Matter of Briones

Cite as 24 I&N Dec. 355 (BIA 2007) Interim Decision #3590

引用为 24 I&N Dec. 355 (BIA 2007) 临时决定第3590号

File A75 907 909 - Dallas

案卷 A75 907 909 - 达拉斯

Decided November 29, 2007

2007年11月29日决定

U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals

美国司法部 移民审查执行办公室 移民上诉委员会

(1) Section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) (2000), covers recidivist immigration violators, so to be inadmissible under that section, an alien must depart the United States after accruing an aggregate period of “unlawful presence” of more than 1 year and thereafter reenter, or attempt to reenter, the United States without being admitted.

(1) 《移民与国籍法》第212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I)条，8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) (2000)，涵盖累犯移民违规者，因此，外国人须在累积“非法居留”期间超过1年之后离开美国，并随后未经准入而重新入境或试图重新入境美国，方可根据该条被认定为不可入境。

(2) Adjustment of status under section 245(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) (2000), is not available to an alien who is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) of the Act.

(2) 根据该法第245(i)条，8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) (2000) 进行的调整身份，不适用于根据该法第212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I)条被认定为不可入境的外国人。

FOR RESPONDENT: J. Joseph Reina, Esquire, Dallas, Texas

被申请人代理律师：J. Joseph Reina，Esquire，德克萨斯州达拉斯

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Ronald Lapid, Appellate Counsel; Paul B. Hunker III, Chief Counsel

国土安全部代理：Ronald Lapid，上诉法律顾问；Paul B. Hunker III，首席法律顾问

BEFORE: Board Panel: FILPPU, COLE, and PAULEY, Board Members.

审理法官：委员会小组：FILPPU、COLE 和 PAULEY，委员会成员。

PAULEY, Board Member:

PAULEY，委员会成员：

The respondent appeals from an Immigration Judge’s March 31, 2005, decision pretermitting his application for adjustment of status under section 245(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) (2000). 1 The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) opposes the appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

被申请人对移民法官2005年3月31日的决定提出上诉，该决定预先驳回了其根据《移民与国籍法》第245(i)条，8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) (2000) 提出的调整身份申请。1 国土安全部（“DHS”）反对该上诉。上诉将被驳回。

The Immigration Judge’s original oral decision contains transcription errors that he corrected, both by handwritten interlineation and by issuance of the March 31, 2005, written decision from which the present appeal was taken. We conclude, and the parties do not argue otherwise, that the Immigration Judge’s decision, as corrected, provides a meaningful basis for appellate review.

移民法官最初的口头决定包含转录错误，他通过手写行间插入和发布2005年3月31日的书面决定（即本上诉所针对的决定）予以更正。我们认定，且双方未提出异议，经更正的移民法官决定为上诉审查提供了有意义的依据。

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引用为 24 I&N Dec. 355 (BIA 2007) 临时决定第3590号

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

I. 事实与程序历史

The respondent is a native and citizen of Mexico who entered the United States without inspection in 1992. In March 1993, the respondent’s father, who was then a lawful permanent resident of the United States, filed a Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130) on the respondent’s behalf, seeking to classify him as a family-sponsored immigrant in the second-preference category, i.e., as the unmarried son of a lawful permanent resident. See section 203(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2) (1988). The former Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) approved the petition in January 1994, but no visa number was then available to the respondent because his preference category was oversubscribed. 2 Nonetheless, the respondent remained in the United States without permission until December 1998, when he departed to Mexico.

被申请人是墨西哥本土公民，于1992年未经检查进入美国。1993年3月，被申请人的父亲（当时是美国合法永久居民）代表被申请人提交了《外籍亲属申请》（I-130表格），寻求将其归类为第二优先类别的家庭担保移民，即合法永久居民的未婚子女。见该法第203(a)(2)条，8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2) (1988)。前移民与归化局（“INS”）于1994年1月批准了该申请，但当时没有可用的签证名额给被申请人，因为其优先类别已超额认购。2 尽管如此，被申请人仍未经许可留在美国，直至1998年12月离开前往墨西哥。

On March 3, 1999, the respondent’s father became a naturalized citizen of the United States. As a result, the respondent’s approved second-preference visa petition was automatically converted to an approved first-preference petition. 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(i)(3) (1999). On March 18, 1999, the respondent reentered the United States without being admitted or paroled by an immigration officer, and he has remained in the United States ever since. In July 1999, the respondent filed an Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status (Form I-485) with the DHS pursuant to section 245(i) of the Act on the basis of his approved visa petition.

