Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez

Decided March 11, 1999

1999年3月11日裁定

U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals

美国司法部 移民审查执行办公室 移民上诉委员会

In an oral decision dated January 21, 1997, an Immigration Judge denied the respondent’s requests for a waiver of inadmissibility and adjust-

在1997年1月21日的口头决定中，移民法官驳回了被申请人关于不可入境豁免和调整

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ment of status pursuant to sections 212(i) and 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(i) and 1255 (Supp. II 1996). The respon- dent’s appeal from that decision will be dismissed. 1

身份的请求，依据的是《移民与国籍法》第212(i)条和第245条，8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(i)和1255（Supp. II 1996）。被申请人对该决定的上诉将被驳回。1

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. 程序背景

In a preliminary hearing held on October 26, 1995, the respondent admitted the allegations contained in the Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing (Form I-221) and was found deportable by the Immigration Judge. He then filed a request for adjustment of status on September 19, 1996, based on an approved visa petition filed by his United States citizen spouse. 2 Because the respondent had been convicted of possession of false identification documents, the respondent also filed a request for a waiver of inadmissibility. See section 245 of the Act. The Immigration Judge originally believed that the respondent required a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Act, but then deter- mined that the respondent fell within an exception to section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act (crime involving moral turpitude). Specifically, the Immigration Judge found that the respondent had not been incarcerated for more than 6 months, making a waiver under 212(h) unnec- essary. See section 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) of the Act. However, the Immigration Judge determined that the respondent’s crime did fall within section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act, which renders inadmissible any alien who procures or seeks to procure, by fraud, documentation or other immigration benefits under the Act. Therefore, the respondent still needed a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act (waiver for fraud or misrep- resentation). In determining whether to grant the application for a section 212(i) waiver, the Immigration Judge found that the respondent had failed to estab- lish extreme hardship to his spouse in the event he is deported. Additionally, the Immigration Judge denied the respondent’s application for adjustment of status as a matter of discretion. On appeal, the respondent argues that the Immigration Judge erred in finding no extreme hardship and that he also gave improper weight to the

在1995年10月26日举行的初步听证中，被申请人承认了《出庭通知与听证通知》（表格I-221）中所载的指控，并被移民法官裁定为可驱逐。随后，他于1996年9月19日基于其美国公民配偶提交的已获批准的签证申请，提交了调整身份请求。2 由于被申请人曾被判持有虚假身份文件罪，被申请人还提交了不可入境豁免请求。见该法第245条。 移民法官最初认为被申请人需要该法第212(h)条下的不可入境豁免，但随后认定被申请人属于该法第212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)条（涉及道德败坏的犯罪）的例外情形。具体而言，移民法官认定被申请人未被监禁超过6个月，因此无需第212(h)条下的豁免。见该法第212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II)条。然而，移民法官认定被申请人的犯罪确实属于该法第212(a)(6)(C)条的范围，该条使任何通过欺诈获取或寻求获取该法下文件或其他移民利益的外国人不可入境。因此，被申请人仍需要该法第212(i)条下的不可入境豁免（欺诈或虚假陈述豁免）。 在决定是否批准第212(i)条豁免申请时，移民法官认定被申请人未能证明若其被驱逐将对其配偶造成极端困难。此外，移民法官作为自由裁量事项驳回了被申请人的调整身份申请。 在上诉中，被申请人主张移民法官认定不存在极端困难有误，并且对本案中的

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negative factors in this case. In addressing the respondent’s arguments, we will engage in an independent review of the merits of the case. Prior to dis- cussing the merits of the respondent’s arguments, however, we will address several issues of statutory interpretation raised in his appeal.

不利因素给予了不当权重。在处理被申请人的论点时，我们将对案件实体进行独立审查。然而，在讨论被申请人论点的实体之前，我们将处理其上诉中提出的若干法律解释问题。

II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION ISSUES

II. 法律解释问题

The respondent first argues that he does not require a waiver of inad- missibility under section 212(i) of the Act because he is not inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act. Specifically, he states that his sole conviction for possession of a false identification document (namely, a counterfeit Texas birth certificate) with the intent to defraud the United States (by obtaining a United States passport) does not fall within the defi- nition of fraud in the Act. As he was convicted only of possession, he asserts that it is error to find him guilty of seeking to procure a fraudulent docu- ment. We disagree. Section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act states:

被申请人首先主张，他不需要该法第212(i)条下的不可入境豁免，因为他并非该法第212(a)(6)(C)(i)条下的不可入境者。具体而言，他表示，其唯一一项持有虚假身份文件（即伪造的德克萨斯州出生证明）并意图欺诈美国（通过获取美国护照）的定罪，不属于该法中欺诈的定义。由于他仅被判持有罪，他声称认定其犯有寻求获取欺诈文件罪是错误的。我们不同意。该法第212(a)(6)(C)(i)条规定：

We note also that in finding the respondent’s conviction fell within sec- tion 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act, the Immigration Judge and the Immigration and Naturalization Service did not improperly “go behind” the conviction record as contended by the respondent. 3 Rather, they were merely estab- lishing the facts regarding the respondent’s fraud, which would have con-

我们还注意到，在认定被申请人的定罪属于该法第212(a)(6)(C)条范围时，移民法官和移民与归化局并未如被申请人所主张的那样不当“追究”定罪记录。3 相反，他们仅仅是在确立有关被申请人欺诈的事实，无论被申请人是否被定罪，这些事实本可

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stituted grounds for inadmissibility whether or not the respondent had been convicted. See section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act (no conviction is required in order to establish inadmissibility). In sum, we agree with the Immigration Judge that the respondent’s activities clearly fall within the purview of section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act. By fraud and by willful misrepresentation of a material fact, he sought to procure both “documentation” and “other benefits” under the Act. Therefore, we turn to the respondent’s claim on appeal that he was not required to establish extreme hardship under recently enacted immigration legislation.

构成不可入境的理由。见该法第212(a)(6)(C)条（确立不可入境无需定罪）。 总之，我们同意移民法官的意见，即被申请人的活动显然属于该法第212(a)(6)(C)(i)条的范围。通过欺诈和故意虚假陈述重大事实，他寻求获取该法下的“文件”和“其他利益”。 因此，我们转向被申请人在上诉中关于其无需根据最近颁布的移民立法证明极端困难的主张。

On appeal, the respondent argues that he was not given an adequate opportunity to present evidence on the issue of extreme hardship because, at the time of his hearing, “the INS was not asking for any showing of ‘extreme hardship.’” He concedes that the new requirements for section 212(i) relief apply to him, notwithstanding the fact that his application for relief was filed prior to the enactment of new legislation, i.e., section 349 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C of Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-639 (“IIRI- RA”). 4 However, he states that his case should be remanded in order to allow him to present adequate evidence on the issue of extreme hardship. 5 We first note that the respondent’s concession is in accord with the Attorney General’s decision in Matter of Soriano, 21 I&N Dec. 516 (BIA 1996; A.G. 1997), which holds that the enactment of new statutory rules of eligibility for discretionary forms of relief acts to withdraw her jurisdiction to grant such relief in pending cases to aliens who do not qualify under those new rules. In conducting a statutory analysis of the new amendments to section 212(c) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994), as amended by Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-

在上诉中，被申请人主张，他未获得充分机会就极端困难问题提交证据，因为在其听证时，“移民与归化局并未要求任何‘极端困难’的证明”。他承认第212(i)条救济的新要求适用于他，尽管其救济申请是在新立法颁布之前提交的，即《1996年非法移民改革与移民责任法》第349条，Pub. L. No. 104-208 C部分，110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-639（“IIRIRA”）。4 然而，他表示其案件应发回重审，以便允许他就极端困难问题提交充分证据。5 我们首先注意到，被申请人的承认与司法部长在Matter of Soriano, 21 I&N Dec. 516 (BIA 1996; A.G. 1997)中的决定一致，该决定认为，颁布新的自由裁量形式救济资格法定规则，具有撤回其在待决案件中向不符合这些新规则的外国人授予此类救济的管辖权的作用。在对该法第212(c)条，8 U.S.C. § 1182(c)（1994），经《1996年反恐怖主义与有效死刑法》Pub. L. No. 104-

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132, § 440(d), 110 Stat. 1214, 1277 (“AEDPA”), the Attorney General stated:

132, § 440(d), 110 Stat. 1214, 1277（“AEDPA”），司法部长表示：

Matter of Soriano, supra, A.G. opinion at 536. Likewise, the Attorney General concluded that the new provisions in section 212(c) applied to pending cases because the new legislation acted to withdraw her authority to grant prospective relief; it did not speak to the rights of the affected party. Id. at 536. The effect was therefore to alter both jurisdiction and the avail- ability of prospective relief to the alien. Id. at 7; see also AEDPA § 440(d). Similarly, we find the request for a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act is a request for prospective relief. “‘It is not designed to remedy the past but only to affect petitioner’s future status with respect to the legality of his presence in the United States.’” Matter of Soriano, supra, A.G. opinion at 538 (quoting Scheidemann v. INS, 83 F.3d 1517, 1523 (3d Cir. 1996) (discussing section 212(c) of the Act)). The con- sequences to both the respondent in this case and the respondent in Scheidemann were clear at the time of that conduct and remain unchanged today—both were subject to possible criminal sanctions and deportation. Id. Therefore, based on the foregoing, we find that the amendments to sec- tion 212(i) of the Act are substantially similar to those discussed in Matter of Soriano, supra, in that they affect only prospective injunctive relief. As we are bound by the Attorney General’s prior decision, we apply this analy- sis to the respondent’s case and find that new provisions in section 212(i) must be applied to pending cases. See Matter of Montenegro, 20 I&N Dec. 603 (BIA 1992) (holding that the Board and all the Immigration Judges are strictly bound by the determinations of the Attorney General because our jurisdiction derives from hers). Since the amendments made by section 349 of the IIRIRA were effective upon the date of enactment, September 30, 1996, they were properly applied by the Immigration Judge in his decision of January 21, 1997. 6 Therefore, we reject the respondent’s claim that since “INS was not asking for any showing of extreme hardship,” his case should be remanded for an opportunity to present evidence of extreme hardship. It is clear from

Matter of Soriano, supra, 司法部长意见第536页。同样，司法部长认定第212(c)条的新条款适用于待决案件，因为新立法撤回了其授予前瞻性救济的权力；它并未涉及受影响当事人的权利。Id. at 536。因此，其效果是同时改变管辖权和外国人获得前瞻性救济的可能性。Id. at 7；另见AEDPA § 440(d)。 同样，我们认定，根据该法第212(i)条提出的不可入境豁免请求属于前瞻性救济请求。“‘其目的不是补救过去，而仅是影响申请人未来在美国居留合法性的身份。’”Matter of Soriano, supra, 司法部长意见第538页（引用Scheidemann v. INS, 83 F.3d 1517, 1523 (3d Cir. 1996)（讨论该法第212(c)条））。本案被申请人和Scheidemann案被申请人在该行为发生时面临的后果是明确的，且至今未变——两人均可能受到刑事制裁和驱逐出境。Id. 因此，基于上述，我们认定该法第212(i)条的修正与Matter of Soriano, supra中讨论的修正实质相似，因为它们仅影响前瞻性禁令救济。由于我们受司法部长先前决定的约束，我们将此分析适用于被申请人的案件，并认定第212(i)条的新条款必须适用于待决案件。见Matter of Montenegro, 20 I&N Dec. 603 (BIA 1992)（认定委员会及所有移民法官严格受司法部长决定的约束，因为我们的管辖权源自其管辖权）。由于IIRIRA第349条所作的修正自颁布之日1996年9月30日起生效，移民法官在其1997年1月21日的决定中正确适用了这些修正。6 因此，我们驳回被申请人的主张，即由于“INS并未要求证明极端困难”，其案件应发回重审以提供证明极端困难的机会。从

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the record that the parties were aware that the extreme hardship requirement added by IIRIRA was being applied to the respondent’s case, and he had ample opportunity to present evidence in this regard. Based on the forego- ing, we find no error in the Immigration Judge’s application of extreme hardship to this case, and we also find no ground upon which to remand. Accordingly, we will now discuss whether the respondent has met the statu- tory requirement of extreme hardship.

记录中可以清楚看出，双方均知悉IIRIRA新增的极端困难要求正适用于被申请人的案件，且其有充分机会就此提供证据。基于上述，我们认定移民法官将极端困难适用于本案并无错误，亦未发现发回重审的任何理由。因此，我们现在将讨论被申请人是否满足极端困难的法定要求。

III. MERITS OF THE RESPONDENT’S CASE

III. 被申请人案件的实体问题

As we have stated in other cases involving discretionary relief, extreme hardship is not a definable term of fixed and inflexible meaning, and the elements to establish extreme hardship are dependent upon the facts and cir- cumstances of each case. See Matter of Chumpitazi, 16 I&N Dec. 629 (BIA 1978). The Board has, however, enunciated factors relevant to the issue of the extreme hardship determination in previous decisions, albeit ones involving relief other than a section 212(i) waiver. Although it is, for the most part, prudent to avoid cross application between different types of relief of particular principles or standards, we find the factors articulated in cases involving suspension of deportation 7 and other waivers of inadmissibility to be helpful, given that both forms of relief require extreme hardship and the exercise of discretion. See Matter of Mendez, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996) (applying discretionary factors artic- ulated in a section 212(c) case to a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h)(1)(B) of the Act); see also Hassan v. INS, 927 F.2d 465, 467 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that suspension cases interpreting extreme hardship are use- ful for interpreting extreme hardship in section 212(h) cases). These factors relate to the level of extreme hardship which an alien’s “qualifying relative,” in this case his spouse, would experience upon deportation of the respon- dent. INS v. Hector, 479 U.S. 85 (1986) (stating that the Board does not need to consider hardship to third parties other than the qualifying relatives delineated in the Act for purposes of deciding whether an alien is entitled to relief).

