销刑事定

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victions and certain expunged convictions were not convictions for immi- gration purposes. This is a critical point considering that Congress’ legisla- tive definition of a conviction under section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act sim- ply codifies the first two elements of our definition in Matter of Ozkok, supra, while excising the third and final element. Absent specific statutory language or legislative history to the contrary, I see no reason why we should break from the practice of this Board and the Ninth Circuit of not considering vacated and certain expunged convictions to be convictions for immigration purposes.

罪和某些被注销定罪不是移民目的下定罪的裁定。这是一个关键点，考虑到国会在该法第101(a)(48)(A)条中的立法定义仅仅编纂了我们在Matter of Ozkok, supra案中定义的前两个要件，同时删除了第三个也是最后一个要件。在没有相反的特定法定语言或立法历史的情况下，我认为没有理由背离本委员会和第九巡回法院不将被撤销和某些被注销定罪视为移民目的下定罪的惯例。

III. CONCLUSION

III. 结论

In interpreting the scope of section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act as cov- ering convictions that have been vacated and expunged, the majority has strayed from the express legislative history underlying the section as well as the precedent decisions of this Board and the Ninth Circuit. The express legislative history of section 101(a)(48)(A) does not evince any desire on the part of Congress to alter the way that this Board and the courts have traditionally treated vacated and expunged convictions. Accordingly, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part from the majority’s decision.

在将《移民与国籍法》第101(a)(48)(A)条的范围解释为涵盖已被撤销和注销的定罪时，多数意见偏离了该条所依据的明确立法历史以及本委员会和第9巡回法院的先例裁决。第101(a)(48)(A)条的明确立法历史并未表明国会意图改变本委员会和法院传统上对待被撤销和注销定罪的方式。因此，我恭敬地部分同意、部分反对多数意见的决定。

DISSENTING OPINION: Lory Diana Rosenberg, Board Member

反对意见：Lory Diana Rosenberg，委员会成员

I respectfully dissent. I agree wholeheartedly with the dissenting opinion of Board Member Villageliu, which concludes that the majority’s construction of section 101(a)(48) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48) (Supp. II 1996), 1 as encompassing convictions that have been expunged and no longer exist, is unsupported either by its statutory language or by the per- tinent legislative history found in the Joint Explanatory Statement. 2 I write separately, as, in addition, I find the majority’s interpretation of section 101(a)(48) of the Act specifically erroneous with regard to the effect of 18 U.S.C. § 3607 (1994) on a first-time state offense for which the respondent would not be deportable had he been prosecuted under federal law. Cf. Garberding v. INS, 30 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 1994); Matter of Manrique, 21 I&N Dec. 58 (BIA 1995).

我恭敬地表示反对。 我完全同意Villageliu委员会成员的反对意见，该意见认为多数意见将《移民与国籍法》第101(a)(48)条（8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)（Supp. II 1996））1 解释为涵盖已被注销且不再存在的定罪，既无成文法语言支持，也无《联合解释声明》中的相关立法历史支持。2 我另行撰写意见，因为此外，我认为多数意见对《移民与国籍法》第101(a)(48)条的解释在涉及18 U.S.C. § 3607（1994）对首次州级犯罪的影响时具体有误，若该respondent根据联邦法律被起诉，则其将不会被驱逐出境。参见Garberding v. INS, 30 F.3d 1187（9th Cir. 1994）；Matter of Manrique, 21 I&N Dec. 58（BIA 1995）。

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As the appeal before us involves a state disposition vacating the respon- dent’s guilty plea to a first offense for possession of a controlled substance, the issue presented actually is not about the proper treatment of state expungement provisions. For the past 40 years, the Board has followed the decision of the Attorney General in Matter of A-F-, 8 I&N Dec. 429 (BIA, A.G. 1959), which holds that an expungement under state law of a convic- tion for a controlled substance offense is ineffective to erase the effect of the conviction for immigration purposes. See also Garberding v. INS, supra, at 1189. Although the majority goes into some detail to address deferred adju- dications under state statutory schemes, as well as our prior decision in Matter of Ozkok, 19 I&N Dec. 546 (BIA 1988), and what constitutes a con- viction under section 101(a)(48) of the amended statute, we already have addressed these matters. See Matter of Punu, 22 I&N Dec. 3364 (BIA 1998) (reviewing the legislative history pertaining exclusively to deferred adjudi- cations under state law); cf. Matter of Roldan, 22 I&N Dec. 3377, at 4-8 (BIA 1999). Moreover, notwithstanding the majority’s effort to characterize every “rehabilitative” state provision generically, neither section 101(a)(48) of the Act, nor our interpretation and application of that section in Matter of Punu, supra, restrict the effect of a federal statute such as 18 U.S.C. § 3607 on the proper construction of a state disposition of an offense for which the respondent would not be deportable had he been prosecuted under federal law. By contrast, the Board’s decisions in Matter of Deris, 20 I&N Dec. 5 (BIA 1989), and Matter of Werk, 16 I&N Dec. 234 (BIA 1977), which were reaffirmed in pertinent part by the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Garberding v. INS, supra, hold that by enacting the federal first offender statute, Congress plainly expressed its intent not to characterize a first offense such as the respondent’s as a con- viction “for any . . . purpose.” 18 U.S.C. § 3607(b); see also Matter of Manrique, supra, (adopting the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning as to the applica- bility of 18 U.S.C. § 3607 in determining which state offenses would not render a respondent deportable). The issue before us, therefore, is whether our decision in Matter of Manrique, supra, has been superseded or must be modified in light of Congress’ enactment of section 101(a)(48) of the Act. I find that 18 U.S.C. § 3607, representing a congressionally mandated exception to the definition of a conviction generally, remains in force and has not been repealed either expressly or by implication by Congress’ enactment of section 101(a)(48) of the Act. Both section 101(a)(48) of the Act and 18 U.S.C. § 3607 may be given effect by recognizing the respondent’s vacated conviction as one for which he would not be deportable if prosecuted under federal law, and find- ing that it may not be relied upon for purposes of determining deportabili- ty. Accordingly, I dissent.