1999年3月3日，被申请人的父亲成为美国归化公民。因此，被申请人已批准的第二优先签证申请自动转换为已批准的第一优先申请。8 C.F.R. § 204.2(i)(3) (1999)。1999年3月18日，被申请人未经移民官员准入或假释而重新进入美国，此后一直留在美国。1999年7月，被申请人根据该法第245(i)条，基于其已批准的签证申请，向DHS提交了《登记永久居留或调整身份申请》（I-485表格）。

In 2004, the DHS denied the respondent’s adjustment of status application and initiated the present removal proceedings, in which the respondent is charged with inadmissibility as an alien who reentered the United States without admission after having previously been unlawfully present in the United States for an aggregate period of more than 1 year. See section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) (2000). The respondent denied the charge but also sought to renew his application for adjustment of status, arguing that inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) of the Act was no impediment to section 245(i) adjustment, which is available by its terms to aliens who are present in the United States after having entered without inspection. The Immigration Judge pretermitted the application, however, concluding that the respondent’s inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) of

2004年，DHS拒绝了被申请人的调整身份申请，并启动了当前的遣返程序，其中被申请人被指控为不可入境的外国人，理由是其此前在美国非法居留累积超过1年后，未经准入而重新进入美国。见该法第212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I)条，8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) (2000)。被申请人否认该指控，但也寻求重新提交其调整身份申请，主张根据该法第212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I)条被认定为不可入境并不妨碍第245(i)条调整身份，该条按其条款适用于未经检查入境后目前在美国的外国人。然而，移民法官预先驳回了该申请，认定被申请人根据该法第212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I)条不可入境

2 On March 1, 2003, the functions of the former INS were transferred to the DHS pursuant to Title IV of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, 2177. To avoid confusion, the former INS shall be referred to in this order as the DHS unless context dictates otherwise.

2 2003年3月1日，前INS的职能根据《2002年国土安全法》第四编，Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, 2177，移交给了DHS。为避免混淆，除非上下文另有要求，本命令中前INS将被称为DHS。

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the Act rendered him ineligible for adjustment of status. 3 The respondent appealed, and at our request the parties have filed supplemental briefs and appeared for oral argument.

该法使其无资格调整身份。3 被申请人提出上诉，并应我们的要求，双方提交了补充简报并出庭进行了口头辩论。

II. ISSUE

II. 问题

The principal issue on appeal is whether adjustment of status under section 245(i) of the Act is available to an alien who is inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) of the Act.

上诉的主要问题是，根据该法第245(i)条进行的调整身份是否适用于根据该法第212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I)条不可入境美国的外国人。

III. ANALYSIS

III. 分析

A. Inadmissibility Under Section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) of the Act

A. 根据该法第212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I)条的不可入境性

The Immigration Judge determined that the respondent is inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) of the Act. In 2004, when the DHS initiated these proceedings, the statute provided as follows, in pertinent part:

移民法官认定被申请人根据该法第212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I)条不可入境美国。2004年，当DHS启动这些程序时，该法规的相关部分规定如下：

§ 1182. Inadmissible aliens (a) Classes of aliens ineligible for visas or admission

§ 1182. 不可入境的外国人 (a) 无资格获得签证或入境的外国人类别

Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, aliens who are inadmissible under the following paragraphs are ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to the United States:

除本章另有规定外，根据以下各款不可入境的外国人无资格获得签证且无资格被准入美国：

. . . . (9) Aliens previously removed

. . . . (9) 先前被遣返的外国人

. . . . (C) Aliens unlawfully present after previous immigration violations

. . . . (C) 先前移民违规后非法居留的外国人

(i) In general Any alien who—

(i) 一般规定 任何外国人——

(I) has been unlawfully present in the United States for an aggregate period of more than 1 year, or

(I) 在美国非法居留累积超过1年，或

(II) has been ordered removed under section 1225(b)(1) of this

(II) 已根据本法第1225(b)(1)条被命令遣返

At the time of the Immigration Judge’s decision in March 2005, visa numbers were available to first-preference family-sponsored immigrants from Mexico whose visa petitions had been filed before October 22, 1994. See Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Visa Bulletin, Vol. VIII, No. 79 (Mar. 2005), available at http://travel.state.gov/visa/frvi/bulletin/bulletin_2111.html. Because the respondent had a current priority date when he submitted his adjustment application to the Immigration Judge, he is not rendered ineligible for such relief by virtue of the subsequent retrogression of his priority date, although final approval of the application would have to be held in abeyance. See United States Citizenship and Immigration Services Operations Instructions 245.4(a)(6); cf. also Matter of Ho, 15 I&N Dec. 692, 693-94 (BIA 1976).

在2005年3月移民法官作出决定时，对于签证申请在1994年10月22日之前提交的墨西哥第一优先家庭担保移民，有可用的签证名额。见美国国务院领事事务局，《签证公告》，第VIII卷，第79号（2005年3月），可查阅 http://travel.state.gov/visa/frvi/bulletin/bulletin_2111.html。由于被申请人在向移民法官提交调整身份申请时具有当前优先日期，其优先日期随后的倒退并不使其无资格获得此类救济，尽管申请的最终批准将必须暂缓。见美国公民及移民服务局操作指示245.4(a)(6)；另比较 Matter of Ho, 15 I&N Dec. 692, 693-94 (BIA 1976)。

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title, section 1229a of this title, or any other provision of law, and who enters or attempts to reenter the United States without being admitted is inadmissible.

标题、本标题第1229a条或任何其他法律条款，且未经准入而进入或试图重新进入美国，则不可入境。

(ii) Exception

(ii) 例外

Clause (i) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission more than 10 years after the date of the alien’s last departure from the United States if, prior to the alien’s reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be readmitted from a foreign contiguous territory, the Attorney General has consented to the alien’s reapplying for admission.