正如我们在其他涉及自由裁量救济的案件中所指出的，极端困难并非一个具有固定和僵化含义的可定义术语，证明极端困难的因素取决于每个案件的事实和情况。见Matter of Chumpitazi, 16 I&N Dec. 629 (BIA 1978)。然而，委员会在先前决定中已阐明了与极端困难认定问题相关的因素，尽管这些决定涉及的是第212(i)条豁免以外的救济。 尽管在大多数情况下，避免在不同类型救济之间交叉适用特定原则或标准是审慎的，但我们认为，涉及暂停驱逐7和其他不可入境豁免的案件中所阐明的因素是有帮助的，因为两种救济形式均要求极端困难并行使自由裁量权。见Matter of Mendez, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996)（将第212(c)条案件中阐明的自由裁量因素适用于该法第212(h)(1)(B)条下的不可入境豁免）；另见Hassan v. INS, 927 F.2d 465, 467 (9th Cir. 1991)（指出解释极端困难的暂停案件有助于解释第212(h)条案件中的极端困难）。这些因素涉及外国人“合格亲属”（本案中为其配偶）在被申请人被驱逐出境后将经历的极端困难程度。INS v. Hector, 479 U.S. 85 (1986)（指出委员会在决定外国人是否有权获得救济时，无需考虑该法所列合格亲属以外的第三方所受的困难）。

The factors deemed relevant in determining extreme hardship to a qual-

在认定对合格

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ifying relative include, but are not limited to, the following: the presence of lawful permanent resident or United States citizen family ties to this coun- try; the qualifying relative’s family ties outside the United States; the con- ditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative’s ties to such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and, finally, significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. See Jong Ha Wang v. INS, 450 U.S. 139 (1981); Gutierrez-Centeno v. INS, 99 F.3d 1529 (9th Cir. 1996); Shooshtary v. INS, 39 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 1994); Palmer v. INS, 4 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 1993); Cerrillo-Perez v. INS, 809 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1987); Ramirez-Durazo v. INS, 794 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1986); Sanchez v. INS, 755 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1985); Contreras-Buenfil v. INS, 712 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1983); Ramirez-Gonzalez v. INS, 695 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Matter of Pilch, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996); Matter of L-O-G-, 21 I&N Dec. 413 (BIA 1996); Matter of O-J-O-, 21 I&N Dec. 381 (BIA 1996); Matter of Ige, 20 I&N Dec. 880 (BIA 1994); Matter of Anderson, 16 I&N Dec. 596 (BIA 1978). While not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case, we will now apply those factors to the present case to the extent they are relevant in determining extreme hardship to the respondent’s spouse. We emphasize again, however, that the list of factors noted above is not exclusive and also that the Attorney General and her delegates have the authority to construe extreme hardship narrowly. INS v. Jong Ha Wang, supra, at 144. In addition, we note that establishing extreme hardship does not create any entitlement to relief. Although extreme hardship is a require- ment for section 212(i) relief, once established, it is but one favorable dis- cretionary factor to be considered. See Matter of Mendez, supra, at 7.

亲属的极端困难时，被认为相关的因素包括但不限于以下各项：合格亲属与美国境内合法永久居民或美国公民的家庭联系；合格亲属在美国境外的家庭联系；合格亲属将迁往的国家或各国的条件以及合格亲属与此类国家的联系程度；离开本国的经济影响；最后，重要的健康状况，特别是当与合格亲属将迁往的国家缺乏适当医疗护理相关时。见Jong Ha Wang v. INS, 450 U.S. 139 (1981); Gutierrez-Centeno v. INS, 99 F.3d 1529 (9th Cir. 1996); Shooshtary v. INS, 39 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 1994); Palmer v. INS, 4 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 1993); Cerrillo-Perez v. INS, 809 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1987); Ramirez-Durazo v. INS, 794 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1986); Sanchez v. INS, 755 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1985); Contreras-Buenfil v. INS, 712 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1983); Ramirez-Gonzalez v. INS, 695 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1983); 另见Matter of Pilch, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996); Matter of L-O-G-, 21 I&N Dec. 413 (BIA 1996); Matter of O-J-O-, 21 I&N Dec. 381 (BIA 1996); Matter of Ige, 20 I&N Dec. 880 (BIA 1994); Matter of Anderson, 16 I&N Dec. 596 (BIA 1978)。 尽管在任何特定案件中并非需要分析上述所有因素，但我们现在将在与认定被申请人配偶极端困难相关的范围内，将这些因素适用于本案。然而，我们再次强调，上述因素清单并非排他性的，且司法部长及其代表有权对极端困难作狭义解释。INS v. Jong Ha Wang, supra, at 144。此外，我们注意到，证明极端困难并不产生任何获得救济的权利。尽管极端困难是第212(i)条救济的一项要求，但一旦证明，它仅是一个应予考虑的有利用自由裁量因素。见Matter of Mendez, supra, at 7。

The respondent is a 24-year-old native and citizen of Mexico. He has resided in the United States since 1989 and was recently married in 1995. At the time of the marriage, the respondent’s wife was a lawful permanent resident; she became a naturalized United States citizen in 1996. Both the respondent and his wife reside with her family and provide them some financial support in return for room and board. Most of the respondent’s family, however, resides in Mexico. The respondent testified that he and his wife have very little money. Therefore, if forced to accompany the respondent to Mexico, the respon- dent’s wife would be unable to travel back and forth to visit her family in the United States. In addition, the respondent’s wife testified that she would have difficulty in obtaining employment in Mexico. Having fully weighed the factors mentioned above, we find that the

被申请人是24岁的墨西哥本土出生公民。他自1989年起居住在美国，并于1995年最近结婚。结婚时，被申请人的妻子是合法永久居民；她于1996年成为归化美国公民。被申请人和他的妻子均与她的家人同住，并提供一些经济支持以换取食宿。然而，被申请人的大部分家人居住在墨西哥。 被申请人作证称，他和妻子几乎没有钱。因此，如果被迫陪同被申请人前往墨西哥，被申请人的妻子将无法往返美国探望家人。此外，被申请人的妻子作证称，她在墨西哥将难以获得就业。 在充分权衡上述因素后，我们认定

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respondent has failed to establish extreme hardship to his spouse. As noted in the Immigration Judge’s decision, the respondent’s wife knew that the respondent was in deportation proceedings at the time they were married. 8 In contrast to the respondent’s assertions on appeal, this factor is not irrele- vant. Rather, it goes to the respondent’s wife’s expectations at the time they were wed. Indeed, she was aware that she may have to face the decision of parting from her husband or following him to Mexico in the event he was ordered deported. In the latter scenario, the respondent’s wife was also aware that a move to Mexico would separate her from her family in California. We find this to undermine the respondent’s argument that his wife will suffer extreme hardship if he is deported. See Perez v. INS, 96 F.3d 390, 392 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that “‘[e]xtreme hardship’ is hardship that is ‘unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected’ upon depor- tation. ‘The common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship.’” (quoting Hassan v. INS, supra, at 468)); Shooshtary v. INS, supra, at 1051 (holding that the uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather repre- sents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported); Silverman v. Rogers, 437 F.2d 102, 107 (1st Cir. 1970) (stating that “[e]ven assuming that the federal government had no right either to prevent a marriage or destroy it, we believe that here it has done nothing more than to say that the residence of one of the marriage partners may not be in the United States”), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 983 (1971). Additionally, at no time during the hearing did the respondent’s wife suggest that she would suffer any particular hardship, let alone extreme hardship, by moving to Mexico. See Shooshtary v. INS, supra, at 1051 (reviewing the Board’s denial of a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h)(1)(B) of the Act, and stating that a “‘waiver should be granted only in those cases where “great actual or prospective injury” to the qualifying party will occur. There must be an “extreme impact” on the citizen or law- ful permanent resident family member. . . .’” (quoting the Board’s decision in the case, which in turn quoted Matter of Ngai, 19 I&N Dec. 245 (BIA 1984))). Furthermore, although the respondent’s spouse would lose the physical proximity to her family, she speaks Spanish and the majority of her family is originally from Mexico. Therefore, she should have less difficul- ty adjusting to life in a foreign country. See Ramirez-Durazo v. INS, supra, at 498 (noting that the family spoke Spanish, which would ease the chil- dren’s transition to Mexican society and schools, and that any hardship

respondent未能证明其配偶会遭受极端困难。正如移民法官在裁决中所指出的，respondent的妻子在结婚时就知道respondent正处于驱逐出境程序中。8 与respondent在上诉中的主张相反，这一因素并非无关紧要。相反，它关系到respondent的妻子在结婚时的预期。事实上，她知道如果respondent被下令驱逐出境，她可能不得不面对与丈夫分离或跟随他前往墨西哥的决定。在后一种情形下，respondent的妻子也知道移居墨西哥会使她与在加利福尼亚的家人分离。我们认为这削弱了respondent关于若他被驱逐出境其妻子将遭受极端困难的论点。参见Perez v. INS, 96 F.3d 390, 392 (9th Cir. 1996)（指出“‘极端困难’是指在驱逐出境时‘不寻常或超出通常预期’的困难。‘驱逐出境的常见结果不足以证明极端困难。’”（引用Hassan v. INS, supra, at 468））；Shooshtary v. INS, supra, at 1051（裁定家庭连根拔起和与朋友分离并不必然构成极端困难，而只是大多数被驱逐出境的外国人家庭所经历的那种不便和困难）；Silverman v. Rogers, 437 F.2d 102, 107 (1st Cir. 1970)（指出“即使假设联邦政府无权阻止婚姻或破坏婚姻，我们认为在此它所做的不过是说婚姻一方当事人的居所可能不在美国”），cert. denied, 402 U.S. 983 (1971)。 此外，在听证会期间，respondent的妻子从未表示她因移居墨西哥会遭受任何特定困难，更不用说极端困难。参见Shooshtary v. INS, supra, at 1051（审查Board根据该法第212(h)(1)(B)条拒绝不可入境豁免，并指出“‘只有在符合条件的一方将遭受‘重大实际或预期伤害’的案件中才应给予豁免。必须对公民或合法永久居民家庭成员产生‘极端影响’。……’”（引用Board在该案中的裁决，该裁决又引用了Matter of Ngai, 19 I&N Dec. 245 (BIA 1984)））。此外，尽管respondent的配偶将失去与家人的物理接近，但她会说西班牙语，且其大多数家人原籍墨西哥。因此，她适应外国生活的困难应当较小。参见Ramirez-Durazo v. INS, supra, at 498（指出该家庭说西班牙语，这将缓解子女向墨西哥社会和学校的过渡，且任何困难

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would be alleviated by numerous relatives living in the country to which the qualifying aliens would be relocating); Ramirez-Gonzalez v. INS, supra, at 1211 (holding that the hardship resulting from separation from extended family would be alleviated by immediate family relatives living in the alien’s homeland); see also Matter of Pilch, supra, at 632 (noting that numerous family members in Poland may be able to provide an emotional base of support upon the aliens’ return to that country). In addition, neither the respondent nor his wife have any real financial ties to the United States. The respondent’s wife is currently unemployed. Although the respondent is a musician in a band, he provided no evidence to prove that it had experienced success such that deportation would cause him to relinquish a lucrative career and, therefore, plunge his wife into unaccustomed poverty. Even if this were the case, we have generally not found financial hardship alone to amount to extreme hardship. See, e.g., INS v. Jong Ha Wang, supra, at 144 (holding that the mere showing of econom- ic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant findings of extreme hardship); Ramirez-Durazo v. INS, supra, at 499 (finding no extreme hardship where the child faced a lower standard of living in Mexico); Hernandez-Patino v. INS, 831 F.2d 750, 755 (7th Cir. 1987); Holley v. INS, 727 F.2d 189 (1st Cir. 1984); Jong Shik Choe v. INS, 597 F.2d 168 (9th Cir. 1979); see also Shooshtary v. INS, supra, at 1051 (stating that the “extreme hardship requirement of section 212(h)(2) was not enacted to insure that the family members of excludable aliens fulfill their dreams or continue in the lives which they currently enjoy”). In sum, the respondent has failed to show that his spouse would suffer extreme hardship over and above the normal economic and social disrup- tions involved in the deportation of a family member. See Matter of Pilch, supra; see also Hassan v. INS, supra, at 468 (finding that an alien attempt- ing to establish extreme hardship must show a more severe impact than that of the common results of deportation); Ramirez-Durazo v. INS, supra, at 498. Therefore, we agree with the Immigration Judge’s decision denying the respondent a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act. Having found the respondent statutorily ineligible for relief, we decline to discuss whether or not he merits a waiver as a matter of discretion. However, for purposes of clarity and future adjudications, we will address the respondent’s argument that the Immigration Judge erred in considering his original fraud as an adverse factor when discussing discretion.