由于我们面前的 appeal 涉及一项州处置，该处置撤销了respondent对首次持有受管制物质犯罪的认罪，因此所呈现的问题实际上并非关于州注销条款的适当处理。过去40年来，委员会一直遵循司法部长在Matter of A-F-, 8 I&N Dec. 429（BIA, A.G. 1959）中的裁决，该裁决认为，根据州法律对受管制物质犯罪定罪的注销，不能有效消除该定罪在移民目的上的效力。另见Garberding v. INS, supra, at 1189。尽管多数意见详细讨论了州法定方案下的延期裁决，以及我们先前在Matter of Ozkok, 19 I&N Dec. 546（BIA 1988）中的裁决，以及修订后的《移民与国籍法》第101(a)(48)条下何为定罪，但我们已经处理了这些事项。参见Matter of Punu, 22 I&N Dec. 3364（BIA 1998）（审查专门涉及州法律下延期裁决的立法历史）；参见Matter of Roldan, 22 I&N Dec. 3377, at 4-8（BIA 1999）。 此外，尽管多数意见努力将每一项“康复性”州条款一般化地描述，但无论是《移民与国籍法》第101(a)(48)条，还是我们在Matter of Punu, supra中对这一条的解释和适用，都没有限制联邦法规如18 U.S.C. § 3607对州处置犯罪的适当解释的效力，若该respondent根据联邦法律被起诉，则其将不会被驱逐出境。相比之下，委员会在Matter of Deris, 20 I&N Dec. 5（BIA 1989）和Matter of Werk, 16 I&N Dec. 234（BIA 1977）中的裁决——这些裁决的相关部分被美国第9巡回上诉法院在Garberding v. INS, supra中的裁决所确认——认为，通过颁布联邦首次犯罪者法规，国会明确表达了其意图，即不将respondent的首次犯罪定性为“为任何……目的”的定罪。18 U.S.C. § 3607(b)；另见Matter of Manrique, supra，（采纳第9巡回法院关于18 U.S.C. § 3607在确定哪些州犯罪不会使respondent被驱逐出境方面的适用性的推理）。 因此，我们面前的问题是，鉴于国会颁布了《移民与国籍法》第101(a)(48)条，我们在Matter of Manrique, supra中的裁决是否已被取代或必须修改。我认为，18 U.S.C. § 3607作为国会授权的对一般定罪定义的例外，仍然有效，并且未被国会颁布《移民与国籍法》第101(a)(48)条明示或默示地废除。《移民与国籍法》第101(a)(48)条和18 U.S.C. § 3607均可通过承认respondent被撤销的定罪为若根据联邦法律被起诉则不会被驱逐出境的定罪，并认定该定罪不得用于确定驱逐出境的目的而得到效力。因此，我表示反对。

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I. SECTION 3607 OF TITLE 18 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE

一、《美国法典》第18编第3607条

The federal first offender statute, which addresses pre-judgment proba- tion, record of disposition, and expungement of records for certain persons charged under the Controlled Substance Act, 21 U.S.C. § 844, provides as follows:

联邦首次犯罪者法规涉及判决前缓刑、处置记录以及根据《受管制物质法》21 U.S.C. § 844被指控的特定人员的记录注销，规定如下：

18 U.S.C. § 3607 (emphasis added). 3 Thus, § 3607(b) provides explicitly, using plain language to convey congressional intent, that treatment under either § 3607(a) or § 3607(c) shall not be considered a conviction “for any . . . purpose.”

18 U.S.C. § 3607（着重部分由原文添加）。3 因此，§ 3607(b)明确使用平实语言传达国会意图，规定根据§ 3607(a)或§ 3607(c)的处理不得被视为“为任何……目的”的定罪。

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The Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron, U.S.A. Inc., v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), invoked by the majority in support of its interpretation of the scope of Congress’ enactment of section 101(a)(48) of the Act in 1996, is no less applicable to Congress’ enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 3607, which became effective in 1988. Cf. Matter of Roldan, supra, at 11. Not only does the plain language of § 3607 man- date that a first offender disposition is not to be considered a “conviction,” but this mandate must be given effect. See COIT Independence Joint Venture v. Federal Sav. and Loan Ins. Corp., 489 U.S. 561 (1989) (stating that “whole statute” interpretation dictates that statutory sections should be read in harmony to achieve a harmonious whole); K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (holding that a construction of the statutory language which takes into account the design of the statute as a whole is preferred).

多数意见援引最高法院在Chevron, U.S.A. Inc., v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837（1984）中的裁决来支持其对国会1996年颁布《移民与国籍法》第101(a)(48)条范围的解释，该裁决同样适用于国会颁布的18 U.S.C. § 3607，该条于1988年生效。参见Matter of Roldan, supra, at 11。§ 3607的平实语言不仅要求首次犯罪者处置不被视为“定罪”，而且这一要求必须得到效力。参见COIT Independence Joint Venture v. Federal Sav. and Loan Ins. Corp., 489 U.S. 561（1989）（指出“整体法规”解释要求法规各条应协调解读以实现和谐整体）；K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291（1988）（裁定优先考虑顾及法规整体设计的法规语言解释）。

In enacting a federal first offender provision, Congress specifically provided an exception to the procedures and consequences that ordinarily apply to the prosecution and conviction of an individual charged with a con- trolled substance violation under 21 U.S.C. § 844. The federal first offend- er statute provides that in the case of an individual who is either a first-time offender or a youthful offender under 21 years of age, a disposition reached under the terms of § 3607 is not a conviction “for the purpose of a disqual- ification or a disability imposed by law upon conviction of a crime, or for any other purpose.” 18 U.S.C. § 3607(b). 4 This federal exception to the treatment of a disposition or expungement as a “conviction” constitutes a federal standard. Id.; see also United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 293-94 (1969) (finding it a fallacy to presume that in a federal act, Congress would incorporate state labels for particular offenses or give controlling effect to state classifications). The Board con- sistently has recognized the propriety of relying on a federal standard in order to promote uniformity in construing and applying the provisions of the Act. See, e.g., Matter of Batista-Hernandez, 21 I&N Dec. 955 (BIA 1997) (addressing the propriety of adopting a federal definition in consid- ering both state and federal controlled substance offenses); Matter of L-G, 21 I&N Dec. 89 (BIA 1995) (analyzing the term “any felony” in 18 U.S.C.