如果在外国人从美国境外某地重新登船或试图从外国毗连领土重新入境之前，司法部长已同意该外国人重新申请入境，则第(i)款不适用于在该外国人最后一次离开美国之日起超过10年后寻求入境的外国人。

Section 212(a)(9)(C) was enacted pursuant to section 301(b) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C of Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-577 (effective Apr. 1, 1997) (“IIRIRA”). The purpose of the statute was to single out recidivist immigration violators and make it more difficult for them to be admitted to the United States after having departed. See generally Matter of Rodarte, 23 I&N Dec. 905, 909 (BIA 2006); Matter of Torres-Garcia, 23 I&N Dec. 866, 868 (BIA 2006).

第212(a)(9)(C)条是根据《1996年非法移民改革和移民责任法》第301(b)条颁布的，该法为 Pub. L. No. 104-208 的C编，110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-577（1997年4月1日生效）（“IIRIRA”）。该法规的目的是单独针对累犯移民违规者，并使其在离开后更难被准入美国。一般见 Matter of Rodarte, 23 I&N Dec. 905, 909 (BIA 2006)；Matter of Torres-Garcia, 23 I&N Dec. 866, 868 (BIA 2006)。

It is undisputed that the respondent was unlawfully present in the United States for more than 1 year between April 1, 1997, the date when section 212(a)(9)(C) of the Act went into effect, and December 1998 when he returned to Mexico. 4 It is also undisputed that he reentered the United States in March 1999 without being inspected, admitted, or paroled. Because the respondent entered the United States without admission or parole after a prior period of unlawful presence in this country of more than 1 year, he is inadmissible pursuant to the plain language of section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I). Furthermore, he cannot presently be granted permission to reapply for admission under section 212(a)(9)(C)(ii), either prospectively or retroactively, because his last departure from the United States occurred less than 10 years

无可争议的是，被申请人在1997年4月1日（该法第212(a)(9)(C)条生效之日）至1998年12月返回墨西哥期间，在美国非法居留超过1年。4 同样无可争议的是，他于1999年3月未经检查、准入或假释而重新进入美国。由于被申请人在此前于美国非法居留超过1年之后未经准入或假释进入美国，根据第212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I)条的明确语言，他不可入境。此外，他目前不能根据第212(a)(9)(C)(ii)条获得重新申请入境的许可，无论是前瞻性还是追溯性，因为他最后一次离开美国发生在不到10年

The respondent’s presence during this period was unlawful within the meaning of section 212(a)(9)(C) despite his status as a “grandfathered alien,” i.e., as the beneficiary of a visa petition that was filed before April 30, 2001. See 8 C.F.R. § 1245.10(m) (2007) (“If the alien is not in a period of stay authorized by the Attorney General, the fact that he or she is a grandfathered alien does not prevent the alien from accruing unlawful presence under section 212(a)(9)(B) and (C) of the Act.”); see also Adjustment of Status to That of Person Admitted for Permanent Residence; Temporary Removal of Certain Restrictions of Eligibility, 66 Fed. Reg. 16,383, 16,386 (Mar. 26, 2001), 2001 WL 284947 (“The mere filing of a visa petition . . . that has the effect of grandfathering the alien has no effect on an alien’s unlawful presence in the United States . . . .”).

尽管被申请人具有“祖父条款外国人”身份，即作为2001年4月30日之前提交的签证申请的受益人，其在此期间的存在根据第212(a)(9)(C)条的含义仍属非法。见 8 C.F.R. § 1245.10(m) (2007)（“如果外国人不在司法部长授权的停留期内，其作为祖父条款外国人的事实并不阻止该外国人根据该法第212(a)(9)(B)和(C)条累积非法居留。”）；另见《调整身份为获准永久居留者；临时取消某些资格限制》，66 Fed. Reg. 16,383, 16,386（2001年3月26日），2001 WL 284947（“仅仅提交具有使外国人祖父化效果的签证申请……对外国人在美国的非法居留没有影响……”）。

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ago. Matter of Torres-Garcia, supra, at 873-76. 5 Having established that the respondent is inadmissible and removable as charged, we now turn to the question whether he is eligible for adjustment of status under section 245(i) of the Act despite his inadmissibility.

之前。Matter of Torres-Garcia，同上，第873-76页。5 在确定被申请人如所指控不可入境且可遣返后，我们现在转向问题：尽管其不可入境，他是否有资格根据该法第245(i)条调整身份。

B. Section 245(i) Adjustment

B. 第245(i)条调整身份

1. Background and Text of Section 245(i)

1. 第245(i)条的背景和文本

Congress has generally limited the availability of adjustment of status to aliens who have been “inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States.” Section 245(a) of the Act. The purpose of this “inspection and admission” requirement is to discourage intending immigrants from moving to the United States before becoming fully eligible for permanent residence and to encourage them to follow the orderly consular process for the issuance of immigrant visas. By the early 1990s, however, Congress had determined that the inspection and admission requirement had become an undesirable impediment to the acquisition of permanent resident status by many close relatives of the more than 2.5 million aliens whose immigration status had been “legalized” pursuant to section 201(a) of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359, 3394 (codified at section 245A of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1225a). Because of the inspection and admission requirement, many close family members of these legalized aliens were obliged to leave the United States so that they could apply for an immigrant visa at a consulate or embassy abroad, placing a significant administrative burden on the resources of the State Department and exposing the aliens themselves to considerable personal expense. See Adjustment of Status to That of Person Admitted for Permanent Residence; Temporary Removal of Certain Restrictions of Eligibility, 59 Fed. Reg. 51,091, 51,092 (Oct. 7, 1994), 1994 WL 543334.