将因居住在该符合条件的外国人将迁往的国家的大量亲属而得到缓解）；Ramirez-Gonzalez v. INS, supra, at 1211（裁定因与大家庭分离而产生的困难将因居住在该外国人家乡的直系亲属而得到缓解）；另见Matter of Pilch, supra, at 632（指出在波兰的众多家庭成员可能能够在该外国人返回该国后提供情感支持基础）。 此外，respondent及其妻子与美国均无任何实际的经济联系。respondent的妻子目前失业。尽管respondent是一个乐队的音乐人，但他未提供任何证据证明该乐队已取得成功，以致驱逐出境会致使他放弃一份收入丰厚的职业，从而使其妻子陷入不习惯的贫困。即使情况如此，我们通常也不认为仅经济困难即构成极端困难。参见，例如，INS v. Jong Ha Wang, supra, at 144（裁定仅证明对符合条件家庭成员的经济损害不足以支持极端困难的认定）；Ramirez-Durazo v. INS, supra, at 499（认定子女在墨西哥面临较低生活水平不构成极端困难）；Hernandez-Patino v. INS, 831 F.2d 750, 755 (7th Cir. 1987)；Holley v. INS, 727 F.2d 189 (1st Cir. 1984)；Jong Shik Choe v. INS, 597 F.2d 168 (9th Cir. 1979)；另见Shooshtary v. INS, supra, at 1051（指出“第212(h)(2)条的极端困难要求并非为确保可被排除的外国人的家庭成员实现其梦想或继续其目前享受的生活而制定”）。 总之，respondent未能证明其配偶将遭受超出驱逐家庭成员所涉及的正常经济和社会扰乱之上的极端困难。参见Matter of Pilch, supra；另见Hassan v. INS, supra, at 468（认定试图证明极端困难的外国人必须证明比驱逐出境的常见结果更严重的影响）；Ramirez-Durazo v. INS, supra, at 498。因此，我们同意移民法官根据该法第212(i)条拒绝给予respondent不可入境豁免的裁决。 在认定respondent在法律上不符合救济资格后，我们拒绝讨论他是否作为自由裁量事项值得获得豁免。然而，为清晰起见并便于未来裁决，我们将讨论respondent关于移民法官在讨论自由裁量权时将他的原始欺诈作为不利因素考虑有误的主张。

On appeal, the respondent cites several cases to support his assertion that the Immigration Judge erroneously focused on the underlying fraud as an adverse factor. See Matter of Alonzo, 17 I&N Dec. 292 (Comm’r 1979);

在上诉中，respondent引用了若干案件以支持其主张，即移民法官错误地将 underlying fraud 作为不利因素予以关注。参见Matter of Alonzo, 17 I&N Dec. 292 (Comm’r 1979)；

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Matter of Da Silva, 17 I&N Dec. 288 (Comm’r 1979). As correctly noted by the respondent, these cases stand for the proposition that obtaining cer- tain documentation by fraud, in order to achieve an immigration benefit, “shows disrespect for the law, but . . . is the action for which [the applicants] seek to be forgiven and should not be held as an adverse factor.” Matter of Alonzo, supra, at 294. However, this Board is not bound by decisions of the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. See Matter of Fueyo, 20 I&N Dec. 84, 87 n.3 (BIA 1989). In addition, since the writ- ing of these decisions, several changes in law have required us to reevalu- ate the issue of use of underlying fraud as an adverse factor. Specifically, the United States Supreme Court ruled in INS v. Yueh- Shaio Yang, 519 U.S. 26 (1996), that the Attorney General has the authori- ty to consider any and all negative factors, including the respondent’s ini- tial fraud, in deciding whether or not to grant a waiver under section 241(a)(1)(H) of the Act. Therefore, as more thoroughly articulated in Matter of Tijam, 22 I&N Dec. 3372 (BIA 1998), the Supreme Court has undercut the rationale of Matter of Da Silva, supra, and Matter of Alonzo, supra. For this reason, as well as those stated in Matter of Tijam, supra, we find that the Immigration Judge properly considered the respondent’s underlying fraud as an adverse factor in denying him relief under section 212(i) of the Act as a matter of discretion.

Matter of Da Silva, 17 I&N Dec. 288 (Comm’r 1979)。正如respondent正确指出的，这些案件所确立的命题是，为获得移民利益而通过欺诈取得某些文件“表明对法律的不尊重，但……正是[申请人]寻求被宽恕的行为，不应被作为不利因素。”Matter of Alonzo, supra, at 294。然而，本Board不受移民和归化局专员裁决的约束。参见Matter of Fueyo, 20 I&N Dec. 84, 87 n.3 (BIA 1989)。此外，自这些裁决作出以来，法律的若干变化要求我们重新评估将 underlying fraud 作为不利因素使用的问题。 具体而言，美国最高法院在INS v. Yueh-Shaio Yang, 519 U.S. 26 (1996)中裁定，司法部长有权在决定是否根据该法第241(a)(1)(H)条给予豁免时考虑任何及所有负面因素，包括respondent最初的欺诈。因此，正如Matter of Tijam, 22 I&N Dec. 3372 (BIA 1998)中更详尽阐述的那样，最高法院已削弱了Matter of Da Silva, supra, 和Matter of Alonzo, supra, 的理据。基于此理由以及Matter of Tijam, supra, 中所述的理由，我们认定移民法官在作为自由裁量事项根据该法第212(i)条拒绝给予respondent救济时，适当地将respondent的 underlying fraud 作为不利因素予以考虑。

IV. CONCLUSION

IV. 结论

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the respondent has failed to establish statutory eligibility for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act. Therefore, he is also ineligible for adjustment of status. In addition, we find that the Immigration Judge properly considered the respondent’s underlying fraud as an adverse factor when denying him relief as a matter of discretion. Accordingly, his appeal will be dismissed. ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

基于上述，我们认定respondent未能证明根据该法第212(i)条获得不可入境豁免的法定资格。因此，他也不符合调整身份的资格。此外，我们认定移民法官在作为自由裁量事项拒绝给予respondent救济时，适当地将respondent的 underlying fraud 作为不利因素予以考虑。据此，其上诉将被驳回。 命令：上诉驳回。

Board Member Anthony C. Moscato did not participate in the decision in this case.

Board Member Anthony C. Moscato未参与本案裁决。

CONCURRING OPINION: Gustavo D. Villageliu, Board Member, in which Paul W. Schmidt, Chairman, joined

协同意见： Gustavo D. Villageliu，Board Member，Paul W. Schmidt，Chairman，加入

I respectfully concur. While I generally concur with both the result and reasoning of the majority opinion, I write separately to address briefly four minor points in the majority’s precedent opinion that may be misinterpreted. First, in assessing the extreme hardship requirement, the majority cites INS v. Hector, 479 U.S. 85 (1986), for the proposition that hardship to rel-

我谨此表示同意。 虽然我总体上同意多数意见的结果和推理，但我另行撰写以简要说明多数意见先例裁决中可能被误解的四个次要问题。 首先，在评估极端困难要求时，多数意见引用INS v. Hector, 479 U.S. 85 (1986)，以支持关于对rel-的困难

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atives not listed under former section 244(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1994), need not be considered. However, the Supreme Court in INS v. Hector, supra, at 86 n.1, specifically recognized the relevance of such relatives’ suffering to the determination of the hardship the respondent will suffer if deported, citing Contreras-Buenfil v. INS, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983) (separation from woman and her son respondent lived with), and Antoine-Dorcelli v. INS, 703 F.2d 19, 21-22 (1st Cir. 1983) (separation from family for whom respondent was caretak- er). Moreover, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, where this case arises, has ruled that in considering the totality of factors relevant to the extreme hardship determination in suspension applications, the Board abused its discretion in failing to consider the consequences of an alien’s deportation on other relatives not specifically listed under section 244(a)(1). See Tukhowinich v. INS, 64 F.3d 460 (9th Cir. 1995). The major- ity’s statement that nonqualifying relatives need not be considered should be read only as applicable to applications for relief under section 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i) (Supp. II 1996), where hardship to the applicant is not a listed factor. Second, the majority’s opinion may be read to imply that the time the respondent and his spouse wed is determinative as to whether to discount the spouse’s hardship because of diminished expectations when marrying an alien in deportation proceedings. I disagree with that implication. Such diminished expectations clearly must relate to the actual circumstances, both of the marriage, and of the pending deportation proceedings, and the totality of the circumstances is paramount. Moreover, we only “discount” equities acquired after a final order of deportation. See Matter of Correa, 19 I&N Dec. 130 (BIA 1984). In this case no final order was entered since an appeal was pending. See Matter of Lok, 18 I&N Dec. 101 (BIA 1981) (stat- ing that an order is final when the Board renders its decision on appeal). Here, such a discount was appropriate, as the majority properly point- ed out that the respondent’s spouse at no time suggested that she would suf- fer any particular hardship if she moved to Mexico with the respondent. A different situation would arise, for instance, where the marriage takes place after proceedings are initiated, but was preceded by a long-term cohabita- tive relationship; where the alien was in protected status and deportation was neither imminent nor likely in the foreseeable future; or where eligi- bility for adjustment of status without the need for a discretionary waiver of inadmissibility has been established. See, e.g., Matter of Gutierrez-Lopez, 21 I&N Dec. 479 (BIA 1996). A respondent’s relationship to his spouse’s offspring may also be an appropriate consideration in the extreme hardship determination. See Contreras-Buenfil v. INS, supra. Any hardship to a qual- ifying spouse must always be considered. See Watkins v. INS, 63 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 1995). In short, as we have often stated, extreme hardship is not a definable term of fixed and inflexible meaning, and the elements to estab-

根据《移民与国籍法》原第244(a)条，8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1994)，未列出的亲属无需考虑。然而，最高法院在INS v. Hector案，supra，第86页注1中，特别承认了此类亲属的痛苦与判定若被驱逐出境答辩人将遭受的困难的相关性，引用了Contreras-Buenfil v. INS, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)（与答辩人同居的妇女及其儿子的分离），以及Antoine-Dorcelli v. INS, 703 F.2d 19, 21-22 (1st Cir. 1983)（与答辩人作为照顾者的家庭的分离）。此外，本案产生的美国第9巡回上诉法院已裁定，在考虑中止申请中判定极端困难相关的全部因素时，Board未考虑外国人被驱逐出境对其他未在第244(a)(1)条下具体列出的亲属的后果，属于滥用自由裁量权。见Tukhowinich v. INS, 64 F.3d 460 (9th Cir. 1995)。多数意见关于非合格亲属无需考虑的陈述应仅被解读为适用于根据该法第212(i)条，8 U.S.C. § 1182(i) (Supp. II 1996) 提出的救济申请，其中申请人的困难并非列出的因素。 其次，多数意见可能被解读为暗示答辩人及其配偶结婚的时间对于是否因在与驱逐程序中的外国人结婚时预期减少而折扣配偶的困难具有决定性。我不同意该暗示。此类减少的预期显然必须与婚姻和待决驱逐程序的实际情形相关，且整体情况至关重要。此外，我们仅“折扣”在最终驱逐令后获得的衡平。见Matter of Correa, 19 I&N Dec. 130 (BIA 1984)。在本案中，由于上诉待决，未作出最终命令。见Matter of Lok, 18 I&N Dec. 101 (BIA 1981)（指出当Board对上诉作出决定时命令为最终）。 在此，此类折扣是适当的，正如多数意见正确指出的，答辩人的配偶从未表示若她与答辩人移居墨西哥将遭受任何特定困难。不同情况会出现，例如，婚姻在程序启动后发生，但之前有长期同居关系；外国人处于受保护身份且驱逐既不迫在眉睫也不可能在可预见的未来发生；或已确立无需自由裁量豁免不可入境即可调整身份的资格。见，例如，Matter of Gutierrez-Lopez, 21 I&N Dec. 479 (BIA 1996)。答辩人与配偶后代的关系也可能是极端困难判定中的适当考虑因素。见Contreras-Buenfil v. INS, supra。对合格配偶的任何困难必须始终予以考虑。见Watkins v. INS, 63 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 1995)。简言之，正如我们经常陈述的，极端困难并非具有固定和僵化含义的可定义术语，且确立

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lish extreme hardship are dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case. See Matter of Chumpitazi, 16 I&N Dec. 629 (BIA 1978). Under the specific facts of this case extreme hardship was not established, and this case should not be misinterpreted as requiring a discount of the hardships present in all cases where the wedding ceremony takes place after proceed- ings are initiated. Third, the majority’s opinion correctly notes that in purchasing the fraudulent birth certificate, using it to procure a fraudulent social security card, and subsequently using these documents to seek to procure a United States passport in order to travel into and out of the United States and seek employment, the respondent sought to procure both “documentation” and “other benefits” under the Act. The majority’s finding is consistent with the close scrutiny of such a finding required by Matter of Healy and Goodchild, 17 I&N Dec. 22 (BIA 1979), because of its harsh consequences. However, a small clarification is needed. The other benefits under the Act the respon- dent sought to procure are the right to travel with a United States passport pursuant to section 215(b) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1185(b) (1994). The majority’s language may be misinterpreted as suggesting that using the fraudulent passport to obtain employment is obtaining a benefit under the Act. Although the use or possession of such document is punishable under section 274C of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324c (1994 & Supp. II 1996), work- ing in the United States is not “a benefit provided under this Act,” and we have specifically held that a violation of section 274C and fraud or misrep- resentation under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act are not equivalent. See Matter of Lazarte, 21 I&N Dec. 214 (BIA 1996); accord Matter of Jimenez- Santillano, 21 I&N Dec. 567 (BIA 1996); cf. Matter of Serna, 20 I&N Dec. 579 (BIA 1992) (relating to possession or use of an altered immigration document). It is long settled that inadmissibility for immigration fraud does not ensue from the mere purchase of fraudulent documents, absent an attempt to fraudulently use the document for immigration purposes. Matter of Kai Hing Hui, 15 I&N Dec. 288 (BIA 1975); Matter of Sarkissian, 10 I&N Dec. 109 (BIA 1962); Matter of Box, 10 I&N Dec. 87 (BIA 1962); accord Matter of D-L- & A-M-, 20 I&N Dec. 409 (BIA 1991); cf. Matter of Serna, supra (stating that mere possession is not a crime involving moral turpitude). Finally, the majority points out that the Supreme Court has indicated that we may permissibly construe the element of extreme hardship narrow- ly. However, such permissibility does not require a narrow construction of extreme hardship, and we have recently declined to do so, choosing instead to rely on our precedents for guidance in our case-by-case determinations. See Matter of O-J-O-, 21 I&N Dec. 381 (BIA 1996). Consequently, this decision should not be misinterpreted as a change in our precedents regard- ing the level of hardship we will require for relief from deportation. See Matter of O-J-O-, supra, at 387, 389 (Dunne and Holmes, concurring), and 571

极端困难的要素取决于每个案件的事实和情况。见Matter of Chumpitazi, 16 I&N Dec. 629 (BIA 1978)。在本案的具体事实下，极端困难未确立，且本案不应被误解为要求在婚礼仪式在程序启动后发生的所有案件中折扣存在的困难。 第三，多数意见正确指出，在购买虚假出生证明、使用其获取虚假社会保障卡，并随后使用这些文件试图获取美国护照以出入美国并寻求就业时，答辩人试图获取该法下的“文件”和“其他利益”。多数意见的认定符合Matter of Healy and Goodchild, 17 I&N Dec. 22 (BIA 1979) 所要求的对此类认定的严格审查，因为其严厉后果。然而，需要一个小澄清。答辩人试图获取的该法下的其他利益是根据该法第215(b)条，8 U.S.C. § 1185(b) (1994) 使用美国护照旅行的权利。多数意见的措辞可能被误解为暗示使用虚假护照获得就业是获得该法下的利益。 尽管使用或持有此类文件根据该法第274C条，8 U.S.C. § 1324c (1994 & Supp. II 1996) 应受惩罚，但在美国工作并非“本法的利益”，且我们特别裁定违反第274C条与该法第212(a)(6)(C)(i)条下的欺诈或虚假陈述不等同。见Matter of Lazarte, 21 I&N Dec. 214 (BIA 1996); accord Matter of Jimenez-Santillano, 21 I&N Dec. 567 (BIA 1996); cf. Matter of Serna, 20 I&N Dec. 579 (BIA 1992)（关于持有或使用变造移民文件）。长期确立的是，移民欺诈的不可入境并非仅因购买虚假文件而产生，除非试图为移民目的欺诈性使用文件。Matter of Kai Hing Hui, 15 I&N Dec. 288 (BIA 1975); Matter of Sarkissian, 10 I&N Dec. 109 (BIA 1962); Matter of Box, 10 I&N Dec. 87 (BIA 1962); accord Matter of D-L- & A-M-, 20 I&N Dec. 409 (BIA 1991); cf. Matter of Serna, supra（指出单纯持有并非涉及道德败坏的犯罪）。 最后，多数意见指出最高法院已表示我们可以允许性地狭义解释极端困难要素。然而，此类允许性并不要求对极端困难进行狭义解释，且我们最近拒绝这样做，选择依赖我们的先例指导我们的逐案判定。见Matter of O-J-O-, 21 I&N Dec. 381 (BIA 1996)。因此，本决定不应被误解为我们关于驱逐救济所需困难水平的先例的改变。见Matter of O-J-O-, supra, at 387, 389 (Dunne and Holmes, concurring)，以及571

cases cited therein.