在颁布联邦首次犯罪者条款时，国会特别规定了通常适用于根据21 U.S.C. § 844被指控违反受管制物质规定的个人的起诉和定罪程序及后果的例外。联邦首次犯罪者法规规定，对于首次犯罪者或未满21岁的青少年犯罪者，根据§ 3607条款达成的处置不是“因定罪而依法施加的取消资格或丧失能力目的，或任何其他目的”的定罪。18 U.S.C. § 3607(b)。4 这一将处置或注销视为“定罪”的联邦例外构成了联邦标准。Id.；另见United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 293-94（1969）（认为在联邦法案中，国会会纳入州对特定犯罪的标签或赋予州分类控制效力是一种谬误）。委员会一贯承认依赖联邦标准以促进在解释和适用《移民与国籍法》条款时的一致性的适当性。参见，例如，Matter of Batista-Hernandez, 21 I&N Dec. 955（BIA 1997）（讨论在考虑州和联邦受管制物质犯罪时采用联邦定义的适当性）；Matter of L-G, 21 I&N Dec. 89（BIA 1995）（分析18 U.S.C.中“任何重罪”一词

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§ 924(c)(2) (1994) to identify the range of state convictions capable of being characterized as drug-trafficking offenses under section 101(a)(43) of the Act); Matter of A-F-, supra, at 466 (acquiescing to the federal policy to treat narcotics offenses seriously and finding it inappropriate for an alien’s deportability for criminal activity to be dependent upon “the vagaries of state law”); see also Matter of Punu, supra, (BIA 1998) (superseding the prior federal standard for a conviction developed by the Board in Matter of Ozkok, supra, at 549). The federal courts have affirmed the Board’s appli- cation of a federal standard in construing state charges. Paredes- Urrestarazu v. United States INS, 36 F.3d 801 (9th Cir. 1994); Yanez-Popp v. United States INS, 998 F.2d 231 (4th Cir. 1993) (following the general proposition in Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, 460 U.S. 103 (1983), that the determination whether a conviction exists for purposes of federal gun control laws is a question of federal, not state law, despite the fact that the predicate offense and its punishment are defined by state law). 5 In construing charges of deportability under Act, the Board has consis- tently extended the federal exception for first-time and youthful offenders to charges lodged in immigration proceedings, including charges based on state offenses. As discussed below, in Matter of Manrique, supra, we fol- lowed over 20 years of Board precedent and agreed that Congress’ express intent not to impose the consequences of conviction for a controlled sub- stance offense in the context of a federal criminal prosecution of a first-time or youthful offender was applicable to charges brought in immigration pro- ceedings that were based on a state offense. See, e.g., Matter of Deris, supra; Matter of Kaneda, 16 I&N Dec. 677 (BIA 1979) (holding that a Virginia statute, limited to first-time and youthful offenders to allow them a second opportunity to lead law-abiding lives, was consistent with the thrust of the comparable federal provision); Matter of Haddad, 16 I&N Dec. 253 (BIA 1977) (holding that dismissal of proceedings pursuant to a Michigan statute under which the respondent was found guilty of possession of mar- ihuana was a counterpart to the federal first offender statute); Matter of Werk, supra (holding that when a conviction has been expunged under the provisions of a state statute that is the counterpart of 21 U.S.C. § 844(b)(1), that conviction may not be used as a basis for finding deportability under section 241(a)(11) of the Act); Matter of Andrade, 14 I&N Dec. 651 (BIA 1974)(addressing youthful offenders charged under state law comparable to federal law); Matter of Zingis, 14 I&N Dec. 621 (BIA 1974) (addressing

§ 924(c)(2) (1994)，以确定根据该法第101(a)(43)条可被定性为毒品贩运犯罪的州定罪范围）；Matter of A-F-, supra, at 466（默许联邦政策严肃对待麻醉品犯罪，并认定外国人的可驱逐性因犯罪活动而取决于“州法律的变幻莫测”是不适当的）；另见Matter of Punu, supra, (BIA 1998)（取代了委员会在Matter of Ozkok, supra, at 549中制定的先前联邦定罪标准）。联邦法院已确认委员会在解释州指控时适用联邦标准。Paredes-Urrestarazu v. United States INS, 36 F.3d 801 (9th Cir. 1994)；Yanez-Popp v. United States INS, 998 F.2d 231 (4th Cir. 1993)（遵循Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, 460 U.S. 103 (1983)中的一般主张，即确定是否存在为联邦枪支管制法律目的的定罪是联邦法律问题而非州法律问题，尽管基础犯罪及其刑罚由州法律界定）。5 在解释该法下的可驱逐性指控时，委员会一贯将针对初犯和青少年罪犯的联邦例外扩展至移民程序中提出的指控，包括基于州犯罪的指控。如下文所述，在Matter of Manrique, supra中，我们遵循了委员会20多年的先例，并同意国会明确意图不对初犯或青少年罪犯在联邦刑事起诉背景下的受管制物质犯罪施加定罪后果，这一意图适用于在移民程序中提出的基于州犯罪的指控。见，例如，Matter of Deris, supra；Matter of Kaneda, 16 I&N Dec. 677 (BIA 1979)（认定一项限于初犯和青少年罪犯以允许他们第二次机会过守法生活的弗吉尼亚州法规与可比联邦条款的主旨一致）；Matter of Haddad, 16 I&N Dec. 253 (BIA 1977)（认定根据密歇根州法规驳回程序，根据该法规答辩人被认定犯有持有大麻罪，相当于联邦初犯法规）；Matter of Werk, supra（认定当定罪已根据相当于21 U.S.C. § 844(b)(1)的州法规条款被撤销时，该定罪不得作为根据该法第241(a)(11)条认定可驱逐性的依据）；Matter of Andrade, 14 I&N Dec. 651 (BIA 1974)（处理根据与联邦法律相当的州法律被指控的青少年罪犯）；Matter of Zingis, 14 I&N Dec. 621 (BIA 1974)（处理