国会一般将调整身份的适用范围限于“经检查并获准入境或获假释进入美国”的外国人。该法第245(a)条。这一“检查与入境”要求的目的是阻止有意移民在完全符合永久居留资格之前移居美国，并鼓励他们遵循有序的领事程序以取得移民签证。然而，到1990年代初，国会已认定，检查与入境要求已成为许多近亲属取得永久居民身份的不当障碍，这些近亲属属于根据1986年《移民改革与控制法》第201(a)条（Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359, 3394，编纂于该法第245A条，8 U.S.C. § 1225a）其移民身份已被“合法化”的超过2.5百万名外国人。由于检查与入境要求，这些合法化外国人的许多近亲属被迫离开美国，以便他们能够在国外的领事馆或大使馆申请移民签证，这给国务院的资源带来了重大的行政负担，并使这些外国人本人承担了相当大的个人开支。见《调整身份为获准永久居留者身份；临时取消某些资格限制》，59 Fed. Reg. 51,091, 51,092（1994年10月7日），1994 WL 543334。

During the pendency of this appeal, Congress transferred authority to adjudicate waiver applications under section 212(a)(9)(C)(ii) of the Act from the Attorney General to the Secretary of Homeland Security. See Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act–Technical Corrections, Pub. L. No. 109-271, § 6(b),120 Stat. 750, 762 (2006). Consequently, even if the respondent’s last departure from the United States had occurred more than 10 years ago, it is not clear that the Immigration Judge would have jurisdiction to entertain his request for such a waiver.

在本上诉审理期间，国会将根据该法第212(a)(9)(C)(ii)条裁决豁免申请的权力从司法部长移交给了国土安全部部长。见《反对妇女暴力与司法部重新授权法——技术更正》，Pub. L. No. 109-271, § 6(b), 120 Stat. 750, 762（2006年）。因此，即使被申请人最后一次离开美国发生在10年以上之前，移民法官是否拥有受理其此类豁免请求的管辖权也并不明确。

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In 1994, Congress responded to this state of affairs by creating a new section 245(i) of the Act, which authorized a limited departure from the general “inspection and admission” requirement by permitting the Attorney General to grant adjustment of status upon the payment of a surcharge to certain aliens who had entered the United States without inspection or failed to maintain lawful status after having been admitted as nonimmigrants. See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-317, § 506(b), 108 Stat. 1724, 1765-66 (effective Oct. 1, 1994) (“1995 Appropriations Act”); see also H.R. Rep. No. 103-708, at 25, 83-84 (1994) (Conf. Rep.), 1994 WL 444749 (explaining the contours of section 506 of the 1995 Appropriations Act). To encourage qualifying aliens to seek this new form of adjustment, moreover, Congress erected barriers to consular processing by requiring most aliens who had been physically present in the United States to remain abroad at their own expense for at least 90 days before they could receive an immigrant visa. See 1995 Appropriations Act § 506(a), 108 Stat. at 1765 (enacting former section 212(o) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(o), which would “sunset” on October 1, 1997).

1994年，国会针对这一状况作出回应，创设了该法新的第245(i)条，该条授权对一般“检查与入境”要求作出有限偏离，允许司法部长在收取附加费的情况下，对某些未经检查进入美国、或作为非移民获准入境后未能维持合法身份的外国人授予调整身份。见《1995年商务部、司法部、国务院、司法机构及相关机构拨款法》，Pub. L. No. 103-317, § 506(b), 108 Stat. 1724, 1765-66（1994年10月1日生效）（“1995年拨款法”）；另见H.R. Rep. No. 103-708, at 25, 83-84（1994年）（会议报告），1994 WL 444749（解释1995年拨款法第506条的轮廓）。此外，为鼓励符合条件的外国人寻求这一新的调整身份形式，国会设置了领事处理的障碍，要求大多数曾实际身在美国的外国人自费留在国外至少90天，之后才能获得移民签证。见1995年拨款法§ 506(a), 108 Stat. at 1765（颁布该法原第212(o)条，8 U.S.C. § 1182(o)，该条将于1997年10月1日“日落”失效）。

As originally enacted, section 245(i) permitted an alien who had entered the United States without inspection to apply for adjustment of status between October 1, 1994, and October 1, 1997, at which time the provision would “sunset.” See 1995 Appropriations Act § 506(c), 108 Stat. at 1766. Congress subsequently repealed this October 1, 1997, sunset date, but substituted a new requirement that any application for section 245(i) adjustment had to be based on an approved visa petition that had been filed before January 14, 1998. See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, §111(a)-(b), 111 Stat. 2440, 2458 (enacted Nov. 26, 1997) (“1998 Appropriations Act”). This January 14, 1998, deadline for the filing of qualifying visa petitions was later extended to April 30, 2001. See LIFE Act Amendments of 2000, Div. B, tit. XV, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 1502(a)(1), 114 Stat. 2763 (enacted Dec. 21, 2000) (“LIFE Act Amendments”) (effective as if included in the enactment of the Legal Immigration Family Equity Act, tit. XI, Pub. L. No. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762 (2000) (“LIFE Act”)). In 2004, when these proceedings began, the statute provided as follows, in pertinent part:

