Matter of Monreal-Aguinaga

Cite as 23 I&N Dec. 56 (BIA 2001) Interim Decision #3447

引用为 23 I&N Dec. 56 (BIA 2001) 临时决定 #3447

File A93 093 210 - Dallas

案卷 A93 093 210 - 达拉斯

Decided May 4, 2001

2001年5月4日决定

U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals

美国司法部 移民审查执行办公室 移民上诉委员会

(1) To establish “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship,” an applicant for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (Supp. V 1999), must demonstrate that his or her spouse, parent, or child would suffer hardship that is substantially beyond that which would ordinarily be expected to result from the alien’s deportation, but need not show that such hardship would be “unconscionable.”

(1) 为确立“特殊且极其不寻常的困难”，根据《移民与国籍法》第240A(b)条，8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (Supp. V 1999) 申请取消递解的外国人，必须证明其配偶、父母或子女将遭受的困难实质上超出通常预期因该外国人被驱逐出境而导致的困难，但无需证明该困难将“不合情理”。

(2) Although many of the factors that were considered in assessing “extreme hardship” for suspension of deportation should also be considered in evaluating “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship,” an applicant for cancellation of removal must demonstrate hardship beyond that which has historically been required in suspension of deportation cases involving the “extreme hardship” standard.

(2) 尽管在评估暂停驱逐的“极端困难”时考虑的许多因素在评估“特殊且极其不寻常的困难”时也应予以考虑，但取消递解的申请人必须证明的困难超出历史上在涉及“极端困难”标准的暂停驱逐案件中所要求的困难。

(3) In establishing eligibility for cancellation of removal, only hardship to qualifying

(3) 在确立取消递解的资格时，仅可考虑对符合条件的

relatives, not to the applicant himself or herself, may be considered, and hardship factors relating to the applicant may be considered only insofar as they might affect the hardship to a qualifying relative.

亲属的困难，而非对申请人本人的困难，且与申请人相关的困难因素仅在其可能影响符合条件的亲属的困难时才可予以考虑。

FOR RESPONDENT: Juan Luis Burgos-Gandia, Esquire, Richardson, Texas

被申请人代理律师：Juan Luis Burgos-Gandia 律师，德克萨斯州理查森

FOR THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE: Heidi Graham, Assistant District Counsel

移民与归化局代理律师：Heidi Graham，助理地区法律顾问

BEFORE: Board En Banc: SCIALABBA, Acting Chairman; DUNNE, Vice Chairman; HEILMAN, SCHMIDT, HOLMES, HURWITZ, VILLAGELIU, FILPPU, COLE, GUENDELSBERGER, MATHON, JONES, GRANT, MOSCATO, MILLER, BRENNAN, ESPENOZA, OSUNA, and OHLSON, Board Members. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion: ROSENBERG, Board Member.

全体委员会审理：代理主席 SCIALABBA；副主席 DUNNE；委员会成员 HEILMAN、SCHMIDT、HOLMES、HURWITZ、VILLAGELIU、FILPPU、COLE、GUENDELSBERGER、MATHON、JONES、GRANT、MOSCATO、MILLER、BRENNAN、ESPENOZA、OSUNA 和 OHLSON。同意与反对意见：委员会成员 ROSENBERG。

HOLMES, Board Member:

委员会成员 HOLMES：

The respondent has filed a timely appeal from an Immigration Judge’s May 19, 1998, decision finding him removable as charged, denying his application for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (Supp. V 1999), and

被申请人对移民法官1998年5月19日的决定及时提出上诉，该决定认定其可如指控被递解，驳回其根据《移民与国籍法》第240A(b)条，8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (Supp. V 1999) 提出的取消递解申请，并

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引用为 23 I&N Dec. 56 (BIA 2001) 临时决定 #3447

granting his request for voluntary departure under section 240B(b) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b) (Supp. V 1999). The respondent appeals solely from the denial of his application for cancellation of removal. The appeal will be dismissed.

批准其根据该法第240B(b)条，8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b) (Supp. V 1999) 提出的自愿离境请求。被申请人仅就取消递解申请的驳回提出上诉。上诉将被驳回。

I. BACKGROUND

I. 背景

In proceedings conducted in 1998, the respondent conceded that he was removable from the United States but applied for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b) of the Act, as well as for voluntary departure. Section 240A(b) of the Act provides that the Attorney General may cancel the removal of, and adjust to the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, an alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the United States if the alien: (A) has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than 10 years immediately preceding the date of such application; (B) has been a person of good moral character during such period; (C) has not been convicted of specified criminal offenses; and (D) establishes that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. Section 240A(b) of the Act; see also 8 C.F.R. § 240.20 (2001).

在1998年进行的程序中，被申请人承认其可从美国被递解，但根据该法第240A(b)条申请取消递解，并申请自愿离境。该法第240A(b)条规定，司法部长可以取消下列外国人的递解并将其身份调整为合法永久居民，如果该外国人：(A) 在此类申请之日紧接之前的连续不少于10年期间内实际居住在美国；(B) 在该期间内品行良好；(C) 未被判定犯有特定刑事罪行；且 (D) 证明递解将导致该外国人的配偶、父母或子女（其为美国公民或合法永久居民）遭受特殊且极其不寻常的困难。该法第240A(b)条；另见 8 C.F.R. § 240.20 (2001)。

The respondent is a 34-year-old native and citizen of Mexico who has been living in the United States since his entry in 1980. He has not returned to Mexico since coming to this country as a 14-year-old child. His wife, who was not statutorily eligible for cancellation of removal, voluntarily departed to Mexico shortly before the respondent’s hearing on his application for cancellation of removal, and she took their infant United States citizen child with her. The couple’s two older children have remained with the respondent in the United States. The oldest child is now 12 years old and the middle child is 8 years old. Both are United States citizens.

被申请人是一名34岁的墨西哥本土公民，自1980年入境以来一直居住在美国。他自14岁作为儿童来到美国后未返回墨西哥。他的妻子（不符合取消递解的法定资格）在被申请人就其取消递解申请举行听证前不久自愿离境前往墨西哥，并带走了他们的美国公民婴儿。这对夫妇的两个较大子女与申请人一起留在美国。最大的孩子现年12岁，中间的孩子8岁。两人均为美国公民。

The respondent has been gainfully employed in this country since his entry as a teenager, and he provides the sole support for his two citizen children in this country, as well as sending money to his wife in Mexico. He has worked in an uncle’s business continuously since 1991. The respondent’s parents lawfully immigrated to this country in 1995, and his children sometimes spend time with these grandparents when their father is working. In addition, the respondent has seven siblings who reside lawfully in the United States, as well as a brother in Mexico who also works for the respondent’s uncle. The respondent’s oldest child testified at the hearing about his life in this country and his desire not to depart for Mexico, which he would do if his father was required to leave the United States.

被申请人自青少年入境以来一直在美国有酬就业，并且是他在美国的两名公民子女的唯一抚养人，同时向墨西哥的妻子汇款。他自1991年以来一直在一名叔叔的企业中连续工作。被申请人的父母于1995年合法移民到美国，他的孩子有时在父亲工作时与这些祖父母共度时光。此外，被申请人在美国有七名合法居住的兄弟姐妹，在墨西哥还有一名兄弟也为被申请人的叔叔工作。被申请人最大的孩子在听证会上作证讲述了他在美国的生活以及他不愿前往墨西哥的愿望，如果他的父亲被要求离开美国，他将前往墨西哥。

There is no dispute that the respondent satisfies the good moral character and continuous physical presence requirements for cancellation of removal.

对于被申请人满足取消递解的良好品行和连续实际居住要求，没有争议。

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Moreover, if he were found statutorily eligible for cancellation, we would grant relief in the exercise of discretion. In this latter regard, the Immigration Judge noted that this was a “sad” case, particularly in view of its effect on the United States citizen children, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service trial attorney characterized the respondent and his family as “really good people.” Thus, the determinative issue before us is whether this respondent’s United States citizen children or his lawful permanent resident parents will suffer “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” if the respondent is ordered deported, as is required for him to establish statutory eligibility for cancellation of removal. The Immigration Judge concluded that this hardship requirement had not been met. We agree.

此外，如果他被认定具有取消递解的法定资格，我们将在行使自由裁量权时给予救济。在后一点上，移民法官指出这是一个“悲伤”的案件，特别是考虑到其对美国公民子女的影响，移民与归化局 trial attorney 将被申请人及其家人描述为“真正的好人”。因此，我们面前的确定性问题是被申请人的美国公民子女或其合法永久居民父母如果被申请人被命令驱逐出境，是否会遭受“特殊且极其不寻常的困难”，这是其确立取消递解法定资格所必需的。移民法官得出结论认为该困难要求未得到满足。我们同意。

II. MEANING OF THE TERM “EXCEPTIONAL AND EXTREMELY UNUSUAL HARDSHIP”

II. “特殊且极其不寻常的困难”一词的含义

This case requires that we address the meaning of the term “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship,” as used in section 240A(b)(1)(D) of the Act. Under the prior law regarding suspension of deportation, an alien, such as this respondent, seeking that form of relief had to establish that he or his qualifying relative would suffer “extreme hardship” if deported. See section 244(a)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1994) (repealed 1996). In 1996, Congress replaced the suspension of deportation provisions of the Act with a form of relief entitled “Cancellation of Removal and Adjustment of Status for Certain Nonpermanent Residents.” See section 240A(b) of the Act.