其中引用的案件。

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION: Lory Diana Rosenberg, Board Member

协同与异议意见：Lory Diana Rosenberg，Board Member

I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. In my view the majority opinion is erroneous as a matter of law in every respect. I disagree with the majority opinion for four principal reasons. First, I disagree that the respondent is inadmissible, as I do not believe that any of the documents he supposedly “procured” fall within the statuto- ry ground of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) (Supp. II 1996), which requires that “a visa [or] other documentation” was used to obtain “admission into the United States or other benefit provided under [the] Act.” Id. Second, I disagree that section 212(i), as amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C of Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-639 (“IIRI- RA”), applies to the respondent, as it contains no express legislative man- date making its application retroactive. Third, even assuming that the respondent was required to satisfy the more restrictive standard imposed by the IIRIRA, requiring a showing of extreme hardship, and limiting the extreme hardship considered to hardship that would be experienced by his spouse, I find that the extreme hardship adjudication fails to consider all the relevant factors involved, contrary to the law of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in which this appeal arises. Fourth, I disagree that the Immigration Judge’s denial of voluntary departure is not a proper matter for review, merely because the respondent has not addressed it in his appeal. It is with regard to my second point of disagreement that I feel I must concur. Arguably, the reasoning in the Attorney General’s decision in Matter of Soriano, 21 I&N Dec. 516 (BIA, A.G. 1997) (interpreting the new restrictions on eligibility for discretionary section 212(c) waivers to present no retroactivity concerns, by comparing such waivers to prospective injunc- tive relief, a procedural mechanism that, under Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994), would be applicable immediately), may control the issue as to which version of section 212(i) of the Act applies to the respondent’s case. Nevertheless, as discussed below, I believe the recent opinions of the Supreme Court, as well as the decisions of three federal cir- cuit courts of appeals and several federal district courts rejecting the Attorney General’s interpretation, warrant our reconsideration of Matter of Soriano, as well as a fresh interpretation of the statutory section at issue, unencumbered by the reasoning in that decision. In sum, based on my findings that (1) the majority decision erroneously determines the respondent inadmissible when he is not inadmissible, and (2)

我尊重地部分协同、部分异议。 在我看来，多数意见在法律上各方面均有错误。我基于四个主要理由不同意多数意见。 首先，我不同意答辩人不可入境，因为我不认为他据称“获取”的任何文件属于《移民与国籍法》第212(a)(6)(C)(i)条，8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) (Supp. II 1996) 下的法定不可入境理由，该条要求“签证[或]其他文件”被用于获得“进入美国或本法提供的其他利益”。Id. 其次，我不同意经1996年《非法移民改革与移民责任法》，Pub. L. No. 104-208 C部分，110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-639（“IIRIRA”）修订的第212(i)条适用于答辩人，因为它不包含使其适用具有追溯力的明确立法授权。 第三，即使假设答辩人被要求满足IIRIRA施加的更严格标准，要求显示极端困难，并将考虑的极端困难限于其配偶将经历的困难，我认定极端困难裁决未能考虑涉及的所有相关因素，违反了本案上诉产生的美国第9巡回上诉法院的法律。第四，我不同意移民法官拒绝自愿离境不是审查的适当事项，仅仅因为答辩人未在上诉中提出。 关于我的第二个不同意点，我觉得我必须协同。可以说，司法部长在Matter of Soriano, 21 I&N Dec. 516 (BIA, A.G. 1997) 决定中的推理（解释对自由裁量第212(c)条豁免资格的新限制不呈现追溯力问题，通过将此类豁免比作前瞻性禁令救济，一种根据Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994) 将立即适用的程序机制）可能控制关于该法第212(i)条哪一版本适用于答辩人案件的问题。然而，如下所述，我认为最高法院最近的意见，以及三个联邦巡回上诉法院和几个联邦地区法院拒绝司法部长解释的裁决，值得我们在重新考虑Matter of Soriano时，以及对该争议法定条款进行新鲜解释时，不受该决定推理的束缚。 总之，基于我的认定：(1) 多数决定错误地判定答辩人不可入境，而他是可入境的，以及(2)

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even if inadmissible, the majority either erroneously judges the respondent’s waiver application according to the wrong version of the statute, or erro- neously applies the prevailing standard applicable to a discretionary determi- nation of the presence of extreme hardship, I conclude that the respondent has been denied a fair hearing, and a reasoned decision. I do not believe that the respondent received a fair hearing as a matter of law, and I do not believe that the favorable and adverse factors present in this case were fairly weighed and balanced as our own standards, applicable circuit standards, and the principle of fundamental fairness require. Consequently, I dissent.

即使不可入境，多数意见要么根据错误版本的法规错误地判断答辩人的豁免申请，要么错误地适用了关于极端困难存在的自由裁量判定的现行标准，我得出结论，答辩人已被剥夺公平听证和合理决定。我不认为答辩人作为法律事项获得了公平听证，且我不认为本案中存在的有利和不利因素按照我们自己的标准、适用的巡回标准以及基本公平原则的要求得到了公平权衡和平衡。因此，我持异议。

I. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

一、初步考虑

This case commenced on May 9, 1995, the date the Immigration and Naturalization Service filed the Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing (Form I-221) with the Immigration Court. It involves a conviction, the sen- tence for which was entered on February 5, 1995. The original hearing was convened before the Immigration Judge on October 26, 1995, and the respondent filed an application for adjustment of status and a waiver of inadmissibility on September 19, 1996. Each of these events preceded the enactment of the IIRIRA. Thus, this case is not subject to the majority of the provisions of the IIRIRA related to removable aliens, as the case was pending prior to September 30, 1996, the date the IIRIRA was enacted. See IIRIRA § 309(c)(1). At issue is the respondent’s application for adjustment of status based on his undeniably valid marriage to a United States citizen. In addition, at issue is the respondent’s application for a waiver of inadmissibility. This aspect of the respondent’s appeal involves the question of how difficult are we are going to make it, within the statutory and regulatory confines that may exist, for the respondent to prevail and be granted a waiver and adjustment of status? In this context, we must examine which provisions of the Immigration and Nation- ality Act actually apply to the respondent, and assuming that the most harsh and restrictive provisions are applicable, how we wish to construe them.

本案于1995年5月9日开始，即移民和归化局向移民法庭提交《说明理由令和听证通知》（I-221表）之日。本案涉及一项定罪，其判决于1995年2月5日作出。原听证会于1995年10月26日在移民法官面前召开，而 respondent 于1996年9月19日提交了调整身份申请和不可入境豁免申请。上述事件均发生在《IIRIRA》颁布之前。因此，本案不受《IIRIRA》中与可驱逐外国人相关的大部分条款约束，因为本案在1996年9月30日即《IIRIRA》颁布之日前尚在审理中。见《IIRIRA》第309(c)(1)条。 本案争议焦点是 respondent 基于其与美国公民无可否认的有效婚姻而提出的调整身份申请。此外，争议焦点还包括 respondent 的不可入境豁免申请。 respondent 上诉的这一方面涉及一个问题：在可能存在的法定和监管限制范围内，我们打算让 respondent 胜诉并获得豁免和调整身份的难度有多大？在此背景下，我们必须审查《移民和国籍法》的哪些条款实际适用于 respondent，并假设最严厉和限制性最强的条款适用，我们希望对它们作何解释。

II. INADMISSIBILITY UNDER SECTION 212(i) OF THE ACT

II. 根据该法第212(i)条的不可入境性

According to the record, the respondent pled guilty to and was con-

根据记录，respondent 认罪并被判

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victed of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(4) (1994), possession of a false identification document. 1 That federal criminal provision under which the respondent was convicted states as follows:

定违反了《美国法典》第18编第1028(a)(4)条（1994年），即持有虚假身份证明文件。1 respondent 被定罪的该联邦刑事条款规定如下：

18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(4) (emphasis added). According to an “Information” in the record, the conviction refers to the respondent’s possession of a false birth certificate, which he used in applying for a United States passport at a passport agency in San Francisco. 2 This conduct occurred on September 27, 1994. Putting aside, for a moment, the procedural defects in the decisions of the Immigration Judge and the majority related to their failure to consider the actual offense for which the respondent was convicted, the majority inexplicably focuses on the verb “procuring” in assessing inadmissibility. In fact, the operative word in section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act as it relates to the respondent’s case is not whether he procured a document or was seek- ing to procure another document, but whether the procuring in which he engaged was for the purpose of obtaining “a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States, or other benefit provided under this Act.” (Emphasis added.) Initially, I note that the conduct of the respondent on which the Immigration Judge and the majority rely in finding the respondent to be inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act is based on his con- viction for offering a United States birth certificate obtained from a friend to obtain a United States passport. The statute under which the respondent was convicted covers conduct that is engaged in with an intent to defraud the United States. It does not require, in every instance, that the conduct engaged in be engaged in with the intent, or with the result, of obtaining a “benefit . . . under this Act.” The term “this Act” in section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) refers to the Immigration and Nationality Act. Thus, an individual could be convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(4) without there being any specific evidence that the individual had any intent

《美国法典》第18编第1028(a)(4)条（着重号为添加）。 根据记录中的一份“起诉书”，该定罪涉及 respondent 持有虚假出生证明，其在旧金山一家护照机构申请美国护照时使用了该证明。2 该行为发生于1994年9月27日。 暂且不论移民法官和多数意见的决定中与未能考虑 respondent 被定罪的实际罪行相关的程序缺陷，多数意见在评估不可入境性时莫名其妙地聚焦于“获取”这一动词。事实上，就 respondent 的案件而言，该法第212(a)(6)(C)(i)条中的关键词语并非他是否获取了一份文件或是否寻求获取另一份文件，而是他所从事的获取行为是否为了获得“签证、其他文件或进入美国的许可，或本法规定的其他利益”。（着重号为添加。） 首先，我注意到，移民法官和多数意见据以认定 respondent 根据该法第212(a)(6)(C)(i)条不可入境的行为，是基于其因提供从朋友处获得的美国出生证明以获取美国护照而被定罪。 respondent 被定罪的法规涵盖以欺诈美国的意图从事的行为。它并不要求每一次所从事的行为都必须具有获得“本法规定的利益”的意图或结果。第212(a)(6)(C)(i)条中的“本法”一词指《移民和国籍法》。 因此，个人可能根据《美国法典》第18编第1028(a)(4)条被定罪，而没有任何具体证据表明该个人具有任何意图

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to act, or actually did act to obtain a “benefit under this Act.” Cf. section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act. There is nothing in the record of conviction before us, nor in the testimony or other documentation in the record before us, that indicates that the respondent engaged in the conduct resulting in his conviction for possession of a false identification document to obtain a “benefit under [the] Act.” Moreover, neither employment, nor the ability to travel necessarily constitutes a “benefit under this Act.” No matter how powerful the majori- ty may wish to make the reach of the Immigration and Nationality Act, it does not extend to the constitutional rights to work and to travel. As should be self-evident, an individual may be prosecuted under federal criminal law for a violation of using false documents “to defraud the United States,” but not be convicted of an offense that involves fraud or a material misrepre- sentation to obtain a “benefit under [the] Act.” As the respondent argues, he was convicted only of possession of identification documents, not of using them to procure admission or any other benefit under the Act. His conviction is for possessing the document with the intent to defraud the United States. No more; no less. 3 Furthermore, it is critical to understand that Congress specifically mod- ified the text of section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act in the IIRIRA. Our analysis of the respondent’s conviction should take into account Congress’ action in adding a separate subsection to cover aliens who make false claims to U.S. citizenship. In adding a second subsection, section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii), Congress indicated its intent to encompass “aliens who falsely claim U.S. citizenship for ‘any purpose or benefit under this Act (including section 274A) . . .’ under any federal or state law.” See National Immigration Project, Immigration Law and Defense, ch. 5, § 5.2, at 41. This new sub- section, effective after September 30, 1996, appears to provide that an alien’s false claim to citizenship covers situations in which an alien has claimed citizenship to obtain employment. See also Department of State cable (no. 97-State-174342) (Sept. 17, 1997), reprinted in 74 Interpreter Releases, No. 37, Sept. 29, 1997, at 1483-85 (concluding that after September 30, 1996, the added subsection would warrant a finding of inad- missibility under section 212(a)(6)(C)). Why would Congress have to amend section 212(a)(6)(C) if subsection