第245(i)条最初颁布时，允许未经检查进入美国的外国人在1994年10月1日至1997年10月1日期间申请调整身份，届时该条款将“日落”失效。见1995年拨款法§ 506(c), 108 Stat. at 1766。国会随后废除了这一1997年10月1日的日落日期，但代之以一项新要求，即任何第245(i)条调整身份申请都必须基于在1998年1月14日之前提交的已获批准的签证申请。见《1998年商务部、司法部、国务院、司法机构及相关机构拨款法》，Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 111(a)-(b), 111 Stat. 2440, 2458（1997年11月26日颁布）（“1998年拨款法”）。这一1998年1月14日提交符合条件签证申请的截止日期后来被延长至2001年4月30日。见《2000年LIFE法修正案》，Div. B, tit. XV, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 1502(a)(1), 114 Stat. 2763（2000年12月21日颁布）（“LIFE法修正案”）（生效方式如同纳入《合法移民家庭平等法》的颁布，tit. XI, Pub. L. No. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762（2000年）（“LIFE法”））。2004年，即这些程序开始时，该法相关部分规定如下：

§ 1255. Adjustment of status of nonimmigrant to that of person admitted for

§ 1255. 非移民调整身份为获准永久居留者身份

permanent residence . . . . (i) Adjustment of status of certain aliens physically present in United States

永久居留 . . . . (i) 某些实际身在美国的外国人调整身份

(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a) and (c) of this section, an alien physically present in the United States—

(1) 尽管有本条(a)款和(c)款的规定，实际身在美国的外国人——

(A) who—

(A) 其——

(i) entered the United States without inspection; . . .

(i) 未经检查进入美国；. . .

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. . . ; and (B) who is the beneficiary . . . of—

. . . ；且 (B) 其是以下申请的受益人……——

(i) a petition for classification . . . that was filed with the Attorney General on or before April 30, 2001; . . . . . . and (C) who, in the case of a beneficiary of a petition for classification . . . that was filed after January 14, 1998, is physically present in the United States on December 21, 2000; may apply to the Attorney General for the adjustment of his or her status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. The Attorney General may accept such application only if the alien remits with such application a sum equaling $1,000 as of the date of receipt of the application . . . .

(i) 于2001年4月30日或之前向司法部长提交的归类申请……；…… . . . 且 (C) 对于在1998年1月14日之后提交的归类申请……的受益人，其于2000年12月21日实际身在美国； 可向司法部长申请将其身份调整为合法获准永久居留的外国人身份。司法部长只有在外国人随申请缴纳相当于申请收到之日1,000美元的款项时，才可以接受该申请……。

(2) Upon receipt of such an application and the sum hereby required, the Attorney General may adjust the status of the alien to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if—

(2) 在收到该申请及本条规定所需款项后，司法部长可以调整该外国人的身份为合法获准永久居留的外国人身份，如果——

(A) the alien is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United States for permanent residence; and

(A) 该外国人有资格获得移民签证且可获准进入美国永久居留；且

(B) an immigrant visa is immediately available to the alien at the time the application is filed.

(B) 在提交申请时，有移民签证可立即提供给该外国人。

The reference to the Attorney General in section 245(i) now refers to the Secretary of Homeland Security as well. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, tit. XV, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 1517, 116 Stat. 2135, 2311 (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 557 (Supp. IV 2004)).

第245(i)条中对司法部长的提及现在也指国土安全部部长。见《2002年国土安全法》，tit. XV, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 1517, 116 Stat. 2135, 2311（编纂于6 U.S.C. § 557 (Supp. IV 2004)）。

2. Interplay Between Sections 245(i) and 212(a) of the Act

2. 该法第245(i)条与第212(a)条之间的相互作用

The fundamental issue before us is one of statutory construction, pertaining to the interplay between sections 212(a)(9)(C) and 245(i) of the Act. We review issues of pure statutory interpretation de novo. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (2007). In conducting such a review, the touchstone of our analysis is the plain language of the statute. Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (citing Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999)). It is presumed that Congress “‘says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.’” Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000) (quoting Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992)); see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). Thus, we do not look past the unambiguous meaning of statutory language except in those rare circumstances where strict adherence to the text would lead to an absurd or bizarre result that is “‘demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.’” Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 190-91 (1991) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)); see also Johnson v. Sawyer, 120 F.3d 1307, 1319 (5th Cir. 1997).