本案要求我们阐述该法第240A(b)(1)(D)条中使用的“特殊且极其不寻常的困难”一词的含义。根据先前关于暂停驱逐的法律，像本被申请人这样寻求该形式救济的外国人必须证明，如果被驱逐，他或其符合条件的亲属将遭受“极端困难”。见该法第244(a)(1)条，8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1994)（1996年废止）。1996年，国会将该法的暂停驱逐条款替换为一种名为“某些非永久居民的取消递解和身份调整”的救济形式。见该法第240A(b)条。

In enacting the cancellation statute, Congress narrowed the class of aliens who could qualify for relief. Under the present cancellation statute, an alien must have 10 years of continuous physical presence in this country, rather than the 7 years necessary under the previous requirements for suspension of deportation. Furthermore, under the new statute, hardship to the applicant for relief is not considered; only hardship to the alien’s United States citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse, parent, or child may be considered. Finally, as indicated above, an alien must show that his or her qualifying relative would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship if the alien is deported.

在颁布取消递解法时，国会缩小了有资格获得救济的外国人类别。根据现行的取消递解法，外国人必须在美国连续实际居住10年，而非先前暂停驱逐要求所需的7年。此外，根据新法，不考虑对救济申请人的困难；仅可考虑对外国人的美国公民或合法永久居民配偶、父母或子女的困难。最后，如上所述，外国人必须证明如果其被驱逐，其符合条件的亲属将遭受特殊且极其不寻常的困难。

The cancellation statute does not further define the term “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.” It is axiomatic, however, that the interpretation of statutory language begins with the terms of the statute itself, and if those terms, on their face, constitute a plain expression of congressional intent, they must be given effect. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). Citing INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 189 (1984), we have also recognized that the “legislative purpose is presumed to be expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used.” Matter of Crammond, 23 I&N Dec. 9, 11 (BIA 2001).

取消递解法未进一步定义“特殊且极其不寻常的困难”一词。然而，不言而喻，法定语言的解释始于法规本身的术语，如果这些术语表面上构成国会意图的明确表达，则必须赋予其效力。Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)。引用 INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 189 (1984)，我们也认识到“立法目的被推定由所用词语的通常含义表达。”Matter of Crammond, 23 I&N Dec. 9, 11 (BIA 2001)。

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The terms “exceptional” and “extremely unusual” seemingly have ordinary meanings. “Exceptional” is defined as “[f]orming an exception; not ordinary; uncommon; rare.” Webster’s New International Dictionary 888 (2d ed. 1959). The added phrase “extremely unusual” plainly indicates circumstances in which the exception to the norm is very uncommon. The “plain meaning” of these terms becomes somewhat less clear, however, when appended to the term hardship, which can have multiple manifestations and inherently introduces an element of subjectivity into this statutory phrase. If the past 50 years have demonstrated nothing else with regard to the phrases “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” and “extreme hardship,” they have shown that reasonable people can agree that the meaning of these terms is “clear,” but come to quite different conclusions as to their application in various factual situations. These are not terms of “fixed and inflexible content or meaning.” Matter of Hwang, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964) (addressing “extreme hardship”).

“特殊”和“极其不寻常”这两个术语似乎具有通常含义。“特殊”被定义为“[形]成例外；非普通；不常见；罕见。”Webster's New International Dictionary 888 (2d ed. 1959)。添加的短语“极其不寻常”明确表示对常规的例外非常罕见的情形。然而，当这些术语附加于困难一词时，“明确含义”变得有些不太清晰，困难可以有多种表现形式，并固有地将主观性因素引入该法定短语。如果过去50年在“特殊且极其不寻常的困难”和“极端困难”这些短语方面没有表明其他什么，它们已经表明，理性的人可以同意这些术语的含义是“明确的”，但在各种事实情况下的适用上得出完全不同的结论。这些不是“固定和灵活内容或含义”的术语。Matter of Hwang, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964)（涉及“极端困难”）。

It is obvious, however, under the plain meaning of the words used in the two statutes, that the hardship standard for cancellation of removal is a higher one than that under the suspension of deportation statute. See generally Cortes- Castillo v. INS, 997 F.2d 1199 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard is more restrictive than the extreme hardship standard); Brown v. INS, 775 F.2d 383 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (same); see also Hernandez-Cordero v. INS, 819 F.2d 558, 565 (5th Cir. 1987) (Rubin, J., dissenting) (“Had Congress intended to restrict relief so narrowly [in section 244(a)(1) of the Act], it could easily have substituted words like those used in the next part of section 244(a), where relief for certain groups of aliens such as convicted criminals and anarchists is limited to cases of ‘exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.’”) The legislative history also plainly states that Congress intended to tighten the hardship standard, in part as a response to what it saw as a weakening of the extreme hardship requirement in certain precedent decisions of this Board. See, e.g., Matter of O-J-O-, 21 I&N Dec. 381 (BIA 1996); see also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-828 (1996).

然而，显而易见的是，根据这两部法规所用词语的通常含义，取消递解出境所适用的困难标准高于暂停递解出境法规下的标准。参见 generally Cortes-Castillo v. INS, 997 F.2d 1199 (7th Cir. 1993)（指出特殊且极其不寻常的困难标准比极端困难标准更具限制性）；Brown v. INS, 775 F.2d 383 (D.C. Cir. 1985)（同上）；另见 Hernandez-Cordero v. INS, 819 F.2d 558, 565 (5th Cir. 1987)（Rubin 法官异议）（“如果国会意图如此狭窄地限制救济[在该法第244(a)(1)条中]，它本可以轻易地替换为第244(a)条下一部分所使用的词语，该部分将某些类别外国人（如被定罪的罪犯和无政府主义者）的救济限于‘特殊且极其不寻常的困难’案件。”）立法历史也明确表明，国会意图收紧困难标准，部分原因是对其认为本委员会某些先例裁决中极端困难要求被削弱所作的回应。参见，例如，Matter of O-J-O-, 21 I&N Dec. 381 (BIA 1996)；另见 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-828 (1996)。

Although the legislative history of section 240A(b)(1)(D) does not attempt to further define the term “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship,” it does provide some guidance as to Congress’ intent in adopting the term. The House Conference Report states that “[t]he managers have deliberately changed the required showing of hardship from ‘extreme hardship’ to ‘exceptional and extremely unusual hardship’ to emphasize that the alien must provide evidence of harm to his spouse, parent, or child substantially beyond that which ordinarily would be expected to result from the alien’s deportation.” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-828 (emphasis added). The legislative history also talks of this relief being available “in truly exceptional cases.” Id. Thus, it appears that Congress intended that cancellation of removal should be available to nonpermanent residents only in compelling cases.

尽管第240A(b)(1)(D)条的立法历史并未试图进一步界定“特殊且极其不寻常的困难”一词，但它确实就国会通过该词时的意图提供了一些指引。众议院会议报告指出，“管理者们有意将所需的困难证明从‘极端困难’改为‘特殊且极其不寻常的困难’，以强调外国人必须提供证据证明其配偶、父母或子女所受的伤害实质上超出通常可预期因该外国人被递解出境而产生的伤害。”H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-828（着重号为后加）。立法历史还谈到该救济“在真正特殊的案件中”才可获得。同上。因此，看来国会意图是，取消递解出境仅应在令人信服的案件中向非永久居民提供。

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We are aware of the general rule that when “Congress adopts a new law incorporating sections of a prior law, Congress normally can be presumed to have had knowledge of the interpretation given to the incorporated law, at least insofar as it affects the new statute.” Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978); see also Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211 (BIA 1985). Here, only a phrase, not a whole section of law, was adopted from the prior law. The origins of the phrase “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” are in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (“1952 Act”). There is both legislative history from the 1952 Act and subsequent case law involving this phrase that we can look to in an attempt to clarify its meaning.

我们知悉一般规则，即当“国会通过新法律纳入先前法律的条款时，通常可以推定国会知悉赋予被纳入法律的解释，至少在该解释影响新法规的范围内。”Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978)；另见 Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211 (BIA 1985)。在此，从先前法律中采纳的仅是一个短语，而非整节法律。“特殊且极其不寻常的困难”这一短语的起源在于1952年《移民与国籍法》，ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163（“1952年法”）。既有1952年法的立法历史，也有涉及该短语的后续判例法，我们可以借助它们来试图澄清其含义。

Under the 1952 Act, as originally enacted, “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” was the hardship standard applicable to all applicants for suspension of deportation.1 The legislative history of the 1952 Act reflects that, at the time, Congress intended that the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard be a very high one indeed. The House Report states that suspension of deportation “should be available only in the very limited category of cases in which the deportation of the alien would be unconscionable.” H.R. Rep. No. 82-1365 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1653, 1718; S. Rep. No. 82-1137, at 25 (1952); see also INS v. Phinpathya, supra, at 190-92; Asikese v. Brownell, 230 F.2d 34, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Matter of M-, 5 I&N Dec. 261 (1953).

根据最初颁布的1952年法，“特殊且极其不寻常的困难”是适用于所有暂停递解出境申请人的困难标准。1 1952年法的立法历史反映，当时国会意图使特殊且极其不寻常的困难标准确实是一个非常高的标准。众议院报告指出，暂停递解出境“应仅在非常有限的案件中可获得，即在该类案件中，将该外国人递解出境将是不可容忍的。”H.R. Rep. No. 82-1365 (1952)，重印于 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1653, 1718；S. Rep. No. 82-1137, at 25 (1952)；另见 INS v. Phinpathya, supra, at 190-92；Asikese v. Brownell, 230 F.2d 34, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1956)；Matter of M-, 5 I&N Dec. 261 (1953)。

We are not persuaded, however, that the relevant cancellation standard should be that a respondent’s deportation be “unconscionable” in its effect on a qualifying relative before a respondent can be found eligible for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b) of the present Act. The legislative history of the 1952 Act referencing such hardship is nearly 50 years old and arose in a different statutory context. Moreover, although the hardship term used then is the same as the one we consider now, there is nothing in the legislative history of the current cancellation statute to suggest that such an extreme standard should be applied. In fact, as discussed above, that history suggests a standard that, although high, is clearly less than “unconscionable.” Furthermore, 50 years of case law regarding the meaning of both “extreme hardship” and “exceptional

然而，我们并不认为相关的取消标准应当是：在依据现行法案第240A(b)条认定答复人有资格获得取消递解之前，答复人的递解对其符合条件的亲属的影响须达到“不合情理”的程度。1952年法案中提及此类困境的立法史距今已近50年，且产生于不同的法定语境。此外，尽管当时使用的困境一词与我们如今审议的相同，但现行取消递解法规的立法史中没有任何内容表明应适用如此极端的标准。事实上，如上所述，该立法史所表明的标准虽然很高，但显然低于“不合情理”。此外，50年来关于“极端困境”和“特殊”含义的判例法

1 In 1962, Congress amended the suspension of deportation provisions, reconfiguring former section 244(a) from five subsections into two. The prior “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard was retained for immigration offenders deportable under specified statutory grounds, principally relating to crime, fraud, and security, who also had to show 10 years of continuous physical presence. See section 244(a)(2) of the Act. The then new section 244(a)(1) established, inter alia, the “extreme hardship” standard for all other applicants for suspension who only needed to show 7 years of continuous physical presence. Congress’ intent was to lessen the degree of hardship required of applicants for suspension under section 244(a)(1). See Matter of Hwang, supra, at 452. The shifts in legislation regarding this form of relief reflect something of the ebb and flow of Congress’ reaction to immigration over the last century.