以采取行动，或实际采取了行动，以获取“本法项下的利益”。参见本法第212(a)(6)(C)(i)条。在我们面前的定罪记录中，以及在我们面前的证言或其他记录文件中，均无任何内容表明，被申请人实施了导致其因持有虚假身份证明文件以获取“本法项下的利益”而被定罪的行为。 此外，就业和旅行能力本身均不必然构成“本法项下的利益”。无论多数意见多么希望扩大《移民与国籍法》的适用范围，该法并不延伸至宪法上的工作权和旅行权。不言自明的是，个人可能因违反使用虚假文件“欺诈美国”的联邦刑法而被起诉，但不会因涉及欺诈或重大虚假陈述以获取“本法项下的利益”的罪行而被定罪。正如被申请人所主张的，他仅因持有身份证明文件而被定罪，而非因使用这些文件以获取入境或本法项下的任何其他利益而被定罪。他的定罪是因持有该文件并具有欺诈美国的意图。仅此而已；不多不少。3 此外，至关重要的是要理解，国会在IIRIRA中专门修改了本法第212(a)(6)(C)条的文本。我们对被申请人定罪的分析应考虑到国会增加了一个单独的子款，以涵盖虚假声称美国公民身份的外国人。在增加第二个子款即第212(a)(6)(C)(ii)条时，国会表明其意图涵盖“为‘本法项下的任何目的或利益（包括第274A条）……’而根据任何联邦或州法律虚假声称美国公民身份的外国人”。参见National Immigration Project, Immigration Law and Defense, ch. 5, § 5.2, at 41。这一新子款于1996年9月30日之后生效，似乎规定外国人的虚假公民身份声称涵盖外国人声称公民身份以获取就业的情形。另见Department of State cable (no. 97-State-174342) (Sept. 17, 1997), reprinted in 74 Interpreter Releases, No. 37, Sept. 29, 1997, at 1483-85（结论认为，在1996年9月30日之后，新增子款将支持根据第212(a)(6)(C)条作出不可入境认定）。 如果该子款……国会为何必须修改第212(a)(6)(C)条

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(i) covered all possible fraud or misrepresentation that could be made for any purpose? Why would such an amendment be necessary if seeking to procure or procuring a passport, which constitutes evidence of citizenship, already was encompassed by the existing section under which the Immigration Judge and the majority contend that the respondent is inad- missible? The answer is that section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) does not cover all fraud or misrepresentation; it covers fraud or misrepresentation to obtain a “benefit under [the] Act.” Being treated as a citizen arguably is not a “benefit under [the] Act,” notwithstanding the possibility that citizenship status may have been acquired based on a prior immigrant status. If one is treated as a citizen, one is not subject to the Act. There are federal criminal provisions to deal with persons who abuse the law and who seek to use fraud or some document to present themselves (or who have presented themselves) as citizens. But what such an individual may gain from such misrepresentation cannot nec- essarily be said to be a “benefit under [the] Act.” What he has gained is treatment as a citizen—a person not subject to the Act. Therefore, as I do not conclude that the respondent is inadmissible based on his conviction, or on any testimony that he presented during the hearing, I would not require him to qualify for a waiver of a ground of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act. However, the majority has dismissed the respondent’s arguments in this regard, and has forged ahead to impose upon the respondent more than merely a require- ment that he establish eligibility for a waiver under section 212(i) as it existed when the respondent’s conduct occurred, when his hearing com- menced, or when he made application for adjustment of status. The major- ity demands that he establish that a waiver is warranted under the version of the statute as amended. Therefore, my differences with the majority opinion continue.

（i）已涵盖为任何目的可能实施的所有欺诈或虚假陈述，国会为何还必须修改第212(a)(6)(C)条？如果寻求获取或获取作为公民身份证据的护照已被移民法官和多数意见据以主张 respondent 不可入境的现有条款所涵盖，为何还需要这样的修正？答案是，第212(a)(6)(C)(i)条并不涵盖所有欺诈或虚假陈述；它涵盖的是为获得“本法规定的利益”而实施的欺诈或虚假陈述。 尽管公民身份可能基于先前的移民身份而获得，但被作为公民对待可以说并非“本法规定的利益”。如果一个人被作为公民对待，则不受本法约束。有联邦刑事条款处理滥用法律并寻求利用欺诈或某些文件将自己（或已经将自己）表现为公民的人。但此类个人可能从这种虚假陈述中获得的东西不一定能说是“本法规定的利益”。他所获得的是作为公民的待遇——一个不受本法约束的人。 因此，由于我不认为 respondent 基于其定罪或其在听证期间提供的任何证词而不可入境，我不会要求他符合该法第212(a)(6)(C)(i)条规定的不可入境理由豁免资格。然而，多数意见驳回了 respondent 在这方面的论点，并继续推进，对 respondent 施加的要求不仅仅是证明其符合在 respondent 行为发生时、听证开始时或提出调整身份申请时存在的第212(i)条规定的豁免资格。多数意见要求他证明根据修正后的法规版本应给予豁免。因此，我与多数意见的分歧继续存在。

III. RESPONDENT’S APPLICATION FOR A WAIVER UNDER SECTION 212(i)

III. respondent 根据第212(i)条提出的豁免申请

Assuming a waiver of inadmissibility is required at all, the respondent’s application should be considered under the version of section 212(i) of the Act that existed at the time he engaged in activity that resulted in his con- viction; at the time he was charged with being deportable and proceedings against him were commenced; and at the time he submitted his application for adjustment of status. Establishing eligibility for a waiver under then- existing section 212(i) of the Act would mean that the respondent would not be required to establish extreme hardship only to his spouse or any other qualifying relative. As discussed in more detail below, I note that the analysis relied on

假设完全需要不可入境豁免，答辩人的申请应根据其从事导致定罪的活动的当时、在其被指控可驱逐出境且针对其的程序启动的当时、以及在其提交调整身份申请的当时存在的《移民与国籍法》第212(i)条版本进行审议。根据当时存在的《移民与国籍法》第212(i)条确立豁免资格，将意味着答辩人无需仅证明其配偶或任何其他符合条件的亲属会遭受极端困难。 如下文更详细讨论的，我注意到所依赖的分析

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by the majority—which is the analysis that the Board invoked in Matter of Gomez-Giraldo, 20 I&N Dec. 957 (BIA 1995), and that was echoed by the Attorney General in her recent decision overruling the Board in Matter of Soriano, supra—has been rejected repeatedly by the Supreme Court of the United States. Although the Board is bound by the decisions of the Attorney General, the Supreme Court has rejected the underpinnings of the Attorney General’s interpretation of an application for a waiver as a “prospective” application in at least two decisions of the Court issued after Soriano. The Supreme Court’s interpretation to the contrary has also been applied by three federal circuit courts of appeals addressing the immigration provision in question subsequent to the Attorney General’s decision in Soriano. In addition, I find questionable the majority’s assumption that the respondent and his spouse knew or should have known what version of the law would be applied to their case, or what would be required to establish extreme hardship to the qualifying family member, particularly since the majority has selected this case to establish a precedent decision, essentially rejecting two of the principal cases relied on previously in adjudicating such waivers. Nevertheless, even if he is required to satisfy the terms of the cur- rent version of section 212(i) of the Act—enacted into law after he engaged in the conduct leading to his conviction (upon which the question of his admissibility relies), and after he was placed in deportation proceedings and had submitted his application for a waiver and for adjustment of status—I am inclined to find that the respondent’s spouse would suffer extreme hard- ship.

多数意见所依赖的分析——即委员会在Matter of Gomez-Giraldo, 20 I&N Dec. 957 (BIA 1995)中援引、并被司法部长在其最近推翻委员会Matter of Soriano, supra裁决的决定中所附和的分析——已被美国最高法院反复拒绝。尽管委员会受司法部长决定的约束，但最高法院在Soriano之后作出的至少两份裁决中，已拒绝司法部长将豁免申请解释为“预期性”申请的解释基础。在司法部长作出Soriano决定之后，三家联邦巡回上诉法院在处理所涉移民条款时，也适用了最高法院相反的解釋。 此外，我认为多数意见的以下假设值得质疑：答辩人及其配偶知道或应当知道将对其案件适用哪一版本的法律，或需要证明什么才能确立对符合条件的家庭成员的极端困难，尤其是因为多数意见选择本案来确立先例裁决，实质上拒绝了此前在裁决此类豁免时所依赖的两个主要案件。然而，即使要求他满足《移民与国籍法》第212(i)条现行版本的条款——该版本是在他从事导致其定罪的行为（其可入境性问题依赖于该行为）之后、在他被置于驱逐出境程序并提交豁免申请和调整身份申请之后颁布成为法律的——我倾向于认定答辩人的配偶将遭受极端困难。

The retroactive application of a statute is not to be presumed, and only will be implemented based on an express statement by Congress of its intention to accomplish such an application. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, supra, at 270 (citing United States v. Heth, 3 Cranch 399, 2 L. Ed. 479 (1806)); see also Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 117 S. Ct. 1871 (1997); Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 117 S. Ct. 891 (1997). This doctrine applies to the noncitizen’s expectations, which may lodge at the time he engages in conduct or is charged with conduct that may require a waiver, that he will be afforded the opportunity to apply for a waiver that is provided by the statute. It extends to cases in which, at the very least, the relevant statute is in existence at the time an application for such a waiver is made. Goncalves v. Reno, 144 F.3d 110 (1st Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 1140 (1999). It is viewed as extending to cases that were commenced at the time the

不推定法规具有溯及力，只有基于国会明确声明其意图实现此种适用时才会实施。Landgraf v. USI Film Products, supra, at 270（引用United States v. Heth, 3 Cranch 399, 2 L. Ed. 479 (1806)）；另见Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 117 S. Ct. 1871 (1997)；Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 117 S. Ct. 891 (1997)。该原则适用于非公民的期待，即其期待可产生于其从事可能需要豁免的行为或被指控该行为之时，即其将获得法规所规定的申请豁免的机会。该原则延伸至至少相关法规在提出此类豁免申请时已存在的情形。Goncalves v. Reno, 144 F.3d 110 (1st Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 1140 (1999)。 该原则被视为延伸至在法规存在时启动的案件。Henderson v. INS, 157 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, sub nom Reno v. Navas, 119 S.Ct. 1141 (1999)；Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 1999)。4 并且它已被解释为适用于非公民对某项罪行认罪时法规已生效、而后来可驱逐出境的指控基于该罪行的案件。Wallace v. Reno, 24 F. Supp.2d 104 (D. Mass. 1998)；另见，例如，Lee v. Reno 15 F. Supp.2d 26, 46 (D.D.C. 1998)（认定溯及适用§440(d)将使申请人“丧失能力”，使其无资格申请豁免，对先前犯罪行为施加额外负担）；Billett v. Reno, 2 F. Supp.2d 368, 373 (W.D.N.Y. 1998)（认定溯及适用不当损害了申请人请求豁免的权利，“尽管他在被定罪时享有此种权利”）；Sandoval v. Reno, 1997 WL 839465, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 1997)（认定国会表达了仅前瞻性适用修正案的意图，而不适用于“AEDPA颁布之前的行为”，因为外国人认罪的决定本应取决于其知道自己有资格在随后的驱逐出境程序中申请酌情救济）。 第一巡回法院和第二巡回法院以及越来越多的联邦地区法院明确认定，在国会未提供相反明确措辞的情况下，拒绝Soriano中采用的“预期性”解释，对移民法规修正条款的适用——该修正条款改变了豁免资格条件——在适用于已对申请豁免救济的机会形成固定期待的申请人时，构成不允许的溯及既往。 法规的溯及适用是指剥夺或损害既得权利、创设新义务、或就过往交易附加新的无能力。Landgraf v. USI Film Products, supra, at 269；Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 117 S. Ct. at 1876。最近，在Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S. Ct. 2059 (1997)中，最高法院强调，在诉诸有关不允许的溯及既往条款的原则之前

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statute was in existence. Henderson v. INS, 157 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, sub nom Reno v. Navas, 119 S.Ct. 1141 (1999); Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 1999). 4 And it has been construed as applying to cases in which the statute was in effect when a noncitizen pled guilty to an offense on which a later charge of deportability is based. Wallace v. Reno, 24 F. Supp.2d 104 (D. Mass. 1998); see also, e.g., Lee v. Reno 15 F. Supp.2d 26, 46 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding that a retroactive application of § 440(d) would “disable” the petitioner by rendering him ineligible to apply for a waiver, imposing additional burdens on prior criminal conduct); Billett v. Reno, 2 F. Supp.2d 368, 373 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding retroactive appli- cation improperly impairs the petitioner’s right to request a waiver “despite the fact that he enjoyed such a right at the time he was convicted”); Sandoval v. Reno, 1997 WL 839465, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 1997) (find- ing that Congress expressed an intent to apply the amendment only prospec- tively and not to “conduct predating AEDPA’s enactment,” because an alien’s decision to plead guilty would have hinged on his knowledge he was eligible to apply for discretionary relief in subsequent deportation proceed- ings). Rejecting the “prospective” construction adopted in Soriano, the First and Second Circuits and a growing number of federal district courts have found explicitly that, in the absence of Congress having provided express language to the contrary, the imposition of an amended section of an immi- gration statute that changes the terms of eligibility for a waiver is imper- missibly retroactive when applied to applicants who had settled expecta- tions regarding the opportunity to apply for waiver relief. A retroactive application of a statute is one that takes away or impairs vested rights, creates a new obligation, or attaches a new disability in rela- tion to past transactions. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, supra, at 269; Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 117 S. Ct. at 1876. Recently, in Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S. Ct. 2059 (1997), the Supreme Court emphasized that before resorting to the principles regarding