我们面前的根本问题是法律解释问题，涉及该法第212(a)(9)(C)条与第245(i)条之间的相互作用。我们对纯法律解释问题进行重新审查。8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i)（2007年）。在进行此类审查时，我们分析的试金石是法规的平实语言。Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004)（引用Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999)）。推定国会“‘在法规中说出其意，并在法规中意指其所说。’”Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000)（引用Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992)）；另见Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)。因此，我们不会越过法规语言明确无误的含义，除非在那些罕见情况下，严格遵循文本会导致荒谬或怪异的结果，而该结果“‘明显与起草者的意图相悖。’”Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 190-91 (1991)（引用Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)）；另见Johnson v. Sawyer, 120 F.3d 1307, 1319 (5th Cir. 1997)。

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With these principles of statutory construction in mind, we note as a threshold matter that section 245(i)(2)(A) of the Act unambiguously requires an applicant for adjustment of status to prove that he is “admissible to the United States for permanent residence.” To satisfy this admissibility requirement, which is echoed in many other provisions of the Act touching upon adjustment of status, the applicant must prove either that he or she is “not inadmissible” under any of the various paragraphs of section 212(a) of the Act, or that any applicable ground of inadmissibility has been waived. 8 C.F.R. § 1245.10(b)(3) (2007). The Immigration Judge concluded that the respondent could not satisfy the admissibility requirement because he is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) of the Act and is ineligible for any waiver of that ground of inadmissibility. 6

牢记这些法律解释原则，我们首先注意到，该法第245(i)(2)(A)条明确要求调整身份申请人证明其“可获准进入美国永久居留”。为满足这一可获准入境要求（该要求在该法涉及调整身份的许多其他条款中也有呼应），申请人必须证明其根据该法第212(a)条各款中的任何一款均“不存在不可入境情形”，或者任何适用的不可入境理由已被豁免。8 C.F.R. § 1245.10(b)(3)（2007年）。移民法官认定，被申请人无法满足可获准入境要求，因为其根据该法第212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I)条属于不可入境，且没有资格获得对该不可入境理由的任何豁免。6

The respondent counters the Immigration Judge’s decision by identifying a contradiction in the language of section 245(i). Specifically, although the respondent acknowledges the admissibility requirement of section 245(i)(2)(A), he points out that section 245(i)(1)(A) affirmatively grants “an alien physically present in the United States . . . who . . . entered the United States without inspection” the right to apply for adjustment of status. As the respondent explains, aliens who have “entered the United States without inspection” can almost never satisfy the admissibility requirement of section 245(i)(2)(A) because their unlawful entry makes them inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Act (pertaining to aliens who are present in the United States without having been admitted or paroled) or section 212(a)(9)(C)(i) of the Act, at issue in this case. In other words, the plain language of the statute seems to make “entry without inspection” both a qualifying and a disqualifying condition for adjustment of status.

被申请人通过指出第245(i)条语言中的矛盾来反驳移民法官的决定。具体而言，尽管被申请人承认第245(i)(2)(A)条的可获准入境要求，但其指出，第245(i)(1)(A)条肯定性地授予“实际身在美国……未经检查进入美国的外国人”申请调整身份的权利。正如被申请人所解释的，曾“未经检查进入美国”的外国人几乎永远无法满足第245(i)(2)(A)条的可获准入境要求，因为其非法入境使其根据该法第212(a)(6)(A)(i)条（涉及未经获准入境或假释而身在美国的外国人）或本案所涉该法第212(a)(9)(C)(i)条属于不可入境。换言之，法规的平实语言似乎使“未经检查入境”既是调整身份的符合条件，又是取消资格的条件。

The contradiction identified by the respondent certainly does exist, but it has not always existed. In 1994, when section 245(i) was first enacted, “an alien physically present in the United States who . . . entered the United States without inspection” was not considered to be inadmissible (or “excludable,” to use the parlance of the time) under section 212(a) of the Act. Instead, such an alien was considered to be “deportable” under former section 241(a)(1)(B) of

被申请人所指出的矛盾确实存在，但并非一直存在。1994年第245(i)条首次颁布时，“实际身在美国……未经检查进入美国的外国人”根据该法第212(a)条不被视为不可入境（或按当时的用语，“不可排除”）。相反，此类外国人根据原第241(a)(1)(B)条被视为“可驱逐”

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in whose jurisdiction this proceeding arises, has extended administrative deference to an unpublished decision of this Board that embodied much the same rationale as that announced by the Immigration Judge in this case. Mortera-Cruz v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 246, 254-56 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1031 (2005).

位于其管辖范围内的美国第五巡回上诉法院已对本委员会的一项未公布裁决给予行政尊重，该裁决所体现的理由与本案移民法官所宣布的理由大致相同。Mortera-Cruz v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 246, 254-56 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1031 (2005)。

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the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(B) (1994), a classification that did not prevent the alien from satisfying the “admissibility” requirement of section 245(i)(2)(A). Moreover, in 1994 the immigration law drew no formal distinction between an alien who had “entered without inspection” once and one who had done so repeatedly; both the first-time offender and the recidivist would have been deportable under former section 241(a)(1)(B) only. The only exception to this rule pertained to aliens who had reentered the United States without inspection after having previously been deported. Depending on the circumstances surrounding the original deportation or the amount of time that had elapsed between the deportation and the reentry, such an alien would have been inadmissible even in 1994. See former sections 212(a)(6)(A), (B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(A), (B) (1994).