1 1962年，国会修订了暂停递解出境条款，将原第244(a)条从五个小节重新配置为两个小节。先前的“特殊且极其不寻常的困难”标准被保留适用于因特定法定理由（主要涉及犯罪、欺诈和安全）可被递解出境的移民违法者，这些人还须证明连续实际居住10年。参见该法第244(a)(2)条。当时新的第244(a)(1)条除其他事项外，为所有其他仅需证明连续实际居住7年的暂停申请人确立了“极端困难”标准。国会的意图是减轻第244(a)(1)条下暂停申请人所要求的困难程度。参见 Matter of Hwang, supra, at 452。关于此类救济的立法变化反映了过去一个世纪国会对外来移民反应的一定起伏。

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and extremely unusual hardship” have intervened since the legislative history of the 1952 Act was promulgated. Finally, the Board case law that immediately followed the 1952 Act adopted the “unconscionable” standard, but found that the standard was met in circumstances that arguably would not now be deemed “truly exceptional.” See, e.g., Matter of H-, 5 I&N Dec. 416 (BIA 1953) (focusing principally on long residence and an inability to return to the United States); see also Cortes-Castillo v. INS, supra, at 1203-04 (7th Cir. 1993). Therefore, we do not find that an “unconscionable” standard is an appropriate one to apply in evaluating a respondent’s eligibility for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b) of the Act.

且极其不寻常的困难”的50年判例法自1952年法立法历史颁布以来已经出现。最后，紧随1952年法之后的委员会判例法采纳了“不可容忍”标准，但认定在如今可能不会被视为“真正特殊”的情形下该标准已得到满足。参见，例如，Matter of H-, 5 I&N Dec. 416 (BIA 1953)（主要关注长期居住和无法返回美国）；另见 Cortes-Castillo v. INS, supra, at 1203-04 (7th Cir. 1993)。因此，我们不认为“不可容忍”标准是评估答辩人根据该法第240A(b)条获得取消递解出境资格的适当标准。

Similarly, we do not find determinative guidance from the series of cases dating from 1953 to 1957, which applied the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard” in the suspension of deportation context prior to the amendments to section 244 of the Act in 1962. See, e.g., Matter of C-, 7 I&N Dec. 608 (BIA 1957); Matter of M-V-, 7 I&N Dec. 571 (BIA 1957); Matter of Z-, 7 I&N Dec. 253 (BIA 1956); Matter of M-, 7 I&N Dec. 147 (BIA 1956); Matter of B-, 6 I&N Dec. 713 (BIA, A.G. 1955); Matter of A-, 6 I&N Dec. 242 (BIA 1954); Matter of S-, 5 I&N Dec. 695 (BIA 1954); Matter of W-, 5 I&N Dec. 586 (BIA 1953); Matter of J-, 5 I&N Dec. 509 (BIA 1953); Matter of M-, 5 I&N Dec. 448 (BIA 1953); Matter of P-, 5 I&N Dec. 421 (BIA 1953); Matter of Z-, 5 I&N Dec. 419 (BIA 1953); Matter of H-, supra; Matter of U-, 5 I&N Dec. 413 (BIA 1953); Matter of S-, 5 I&N Dec. 409 (BIA 1953).2

同样，我们也不认为1953年至1957年间在1962年该法第244条修正之前于暂停递解出境语境中适用“特殊且极其不寻常的困难标准”的一系列案件提供了决定性指引。参见，例如，Matter of C-, 7 I&N Dec. 608 (BIA 1957)；Matter of M-V-, 7 I&N Dec. 571 (BIA 1957)；Matter of Z-, 7 I&N Dec. 253 (BIA 1956)；Matter of M-, 7 I&N Dec. 147 (BIA 1956)；Matter of B-, 6 I&N Dec. 713 (BIA, A.G. 1955)；Matter of A-, 6 I&N Dec. 242 (BIA 1954)；Matter of S-, 5 I&N Dec. 695 (BIA 1954)；Matter of W-, 5 I&N Dec. 586 (BIA 1953)；Matter of J-, 5 I&N Dec. 509 (BIA 1953)；Matter of M-, 5 I&N Dec. 448 (BIA 1953)；Matter of P-, 5 I&N Dec. 421 (BIA 1953)；Matter of Z-, 5 I&N Dec. 419 (BIA 1953)；Matter of H-, supra；Matter of U-, 5 I&N Dec. 413 (BIA 1953)；Matter of S-, 5 I&N Dec. 409 (BIA 1953)。2

This case law covers only that period of time when the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard was applied to all applicants for suspension of deportation, predating the period during which the standard was required principally for criminal aliens. Furthermore, in many of these cases the focus was on hardship to the alien, a hardship element that cannot even be considered under the present statute. See, e.g., Matter of S-, 5 I&N Dec. 409 (setting out the factors to consider in evaluating the necessary degree of hardship for suspension of deportation eligibility). Finally, all of this case law arose in a different overall statutory context and obviously significantly predated the decades of interpretation of the “extreme hardship” standard that culminated in Congress’ enactment in 1996 of the cancellation of removal provisions in section 240A(b) of the Act. See, e.g., Cortes-Castillo v. INS, supra, at 1204 (“The definition of ‘exceptional and extremely unusual hardship’, now applied

该判例法仅涵盖“特殊且极其不寻常的困难”标准适用于所有暂停递解出境申请人的那段时期，早于该标准主要要求适用于犯罪外国人的时期。此外，在许多此类案件中，关注点在于外国人自身的困难，而这一困难要素在现行法规下甚至不能予以考虑。参见，例如，Matter of S-, 5 I&N Dec. 409（列出评估暂停递解出境资格所需困难程度时应考虑的因素）。最后，所有这些判例法都产生于不同的整体法定语境，并且显然大大早于对“极端困难”标准数十年的解释，这些解释最终促成了国会于1996年在该法第240A(b)条中颁布取消递解出境条款。参见，例如，Cortes-Castillo v. INS, supra, at 1204（“‘特殊且极其不寻常的困难’的定义，现适用于

2 In Matter of S-, 5 I&N Dec. 409, we identified five factors to be considered in evaluating “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.” This decision was issued simultaneously with four other published Board decisions, cited above, which applied the standard in varying factual circumstances. The approach of providing examples and discussion in published Board decisions in varying factual settings likely remains the best manner in which to provide content to the phrase “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” in the context of applications for cancellation of removal under the present law.

2 在 Matter of S-, 5 I&N Dec. 409 中，我们确定了评估“特殊且极其不寻常的困难”时应考虑的五项因素。该裁决与上述另外四项公布的委员会裁决同时发布，这些裁决在不同事实情形下适用了该标准。在不同事实背景下通过公布的委员会裁决提供示例和讨论的做法，可能仍然是在现行法下取消递解出境申请语境中为“特殊且极其不寻常的困难”一语提供内容的最佳方式。

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only to aliens seeking relief under section 244(a)(2), has become more stringent in the forty years since the Board decided Matter of S. and Matter of U.”).3 In view of these considerations, as well as the fact that so many years have passed and so much intervening (and not necessarily consistent) case law has developed regarding the term “extreme hardship” since these cases were decided, we do not find that any determinative guidance considering the phrase “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” in the cancellation of removal context arises from these early suspension of deportation cases.