法规已经存在。Henderson v. INS, 157 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, sub nom Reno v. Navas, 119 S.Ct. 1141 (1999); Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 1999)。4 并且它已被解释为适用于以下情形：当非公民对某项罪行认罪时该法规已经生效，而后来基于该罪行提出驱逐出境指控。Wallace v. Reno, 24 F. Supp.2d 104 (D. Mass. 1998); 另见，例如，Lee v. Reno 15 F. Supp.2d 26, 46 (D.D.C. 1998)（认定追溯适用§ 440(d)将“使”申请人“丧失能力”，使其无资格申请豁免，对先前犯罪行为施加额外负担）；Billett v. Reno, 2 F. Supp.2d 368, 373 (W.D.N.Y. 1998)（认定追溯适用不当损害申请人请求豁免的权利，“尽管他在被定罪时享有此种权利”）；Sandoval v. Reno, 1997 WL 839465, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 1997)（认定国会表达的意图是仅前瞻性适用该修正案，而不适用于“AEDPA颁布之前的行为”，因为外国人决定认罪本应取决于其知道自己有资格在随后的驱逐出境程序中申请酌情救济）。 第1巡回法院和第2巡回法院以及越来越多的联邦地区法院驳回了Soriano案中采用的“前瞻性”解释，明确认定：在国会未提供相反明确措辞的情况下，对移民法规修正条款的适用——该条款改变了豁免资格的条款——在适用于已就申请豁免救济的机会形成既定期望的申请人时，构成不允许的追溯适用。 法规的追溯适用是指剥夺或损害既得权利、创设新义务、或就过去交易附加新的无能力。Landgraf v. USI Film Products, supra, at 269; Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 117 S. Ct. at 1876。最近，在Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S. Ct. 2059 (1997)中，最高法院强调，在诉诸有关原则之前，

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impermissibly retroactive provisions articulated in Landgraf, as was done by the Attorney General in Soriano, the “normal rules of construction” apply. These rules should be applied to determine a statute’s temporal reach, as such a determination may eliminate the possibility of retroactive appli- cation and avoid the need for a Landgraf analysis altogether. Lindh v. Murphy, 117 S. Ct. at 2062-63. 5 Applying the normal rules of construction to section 212(i) of the Act, as amended by the IIRIRA, it is evident that there is nothing in its plain terms or elsewhere in the statute that even suggests that the amended ver- sion of the waiver provision was meant to be applied retroactively to a pend- ing application, which seeks to waive conduct occurring prior to the amend- ment of the Act. Although, in Matter of Soriano, supra, the Attorney General construed a different waiver provision, amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (“AEDPA”), as being prospective, she neither undertook the type of statutory construction mandated by the Court in Lindh, nor addressed the respondent’s vested interest in having an opportunity to make the applica- tion. Such an assessment now is clearly required according to the Court’s decision in Hughes. Cf. Matter of Soriano, supra. The Attorney General’s approach to analyzing the reach of the amend- ment to section 212(c) of the Act has been soundly criticized. See Goncalves v. Reno, supra, at 129 (critiquing the opinion of the Attorney General in Soriano as misinterpreting Landgraf and “effectively [applying] a presumption in favor of retroactive application to any restriction of relief that could be described as discretionary,” a proposition that was rejected by the Supreme Court in Landgraf itself). 6 In addition, Congress’ amendment of section 212(i) in the IIRIRA took place after the Board’s decision in Matter of Soriano, supra, in which the Board originally had found that in

——如司法部长在Soriano中所做的那样——应适用“正常解释规则”。这些规则应用于确定法规的时间效力范围，因为此种确定可能消除溯及适用的可能性，并完全避免Landgraf分析的需要。Lindh v. Murphy, 117 S. Ct. at 2062-63。5 将正常解释规则适用于经IIRIRA修正的《移民与国籍法》第212(i)条，显而易见，其明文条款或法规其他任何地方均无任何内容甚至暗示豁免条款的修正版本意在溯及适用于待决申请，该申请寻求豁免在《移民与国籍法》修正之前发生的行为。尽管在Matter of Soriano, supra中，司法部长将另一项由《1996年反恐怖主义与有效死刑法》第104-132号公法、110 Stat. 1214（“AEDPA”）修正的豁免条款解释为前瞻性适用，但她既未进行Lindh案中法院所要求的法规解释类型，也未处理答辩人因有机会提出申请而享有的既得利益。根据法院在Hughes案中的裁决，现在显然需要进行此种评估。参见Matter of Soriano, supra。 司法部长分析《移民与国籍法》第212(c)条修正案效力范围的方法已受到有力批评。见Goncalves v. Reno, supra, at 129（批评司法部长在Soriano中的意见误解了Landgraf，并“实际上[适用]了有利于溯及适用于任何可被描述为酌情性的救济限制的推定”，而这一主张已被最高法院在Landgraf案本身中拒绝）。6 此外，国会在IIRIRA中对第212(i)条的修正发生在委员会作出Matter of Soriano, supra裁决之后，在该裁决中委员会最初认定

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the absence of an express temporal restriction making the amended version of section 212(c) of the Act retroactive, the provision would not apply to applications for the waiver that were filed or were pending on the date of enactment of the AEDPA. Cf. Goncalves v. Reno, supra (noting that the chronology of legislative events and the issuance of the Board’s decision in Matter of Soriano, which preceded passage of the IIRIRA, indicates that Congress should have been aware of the prevailing agency interpretation and should have expressly mandated a retroactive application if Congress intended the statute to be interpreted differently). In other words, Congress must be deemed to have been aware of the Board’s original interpretation of section 212(c), which remained in force on September 30, 1996, when it amended section 212(i) of the Act. Likewise, Congress must be deemed to have enacted IIRIRA with the knowledge that Landgraf’s “background rule”—i.e., the presumption against retroactivity—would otherwise make its provisions prospective “in the absence of congressional guidance.” Landgraf v. USI Film Products, supra, at 261, 273; see also Lindh v. Murphy, 117 S. Ct. at 2064 (“Since Landgraf was the Court’s latest word on the subject when the Act was passed, Congress could have taken the opinion’s cautious statement about [which type of statutes would be applied retroactively] as counseling the wisdom of being explicit if it wanted such a provision to be applied to cases already pending.”) In light of the reasonable assumption that Congress understood both the principles of statutory construction disfavoring retroactive application of the laws in the absence of an express statement by Congress, and the Board’s prevailing interpretation of a comparable amendment to avoid a retroactive application, its failure to expressly mandate that the amended version of section 212(i) of the Act would be applicable to conduct occur- ring, or cases pending, prior to September 30, 1996, is significant. It makes such an application by the majority in its decision today both unreasonable and contrary to applicable Supreme Court authority. Goncalves v. Reno, supra. In the instant case, involving the applicability of the IIRIRA version of section 212(i), the question is whether there is any justification for apply- ing the amended version of section 212(i) of the Act retroactively to actions that occurred, or proceedings and applications that were initiated, prior to the enactment date. Cf. Lindh v. Murphy, supra. I find none. Moreover, in the event that the statutory language presents any question concerning Congress’ intent with regard to the statute’s temporal reach, the well-established principle that the retroactive application of a statute requires an express statement of legislative intent controls. The Supreme Court outlined a three-part approach in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, supra, for determining the temporal reach of a statute: First, whether Congress manifested an intent to apply a statute retroactively through “clear, strong, and imperative” language; second, assuming that there is no

由于缺乏使该法第212(c)条修正版本具有追溯力的明示时间限制，该规定将不适用于在《反恐怖主义与有效死刑法》颁布之日已提交或尚待处理的豁免申请。参见Goncalves v. Reno, supra（指出立法事件的时间顺序以及委员会在Matter of Soriano案中作出裁决——该裁决先于《非法移民改革与移民责任法》通过——表明国会本应知悉当时占主导地位的行政机关解释，并且如果国会意图对该法条作不同解释，本应明确授权追溯适用）。换言之，必须认定国会知悉委员会对第212(c)条的原始解释，该解释在1996年9月30日国会修订该法第212(i)条时仍然有效。同样，必须认定国会在颁布《非法移民改革与移民责任法》时知悉Landgraf的“背景规则”——即反对追溯适用的推定——否则该推定将使其条款“在缺乏国会指引的情况下”仅具有前瞻效力。Landgraf v. USI Film Products, supra, at 261, 273；另见Lindh v. Murphy, 117 S. Ct. at 2064（“由于Landgraf是该法通过时法院就该主题的最新表述，国会本可将该意见关于[哪类法条将被追溯适用]的审慎表述视为一种建议，即如果它希望此类规定适用于已经待决的案件，明智的做法是作出明确规定。”）鉴于有合理假设认为国会既理解在缺乏国会明示声明时不利于追溯适用法律的法条解释原则，也理解委员会对一项可比修正案为避免追溯适用所作的占主导地位的解释，因此国会未能明确授权该法第212(i)条修正版本适用于1996年9月30日之前发生的行为或待决案件，这一点意义重大。这使得多数意见在其今日裁决中作此适用既不合理，也违背可适用的最高法院权威。Goncalves v. Reno, supra。在本案中，涉及《非法移民改革与移民责任法》版本第212(i)条的适用问题，问题在于是否有任何正当理由将第212(i)条修正版本追溯适用于颁布日期之前发生的行为或启动的程序和申请。参见Lindh v. Murphy, supra。我认为没有。此外，如果法条语言就国会关于该法条时间效力的意图产生任何疑问，则追溯适用法条需要立法意图明示声明这一公认原则起支配作用。最高法院在Landgraf v. USI Film Products, supra中概述了确定法条时间效力的三部分方法：第一，国会是否通过“明确、有力且强制性的”语言表明追溯适用法条的意图；第二，假设没有

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clear expression of legislative intent to apply the statute retroactively, whether the statute would, in fact, have genuine retroactive effect, id. at 267-69, 280; 7 and third, if the statute would operate retroactively, whether there is a clear indication in the statute as a whole or in the statute’s leg- islative history, that Congress intended the statute to apply retroactively to past conduct, id. at 280. Consideration of each part of the Court’s approach in Landgraf indicates that section 212(i), as amended, should not be applied retroactively. 8 A provision, such as section 212(i), as reenacted in the IIRIRA without any specific applicability rule assigned to it, must be read to have only a prospective application. “[W]hen Congress wished to provide [for retroac- tive application], it knew how to do so and did so expressly.” Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 572 (1970); see also Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 491 (1994); Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993); Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 213-14 (1988). The Supreme Court has stated clearly and repeatedly the “‘principle that the legal effect of con- duct should ordinarily be assessed under the law that existed when the con- duct took place has timeless and universal appeal.’” Landgraf v. USI Film Products, supra, at 265 (quoting Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 855 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)); see also Lynce v. Mathis, 117 S. Ct. at 895 (noting that “[i]n both the civil and the criminal context, the Constitution places limits on the sovereign’s ability to use its law-making power to modify bar- gains it has made with its subjects.” (emphasis added)). Thus, the Court held that a presumption against retroactivity “assures that Congress itself has affirmatively considered the potential unfairness of retroactive application and determined that it is an acceptable price to pay for the countervailing benefits.” Landgraf v. USI Film Products, supra, at 272-73. It thereby “allo- cat[ed] to Congress responsibility for fundamental policy judgments con-

关于追溯适用法条的立法意图的明确表述，该法条事实上是否会产生真正的追溯效力，id. at 267-69, 280；7 以及第三，如果该法条将追溯适用，该法条整体或该法条的立法历史中是否有明确迹象表明国会意图将该法条追溯适用于过去的行为，id. at 280。对法院在Landgraf中方法各部分逐一考量表明，第212(i)条经修正后不应追溯适用。8 像第212(i)条这样在《非法移民改革与移民责任法》中重新颁布而未赋予任何具体适用规则的规定，必须被解读为仅具有前瞻适用效力。“当国会希望规定[追溯适用]时，它知道如何去做，并且明确地这样做了。”Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 572 (1970)；另见Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 491 (1994)；Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993)；Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 213-14 (1988)。最高法院已明确且反复指出，“行为的法律效果通常应根据行为发生时存在的法律来评估这一原则具有永恒且普遍的吸引力。”Landgraf v. USI Film Products, supra, at 265（引用Scalia大法官在Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 855 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)中的协同意见）；另见Lynce v. Mathis, 117 S. Ct. at 895（指出“在民事和刑事语境中，宪法均对主权者利用其立法权修改其与臣民所达成之交易的能力施加限制。”（强调为原文所加））。因此，法院裁定，反对追溯适用的推定“确保国会本身已积极考虑追溯适用的潜在不公平性，并认定这是为换取对等利益而可接受的代价。”Landgraf v. USI Film Products, supra, at 272-73。它由此“将涉及法条适当时间效力的根本政策判断责任分配给国会”——

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cerning the proper temporal reach of statutes.” Id. at 273. Indeed, contrary to past Board precedents, according to the Supreme Court’s decision in Lindh v. Murphy, 117 S. Ct. at 2064, “the rule of nega- tive implication is part of the normal rules of statutory construction.” Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F.3d at 240. According to Lindh, in light of Congress’ silence and the principle of “expressio unius est exclusio alterius,” we need not consider whether the statute before us is genuinely retroactive pursuant to the standards enunciated in Landgraf and Hughes. See Sandoval v. Reno, supra, at 240; Henderson v. INS, supra, at 129 (cit- ing Lindh v. Murphy, 117 S. Ct. at 2068). The circuit courts of appeal and various of the district courts that have addressed this issue concur that con- struction of the “negative implication” created by Congress’ failure to man- date a retroactive application reflects that, at a minimum, Congress’ silence constitutes an indication of its express intent that the amendment to former section 212(c) of the Act would not apply to proceedings that were initiat- ed before the AEDPA was enacted. Sandoval v. Reno, supra, at 241-42; Henderson v. INS, supra, at 129. Thus, in the context of retroactivity analy- sis, congressional silence does not create an ambiguity or any other cir- cumstances in which a prior agency interpretation is owed deference. It con- stitutes an expression of intent as plainly as if it had affirmatively prohibit- ed a retroactive application of the new statute. I conclude that although section 212(i) of the Act was modified by the IIRIRA, Congress did not expressly mandate that the new version of sec- tion 212(i) was to be applied retroactively. As I have stated here and in prior separate opinions, the type of distinction made by the Attorney General’s opinion in Soriano has been found by the federal courts to be inappropriate. In the instant case, the application of the amended version of section 212(i) of the Act impairs the respondent’s vested right—not necessarily to obtain relief—but merely to apply for relief from deporta- tion based on his own hardship. Application of the new amended waiver provision imposes on him the new disability that precludes his advancing any factors relevant to his own hardship in support of his waiver applica- tion. Ultimately, it imposes on him the disability of denial of adjustment of status based on a finding of inadmissibility, without reasonable notice of the standards that will be applied to his application for a waiver. As such, it is impermissibly retroactive. Thus, although the Ninth Circuit, in which this case arises, has not yet addressed this question, the growing number of federal reviewing bodies that have rejected the analysis set forth by the Attorney General in Matter of Soriano, supra, supports my conclusion. Notwithstanding the Attorney General’s decision in Matter of Soriano, I believe that the law requires us to adjudicate the respondent’s application for a waiver under section 212(i) of the Act according to the terms of that section as they existed in when the respondent acted and when he submitted his application for a