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youthful offenders charged under federal law). The Board’s comparison of state dispositions with the terms of the fed- eral first offender statute is consistent with federal court interpretations, which have emphasized that dispositions under § 3607 apply not only to offenses prosecuted under § 844, but to state and other federal offenses “described in” that section. See United States v. Rivera, 996 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1993) (concluding that if Congress had wanted to restrict the statute’s reach to federal convictions, it could easily have said that predicate offenses are limited to federal law); United States v. Barial, 31 F.3d 216, 217-18 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that a controlled substance violation with- in the jurisdiction of the United States Park Police is amenable to a dispo- sition under § 3607(a), which accommodates a broad reading of offenses subject to its terms). Similarly, we have acknowledged that in 1994, the Ninth Circuit not only endorsed the Board’s extension of the provisions of § 3607 to state offenses, but criticized the Board for an impermissibly narrow application of the statute, finding “no rational basis for treating the alien [in Garberding] differently from one whose drug possession ‘conviction’ was ‘expunged’ under a state statute considered to be an exact counterpart to the federal statute.” Matter of Manrique, supra, at 62; see also Paredes- Urrestarazu v. United States INS, supra, at 815 (concluding that the inter- est in uniform implementation of the immigration laws provides a rational basis for not giving effect to a state procedure where the conviction in ques- tion would not have been expunged under the federal first offender statute).

根据联邦法律被指控的青少年罪犯）。 委员会将州处置与联邦初犯法规条款进行比较，这与联邦法院的解释一致，联邦法院强调§ 3607下的处置不仅适用于根据§ 844起诉的犯罪，还适用于该条“所述”的州和其他联邦犯罪。见United States v. Rivera, 996 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1993)（认定如果国会想将该法规的适用范围限于联邦定罪，它可以很容易地说明基础犯罪限于联邦法律）；United States v. Barial, 31 F.3d 216, 217-18 (4th Cir. 1994)（认定在美国公园警察管辖范围内的受管制物质违规可适用§ 3607(a)下的处置，该条对受其条款约束的犯罪作广义解读）。 同样，我们承认，1994年，第9巡回不仅认可委员会将§ 3607条款扩展至州犯罪，还批评委员会对该法规的适用过于狭窄，认定“没有合理依据将[Garberding中的]外国人与毒品持有‘定罪’已根据被视为联邦法规完全对应物的州法规被‘撤销’的外国人区别对待。”Matter of Manrique, supra, at 62；另见Paredes-Urrestarazu v. United States INS, supra, at 815（认定统一实施移民法律的利益为不使州程序生效提供了合理依据，因为所涉定罪根据联邦初犯法规不会被撤销）。

The addition of a statutory definition of “conviction” by section 322(a)(1) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C of Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009- 628 (“IIRIRA”), does not disturb either our commitment to a uniform fed- eral standard or our construction of § 3607. For the reasons discussed below, I conclude that the first offender exception under § 3607 continues to apply to qualifying state, as well as federal, offenses. Congress did not act affirmatively to repeal 18 U.S.C. § 3607, either generally, or as applied to “convictions” under the immigration laws. Cf. IIRIRA § 322 (enacting section 101(a)(48) of the Act). Repeal by implica- tion is disfavored. See Sharma v. INS, 89 F.3d 545, 547-48 (9th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. United Continental Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 168 (1976) (“It is, of course, a cardinal principle of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored.”). To the contrary, “‘[w]hen two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts . . . to regard each as effective.’” Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148 (1976)

1996年《非法移民改革和移民责任法》（Pub. L. No. 104-208 C部分，110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-628，“IIRIRA”）第322(a)(1)条增加“定罪”的法定定义，并未动摇我们对统一联邦标准的承诺或我们对§ 3607的解释。基于下文讨论的理由，我得出结论，§ 3607下的初犯例外继续适用于符合条件的州犯罪以及联邦犯罪。 国会并未积极采取行动废除18 U.S.C. § 3607，无论是普遍废除还是就移民法律下的“定罪”而言。参见IIRIRA § 322（颁布该法第101(a)(48)条）。默示废除不受青睐。见Sharma v. INS, 89 F.3d 545, 547-48 (9th Cir. 1996)；另见United States v. United Continental Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 168 (1976)（“当然，法定解释的基本原则是默示废除不受青睐。”）。相反，“‘当两部法规能够共存时，法院有义务……将每部视为有效。’”Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148 (1976)

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(quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)). Specifically, the Supreme Court has emphasized that “[w]e must read the statutes to give effect to each if we can do so while preserving their sense and purpose.” Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 267 (1981). Comparing the terms of the earlier and more narrow National Bank Act with the later and more broad Securities Exchange Act, in Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., supra, the Supreme Court conceded that “unless a ‘clear intention otherwise’ can be discerned, the principle of statutory con- struction discussed above counsels that the specific . . . provisions [of the law existing at the time the new statute was enacted] are applicable.” Id. at 154 (citing Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U.S. 222 (1957). The absence of specific language negating the operative statutory section may be dispositive. See Estate of Bell v. Commissioner, 928 F.2d 901, 903-04 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting the Supreme Court’s statement in Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464 U.S. 386, 398 (1984) that the “[c]ourts are not authorized to rewrite a statute because they might deem its effects sus- ceptible of improvement”). As the Supreme Court reiterated, there are but two well-settled cate- gories of repeal by implication. First, repeal by implication will be observed “‘where provisions in . . . two acts are in irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one.’” Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., supra, at 154 (quoting Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936). Second, such repeal may exist “‘if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute.’” Id. “‘But, in either case, the intention of the legislature to repeal must be clear and manifest. . . .’” Id. (emphasis added); see Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 524 (1987); see also Moyle v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 147 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 1998) cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 1451 (1999); Northwest Forest Resource Council v. Pilchuck Audobon Society, 97 F.3d 1161, 1166 (9th Cir. 1996). The same analysis is applicable here. Section 3607, which embodies a narrow exception to what otherwise might constitute a “conviction,” cannot be said to have been repealed or rendered inapplicable by Congress’ enact- ment of section 101(a)(48) of the Act. No specific language expressly repealing 18 U.S.C. § 3607 as applied to immigration proceedings exists in the statute, and there is no indication whatsoever in the legislative history that Congress intended section 101(a)(48) of the Act to supersede the appli- cability of the federal first offender statute, either to federal prosecutions actually brought under its terms or to state prosecutions that could have been brought under its terms. Moreover, Congress must be deemed to be aware of controlling judicial and administrative decisions when it acts. As discussed below, the first offender statute has been applied to both state and federal dispositions sub-