仅适用于寻求第244(a)(2)条下救济的外国人，自委员会裁决 Matter of S. 和 Matter of U. 以来的四十年间已变得更加严格。”）3 鉴于这些考虑，以及自这些案件裁决以来已过去如此多年，且在此期间就“极端困难”一词发展出了如此多（且未必一致）的判例法，我们不认为这些早期暂停递解出境案件在取消递解出境语境下就“特殊且极其不寻常的困难”一语提供了任何决定性指引。

Thus, although both the relevant legislative history from the 1952 Act and the old case law discussed above provide an historical context for evaluating the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard in applications for cancellation of removal, our principal focus is on the statutory language itself and the legislative history of the revisions that were enacted in 1996. What is clear is that the term “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” is a more restrictive standard than the “extreme hardship” standard applied in section 244(a)(1) suspension of deportation cases, particularly as it was applied in Matter of O-J-O-, supra. The new standard requires a showing of hardship beyond that which has historically been required in suspension of deportation cases involving the “extreme hardship” standard. As the legislative history indicates, the hardship to an alien’s relatives, if the alien is obliged to leave the United States, must be “substantially” beyond the ordinary hardship that would be expected when a close family member leaves this country. Cancellation of removal under section 240A(b) of the Act is to be limited to “truly exceptional” situations. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-828.4

因此，尽管1952年法案的相关立法历史以及上文讨论的旧判例法为评估取消递解出境申请中的“特殊且极其不寻常的困难”标准提供了历史背景，我们的主要关注点仍是法定语言本身以及1996年所颁布修订的立法历史。明确的是，“特殊且极其不寻常的困难”一词比适用于第244(a)(1)条暂停递解出境案件的“极端困难”标准更具限制性，尤其是如其在Matter of O-J-O-案（见上文）中的适用。新标准要求证明的困难超出历史上在涉及“极端困难”标准的暂停递解出境案件中所要求的程度。正如立法历史所表明，如果外国人被迫离开美国，其亲属所遭受的困难必须“实质上”超出近亲属离开本国时通常可预期的普通困难。根据该法第240A(b)条取消递解出境应限于“真正特殊”的情形。H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-828.4

3 A more recent Board precedent, Matter of Pena-Diaz, 20 I&N Dec. 841 (BIA 1994), involved a respondent who was required to meet the more exacting exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard for suspension of deportation because he had been convicted of a controlled substance violation. Under the particular circumstances of that case, we found that the respondent had shown a prima facie case of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship where he had been in the United States for more than 20 years, and where the Service had “affirmatively permitted” him to remain here for many years by granting his request for deferred action. Id. at 846. However, that case did not provide a discussion of the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard and involved a motion to reopen where only a prima facie showing of the requisite hardship had to be made. Thus, it is of limited value to us today. 4 The concurring and dissenting opinion argues that the Board has enunciated a new standard for considering applications for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b) and that fairness dictates a remand of this case for further proceedings. However, the standard is that set forth by the new law itself and does not arise from any sudden change or unexplained departure by the Board from settled law. Moreover, although one can argue over the degree of hardship that has been demonstrated by the evidence presented by an applicant for relief in a given case, the underlying requirement of presenting the evidence

3 较近的委员会先例Matter of Pena-Diaz，20 I&N Dec. 841（BIA 1994），涉及一名 respondent（被申请人），因其曾被判定犯有管制物质违规行为，须满足更为严格的暂停递解出境的特殊且极其不寻常困难标准。在该案的具体情形下，我们认定该 respondent 已初步证明存在特殊且极其不寻常的困难，因其已在美国居留超过20年，且移民局通过批准其暂缓行动请求“肯定地允许”其在此居留多年。Id. at 846。然而，该案未对特殊且极其不寻常困难标准进行讨论，且涉及的是仅需初步证明存在所需困难的重新开案动议。因此，该案对今日的我们价值有限。 4 concurring and dissenting opinion（协同与异议意见）主张，委员会已就根据第240A(b)条审议取消递解出境申请阐明了新标准，且公平原则要求将本案发回进一步审理。然而，该标准系新法本身所规定，并非源于委员会对既定法律的突然改变或无解释的背离。此外，尽管人们可以就某一案件中救济申请人所提证据已证明的困难程度进行争论，但提交证据的基本要求

(continued...)

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At the same time, we recognize that some cases in which this Board or the Immigration Judges have found “extreme hardship” under the suspension statute may also have presented facts and circumstances that rose to the level of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.” Moreover, although guidance as to this term’s meaning can be provided, each case must be assessed and decided on its own facts.

同时，我们认识到，本委员会或移民法官根据暂停递解出境法规认定“极端困难”的某些案件，也可能呈现了达到“特殊且极其不寻常的困难”程度的事实和情形。此外，尽管可以就该术语的含义提供指导，但每件案件必须根据其自身事实进行评估和裁决。

III. FACTORS TO CONSIDER

三、应考虑的因素

We do find it appropriate and useful to look to the factors that we have considered in the past in assessing “extreme hardship” for purposes of adjudicating suspension of deportation applications, as set forth in our decision in Matter of Anderson, 16 I&N Dec. 596 (BIA 1978). That is, many of the factors that should be considered in assessing “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” are essentially the same as those that have been considered for many years in assessing “extreme hardship,” but they must be weighed according to the higher standard required for cancellation of removal. However, insofar as some of the factors set forth in Matter of Anderson may relate only to the applicant for relief, they cannot be considered under the cancellation statute, where only hardship to qualifying relatives, and not to the applicant, may be considered. Factors relating to the applicant himself or herself can only be considered insofar as they may affect the hardship to a qualifying relative.

我们确实认为，参照我们在过去评估“极端困难”以裁决暂停递解出境申请时所考虑的因素是适当且有益的，如我们在Matter of Anderson，16 I&N Dec. 596（BIA 1978）裁决中所述。也就是说，在评估“特殊且极其不寻常的困难”时应考虑的许多因素，与多年来在评估“极端困难”时所考虑的因素基本相同，但必须按照取消递解出境所要求的更高标准加以权衡。然而，鉴于Matter of Anderson中列出的某些因素可能仅与救济申请人有关，在取消递解出境法规下不能予以考虑，因为该法规仅可考虑对符合资格的亲属而非对申请人本人的困难。与申请人本人相关的因素，仅在其可能影响符合资格亲属的困难时方可予以考虑。

In Matter of Anderson, supra, we stated that such factors as the age of a respondent, both at the time of entry and at the time of the application for relief, family ties in the United States and abroad, length of residence in this country, the health of the respondent and qualifying family members, the political and economic conditions in the country of return, the possibility of other means of adjusting status in the United States, the alien’s involvement and position in his or her community here, and his or her immigration history are all proper factors to be considered. Id. at 597; see also Matter of Kao and Lin, 23 I&N Dec. 45 (BIA 2001); Matter of Pilch, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996).

在Matter of Anderson（见上文）中，我们指出，诸如 respondent 在入境时和申请救济时的年龄、在美国境内外的家庭关系、在本国的居留时间、respondent 及符合资格家庭成员的健康状况、返回国的政治和经济状况、在美国调整身份的其他途径的可能性、该外国人在其所在社区的参与和地位，以及其移民历史，均为应予考虑的适当因素。Id. at 597；另见 Matter of Kao and Lin，23 I&N Dec. 45（BIA 2001）；Matter of Pilch，21 I&N Dec. 627（BIA 1996）。

For cancellation of removal, we consider the ages, health, and circumstances of qualifying lawful permanent resident and United States citizen relatives. For example, an applicant who has elderly parents in this country who are solely dependent upon him for support might well have a strong case. Another strong applicant might have a qualifying child with very serious health issues, or compelling special needs in school. A lower standard of living or adverse country conditions in the country of return are factors to consider only insofar as they may affect a qualifying relative, but generally will be insufficient in

对于取消递解出境，我们考虑符合资格的合法永久居民和美国公民亲属的年龄、健康和情况。例如，在本国年迈父母完全依赖其供养的申请人，可能有很强的理由。另一类强有力的申请人可能有符合资格的子女存在非常严重的健康问题，或在学校有令人信服的特殊需求。返回国较低的生活水平或不利的国家状况，仅在可能影响符合资格亲属时方可作为考虑因素，但通常本身不足以

4(...continued) of any hardship that would arise from one’s forced departure from this country has remained unchanged under the old and new laws.

4（……续） 因被迫离开本国而产生的任何困难的提交，在旧法和新法下均保持不变。

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themselves to support a finding of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. As with extreme hardship, all hardship factors should be considered in the aggregate when assessing exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. See generally Matter of Kao and Lin, supra.

支持认定特殊且极其不寻常的困难。与极端困难一样，在评估特殊且极其不寻常的困难时，所有困难因素应综合考量。一般参见 Matter of Kao and Lin（见上文）。

IV. APPLICATION OF THE EXCEPTIONAL AND EXTREMELY UNUSUAL HARDSHIP STANDARD TO THE RESPONDENT

四、特殊且极其不寻常困难标准对 respondent 的适用

This case presents a good example of the difference between the “extreme hardship” and the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standards. Were this a suspension of deportation case, where only extreme hardship is required and where hardship to the respondent himself could be considered, the respondent might well have been found eligible for that relief. The hardship to the respondent, particularly in view of his 20 years of residence after his entry at age 14, his loss of long-standing employment, the adverse effect of his forced departure from this country on his two school-age United States citizen children, and the separation from his lawful permanent resident parents would likely have been found to rise to the level of “extreme” hardship by a majority of this Board. However, under the cancellation of removal requirements, we cannot conclude that the respondent has established that the hardship to his citizen children or lawful permanent resident parents rises to the higher level of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.”5

本案很好地例示了“极端困难”与“特殊且极其不寻常的困难”标准之间的区别。如果这是一件暂停递解出境案件，仅要求极端困难且可考虑对 respondent 本人的困难，则 respondent 很可能被认定有资格获得该救济。对 respondent 的困难，尤其是鉴于其14岁入境后已居留20年、失去长期工作、被迫离开本国对其两名学龄美国公民子女的不利影响，以及与合法永久居民父母的分离，本委员会多数成员很可能认定达到“极端”困难的程度。然而，根据取消递解出境的要求，我们不能认定 respondent 已证明其公民子女或合法永久居民父母所受困难达到“特殊且极其不寻常的困难”的更高程度。5

The respondent’s two oldest children will likely relocate to Mexico with him. However, although he has lived here for many years, the respondent is 34 years old and is apparently in good health and able to work. There is nothing to show that he would be unable to work and support his United States citizen children in Mexico. His wife is also from Mexico and, as indicated above, departed the United States shortly before the respondent’s hearing, taking their infant child back to Mexico with her. Therefore, should the children go to Mexico with their father, the family will be reunited. The respondent testified that his children are in good health.

respondent 的两个最年长的子女很可能随他迁往墨西哥。然而，尽管他已在此居住多年，respondent 现年34岁，显然身体健康且能够工作。没有任何证据表明他无法在墨西哥工作和供养其美国公民子女。其妻子也来自墨西哥，且如上所述，在 respondent 听证前不久离开美国，带着他们的婴儿返回墨西哥。因此，如果子女随父亲前往墨西哥，家庭将团聚。respondent 作证称其子女身体健康。

The respondent’s oldest child is 12 years old. He testified at the hearing that he has classes in both English and Spanish and can speak, read, and write in both languages. He testified that although he is close to his grandparents in the United States, if his father leaves this country, he will go with him. He stated that he is doing well in school, where he has friends. Asked if he would prefer to stay in the United States or go to Mexico, the child replied that he would like to stay here, “because I think it’s better here than in Mexico.”

respondent 最年长的子女12岁。他在听证时作证称，他有英语和西班牙语课程，能说、读、写两种语言。他作证称，尽管他与在美国的祖父母关系亲密，但如果父亲离开本国，他将随父亲前往。他表示自己在学校表现良好，在那里有朋友。当被问及他更愿意留在美国还是去墨西哥时，该子女回答说他想留在这里，“因为我觉得这里比墨西哥好。”

Although the concurring and dissenting opinion indicates otherwise, we have not characterized this as a “close case” under the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard that must be met to demonstrate eligibility for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b) of the Act.