《移民与国籍法》第 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(B) (1994) 条，该分类并不妨碍该外国人满足第 245(i)(2)(A) 条的“可入境”要求。此外，在 1994 年，移民法并未对外国人一次“未经检查入境”与多次“未经检查入境”作正式区分；初犯者和累犯均仅依前第 241(a)(1)(B) 条可被驱逐。该规则的唯一例外涉及此前已被驱逐后未经检查再次入境美国的外国人。根据原驱逐的相关情况或驱逐与再入境之间经过的时间长短，此类外国人在 1994 年也会被认定为不可入境。见《移民与国籍法》前第 212(a)(6)(A)、(B) 条，8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(A)、(B) (1994)。

This legal landscape was fundamentally altered upon enactment of the IIRIRA, which became effective for present purposes on April 1, 1997. See IIRIRA § 309(a), 110 Stat. at 3009-625. Among many other things, the IIRIRA did away with the “entered without inspection” deportability ground and recharacterized aliens who had previously been “deportable” under that ground as being “inadmissible.” Specifically, section 301(c) of the IIRIRA, 110 Stat. at 3009-578, created a general ground of inadmissibility applicable to all aliens who are present in the United States without having been admitted or paroled (i.e., the section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) ground), while section 301(b) of the IIRIRA, 110 Stat. at 3009-575 to 3009-578, created the section 212(a)(9) grounds of inadmissibility at issue in the present case, which apply more narrowly to aliens who seek admission or evade inspection after having committed prior immigration violations. It is these amendments that gave rise to the present tension between sections 245(i)(1)(A) and (2)(A) of the Act.

随着《非法移民改革和移民责任法》（IIRIRA）的颁布，这一法律格局发生了根本性改变，就目前目的而言，该法于 1997 年 4 月 1 日生效。见 IIRIRA § 309(a), 110 Stat. at 3009-625。除许多其他内容外，IIRIRA 废除了“未经检查入境”这一可驱逐理由，并将此前依该理由“可被驱逐”的外国人重新定性为“不可入境”。具体而言，IIRIRA 第 301(c) 条，110 Stat. at 3009-578，创设了一项适用于所有未经入境或假释而身在美国的外国人的一般不可入境理由（即第 212(a)(6)(A)(i) 条理由），而 IIRIRA 第 301(b) 条，110 Stat. at 3009-575 至 3009-578，则创设了本案所涉的第 212(a)(9) 条不可入境理由，该理由更狭窄地适用于在先前实施移民违规后寻求入境或逃避检查的外国人。正是这些修正案引发了《移民与国籍法》第 245(i)(1)(A) 条与 (2)(A) 条之间目前的紧张关系。

Shortly before the IIRIRA went into effect, the General Counsel of the former INS sought to forestall the potential consequences of this contradiction by issuing a policy memorandum that expressed the view that section 245(i) adjustment would remain available to the large class of aliens who were about to become inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Act. See Memorandum from David Martin, INS General Counsel, to Michael L. Aytes, Ass’t Comm’r, Office of Benefits (Feb. 19, 1997), reprinted in 74 Interpreter Releases, No. 11, March 24, 1997, app. II at 516-22. According to this memorandum, section 245(i)(1)(A), which made adjustment available to aliens who had “entered without inspection,” falls within “the ambit of the ‘otherwise provided’ savings clause of section 212(a) of the Act,” and essentially constitutes an implicit waiver for aliens who are inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i). Id. at 518-19. This “savings clause,” which is included in the prefatory language of section 212(a) of the Act, states that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this Act, aliens who are inadmissible under the following

在 IIRIRA 生效前不久，前 INS 总法律顾问试图通过发布一份政策备忘录来防止这一矛盾可能产生的后果，该备忘录认为，第 245(i) 条调整身份将继续适用于即将依《移民与国籍法》第 212(a)(6)(A)(i) 条成为不可入境的外国人的这一大类群体。见 Memorandum from David Martin, INS General Counsel, to Michael L. Aytes, Ass’t Comm’r, Office of Benefits (Feb. 19, 1997), reprinted in 74 Interpreter Releases, No. 11, March 24, 1997, app. II at 516-22。根据该备忘录，第 245(i)(1)(A) 条使“未经检查入境”的外国人可获得调整身份，该条属于“《移民与国籍法》第 212(a) 条‘另有规定’保留条款的范围”，并且实质上构成对依第 212(a)(6)(A)(i) 条不可入境的外国人的默示豁免。Id. at 518-19。该“保留条款”载于《移民与国籍法》第 212(a) 条的序言文字中，规定“[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this Act, aliens who are inadmissible under the following

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paragraphs are ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to the United States.” Section 212(a) of the Act (emphasis added).

paragraphs are ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to the United States.”《移民与国籍法》第 212(a) 条（着重号为后加）。

On appeal, the respondent relies on this same “savings clause” to argue that inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) of the Act should not be an obstacle to section 245(i) adjustment. According to the respondent, even if his surreptitious reentry into the United States after a prior period of unlawful presence of more than 1 year would ordinarily render him “ineligible to be admitted to the United States” for permanent residence, section 245(i)(1)(A) “otherwise provide[s]” within the meaning of the savings clause because it makes adjustment of status available to aliens, such as himself, who have “entered the United States without inspection.” Indeed, the respondent contends that inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(C) arises from the precise circumstance that section 245(i) was intended to forgive, that is, unlawful presence in the United States. Thus, according to his argument, if aliens who are inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(C) were disqualified from adjustment, section 245(i) would be rendered superfluous, because virtually all aliens who have “entered the United States without inspection” have also accrued the 1 year of “unlawful presence” sufficient to make them inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I).