（引用Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)）。具体而言，最高法院强调，“我们必须在能够保持其意义和目的的同时，解读法规以使每部都生效。”Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 267 (1981)。 在Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., supra中，比较较早且较窄的《国家银行法》与较晚且较广的《证券交易法》的条款，最高法院承认，“除非能够辨别出‘明确的相反意图’，上述讨论的法定解释原则建议[新法规颁布时存在的法律]的具体……条款适用。”Id. at 154（引用Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U.S. 222 (1957)）。缺乏否定有效法规条款的具体语言可能是决定性的。见Estate of Bell v. Commissioner, 928 F.2d 901, 903-04 (9th Cir. 1991)（引用最高法院在Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464 U.S. 386, 398 (1984)中的陈述，即“法院无权因为认为法规的效果可以改进而重写法规”）。 正如最高法院重申的，默示废除只有两类明确确立的情形。第一，默示废除将在“‘……两部法案的条款存在不可调和的冲突时被遵守，后一法案在冲突范围内构成对前一法案的默示废除。’”Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., supra, at 154（引用Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936)）。第二，这种废除可能存在于“‘如果后一法案涵盖前一法案的全部主题并明确意图作为替代。’”Id. “‘但在任一情况下，立法机关废除的意图必须明确和显而易见……’”Id.（强调添加）；见Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 524 (1987)；另见Moyle v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 147 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 1998) cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 1451 (1999)；Northwest Forest Resource Council v. Pilchuck Audobon Society, 97 F.3d 1161, 1166 (9th Cir. 1996)。 同样的分析适用于此。§ 3607体现了对原本可能构成“定罪”的狭窄例外，不能因国会颁布该法第101(a)(48)条而被视为已被废除或变得不适用。法规中不存在明确废除18 U.S.C. § 3607在移民程序中适用的具体语言，立法历史中也没有任何迹象表明国会意图使该法第101(a)(48)条取代联邦初犯法规的适用性，无论是对于实际根据其条款提起的联邦起诉还是对于本可根据其条款提起的州起诉。 此外，国会在行动时必须被视为知晓具有约束力的司法和行政决定。如下文所述，初犯法规已适用于州和联邦处置，

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mitted in deportation proceedings as far back as 1977 and as recently as 1995. Congress is deemed to be aware not only of prior interpretations of a statute, but also of pre-existing case law when it acts. Scheidemann v. INS, 83 F.3d 1517, 1526 (3d Cir. 1996); see also Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978) (stating that “Congress is presumed to be aware of an adminis- trative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change”) (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1975); NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361, 366 (1951); National Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 140, 147 (1920); 2A C. Sands, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 49.09 (4th ed. 1973), and cases cited). In enacting a statutory definition of a “convic- tion” in the IIRIRA, Congress demonstrated a detailed knowledge of exist- ing judicial and administrative interpretations of that term as used in rela- tion to immigration law violations. As in Lorillard v. Pons, supra, Congress’ selectivity in eliminating one particular element of our prior definition of a conviction “strongly suggests that but for those changes Congress express- ly made, it intended to incorporate fully the [existing] remedies and proce- dures.” Id. at 582. Furthermore, the enactment of section 101(a)(48) of the Act does not create an “irreconcilable conflict” with the terms of 18 U.S.C. § 3607, as that section merely constitutes an exception to the criteria that ordinarily would warrant a finding that a conviction exists. Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., supra, at 154. “‘Repeal is to be regarded as implied only if nec- essary to make the (later enacted law) work . . . .’” Id. at 155 (quoting Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963)). Section 101(a)(48) of the Act is readily given effect as applied to deferred adjudications under state law. Cf. Matter of Punu, supra. Similarly, section 101(a)(48) of the Act does not cover “the whole subject” addressed by 18 U.S.C. § 3607, nor does it completely substitute for 18 U.S.C. § 3607. Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., supra, at 154; Sharma v. INS, supra. Instead, the limited federal exception continues to apply to a narrow group of cases, notwithstanding the subsequent change in the law.

早在1977年，晚至1995年，驱逐程序中就已存在此类提交。国会不仅被视为知晓法规的先前解释，而且在其行动时也知晓既存的判例法。Scheidemann v. INS, 83 F.3d 1517, 1526 (3d Cir. 1996)；另见 Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978)（指出“推定国会知晓对法规的行政或司法解释，并在不加修改地重新颁布法规时采纳该解释”）（引述 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1975)；NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361, 366 (1951)；National Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 140, 147 (1920)；2A C. Sands, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 49.09 (4th ed. 1973)，及所引案例）。在IIRIRA中制定“定罪”的法定定义时，国会展示了对该术语在涉及移民法违规方面现有司法和行政解释的详尽了解。正如在Lorillard v. Pons, supra中一样，国会在消除我们先前定罪定义中某一特定要素时的选择性“强烈表明，若非国会明确作出的那些改变，它意图完全纳入[现有的]救济和程序。”Id. at 582。此外，该法第101(a)(48)条的颁布并未与18 U.S.C. § 3607的条款产生“不可调和的冲突”，因为该条仅构成对通常可据以认定存在定罪的标准的例外。Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., supra, at 154。“‘只有在为使（后来颁布的法律）发挥作用所必需时，才可视为默示废止。’”Id. at 155（引述 Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963)）。该法第101(a)(48)条在适用于州法律下的延期裁决时易于生效。Cf. Matter of Punu, supra。同样，该法第101(a)(48)条并不涵盖18 U.S.C. § 3607所处理的“整个主题”，也不完全替代18 U.S.C. § 3607。Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., supra, at 154；Sharma v. INS, supra。相反，有限的联邦例外继续适用于一小部分案件，尽管法律随后发生了变化。