尽管协同与异议意见表明相反观点，我们并未将此案定性为根据该法第240A(b)条证明取消递解出境资格所必须满足的“特殊且极其不寻常的困难”标准下的“接近案件”。

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The respondent’s parents have been lawful permanent residents since 1995. His father still works, but his mother is not employed. The respondent did not present any evidence to show that they have any particular health problems or that there are any other unusual factors that might make it an exceptional and extremely unusual hardship for them if the respondent is returned to Mexico. The record does not reflect the ages of the respondent’s parents. We note that the respondent testified that he has siblings who also live in the Dallas area, and presumably they could help their parents, should that become necessary.

respondent 的父母自1995年以来一直是合法永久居民。其父亲仍在工作，但母亲未就业。respondent 未提交任何证据表明他们有任何特定健康问题，或存在任何其他不寻常因素，使得 respondent 被遣返墨西哥对他们构成特殊且极其不寻常的困难。记录未反映 respondent 父母的年龄。我们注意到，respondent 作证称他有兄弟姐妹也住在达拉斯地区，想必在必要时他们可以帮助其父母。

Even considering all of the factors presented cumulatively, we find that the respondent has not met his burden of establishing that either his children or his parents would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship if he is deported. The respondent has not provided evidence to establish that his qualifying relatives would suffer hardship that is substantially different from, or beyond, that which would normally be expected from the deportation of an alien with close family members here.

即使综合考量所呈现的所有因素，我们认定 respondent 未能履行其举证责任，证明若他被驱逐，其子女或父母将遭受特殊且极其不寻常的困难。respondent 未提供证据证明其符合资格的亲属将遭受与通常预期因有近亲属在本国的外国人被驱逐出境而遭受的困难有实质不同或超出该程度的困难。

We recognize that the respondent’s children will suffer some hardship, and likely will have fewer opportunities, should they go to Mexico, and we further recognize that the respondent’s parents will suffer some hardship from having their son living farther away. We have no doubt that if the respondent were eligible for cancellation of removal, we would grant such relief in the exercise of discretion. However, Congress has established an “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard of eligibility for cancellation of removal, and we cannot find that the evidence presented in this case rises to the high level of hardship required under section 240A(b)(1)(D) of the Act.6 Accordingly, the respondent’s appeal must be dismissed.

我们认识到，如果被申请人前往墨西哥，其子女将遭受一些困难，并且可能机会更少，我们还进一步认识到，被申请人的父母将因其儿子住得更远而遭受一些困难。我们毫不怀疑，如果被申请人有资格获得取消递解出境，我们将在行使自由裁量权时给予此类救济。然而，国会为取消递解出境的资格确立了“特殊且极其不寻常的困难”标准，我们无法认定本案中提供的证据达到了该法第240A(b)(1)(D)条所要求的高水平困难。6 因此，被申请人的上诉必须被驳回。

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. FURTHER ORDER: Pursuant to the Immigration Judge’s order and conditioned upon compliance with conditions set forth by the Immigration Judge and the statute, the respondent is permitted to voluntarily depart from the United States, without expense to the Government, within 30 days from the date of this order or any extension beyond that time as may be granted by the district director. See section 240B(b) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. §§ 240.26(c), (f) (2001).

命令：上诉被驳回。 进一步命令：根据移民法官的命令，并在遵守移民法官和法规规定的条件的前提下，允许被申请人在本命令之日起30天内或地区局长可能批准的任何延长期内，自行离开美国，费用不由政府承担。见该法第240B(b)条；8 C.F.R. §§ 240.26(c), (f) (2001)。

NOTICE: If the respondent fails to depart the United States within the time period specified, or any extensions granted by the district director, the respondent shall be subject to a civil penalty of not less than $1,000 and not more than $5,000 and shall be ineligible for a period of 10 years for any further

通知：如果被申请人未在指定期限内或地区局长批准的任何延长期内离开美国，被申请人应受到不低于1,000美元且不超过5,000美元的民事罚款，并将在10年内没有资格获得任何进一步的

The concurring and dissenting opinion reflects strong advocacy for the respondent. However, the burden of proof and persuasion rests on the respondent, and not the Immigration Judge, to establish that the respondent’s removal would result in “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a qualifying relative. In the end, the concurring and dissenting opinion seemingly acknowledges that this showing has not been met on the record before us.

concurring and dissenting opinion reflects strong advocacy for the respondent. However, the burden of proof and persuasion rests on the respondent, and not the Immigration Judge, to establish that the respondent’s removal would result in “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a qualifying relative. In the end, the concurring and dissenting opinion seemingly acknowledges that this showing has not been met on the record before us.

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relief under section 240B and sections 240A, 245, 248, and 249 of the Act. See section 240B(d) of the Act.

该法第240B条以及第240A、245、248和249条规定的救济。见该法第240B(d)条。

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION: Lory Diana Rosenberg, Board Member

concurring and dissenting opinion: Lory Diana Rosenberg, Board Member

I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.

我尊重地部分同意，部分反对。

I

I

concur with the majority’s conclusion that in enacting section 240A(b)(1)(D) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (Supp. V 1999), Congress foreclosed certain aliens from eligibility for relief from removal based on long-term residence in the United States. I also agree that while the plain meaning of the individual words in the standard “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” may be commonly understood to refer to some type of difficulty or burden that is uncommon, rare, or different from the norm, these are not terms of “fixed and inflexible content or meaning.” Matter of Hwang, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964).

同意多数意见的结论，即在制定《移民与国籍法》第240A(b)(1)(D)条，8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (Supp. V 1999)时，国会排除了某些外国人基于在美国长期居住而获得免于递解出境的救济的资格。我也同意，尽管标准“特殊且极其不寻常的困难”中个别词语的通常含义可能被普遍理解为指某种不常见、罕见或不同于常态的困难或负担，但这些术语并非“固定不变的内容或含义”。Matter of Hwang, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964)。

As the majority acknowledges, our interpretation of this standard, even as defined by the plain meaning of the words used, tends to be subjective in nature and is largely dependent on definition through case-by-case application. Therefore, I believe that the critical elements in any cancellation of removal adjudication always will be the evidentiary factors and how they are presented.

正如多数意见所承认的，我们对这一标准的解释，即使以所用词语的通常含义来界定，也往往是主观的，并且在很大程度上依赖于通过逐案适用来定义。因此，我认为在任何取消递解出境裁决中的关键要素始终是证据因素及其呈现方式。

As discussed below, I am not comfortable with the majority’s attempt to distinguish the meaning of the language of this standard, as a matter of law, from the very same language that has existed and been applied in the Act since 1952. In light of the fact that we are pronouncing a different interpretation of this standard in the context of cancellation of removal for the first time, I believe it more prudent to remand this case to give the respondent an opportunity to submit evidence that might allow him to satisfy the standard that we have articulated today.

如下文所述，我对多数意见试图在法律上将这一标准语言的含义与自1952年以来该法中一直存在并适用的完全相同的语言区分开来感到不安。鉴于我们首次在取消递解出境的背景下宣布对这一标准的不同解释，我认为更谨慎的做法是将此案发回重审，给被申请人一个机会提交可能使其满足我们今天所阐述的标准的证据。

I. EXCEPTIONAL AND EXTREMELY UNUSUAL HARDSHIP

一、特殊且极其不寻常的困难

The majority’s effort to justify our giving a different meaning to Congress’ repeated use of the phrase “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” as the standard for certain cancellation of removal applications is simply unpersuasive. I find no basis for invoking an exception to the principle that “Congress normally can be presumed to have had knowledge of the interpretation given to the incorporated law,” merely because Congress adopted only a phrase and not a whole section of prior law. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978); see also Matter of Monreal, 23 I&N Dec. 56, 60 (BIA 2001). More specifically, “Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change.” Lorillard v. Pons, supra, at 580-81 (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v.

多数意见试图为我们对国会反复使用“特殊且极其不寻常的困难”这一短语作为某些取消递解出境申请的标准赋予不同含义提供理由，这完全没有说服力。我认为没有依据援引以下原则的例外：“通常可以推定国会知道所纳入法律的解释”，仅仅因为国会只采纳了一个短语而非先前法律的整个条款。Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978)；另见 Matter of Monreal, 23 I&N Dec. 56, 60 (BIA 2001)。更具体地说，“推定国会知道对法规的行政或司法解释，并在不加修改地重新制定法规时采纳该解释。”Lorillard v. Pons, supra, at 580-81（引用 Albemarle Paper Co. v.

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Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1975); NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361, 366 (1951); National Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 140, 147 (1920); 2A C. Sands, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 49.09, and cases cited (4th ed. 1973)).

Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1975)；NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361, 366 (1951)；National Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 140, 147 (1920)；2A C. Sands, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 49.09, and cases cited (4th ed. 1973)）。

The “exceptional and extremely unusual” language was not only the hardship standard that applied to all suspension of deportation applications under the Act between 1952 and 1962, but represents the standard that, until 1996, continued to govern our hardship adjudications in suspension of deportation claims presented by aliens who were subject to deportation for criminal, fraud, or security violations of the Act.1 The legislative history reflects that in enacting this form of cancellation of removal, Congress apparently examined closely the historical underpinnings and application of the suspension of deportation provisions. Indeed, Congress not only explicitly adopted the stricter hardship standard, which had existed all along, but also eliminated altogether access to this form of relief for individuals convicted of criminal offenses and incorporated across the board the requirement that an individual have 10 years of continuous physical presence to qualify for relief.

“特殊且极其不寻常”的措辞不仅是1952年至1962年间适用于该法下所有暂停递解出境申请的困难标准，而且代表了直到1996年为止，在因刑事、欺诈或安全违反该法而面临递解出境的外国人提出的暂停递解出境请求中，继续支配我们困难裁决的标准。1 立法历史表明，在制定这种形式的取消递解出境时，国会显然仔细审查了暂停递解出境条款的历史基础和适用情况。事实上，国会不仅明确采纳了一直存在的更严格的困难标准，而且完全取消了因刑事犯罪被定罪个人获得这种形式救济的机会，并全面纳入了个人必须具有10年连续实际居住才有资格获得救济的要求。

Each of the changes reflects Congress’ awareness of the prior 10-year suspension of deportation provision, including the specific hardship standard that had been applied over the years. Surely, by virtue of making these changes, Congress must be deemed to have considered how we had interpreted and applied that standard. Therefore, I cannot agree with the majority’s wholesale rejection of our case law addressing the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard as providing nothing more than an “historical context.” Rather, it provides the context that gives this phrase meaning. See Matter of O-J-O-, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 389-90 (BIA 1996) (Holmes, concurring) (“In my view, the best manner in which to provide ‘content’ to this ‘ambiguous phrase’ is to provide examples and discussion in published Board decisions of factual circumstances in which the Board has concluded that the ‘extreme hardship’ requirement for suspension of deportation eligibility either has or has not been met.”).

每一项变更都反映了国会对先前10年暂停递解出境条款的认识，包括多年来所适用的具体困难标准。当然，通过做出这些变更，必须认为国会考虑了我们对这一标准的解释和适用方式。因此，我不能同意多数意见全盘否定我们关于“特殊且极其不寻常的困难”标准的判例法，认为其仅提供“历史背景”。相反，它提供了赋予该短语含义的背景。见 Matter of O-J-O-, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 389-90 (BIA 1996) (Holmes, concurring)（“在我看来，为这一‘模糊短语’提供‘内容’的最佳方式是在委员会公布的裁决中提供例子并讨论委员会已得出结论认为暂停递解出境资格的‘极端困难’要求已满足或未满足的事实情况。”）。

1 See Matter of Pena-Diaz, 20 I&N Dec. 841 (BIA 1994); see also cases involving the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard as construed under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (“1952 Act”), in which the more stringent standard was met, e.g., Matter of S-, 5 I&N Dec. 409 (BIA 1953) (holding that the standard was satisfied by a 27-year residence, limited savings, and the prospect of severe financial hardship); Matter of W-, 5 I&N Dec. 586 (BIA 1953) (finding that the standard was satisfied by a married female with residence of 9 years, few assets, and five dependent children). But see Matter of V-, 7 I&N Dec. 348 (BIA 1956) (holding that a stowaway with 9 years of residence, no dependents, and no home to be broken up failed to meet the standard).

1 见 Matter of Pena-Diaz, 20 I&N Dec. 841 (BIA 1994)；另见涉及根据1952年《移民与国籍法》解释的特殊且极其不寻常困难标准的案件，ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163（“1952年法”），其中满足了更严格的标准，例如 Matter of S-, 5 I&N Dec. 409 (BIA 1953)（裁定27年居住、有限储蓄和严重经济困难的前景满足了该标准）；Matter of W-, 5 I&N Dec. 586 (BIA 1953)（认定一名居住9年、资产很少且有五名受抚养子女的已婚女性满足了该标准）。但见 Matter of V-, 7 I&N Dec. 348 (BIA 1956)（裁定一名居住9年、无受抚养人且无家庭可拆散的偷渡者未能满足该标准）。

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Similarly, I do not agree that we somehow are being evenhanded in rejecting this case law, while also rejecting a statement in the legislative history of the 1952 Act that the hardship must rise to an “unconscionable” level before it will meet the standard. It is the case law that interprets the legislative provisions, and not a prior legislative statement intended to guide that interpretation, that makes up our jurisprudence as to what constitutes exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. It is that jurisprudence of which Congress is presumed to be aware when it legislates anew and uses the same language. See Lorillard v. Pons, supra. Therefore, I believe that the existing body of our prior case law does provide useful guidance in determining whether a showing of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship has been made.

同样，我不同意我们在否定这一判例法的同时，又否定1952年法立法历史中关于困难必须达到“不合情理”程度才能满足标准的陈述，从而在某种程度上做到不偏不倚。解释立法条款的是判例法，而不是旨在指导该解释的先前立法陈述，判例法构成了我们关于什么构成特殊且极其不寻常困难的法学。国会重新立法并使用相同语言时，推定其知道的就是该法学。见 Lorillard v. Pons, supra。因此，我认为我们先前判例法的现有体系确实为确定是否已证明特殊且极其不寻常的困难提供了有用的指导。

II. DUE PROCESS AND EVIDENTIARY FACTORS

二、正当程序与证据因素

Whatever “meaning” is settled upon as a matter of law, the application of the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard to individual cases is dependent on a variety of factors and variables, considered individually and in combination. In the instant case, the removal hearing took place 3 years ago, in 1998. Although the statute was amended in 1996 to include the cancellation of removal provision at issue here, the new provisions only took effect on April 1, 1997. The Notice to Appear (Form I-862) in the respondent’s case was filed with the Immigration Court on October 16, 1997. The respondent was represented by counsel and filed for cancellation of removal.

无论作为法律问题最终确定何种“含义”，“特殊且极其不寻常的困难”标准在个案中的适用取决于各种因素和变量，需单独和综合考量。在本案中，递解出境听证会于3年前，即1998年举行。尽管该法于1996年修订，纳入了此处涉及的取消递解出境条款，但新条款仅于1997年4月1日生效。被申请人案件的出庭通知（I-862表）于1997年10月16日提交给移民法院。被申请人由律师代理并申请取消递解出境。

According to the transcript, when the removal hearing convened, the respondent was represented by counsel. In a perfunctory exchange that filled less than half of a page in the transcript, the Immigration Judge and the respondent’s counsel agreed that the respondent would apply for cancellation of removal. In his decision, the Immigration Judge found that the respondent was truthful in his testimony and that he was a person of good moral character who had resided in the United States since 1980, when he was approximately 15 years of age. However, the first time there is ever any meaningful discussion of the standard applicable to the respondent’s cancellation of removal application is in the Immigration Judge’s decision.

根据笔录，当递解出境听证会召开时，被申请人由律师代理。在不到半页笔录的敷衍交流中，移民法官和被申请人的律师同意被申请人将申请取消递解出境。在其裁决中，移民法官认定被申请人的证词真实，并且他是一个品行良好的人，自1980年约15岁时起居住在美国。然而，首次对适用于被申请人取消递解出境申请的标准进行任何有意义的讨论是在移民法官的裁决中。

There is no evidence that the Immigration Judge put the respondent on notice of the burden of proof he must meet, or that he specified what he understood “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to mean, or how he would apply that standard to the evidence provided by the respondent. See 8 C.F.R. § 240.11 (2001). At best, after all of the evidence had been presented, the Immigration Judge, at the end of his oral decision, offered some allusion to ball parks and parking lots. Accordingly, all that the respondent had to rely on to determine what standard he had to meet would have been our earlier decisions interpreting the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard.

没有证据表明移民法官已告知 respondent 他必须满足的举证责任，或者他具体说明了他所理解的“特殊且极其不寻常的困难”的含义，或者他将如何将该标准适用于 respondent 提供的证据。参见 8 C.F.R. § 240.11 (2001)。充其量，在所有证据均已提交之后，移民法官在其口头裁决的结尾，对“球场”和“停车场”作了一些暗示。因此，respondent 在确定他必须满足什么标准时所能依赖的，只能是我们早先解释“特殊且极其不寻常的困难”标准的裁决。

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We now have declared that we understand “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to mean something other than what is expressed in those precedent decisions. I conclude that under these circumstances, the prudent course of action is to remand the case and allow the respondent to present whatever evidence he may have to meet the standard that we just have articulated. See Matter of Alarcon, 20 I&N Dec. 557, 562-63 (BIA 1992) (remanding to allow adjudication of an application under a new standard); see also Singh v. INS, 213 F.3d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 2000) (criticizing the Board for applying a new standard that went beyond the terms of the regulation without giving the respondent notice or an opportunity to comply).

我们现在已经声明，我们将“特殊且极其不寻常的困难”理解为不同于那些先例裁决中所表达的含义。我认为，在这种情况下，审慎的做法是将案件发回重审，并允许 respondent 提交他可能拥有的任何证据，以满足我们刚刚阐明的标准。参见 Matter of Alarcon, 20 I&N Dec. 557, 562-63 (BIA 1992)（发回重审以允许根据新标准裁决申请）；另见 Singh v. INS, 213 F.3d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 2000)（批评 Board 适用超出法规条款的新标准，而未给予 respondent 通知或遵守的机会）。

When the removal hearing began, the respondent’s infant son Javier had just been born. The respondent and his wife had been married since 1987 and had lived together in the United States at all times. The respondent and his wife have two other children, Daisy and Eric, both born in the United States, who are now 8 and 12 years old respectively. The children’s father—the respondent—had lived in the United States since he was a teenager. The children have a substantial extended family in the United States. The respondent and his entire family lived together until, apparently, the respondent’s wife was denied cancellation of removal and was required to leave the United States for Mexico. The two older children, who had lived in the United States their entire lives, remained here with their father and their grandparents, aunts, and uncles.