Id. at 273。事实上，与委员会过去的先例相反，根据最高法院在Lindh v. Murphy, 117 S. Ct. at 2064中的裁决，“否定推论规则是法条解释正常规则的一部分。”Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F.3d at 240。根据Lindh，鉴于国会的沉默以及“expressio unius est exclusio alterius”（明示其一即排除其他）原则，我们无需考虑我们面前的法规是否根据Landgraf和Hughes所阐明的标准具有真正的追溯效力。参见Sandoval v. Reno, supra, at 240；Henderson v. INS, supra, at 129（引用Lindh v. Murphy, 117 S. Ct. at 2068）。审理此问题的巡回上诉法院和各地区法院一致认为，对国会未能授权追溯适用所创造的“否定推论”进行解释表明，国会至少其沉默构成一种迹象，表明其明确意图是该法原第212(c)条的修正案不适用于《反恐怖主义与有效死刑法》颁布之前启动的程序。Sandoval v. Reno, supra, at 241-42；Henderson v. INS, supra, at 129。因此，在追溯性分析的语境中，国会沉默并不产生歧义或任何其他应对先前行政机关解释给予尊重的情形。它构成一种意图表达，如同其已积极禁止新法条的追溯适用一样明确。我得出结论：尽管该法第212(i)条经《非法移民改革与移民责任法》修改，国会并未明确授权第212(i)条新版本应追溯适用。正如我在此前和此前的单独意见中所指出的，司法部长在Soriano案意见中所作的那类区分已被联邦法院认定为不适当。在本案中，适用该法第212(i)条修正版本损害了被申请人的既得权利——不一定是获得救济的权利——而仅仅是基于其自身困境申请免于驱逐出境救济的权利。适用新的修正豁免规定对其施加了新的不利条件，使其无法提出任何与其自身困境相关的因素来支持其豁免申请。最终，它对其施加了基于不可入境认定而拒绝调整身份的不利后果，且未就其豁免申请将适用何种标准给予合理通知。因此，它具有不被允许的追溯效力。因此，尽管本案所涉的第9巡回法院尚未处理此问题，但越来越多的联邦审查机构已拒绝司法部长在Matter of Soriano, supra案中提出的分析，这支持我的结论。尽管司法部长在Matter of Soriano案中作出裁决，我认为法律要求我们根据该法第212(i)条在被申请人行为时及其提交豁免申请时所存在的条款，裁决被申请人依据该条提出的豁免申请。

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waiver.

豁免申请。

What is equally or even more objectionable is the fact that the majori- ty, and the concurring members, accept the application of the new extreme hardship standard to the respondent’s spouse without actually considering and weighing the actual factors in the record that point to the hardship the respondent’s spouse will suffer if his waiver is denied and he is deported. Even assuming that the majority’s imposition of the current version of sec- tion 212(i) of the Act is correct, I have two principal objections to the majority’s conclusions. First, I find that, in its consideration of the respon- dent’s wife’s situation, the majority has completely ignored many of the rel- evant factors that are authorized by our precedent decisions, and that are required to be taken into account by the decisions of the circuit court in which this case arises. Second, the majority distorts the record with regard to the factors it does consider, and its failure to consider the relevant factors cumulatively in assessing hardship constitutes an abuse of discretion. While the majority articulates at least some of the various factors that must be considered, both Board and federal circuit court of appeals author- ities require consideration of a greater breadth of factors, including the qualifying relative’s family ties within and without the United States and the impact of separation; the economic and other conditions in the country to which she have to accompany her relative; the financial, emotional, cul- tural, and political conditions in that country; her ability to raise children and other quality of life factors in that country; as well as her age, length of residence in this country, health, technical skills, employability, and other factors. See, e.g., Mejia-Carrillo v. United States, 656 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1981) (relating to consideration of noneconomic hardships resulting from removal); Ravancho v. INS, 658 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1981) (relating to con- sideration of psychiatric information); see also Tukhowinich v. INS, 57 F.3d 869 (9th Cir. 1995) (relating to consideration of respondent’s role as sole provider for her undocumented family here and abroad); Watkins v. INS, 63 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 1995) (relating to consideration cumulatively of spouse’s hardship, fear of persecution, child’s inability to master a foreign language, and psychological factors); Salameda v. INS, 70 F.3d 447 (7th Cir. 1995) (relating to need to consider separation from community ties); Cerillo-Perez v. INS, 809 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1987) (relating to consideration of hardship to other than qualifying family members). In addition, it must be noted that in a related context, the Ninth Circuit has been critical of this Board as being overzealous in grasping at any interpretation of law or facts which will allow it to defeat a bona fide claim for suspension of deportation.

同样甚至更令人反感的是，多数意见及协同意见成员接受了新的极端困难标准适用于被申请人的配偶，却未实际考虑和权衡记录中指向若其豁免被拒并被驱逐出境、被申请人的配偶将遭受的困难的实际因素。即使假定多数意见对现行版本该法第212(i)条的适用是正确的，我对多数意见的结论有两个主要反对意见。第一，我认为，在考虑被申请人妻子的情况时，多数意见完全忽略了我们的先例裁决所授权、且本案所在巡回法院的裁决要求予以考虑的许多相关因素。第二，多数意见歪曲了其确实考虑的因素方面的记录，且其未累积考虑相关因素以评估困难，构成滥用自由裁量权。 尽管多数意见至少阐述了必须考虑的若干不同因素，但委员会和联邦巡回上诉法院的权威均要求考虑更广泛的因素，包括合格亲属在美国境内外的家庭纽带及分离的影响；她将不得不随同其亲属前往的国家中的经济及其他状况；该国的经济、情感、文化和政治状况；她在该国抚养子女的能力及其他生活质量因素；以及她的年龄、在本国的居住时间、健康状况、技术技能、就业能力及其他因素。参见，例如，Mejia-Carrillo v. United States, 656 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1981)（涉及考虑驱逐导致的非经济困难）；Ravancho v. INS, 658 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1981)（涉及考虑精神病学信息）；另见 Tukhowinich v. INS, 57 F.3d 869 (9th Cir. 1995)（涉及考虑被申请人作为其在国内外无证家庭成员唯一供养者的角色）；Watkins v. INS, 63 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 1995)（涉及累积考虑配偶的困难、对迫害的恐惧、子女无法掌握外语以及心理因素）；Salameda v. INS, 70 F.3d 447 (7th Cir. 1995)（涉及需要考虑与社区纽带的分离）；Cerillo-Perez v. INS, 809 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1987)（涉及考虑对合格家庭成员以外人员的困难）。此外，必须指出，在相关语境中，第9巡回法院一直批评本委员会过于热衷于抓住任何法律或事实解释以击败善意的暂停驱逐申请。

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Castrejon-Garcia v. INS, 60 F.3d 1359, 1362 (9th Cir. 1995). The majority fails to emphasize, as it should, that all relevant factors must be considered both individually and cumulatively. Matter of O-J-O-, 21 I&N Dec. 281 (BIA 1996); Matter of Anderson, 16 I&N Dec. 596 (BIA 1978); Matter of Riccio, 15 I&N Dec. 548 (BIA 1976); see also Gutierrez- Centeno v. INS, 99 F.3d 1529 (9th Cir. 1996). Specifically, in Mattis v. United States INS, 774 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1985), the Ninth Circuit stat- ed unequivocally:

Castrejon-Garcia v. INS, 60 F.3d 1359, 1362 (9th Cir. 1995)。 多数意见未能如其应当的那样强调，所有相关因素必须既单独又累积地予以考虑。Matter of O-J-O-, 21 I&N Dec. 281 (BIA 1996)；Matter of Anderson, 16 I&N Dec. 596 (BIA 1978)；Matter of Riccio, 15 I&N Dec. 548 (BIA 1976)；另见 Gutierrez-Centeno v. INS, 99 F.3d 1529 (9th Cir. 1996)。具体而言，在 Mattis v. United States INS, 774 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1985)中，第9巡回法院明确表示：

The majority opinion does not properly consider all of the factors in the record regarding the hardship faced by the respondent’s wife, and its opin- ion denying the waiver does not reflect a proper consideration of all of the factors relevant to extreme hardship in this case. Instead, the majority places undue weight on certain factors and fails to adequately consider other rele- vant factors. Cf. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 491 (1951) (requiring complete assessment of both favorable and detrimental factors); Watkins v. INS, 63 F.3d 844, 848 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the Board abuses its discretion when it does not “consider all relevant factors before ruling”); see also Salameda v. INS, supra. What is more, I find that in assessing extreme hardship, the majority gives short shrift to a number of material factors that require considera- tion under our precedent and the controlling law of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, cited above. 9 In Watkins v. INS, supra, at 848 the Ninth Circuit made quite clear that although the Board may choose to “interpret ‘extreme hardship’ narrowly . . . , INS v. Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 145, 101 S. Ct. 1027, 1031, 67 L. Ed. 2d 123 (1981) (per curiam), [we must] “‘consider[] all factors relevant to the hardship deter- mination and state[] [our] reasons for denying the requested relief,’

多数意见未适当考虑记录中关于被申请人妻子所面临困难的所有因素，其拒绝豁免的意见也未反映对本案件中与极端困难相关的所有因素的适当考虑。相反，多数意见对某些因素给予了不当权重，且未能充分考虑其他相关因素。比较 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 491 (1951)（要求对有利和不利因素进行全面评估）；Watkins v. INS, 63 F.3d 844, 848 (9th Cir. 1995)（裁定委员会在未“在裁决前考虑所有相关因素”时滥用其自由裁量权）；另见 Salameda v. INS, 同上。 此外，我认为在评估极端困难时，多数意见轻视了若干实质性因素，而根据我们的先例和上文引述的美国第9巡回上诉法院的支配性法律，这些因素需要予以考虑。9 在 Watkins v. INS, 同上, 第848页中，第9巡回法院相当明确地指出，尽管委员会可以选择“狭义地解释‘极端困难’……，INS v. Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 145, 101 S. Ct. 1027, 1031, 67 L. Ed. 2d 123 (1981)（per curiam），[我们必须]‘考虑与困难裁定相关的所有因素并说明[我们]拒绝所请求救济的理由’，”

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Ramirez-Durazo v. INS, 794 F.2d 491, 498 (9th Cir. 1986).” The court emphasized the following:

Ramirez-Durazo v. INS, 794 F.2d 491, 498 (9th Cir. 1986)。”法院强调了以下内容：

Watkins v. INS, supra, at 848; accord Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, supra. In particular, I dispute the majority’s reading of the record to indicate that the respondent’s wife never “suggested that she would suffer any par- ticular hardship.” Matter of Cervantes, 21 I&N Dec. 3380, at 10 (BIA 1999). Moreover, I find the majority’s assessment of some of the factors it does consider relating to the wife’s hardship to be objectionable. Specifically, as I read the opinion, the majority dismisses the hardship that the respondent’s wife, a naturalized citizen, might face, primarily because she speaks Spanish and was born in Mexico, the country to which the respondent would be deported. What kind of an evaluation is that? What does that say about the majority’s view of United States citizenship, albeit citizenship acquired through naturalization? Are we to assume that the majority gives such little value to the mean- ing of citizenship, or supposes that naturalization acquired by a spouse of Mexican origin is of such little import that no hardship would be experi- enced by the respondent’s wife were she forced to accompany her husband to Mexico or face separation from him? In fact, the transcript reflects that the respondent’s spouse, who was 21 at the time of the hearing before the Immigration Judge, came to the United States as a baby and has never lived in Mexico. Furthermore, although it is barely evident from reading the majority opinion, the record also reflects quite clearly that the respondent’s wife has extremely close family ties with her parents, and that she and her husband live together as a family with her parents and her sisters. The respondent’s wife also clarified that her mother is a United States citizen by birth, her father a resident alien, and that her two sisters were born in the United States. The majority’s contention that the “majority of her family is origi- nally from Mexico,” is absolutely specious. Matter of Cervantes, supra, at 10. The respondent has lived in this country with her parents and her sisters and her extended family for almost her entire life. No matter where her father or members of her extended family were originally from, this family has lived in a close-knit relationship in the United States for years. That the respondent’s grandparents or her father was born in Mexico is meaningless

Watkins v. INS, 同上, 第848页；一致意见 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 同上。 特别是，我不同意多数意见对记录的解读，即被申请人的妻子从未“表示她将遭受任何特定困难”。Matter of Cervantes, 21 I&N Dec. 3380, 第10页 (BIA 1999)。此外，我认为多数意见对其确实考虑的一些与妻子困难相关的因素的评估令人反感。具体而言，如我所读该意见，多数意见驳回了被申请人妻子——一名归化公民——可能面临的困难，主要因为她讲西班牙语且出生在墨西哥，即被申请人将被驱逐出境的国家。那是什么样的评估？这对多数意见关于美国公民身份（尽管是通过归化获得的公民身份）的看法说明了什么？ 我们是否应假定多数意见对公民身份的含义赋予如此小的价值，或认为墨西哥裔配偶获得的归化如此不重要，以至于被申请人的妻子若被迫随丈夫前往墨西哥或面临与他分离，将不会经历任何困难？事实上，庭审记录反映，被申请人的配偶在移民法官听证时21岁，作为婴儿来到美国，从未在墨西哥生活过。 此外，尽管从阅读多数意见几乎看不出，但记录也相当清楚地反映，被申请人的妻子与其父母有极其密切的家庭纽带，且她与丈夫作为一个家庭与她的父母和姐妹住在一起。被申请人的妻子还澄清，她的母亲是美国出生公民，父亲是居民外国人，她的两个姐妹出生在美国。多数意见关于“她家庭的大多数原本来自墨西哥”的论点绝对似是而非。Matter of Cervantes, 同上, 第10页。被申请人几乎一生都与她的父母、姐妹和大家庭生活在这个国家。无论她的父亲或大家庭成员原本来自哪里，这个家庭多年来在美国一直生活在紧密的关系中。被申请人的祖父母或她的父亲出生在墨西哥这一事实毫无意义