II. MATTER OF MANRIQUE AND SECTION 101(A)(48) OF THE ACT

II. MANRIQUE案与该法第101(A)(48)条

Historically, the Attorney General has interpreted congressional intent as calling for the harsh treatment of convicted noncitizen drug offenders. Consequently, in Matter of A-F-, supra, the Attorney General ruled that an after-the-fact state expungement of a drug conviction need not be honored and that such a conviction would continue to form a ground for deportation. Section 3607, however, is a congressionally mandated exception supersed- ing any other federal definition of a “conviction,” based on Congress’ real-

历史上，司法部长将国会意图解释为要求对被定罪的非公民毒品犯罪者予以严厉对待。因此，在Matter of A-F-, supra中，司法部长裁定，事后州对毒品定罪的撤销不必予以尊重，且此类定罪将继续构成驱逐的理由。然而，第3607条是国会授权的例外，取代任何其他联邦对“定罪”的定义，其依据是国会对药物滥用广度的现实评估以及承认初犯和年轻犯罪者康复可能性的需要。它反映了国会相反的意图，即故意为初犯和年轻毒品犯罪者创设例外，并推翻严厉惩罚此类行为的其他立法意图表达。

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istic appraisal of the breadth of drug abuse and the need to acknowledge the rehabilitative possibilities in the case of first-time and youthful offenders. It reflects a contrary intent on the part of Congress, which deliberately creat- ed an exception for first-time and youthful drug offenders and overrides other expressions of legislative intent to harshly punish such conduct. In Matter of Manrique, supra, at 63 n.8, the Board noted that it “would now consider a person ‘convicted’ under the statutes in those cases, but for the policy of leniency toward first offenders.” (Emphasis added.) This inter- pretation is consistent with the language presently in the statute. Id. (citing Matter of Seda, 17 I&N Dec. 550 (BIA 1980), overruled in part, Matter of Ozkok, supra). The policy of leniency referred to is federal legislative poli- cy, reflected in congressional enactments. Matter of Manrique, supra, makes clear that, despite the imprecise and inexact references previously relied on by the Board and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, we now recognize that a disposition under 18 U.S.C. § 3607(a) is not a convic- tion. Matter of Manrique, supra, at 10 n.7. While some confusion may have been created as the result of the statutory subsections contained in § 3607, one of which refers to “expunged” convictions, see, e.g., § 3607(c), the fact of the nonexistence of a conviction under 18 U.S.C. 3607(b), and the fact of an expungement of a conviction, generally speaking, are distinct and are not to be confused. Id. Thus, in Matter of Manrique, we recognized that Matter of A-F-, supra, stands for the proposition that a drug offender’s expunged conviction is not to be excused for immigration purposes. See also Garberding v. INS, supra, at 445-46 (acknowledging that a drug offender cannot escape deportation by a technical erasure of his conviction). We acknowledged that, in the cases of youthful offenders, there is a rational basis for an exception to the rule under the former Federal Youth Correction Act (“FYCA”) (now codi- fied as 18 U.S.C. § 3607(c)), which the federal courts found to be equally as compelling as Congress’ concern that drug offenders be deported. See Mestre Morera v. United States INS, 462 F.2d 1030 (1st Cir. 1972); see also Matter of Andrade, supra; Matter of Zingis, supra. We also recognized that “[w]hen a similar issue arose regarding . . . first offender treatment,” the Service opined that the first offender provisions were for first offenders what the youthful corrections provisions were for minors. Matter of Manrique, supra, at 10; see also Matter of Andrade, supra. We reaffirmed and adopted that reasoning, applying it to cases arising under 18 U.S.C. § 3607.

在Matter of Manrique, supra, at 63 n.8中，委员会指出，它“现在将考虑根据那些案件中的法规被‘定罪’的人，但出于对初犯的宽大政策。”（强调为原文所加。）这一解释与法规目前的语言一致。Id.（引述Matter of Seda, 17 I&N Dec. 550 (BIA 1980)，部分被推翻，Matter of Ozkok, supra）。所提及的宽大政策是联邦立法政策，体现在国会立法中。Matter of Manrique, supra明确表明，尽管委员会和移民归化局先前依赖的引用不精确且不准确，我们现在认识到，根据18 U.S.C. § 3607(a)的处理不是定罪。Matter of Manrique, supra, at 10 n.7。虽然§ 3607中包含的法定小节（其中一节提及“被撤销”的定罪，见例如§ 3607(c)）可能造成了一些混淆，但根据18 U.S.C. 3607(b)定罪不存在的事实，与定罪被撤销的事实，一般而言是不同的，不应混淆。Id。因此，在Matter of Manrique中，我们认识到Matter of A-F-, supra支持以下主张：毒品犯罪者被撤销的定罪在移民目的上不予宽恕。另见Garberding v. INS, supra, at 445-46（承认毒品犯罪者不能通过技术性消除其定罪来逃避驱逐）。我们承认，在年轻犯罪者的案件中，前《联邦青年矫正法》（“FYCA”）（现编纂为18 U.S.C. § 3607(c)）下的规则例外具有合理基础，联邦法院认为其与国会关于毒品犯罪者应被驱逐的关注同样具有说服力。见Mestre Morera v. United States INS, 462 F.2d 1030 (1st Cir. 1972)；另见Matter of Andrade, supra；Matter of Zingis, supra。我们还认识到，“当关于……初犯待遇出现类似问题时”，移民局认为初犯条款对初犯的作用如同青年矫正条款对未成年人的作用。Matter of Manrique, supra, at 10；另见Matter of Andrade, supra。我们重申并采纳了该推理，将其适用于根据18 U.S.C. § 3607产生的案件。

The crux of the Board’s reaffirmation of the applicability of 18 U.S.C. § 3607 in Manrique is plain:

委员会在Manrique中重申18 U.S.C. § 3607适用性的核心是明确的：

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Matter of Manrique, supra, at 63-64 (citation omitted).