当驱逐听证开始时，respondent 的婴儿儿子 Javier 刚刚出生。respondent 和妻子自1987年以来一直结婚，并始终在美国共同生活。respondent 和妻子还有另外两个孩子，Daisy 和 Eric，均在美国出生，现在分别为8岁和12岁。孩子们的父亲——respondent——自青少年时期起就居住在美国。孩子们在美国有一个庞大的大家庭。respondent 和整个家庭一直生活在一起，直到显然 respondent 的妻子被拒绝取消驱逐并被要求离开美国前往墨西哥。两个较大的孩子，一生都生活在美国，留在这里与他们的父亲以及祖父母、阿姨和叔叔们在一起。

This is the backdrop against which we must consider whether the children’s hardship, should their father be removed, would be “exceptional and extremely unusual.” The majority admits that this is a close case. The majority states specifically that under the “extreme hardship” standard, the respondent likely would have prevailed. Matter of Monreal, supra, at 64 (finding that under the extreme hardship standard, the respondent might well have been found eligible for suspension of deportation). Moreover, the majority states specifically that there is no dispute that the respondent satisfies the good moral character and continuous physical presence requirements for cancellation of removal and that, had the respondent satisfied the hardship standard, we would likely grant relief in the exercise of discretion. Id. at 57-58, 64-65.

这就是我们必须考虑的背景，即如果孩子们的父亲被驱逐，孩子们将遭受的困难是否会是“特殊且极其不寻常的”。多数意见承认这是一个接近的案例。多数意见特别指出，根据“极端困难”标准，respondent 很可能已经胜诉。Matter of Monreal, supra, at 64（认定根据极端困难标准，respondent 很可能被认定有资格获得驱逐暂缓）。此外，多数意见特别指出，没有争议的是 respondent 满足取消驱逐的良好道德品质和连续实际居住要求，并且如果 respondent 满足了困难标准，我们很可能会在行使自由裁量权时批准救济。Id. at 57-58, 64-65。

So, why does the respondent not qualify under the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard? I agree that our determinations should comport with Congress’ expression in the legislative history of the 1996 revisions to the Act that cancellation of removal should be based on hardship that is “substantially beyond that which ordinarily would be expected to result from the alien’s deportation.” H.R. Conf. Rep. 104-828 (1996) (emphasis added). However, it is clear to me that, given the subjective nature of the relief at issue, the reason that the respondent may have fallen short of qualifying for relief is not necessarily attributable to substantive considerations. Rather, as with many other such cases, the ultimate determination in this case actually turns on evidentiary considerations.

那么，为什么 respondent 不符合特殊且极其不寻常的困难标准呢？我同意我们的裁定应当符合国会在1996年《移民与国籍法》修订案的立法历史中所表达的意图，即取消驱逐应基于“实质上超出通常预期会因外国人驱逐而导致的困难”。H.R. Conf. Rep. 104-828 (1996)（强调为后加）。然而，在我看来很清楚，鉴于所涉救济的主观性质，respondent 可能未能符合救济资格的原因不一定归因于实质性考虑。相反，与许多其他此类案件一样，本案的最终裁定实际上取决于证据方面的考虑。

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In Matter of Pilch, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996), we emphasized that the principal problem with the case was an evidentiary one. See id. at 630 (“[W]e find the testimony and evidence insufficient to demonstrate that their deportation would cause extreme hardship to themselves.” (Emphasis added.)). For example, we found that respondents’ claims were largely based on the general economic conditions in Poland and not on any condition or circumstance unique to them. Id. In addition, we noted that “[i]n any case, there is minimal evidence that he would be unable to recoup his investment in the business he and his partner established in 1993.” Id. at 631 (emphasis added). In addressing the claimed hardship to the respondents’ children, we stated that “[t]here is no evidence that the children suffer from any physical or mental disabilities . . . [and] no evidence that they would be deprived of educational opportunities if they go to Poland.” Id. at 632 (emphasis added).

在 Matter of Pilch, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996) 中，我们强调该案的主要问题是证据问题。参见 id. at 630（“[W]e 认定证词和证据不足以证明他们的驱逐将对他们自己造成极端困难。”（强调为后加。））。例如，我们认定 respondents 的主张主要基于波兰的一般经济状况，而非任何他们特有的条件或情况。Id. 此外，我们指出，“[i]n 任何情况下，几乎没有证据表明他将无法收回他和合伙人在1993年建立的企业的投资。”Id. at 631（强调为后加）。在处理对 respondents 子女所主张的困难时，我们指出，“[t]here 没有证据表明子女患有任何身体或精神残疾……[并且]没有证据表明如果他们去波兰将被剥夺教育机会。”Id. at 632（强调为后加）。

Had the evidence been presented differently in Matter of Pilch, supra, the outcome might have been different under the extreme hardship standard. Likewise, if the evidence offered in the respondent’s case is presented differently, the outcome may well be different under the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard.

如果在 Matter of Pilch, supra 中证据的呈现方式不同，根据极端困难标准，结果可能会不同。同样，如果 respondent 案件中提供的证据以不同方式呈现，根据特殊且极其不寻常的困难标准，结果很可能也会不同。

The majority contends that “[t]his case presents a good example of the difference between the ‘extreme hardship’ and the ‘exceptional and extremely unusual hardship’ standards. Were this a suspension of deportation case, . . . the respondent might well have been found eligible for that relief.” Matter of Monreal, supra, at 64. However, we are not considering only the hardship to the respondent or an aggregate of the hardship to the respondent and his qualifying family members. We are considering only the hardship to his United States citizen children and his lawful permanent resident parents.

多数意见主张，“[t]his 案件很好地展示了‘极端困难’与‘特殊且极其不寻常的困难’标准之间的区别。如果这是一个驱逐暂缓案件，……respondent 很可能被认定有资格获得该救济。”Matter of Monreal, supra, at 64。然而，我们并非仅考虑对 respondent 的困难或对 respondent 及其合格家庭成员困难的总和。我们仅考虑对其美国公民子女及其合法永久居民父母的困难。

The significance of the respondent’s 8- and 12-year old children’s acculturation as United States citizens in an American family is very likely far greater than what is suggested by the minimal amount of evidence that was presented at the hearing or considered by the Immigration Judge. Specifically, the children’s birthright citizenship status, their ties to their grandparents and extended family in the United States, the substantial amount of time they have been schooled in the United States educational system, and their socialization in the United States generally, are all factors that are unique to these children. The potential value of these United States citizen children’s ties certainly is in the “parking lot” or a “ball park,” not out of it, as the Immigration Judge put it. Consequently, with a proper and extensive evidentiary presentation, it is possible that the children’s loss and the nature of the hardship they would suffer if their father is removed and those ties are severed may very well be “exceptional and extremely unusual.”

respondent 的8岁和12岁子女作为美国公民在一个美国家庭中的文化适应的重要性，很可能远远超过听证会上提供的或移民法官所考虑的极少证据所暗示的程度。具体而言，孩子们的出生公民身份、他们与美国祖父母和大家庭的联系、他们在美国教育系统中接受教育的相当长时间，以及他们总体上在美国的社会化，都是这些孩子特有的因素。这些美国公民子女联系纽带的潜在价值肯定在“停车场”或“球场”内，而不是像移民法官所说的那样在球场外。因此，通过适当且广泛的证据呈现，孩子们如果父亲被驱逐且这些纽带被切断将遭受的损失和困难的性质，很可能确实是“特殊且极其不寻常的”。

Neither the majority nor the Immigration Judge really articulate why the evidence in the case might not be found to satisfy the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard, other than to say that the new standard

多数意见和移民法官都没有真正阐明为什么本案中的证据可能不被认定满足“特殊且极其不寻常的困难”标准，除了说新标准

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requires a more unique and extreme form of hardship. Yet the respondent who was granted suspension of deportation in Matter of O-J-O-, supra, merely came to the United States at a young age, lived here for a significant period of years, worked, and became acculturated. This respondent not only came to the United States at a young age, worked, and lived here several years longer than did the respondent in Matter of O-J-O-, but he also established an entire immediate family—and has close ties with his siblings and parents—in this country. These factors have a significant bearing on the hardship to his children.

要求一种更独特和极端形式的困难。然而，在 Matter of O-J-O-, supra 中获得驱逐暂缓的 respondent 仅仅是年轻时来到美国，在这里居住了相当长的年份，工作，并融入了文化。本 respondent 不仅年轻时来到美国，工作，并比 Matter of O-J-O- 中的 respondent 多居住了几年，而且他还在这个国家建立了整个直系家庭——并与他的兄弟姐妹和父母有密切联系。这些因素对他子女的困难有重大影响。

Unlike the respondent in Matter of O-J-O-, this respondent likely has inculcated into his children the American values he himself adopted over the 20-year period of his residence. Similarly, unlike in Matter of Pilch, supra, these children are not just 4 and 5 years old. Cf. id. at 632. Simply by virtue of being 8 and 12 years old, they are more than likely to have been socialized through years in the school system and in their communities. Although they have been exposed to the Spanish language, the record is not as clear as it is represented to be that even the older child, Eric, can really manage academic studies in the Spanish language.

与 Matter of O-J-O- 中的 respondent 不同，本 respondent 很可能已将他本人在20年居住期间所接受的美国价值观灌输给了他的子女。同样，与 Matter of Pilch, supra 不同，这些孩子不仅仅是4岁和5岁。Cf. id. at 632。仅仅因为8岁和12岁，他们很可能已经在学校系统和社区中度过了多年社会化过程。尽管他们接触过西班牙语，但记录并不像所描述的那样清楚，甚至较大的孩子 Eric 是否真的能够用西班牙语进行学术学习。

The issue before us really is whether their father’s removal will cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to these two preteen-age children, who already have been separated from their mother and younger sibling. Is there hardship that is “‘substantially beyond that which ordinarily would be expected to result’” from their father’s deportation? Matter of Monreal, supra, at 59 (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-828).