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to an assessment of the isolation and lack of family support she will have today, if she must accompany her husband to Mexico. At the same time, her relationship with her husband dates back to 1994, when she met him at a school dance. They were married in September 1995. The majority’s belittling of the respondent’s relationship with her husband because she was aware he was subject to deportation proceedings when they were married says nothing about the quality of their relationship, or the hardship she would experience if forced to choose between her husband and the rest of her family. Even assuming his immigration status at the time of their marriage is of some effect in the overall discretionary equation, the fact that the respondent was deportable does not undermine his wife’s expectations at the time they were wed. At the time they married, the respondent’s wife reasonably may have assumed that her husband would be able to apply for and obtain both adjustment of status and a waiver under then-existing section 212(i) of the Act, which, according to both Matter of Da Silva, 17 I&N Dec. 288 (Comm’r 1979), and Matter of Alonzo, 17 I&N Dec. 292 (Comm’r 1979), would have been liberally construed. Moreover, other precedent decisions cannot be dismissed as eagerly as the majority may wish. Such decisions, which we not only followed histor- ically, but which we issued directly, emphasize the often determinative weight given to family ties and, particularly, to marriage to a United States citizen. For example, reiterating the recognition that “[i]t is difficult and probably inadvisable to set up restrictive guide lines for the exercise of dis- cretion,” because “[p]roblems which may arise in applications for adjust- ment must of necessity be resolved on an individual basis,” the Board held in Matter of Arai, 13 I&N Dec. 494, 495-96 (BIA 1970):

评估她今天如果必须陪同丈夫前往墨西哥将面临的孤立和缺乏家庭支持的情况。 与此同时，她与丈夫的关系可追溯至1994年，当时她在一场学校舞会上与他相识。他们于1995年9月结婚。多数意见贬低答辩人与丈夫的关系，理由是她结婚时知道丈夫正面临驱逐出境程序，但这丝毫不能说明他们关系的质量，也不能说明如果她被迫在丈夫和其余家人之间做出选择将经历何种困难。即使假定丈夫在结婚时的移民身份在整体自由裁量考量中具有一定影响，答辩人可被驱逐出境这一事实并不削弱其妻子在结婚时的期望。在他们结婚时，答辩人的妻子有理由认为丈夫能够申请并获得调整身份以及根据当时存在的《移民与国籍法》第212(i)条获得豁免，根据Matter of Da Silva, 17 I&N Dec. 288 (Comm'r 1979)和Matter of Alonzo, 17 I&N Dec. 292 (Comm'r 1979)两案，该条款本应得到宽松解释。 此外，其他先例裁决不能像多数意见所希望的那样轻易被摒弃。这些裁决不仅我们在历史上遵循，而且是我们直接作出的，它们强调家庭关系、特别是与美国公民的婚姻往往具有决定性权重。例如，委员会在Matter of Arai, 13 I&N Dec. 494, 495-96 (BIA 1970)中重申了以下认识：“为行使自由裁量权设定限制性指导方针是困难的，而且可能并不可取”，因为“调整身份申请中可能出现的问题必须根据个案情况加以解决”，并裁定：

Our decisions in this regard not only should influence the weight given to the factors presented in the case before us today, but also may be pre- sumed to have contributed to the respondent’s wife’s expectations when she married her husband. It cannot be denied that in Matter of Ibrahim, 18 I&N Dec. 55 (BIA 1981), 10 the Board clarified and reaffirmed its decision in Matter of Cavazos, 17 I&N Dec. 215 (BIA 1980), as standing for the rule

我们在这方面的裁决不仅应当影响对今天所审理案件中呈现因素的权重，而且可以推定对答辩人妻子在结婚时的期望产生了影响。不可否认，在Matter of Ibrahim, 18 I&N Dec. 55 (BIA 1981), 10中，委员会澄清并重申了其在Matter of Cavazos, 17 I&N Dec. 215 (BIA 1980)中的裁决，确立以下规则：

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that, in the absence of other adverse factors, an application for adjustment of status as an immediate relative should generally be granted in the exer- cise of discretion notwithstanding the fact that the applicant entered the United States as a nonimmigrant with a preconceived intention to remain. In addition, subsequent Board decisions found the fact of marriage and fam- ily relationships to override the adverse factor of a criminal conviction. See, e.g., Matter of Battista, 19 I&N Dec. 484 (BIA 1987) (emphasizing that an adjustment application filed by an alien whose immediate relative petition was approved prior to his entry as a nonimmigrant, and who had been con- victed of grand theft, requires consideration of all factors, including his sig- nificant family ties). The respondent’s wife testified that if necessary she would give up her family to accompany her husband, because “I swear that I was gonna stay with him until the death will separate us,” but indicated immediately there- after that it would be a hard choice, because “it’s a hard situation.” She went on to state that she was extremely close emotionally with her family, especially with her mother. She stated further that her grandparents, aunts, and cousins live in a small town 8 minutes away from her family’s home where she resides. She testified that were she forced to accompany her hus- band to Mexico, she would not have the money to travel back and forth to visit her family. She stated further that her family, being as large as it is, would not be able to visit her often. She explained that her parents “don’t even go to Mexico either because it’s hard.” Furthermore, the respondent’s wife testified that she would have diffi- culty finding employment, and the respondent’s testimony indicates that he and his wife have very little money. The record reflects that the respondent’s wife is not now employed but is attending a technical training course involving computers on a part-time basis. Rather than treat the respondent’s and his wife’s economic situation as a factor contributing to extreme hard- ship, the majority turns their financial difficulties as a factor that minimizes the wife’s hardship were her husband to be denied the waiver and deported. According to the majority, since the respondent and his wife have little money here in the United States and the respondent’s wife is unemployed, they might just as well be poverty-stricken in Mexico. Even were this a rea- sonable analysis of the financial factors involved, it utterly ignores the fact that here in the United States the respondent and his wife live with and can call on the support of the respondent’s wife’s family. As emphasized in Watkins v. INS, supra, at 850, we are required to “‘consider all relevant factors cumulatively in deciding whether extreme hardship has been established.’ Batoon, 707 F.2d at 401 (emphasis added); see also Dragon v. INS, 748 F.2d 1304, 1306 (9th Cir. 1984); Santana- Figueroa v. INS, 644 F.2d 1354, 1357 (9th Cir. 1981).” The court stressed that “the BIA correctly stated the law, but failed to apply it correctly. It found that the professional and social changes petitioner would face . . . .

即在没有其他不利因素的情况下，作为直系亲属的调整身份申请一般应在行使自由裁量权时予以批准，尽管申请人以非移民身份入境时即预谋留在美国。此外，委员会此后的裁决认定婚姻和家庭关系的事实可以压倒刑事定罪这一不利因素。参见，例如，Matter of Battista, 19 I&N Dec. 484 (BIA 1987)（强调一名外国人在其直系亲属申请于其以非移民身份入境前获批、且曾被判犯有重大盗窃罪的情况下提交的调整身份申请，需要考量所有因素，包括其重要的家庭关系）。 答辩人的妻子作证称，如有必要她愿意放弃自己的家庭去陪同丈夫，因为“我发誓我会和他在一起，直到死亡将我们分开”，但随即表示这将是一个艰难的选择，因为“这是一个艰难的处境”。她接着表示，她在情感上与家人极为亲密，尤其是与她的母亲。她还表示，她的祖父母、姑姨和表兄弟姐妹住在一个距她所居住的自家住宅8分钟车程的小镇上。她作证称，如果她被迫陪同丈夫前往墨西哥，她将没有钱往返探亲。她还表示，她的家族如此庞大，无法经常来看望她。她解释说，她的父母“甚至也不去墨西哥，因为那很艰难”。 此外，答辩人的妻子作证称她将难以找到工作，而答辩人的证词表明他和妻子几乎没有钱。记录显示，答辩人的妻子目前没有工作，而是兼职参加一门涉及计算机的技术培训课程。多数意见没有将答辩人及其妻子的经济状况视为造成极端困难的因素，反而将他们的经济困难作为削弱妻子在丈夫被拒豁免并被驱逐出境情况下所遭受困难的因素。根据多数意见，既然答辩人及其妻子在美国几乎没有钱且答辩人的妻子失业，他们在墨西哥也可能同样一贫如洗。即使这是对所涉经济因素的合理分析，它也完全忽视了这样一个事实：在美国，答辩人及其妻子与答辩人妻子的家人同住并可以依靠其支持。 正如Watkins v. INS, supra, at 850中所强调的，我们必须“‘累积考量所有相关因素以裁定是否已确立极端困难。’Batoon, 707 F.2d at 401（着重号为原文所加）；另见Dragon v. INS, 748 F.2d 1304, 1306 (9th Cir. 1984); Santana-Figueroa v. INS, 644 F.2d 1354, 1357 (9th Cir. 1981)。”法院强调，“BIA正确陈述了法律，但未能正确适用。它认定申请人将面临的职业和社会变化……

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would not rise to the level of extreme hardship. It then found separately that the birth of petitioner’s second son ‘standing alone does not change our finding.’ But the standard is not whether each factor, standing alone, con- stitutes extreme hardship, but whether the cumulative effect of all factors constitutes extreme hardship.” Watkins v. INS, supra, at 850 (emphasis added). Such a cumulative evaluation is glaringly absent from the majority opinion. Instead the majority decision takes the fact of the respondent’s wife’s marriage and her family ties, minimizes them, and rejects them as an indicia of extreme hardship, and then takes the respondent’s wife’s financial situation and minimizes and rejects it as a significant hardship factor. Cf. Arrozal v. INS, 159 F.3d 429, 433 (9th Cir. 1998). Nowhere does the major- ity opinion cumulatively consider these and other factors apparent in the record-such as the length of the wife’s residence in the United States, her citizenship status and what giving that up in the sense of leaving the United States would mean, and her desire to have a family with her husband-and weigh them together. This is precisely the type of erroneous and arbitrary evaluation that vio- lates the respondent’s due process rights to a fair hearing and a reasoned decision with regard to his waiver application. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, supra. Consequently, in my view, no matter what statutory limitation may exist with respect to judicial review of discretionary decisions made by the Attorney General, the abuse of discretion present in the majority opin- ion in this case constitutes a substantive deprivation of the respondent’s due process right to make an application for a waiver and have it fairly and meaningfully considered and adjudicated. See Kalaw v. INS, 133 F.3d 1147, 1153 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Arrozal v. INS, supra (finding jurisdiction to hear a motion to reopen).

不会达到极端困难的程度。然后它另行认定申请人次子的出生‘单独来看并不改变我们的认定’。但标准并非每个因素单独来看是否构成极端困难，而是所有因素的累积效果是否构成极端困难。”Watkins v. INS, supra, at 850（着重号为原文所加）。 多数意见中明显缺乏这种累积评估。相反，多数意见裁决将答辩人妻子婚姻的事实及其家庭关系拿来，加以贬低，并拒绝将其作为极端困难的标志，然后将答辩人妻子的经济状况拿来，加以贬低并拒绝将其作为重要的困难因素。参见Arrozal v. INS, 159 F.3d 429, 433 (9th Cir. 1998)。多数意见从未累积考量这些因素以及记录中显而易见的其他因素——例如妻子在美国居住的时间长短、她的公民身份以及放弃该身份（即离开美国）将意味着什么、以及她希望与丈夫组建家庭的愿望——并将它们综合权衡。 这正是违反答辩人获得公正听证和就其豁免申请获得有理由裁决的正当程序权利的那类错误和任意评估。Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, supra。因此，在我看来，无论对司法审查司法部长所作自由裁量裁决存在何种法定限制，本案多数意见中存在的滥用自由裁量权构成对答辩人提出豁免申请并使其获得公正和有意义考量和裁决的正当程序权利的实质性剥夺。参见Kalaw v. INS, 133 F.3d 1147, 1153 (9th Cir. 1997)；另见Arrozal v. INS, supra（认定对重新开案动议享有管辖权）。

IV. CONCLUSION

IV. 结论

I do not believe the respondent is inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act. Even if he is inadmissible, I do not believe that the current version of the section 212(i) waiver provision applies to his case, and I find such an application to have an impermissibly retroactive effect, holding the respondent to a standard that is not the one that existed (a) at the time he was convicted, (b) when he was charged with being deportable, or (c) when he made his adjustment and waiver application. However, even assuming he must satisfy the current terms of section 212(i) of the Act, which require that he establish that his wife, who is his qualifying relative, will suffer extreme hardship, I believe he has done so. I conclude that the respondent has established that his wife would suffer extreme hardship were she required either to accompany him to Mexico and leave her fami-

我不认为答辩人根据《移民与国籍法》第212(a)(6)(C)(i)条不可入境。即使他不可入境，我也不认为现行版本的第212(i)条豁免条款适用于他的案件，并且我认定此类适用具有不被允许的溯及效力，使答辩人受制于一项并非以下时间点存在的标准：(a) 他被定罪时，(b) 他被指控可被驱逐出境时，或 (c) 他提出调整身份和豁免申请时。然而，即使假定他必须满足《移民与国籍法》第212(i)条的现行条款，该条款要求他证明其合格亲属妻子将遭受极端困难，我认为他已做到这一点。我认定答辩人已证明，如果其妻子被要求陪同他前往墨西哥并离开她的家

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ly, or to separate from him and remain with her family in her adopted coun- try where she has lived since she was an infant. I conclude further that the favorable factors presented in this case in terms of the respondent’s marital relationship and the couple’s ties to an extensive family network in this country, together with the hardship his wife would suffer, warrant granting his application for adjustment of status and a waiver under section 212(i) of the Act in the exercise of discretion.

人，或者与他分离并留在她自婴儿时期起就居住的收养国与家人在一起，她将遭受极端困难。我进一步认定，本案中呈现的有利因素——答辩人的婚姻关系以及这对夫妇与本国庞大亲属网络的联系——连同其妻子将遭受的困难，足以支持在行使自由裁量权时批准其调整身份申请和根据《移民与国籍法》第212(i)条的豁免。

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