Matter of Manrique, supra, at 63-64（引文省略）。

As the Board stated in Manrique, the Board’s construction of federal ameliorative statutes as having state counterparts is found in the Board’s deci- sion in Matter of Andrade, supra. There, the Board extended the rule that a conviction under the federal youth offender statute would not constitute a basis for deportation to drug violators who had been treated as youth offend- ers under comparable state law. See also Matter of Zingis, supra, at 622-23 (citing Mestre Morera v. United States INS, supra, and holding that Congress’ desire to give youth a new chance “would be thwarted by deportation. Its pol- icy to provide for expungement of offenses by juveniles is as important a con- gressional policy as the policy to deport narcotics offenders.”). The Board’s decision in Matter of Andrade, supra, relied on the state- ments of then Solicitor General Robert Bork that “[d]eportation statutes, because of their drastic consequences, must be strictly construed. E.g., Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637, 642-643; Fong How Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10. Accordingly, a state conviction of a youth offender for a mari- huana offense that has been expunged following satisfactory rehabilitative treatment should not be regarded as the basis of deportation in the absence of persuasive reasons or a clear statement of congressional intent.” Id. app. at 655. In addition, the then Solicitor General concluded that, “given the role necessarily played by state law in deportation proceedings, . . . there is little, if any, reason to justify a different result where the expungement of a youth offender’s conviction occurred pursuant to state law. The same result can and, I think, should be reached in such a case.” Id. app. at 657. Moreover, in Andrade, then Solicitor General Bork noted:

正如委员会在Manrique中所指出，委员会将联邦改善性法规解释为具有州对应法规的构建见于委员会在Matter of Andrade, supra中的决定。在那里，委员会将联邦青年犯罪者法规下的定罪不构成驱逐理由的规则延伸至根据类似州法律被视为青年犯罪者的毒品违规者。另见Matter of Zingis, supra, at 622-23（引述Mestre Morera v. United States INS, supra，并裁定国会给予青年新机会的愿望“将因驱逐而受挫。其规定撤销青少年犯罪的政策与驱逐毒品犯罪者的政策同样是重要的国会政策。”）。委员会在Matter of Andrade, supra中的决定依赖于时任副检察长Robert Bork的陈述，即“[驱逐法规，由于其严厉后果，必须严格解释。E.g., Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637, 642-643；Fong How Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10。因此，在缺乏有说服力的理由或国会意图的明确声明的情况下，青年犯罪者因大麻犯罪而被州定罪并在令人满意的康复治疗后撤销的，不应被视为驱逐的依据。”Id. app. at 655。此外，时任副检察长得出结论，“鉴于州法律在驱逐程序中所必然发挥的作用，……几乎没有理由证明在青年犯罪者的定罪根据州法律被撤销的情况下会有不同结果。在这种情况下可以并且我认为应该达到相同的结果。”Id. app. at 657。此外，在Andrade中，时任副检察长Bork指出：

Id. (citations omitted). The Solicitor General further recognized that

Id.（引文省略）。副检察长进一步认识到，

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U.S. 204, 209-210; De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580-581; cf. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 354-358. In the context of deportation, it is unquestionable that state law has a role to play, in that certain convictions for violation of state law are grounds for deportation, and pardons by governors may bar a state conviction from being so used. . . . .

U.S. 204, 209-210；De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580-581；cf. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 354-358。在驱逐的背景下，毫无疑问州法律有其作用，因为某些违反州法律的定罪是驱逐的理由，而州长的赦免可能阻止州定罪被如此使用。……

Id. app. at 657-59; accord Garberding v. INS, supra. This is not a novel proposition, but reflects a consistently held position of the Board and the federal courts. For example, in Matter of Deris, supra, citing Matter of Werk, supra, the Board found that “[i]n passing the first offender statute, Congress expressed its intent to rehabilitate the individual user of drugs. This policy has been considered to be of equal importance to the congressional policy to deport narcotics offenders.” 6 Matter of Deris, supra, at 10 (footnote omitted). In Werk, the Board agreed with the position of the Immigration and Naturalization Service that the legislative history at H.R. Rep. No. 91-1444, reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin News 4566, 4616, “‘indicates that discharge and dismissal under [the former first offender statute] shall not be deemed conviction of a crime.’” Matter of Werk, supra, at 235 (quoting the Service). The Board reached its conclusion in Matter of Deris that state statutes that are counterparts to the first offender statute do not support a finding of deportability by referring to the Board’s treatment of federal youthful offender provisions. See Matter of Werk, supra, at 235. Therefore, the youthful and first offender exceptions to what constitutes a “conviction” extend to state convictions, and remain applicable today.

同上，附录第657-59页；同见Garberding v. INS，同上。 这并非新颖的主张，而是反映了移民上诉委员会和联邦法院一贯坚持的立场。例如，在Matter of Deris，同上中，委员会援引Matter of Werk，同上，认定“国会在通过初犯者法规时，表达了其改造吸毒者个人的意图。这一政策被认为与国会驱逐毒品犯罪者的政策同等重要。”6 Matter of Deris，同上，第10页（脚注省略）。在Werk案中，委员会同意移民和归化局的观点，即H.R. Rep. No. 91-1444的立法史（重印于1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin News 4566, 4616）“表明，根据[前初犯者法规]作出的释放和撤销起诉不应被视为犯罪定罪。”Matter of Werk，同上，第235页（引用移民局意见）。 委员会在Matter of Deris中通过援引委员会对联邦青少年犯罪者条款的处理，得出结论：与初犯者法规相对应的州法规不支持可驱逐性的认定。见Matter of Werk，同上，第235页。因此，关于何为“定罪”的青少年犯罪者和初犯者例外延伸适用于州定罪，并且至今仍然适用。