我们面前的问题真正是，他们父亲的驱逐是否会对这两个已经与母亲和年幼弟妹分离的青春期前儿童造成特殊且极其不寻常的困难。是否存在“实质上超出通常预期会因”他们父亲驱逐而“导致的困难”？Matter of Monreal, supra, at 59（引用 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-828）。

Unquestionably, the children face a dramatic change in their day-to-day lives. Even putting the potential change in their economic circumstances and standard of living aside, they face a change of geography, climate, cuisine, culture, language, and social mores. They face a loss of their home, their childhood roots, their friends, and their customary family circle. They face separation from their grandparents. They face a completely different school system and classes taught in a completely different language. Are the hardships resulting from these involuntary changes “truly exceptional”?

毫无疑问，孩子们面临日常生活的巨大变化。即使将他们经济状况和生活水平可能的变化放在一边，他们也面临地理、气候、饮食、文化、语言和社会习俗的变化。他们面临失去家园、童年根基、朋友和惯常家庭圈子的损失。他们面临与祖父母的分离。他们面临完全不同的学校系统和用完全不同的语言授课的班级。这些非自愿变化导致的困难是否“真正特殊”？

The legislative history emphasizes that the ordinary results of a parent’s removal are not to be considered in determining the existence of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to qualifying family members. The ordinary results of a parent’s deportation relative to his or her United States citizen children may well be leaving one’s home and friends for another country and possibly having to adapt to a new school system or a reduced standard of living.

立法历史强调，在确定对合格家庭成员是否存在特殊且极其不寻常的困难时，不考虑父母驱逐的普通结果。父母驱逐对其美国公民子女的普通结果很可能就是离开自己的家和朋友前往另一个国家，并可能不得不适应新的学校系统或降低的生活水平。

However, not every United States citizen child of a parent who is subject to removal has spent his or her whole life in this country, maintaining no ties to his father’s homeland. Just as the respondent’s arrival as a teenager and lengthy residence here make it more likely that he also is assimilated to the United States, these children very likely lit sparklers on the Fourth of July, marched in the Columbus Day parade, and cheered as loudly as any other American during

然而，并非每一位父母面临遣返的美国公民子女都在这个国家度过了他或她的一生，与父亲的祖国没有任何联系。正如答辩人青少年时期来到美国并在此长期居住，使他更有可能已被同化于美国一样，这些孩子很可能在7月4日点燃了烟花棒，参加了哥伦布日游行，并像任何其他美国人一样在

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the World Series. Not every child has a parent subject to removal who has lived here since his formative years. Not every child of a removable parent is approaching his or her teenage years. Not every child has grandparents who have immigrated here from their home country. Not every child would have to readjust to a society and a school system where classes are conducted in a different language.

世界大赛期间一样大声欢呼。并非每个孩子都有一位自其成长岁月起就居住在此的面临遣返的父母。并非每个面临遣返父母的子女都即将进入青少年时期。并非每个孩子都有从祖国移民至此的祖父母。并非每个孩子都必须重新适应一个以不同语言授课的社会和学校体系。

Moreover, the Immigration Judge grossly erred in his assumption that it would be “counterproductive” to grant cancellation because the respondent’s wife had returned to Mexico. Amazingly, the majority seems to accept the notion that under the circumstances of the children’s mother having had to return to Mexico, their having to accompany the respondent upon his removal would likely be the occasion for a family reunion, rather than an exile. To the contrary, the fact that their mother was forced to leave them and go back to Mexico with their little brother is more than likely an exacerbating condition that makes the potential hardship faced by these children even greater. Their mother’s departure with their infant sibling was not a joyful or desired event, but one that the family was required to face owing to her lack of lawful immigration status in the United States.

此外，移民法官在其假设中犯了严重错误，即认为批准取消遣返将是“适得其反”的，因为答辩人的妻子已返回墨西哥。令人惊讶的是，多数意见似乎接受了这样一种观念：在孩子们的母亲不得不返回墨西哥的情况下，他们不得不随答辩人一起被遣返很可能成为家庭团聚的契机，而非流放。相反，他们的母亲被迫离开他们，带着他们的小弟弟返回墨西哥这一事实，很可能是一种加剧状况，使这些孩子面临的潜在困难更加严重。他们的母亲带着他们年幼的兄弟姐妹离开，并非一个欢乐或令人向往的事件，而是由于她在美国缺乏合法移民身份而家庭不得不面对的事件。

Accordingly, I believe that the children’s inevitable departure with their father can be seen as a very serious additional loss that they will be forced to bear when they are most vulnerable, and when the stability of their family life already has been shattered. Their father’s removal, and their departure with him, will force them to face even greater disruption in the regularity and stability of their lives. To simply say that the respondent’s wife is from Mexico, and the respondent is from Mexico, as though that makes it an “ordinary,” rather than an unusual, hardship for the children to have to leave their home forever to accompany their father to that country, completely ignores the fact that these children are Americans. See Matter of Cervantes, Interim Decision 3380, at 31 (BIA 1999) (Rosenberg, dissenting) (criticizing the majority for minimizing the hardship that a naturalized citizen would face merely because she speaks Spanish and was born in Mexico).

因此，我认为孩子们不可避免地随父亲离开，可以被视为他们将被迫承受的非常严重的额外损失，而且是在他们最为脆弱、其家庭生活的稳定性已被粉碎之时。他们父亲的遣返，以及他们随他离开，将迫使他们面对其生活的规律性和稳定性方面更大的 disruption。仅仅说答辩人的妻子来自墨西哥，答辩人也来自墨西哥，仿佛这就使孩子们不得不永远离开家园随父亲前往该国成为一种“普通”而非不寻常的困难，这完全忽视了这些孩子是美国人的事实。见 Matter of Cervantes，临时决定第3380号，第31页（BIA 1999）（Rosenberg，持异议）（批评多数意见仅因入籍公民会说西班牙语且出生于墨西哥而将其将面临的困难最小化）。

Although I believe that some of my suppositions regarding the extraordinary nature of the ties that the children will be forced to sever and the hardship they will have to endure may well be correct, they are not substantiated in the record. The deficiency in the record before us is the lack of corroborating and supporting evidence that forcefully demonstrates that the hardships to the children truly will be of a level that meets the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard.

尽管我认为我关于孩子们将被迫切断的联系的非凡性质以及他们将不得不承受的困难的一些推测很可能是正确的，但这些推测在记录中并未得到证实。我们面前的记录中的缺陷在于缺乏确凿和佐证证据，以有力地证明孩子们所面临的困难确实将达到符合特殊和极不寻常困难标准的程度。

Such evidence might include a professional evaluation of the children’s language capabilities; individual medical and psychological reports by expert witnesses indicating the potential impact of relocation to Mexico on the children’s development and ability to flourish; authoritative documentation indicating the similarities and differences between the United States and

此类证据可能包括对儿童语言能力的专业评估；专家证人出具的个别医疗和心理报告，表明搬迁至墨西哥对儿童发展和茁壮成长能力的潜在影响；表明美国和

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Mexican school systems; recognized sociological studies reflecting the ability of United States citizen children to adapt to different cultures and countries; economic studies indicating the likely employment prospects for the respondent and the resulting effect on the children’s standard of living; reports regarding the anticipated ease or difficulty of later adjustment to United States social and educational standards, should the children wish to return when they reach college age; and any information concerning the children’s ability to maintain contacts with their aunts, uncles, grandparents, friends, teachers, or other influential figures in the United States. In all cases, were evidence of this type to be presented, it must be specifically linked to these individual children, in terms of their gender, age, level of development, level of achievement, and any special problems or needs that they may have. Any reports should be authenticated. Any evaluations should be attested to under oath, with a recitation of the qualifications of the maker of the document. All expert witnesses should be available to appear in court, give direct testimony, and be cross-examined.

墨西哥学校体系之间异同的权威文件；反映美国公民儿童适应不同文化和国家能力的公认社会学研究；表明答辩人可能的就业前景及其对儿童生活水平所产生影响的經濟研究；关于儿童日后若希望在大学年龄返回美国时适应美国社会和教育标准的预期难易程度的报告；以及关于儿童与美国的姑姨、叔伯、祖父母、朋友、教师或其他有影响力人物保持联系能力的任何信息。在所有案件中，若提交此类证据，必须将其具体与这些个别儿童联系起来，考虑其性别、年龄、发育水平、成就水平以及他们可能存在的任何特殊问题或需求。任何报告均应经过认证。任何评估均应在宣誓下予以证明，并陈述文件制作人的资格。所有专家证人均应出庭、提供直接证言并接受交叉询问。

I note that a motion to reopen that states new facts to be proved at a reopened hearing and establishes that such evidence is material and was not previously available or discoverable may be filed within 90 days of a final administrative order. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(c) (2001). However, in light of the fact that neither the parties nor the Immigration Judge had the benefit of our interpretation of the statutory standard at the time of the hearing, I would remand the record for further proceedings. This will give all the opportunity to present any available evidence that may better substantiate the respondent’s claim and will allow the Immigration Judge to make a decision consistent with our interpretation of the statute. Accordingly, I concur in part and dissent in part.

我注意到，重新开案动议若陈述将在重新开庭时证明的新事实，并确立该证据具有实质性且此前无法获得或发现，可在最终行政命令作出后90天内提交。见 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(c) (2001)。然而，鉴于双方和移民法官在听证时均未能受益于我们对法定标准的解释，我将把记录发回进一步审理。这将使所有人有机会提交任何可更好证实答辩人主张的现有证据，并使移民法官能够作出与我们对该法规的解释相一致的决定。因此，我部分同意、部分持异议。

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