In actuality, the case before us is not an expungement case, but a case involving whether a conviction may be considered to exist “for any . . . pur-

实际上，我们面前的案件并非撤销定罪记录案件，而是一个涉及是否可以认定存在“为任何……目的”的定罪的案件。

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pose.” 18 U.S.C. § 3607(b). As addressed in Garberding v. INS, supra, and subsequently conceded by the Board as applying in Matter of Manrique, supra, the constitutional guarantee of equal protection requires us to give the same effect to a disposition under state law that we would be bound to give had the respondent been prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 3607 itself. As the Board stated in Matter of Dillingham, 21 I&N Dec. 1001 (BIA 1997),

目的。”18 U.S.C. § 3607(b)。正如Garberding v. INS，同上中所论述，以及委员会随后在Matter of Manrique，同上中承认适用的那样，平等保护的宪法保障要求我们对州法律下的处置赋予与答辩人若根据18 U.S.C. § 3607本身被起诉时我们必将赋予的相同效力。正如委员会在Matter of Dillingham, 21 I&N Dec. 1001 (BIA 1997)中所指出的，

Id. at 1002-3 (footnote omitted). In the case of an “expungement” under 18 U.S.C. § 3607, it is the leg- islative branch that has determined to allow an ameliorative mechanism to overcome and even obviate the fact that a conviction has previously been entered. The operation of such provisions does not rely on a specific exec- utive determination relevant to an individual case, but is founded on the notion that post-conviction conduct may warrant the erasure of a conviction for certain specified purposes. See, e.g., Matter of Luviano, 21 I&N Dec. 235 (BIA 1996). As I have clarified, 18 U.S.C. § 3607 contains two independently oper- ative provisions—(a) and (c). The former provision is a pre-judgment dis- position and does not involve a conviction, and the latter provision appears to involve an expungement of a pre-judgement disposition. Neither may be treated as a conviction for any purpose. 18 U.S.C. § 3607(b). Therefore, § 3607 is not, by any stretch of the imagination, a typical expungement pro- vision. Congress specifically mandated to the contrary. Simple logic also leads to the conclusion that dispositions under 18 U.S.C. § 3607 are not “expungements,” in the ordinary sense of the word, since a conviction must preexist an “expungement” in order for such ame- liorative action to have anything to expunge. See, e.g., § 3607(a). It is stat- ed unequivocally in § 3607 that the dispositions contained in its subsections shall not be treated as a conviction for any purpose. 18 U.S.C. § 3607(b). It therefore is wholly improper and inappropriate to refer to dispositions under § 3607 as “convictions” which have been “expunged.” Even were we to interpret the change in section 101(a)(48)(A) of the

同上，第1002-3页（脚注省略）。 在根据18 U.S.C. § 3607进行“撤销定罪记录”的情况下，是立法分支决定允许一种改良机制来克服甚至消除此前已作出定罪这一事实。此类条款的运作并不依赖于针对个案的具体行政裁定，而是建立在以下理念之上：定罪后的行为可能为某些特定目的而值得消除定罪。见，例如，Matter of Luviano, 21 I&N Dec. 235 (BIA 1996)。 正如我已澄清的，18 U.S.C. § 3607包含两项独立运作的条款——(a)和(c)。前一条款是判决前处置，不涉及定罪；后一条款似乎涉及对判决前处置的撤销定罪记录。两者均不得为任何目的被视为定罪。18 U.S.C. § 3607(b)。因此，§ 3607无论如何想象都不是典型的撤销定罪记录条款。国会明确作出了相反的规定。 简单的逻辑也得出以下结论：18 U.S.C. § 3607下的处置并非通常意义上的“撤销定罪记录”，因为定罪必须先在“撤销定罪记录”之前存在，此种改良措施才有可撤销的内容。见，例如，§ 3607(a)。§ 3607明确规定，其各款所载的处置不得为任何目的被视为定罪。18 U.S.C. § 3607(b)。因此，将§ 3607下的处置称为已被“撤销”的“定罪”是完全不当和不适宜的。 即使我们将该法第101(a)(48)(A)条的修改解释为影响那些可能被解释为已撤销定罪的处置，

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Act as affecting those dispositions that might otherwise be construed as expunged convictions, this would not alter the way in which we are bound to construe dispositions under § 3607 or its counterparts, as established in Garberding v. INS, supra, and Matter of Manrique, supra. As the majority acknowledges, “There is no issue in this case regarding this respondent’s satisfaction of each of the four Manrique requirements” that we employ to determine whether the disposition under state law is comparable to a pros- ecution under the federal first offender statute. Matter of Roldan, supra, at 16 (BIA 1999). Thus, the respondent is not deportable.

这也不会改变我们根据§ 3607或其对应法规解释处置的受约束方式，正如Garberding v. INS，同上和Matter of Manrique，同上所确立的那样。正如多数意见所承认的，“本案中不存在关于答辩人是否满足我们用以确定州法律下的处置是否可与根据联邦初犯者法规起诉相比拟的四项Manrique要求中每一项的问题。”Matter of Roldan，同上，第16页（BIA 1999）。因此，答辩人不可被驱逐。

III. CONCLUSION

III. 结论

In conclusion, the enactment of section 101(a)(48) of the Act does not act to repeal 18 U.S.C. § 3607 as applied to determining deportability. As in Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., supra, at 155, “[I]t is not enough to show that the two statutes produce differing results when applied to the same factual situation, for that no more than states the problem.” Rather, “when two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts . . . to regard each as effective.” Morton v. Mancari, supra, at 551.

总之，该法第101(a)(48)条的颁布并不构成对18 U.S.C. § 3607在确定可驱逐性方面的适用上的废止。正如在Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co.，同上，第155页中所述，“仅表明两部法规在适用于同一事实情况时产生不同结果是不够的，因为这只不过是在陈述问题。”相反，“当两部法规能够共存时，法院有义务……将每一部视为有效。”Morton v. Mancari，同上，第551页。

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