在上诉中，被上诉人依据同一“保留条款”主张，依《移民与国籍法》第 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) 条不可入境不应成为第 245(i) 条调整身份的障碍。据被上诉人所述，即使其在先前超过 1 年的非法居留期后秘密再入境美国通常会使他“无资格获得美国永久居留入境许可”，第 245(i)(1)(A) 条仍属于保留条款意义上的“另有规定”，因为它使诸如他本人这样“未经检查入境美国”的外国人可以获得调整身份。事实上，被上诉人主张，依第 212(a)(9)(C) 条不可入境正是源于第 245(i) 条意图宽恕的情形，即在美国的非法居留。因此，按其论点，如果依第 212(a)(9)(C) 条不可入境的外国人被取消调整身份资格，第 245(i) 条将被架空，因为几乎所有“未经检查入境美国”的外国人也已累计了足以使其依第 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) 条不可入境的 1 年“非法居留”。

Shortly after the IIRIRA went into effect, the former INS issued additional policy guidance that espoused a position directly contrary to that presently advanced by the respondent. See Memorandum from Louis D. Crocetti, Jr., INS Assoc. Comm’r, Office of Examinations, to INS Officials (May 1, 1997), reprinted in 2 Bender’s Immigr. Bull. 450, 452 (June 1, 1997) (reiterating that inadmissibility under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) does not disqualify aliens from seeking adjustment of status, but also providing that aliens subject to sections 212(a)(9)(B) and (C) of the Act “will be deemed inadmissible under that section of the Act for purposes of adjustment of status”). This additional memorandum contains no substantial analysis of the statutory language of section 245(i), however, and several courts have therefore found it unpersuasive when compared with the lengthier discussion set forth in the February 1997 General Counsel’s Memorandum. Acosta v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 550, 554 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 783, 792-93 & n.8 (9th Cir. 2004)); Padilla-Caldera v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 1294, 1300-01 (10th Cir.), amended and superseded on reh’g, 453 F.3d 1237, 1244 (10th Cir. 2005).

在 IIRIRA 生效后不久，前 INS 发布了额外的政策指导，其所持立场与被上诉人目前提出的立场直接相反。见 Memorandum from Louis D. Crocetti, Jr., INS Assoc. Comm’r, Office of Examinations, to INS Officials (May 1, 1997), reprinted in 2 Bender’s Immigr. Bull. 450, 452 (June 1, 1997)（重申依第 212(a)(6)(A)(i) 条不可入境并不使外国人丧失寻求调整身份的资格，但同时规定受《移民与国籍法》第 212(a)(9)(B) 和 (C) 条约束的外国人“就调整身份而言将被视为依《移民与国籍法》该条不可入境”）。然而，该附加备忘录未对第 245(i) 条的法定语言作实质性分析，因此若干法院在与 1997 年 2 月总法律顾问备忘录所载更详尽论述相比较后，认定其不具说服力。Acosta v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 550, 554 (9th Cir. 2006)（引用 Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 783, 792-93 & n.8 (9th Cir. 2004)）；Padilla-Caldera v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 1294, 1300-01 (10th Cir.), amended and superseded on reh’g, 453 F.3d 1237, 1244 (10th Cir. 2005)。

For a number of reasons, we find the respondent’s position with respect to the “savings clause” to be untenable. Indeed, we disagree with the analysis embodied in the former INS’ February 1997 Memorandum relating to the

基于若干理由，我们认为被上诉人关于“保留条款”的立场站不住脚。事实上，我们不同意前 INS 1997 年 2 月备忘录中关于

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interplay between section 245(i) and section 212(a)(6)(A)(i). 7 In our view, section 245(i) adjustment remains available to aliens inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) only because a contrary interpretation would render the language of section 245(i) so internally contradictory as to effectively vitiate the statute, an absurd result that Congress is presumed not to have intended. See Demarest v. Manspeaker, supra. However, the fact that a statute’s plain language may lead to absurd results in some cases does not permit us to disregard that language in other contexts where no such absurd consequence would follow. And as we shall explain, applying the admissibility requirement of section 245(i)(2)(A) to aliens who are inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) does not have absurd consequences.

第 245(i) 条与第 212(a)(6)(A)(i) 条之间相互关系的分析。7 我们认为，依第 212(a)(6)(A)(i) 条不可入境的外国人仍可获得第 245(i) 条调整身份，仅仅是因为相反解释会使第 245(i) 条的语言在内部如此自相矛盾，以致实际上使该法规失效，而这是一种荒谬的结果，应推定国会无意为之。见 Demarest v. Manspeaker, supra。然而，法规的平白语言在某些情况下可能导致荒谬结果这一事实，并不允许我们在不会产生此类荒谬后果的其他语境中无视该语言。而且正如我们将解释的，对依第 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) 条不可入境的外国人适用第 245(i)(2)(A) 条的可入境要求，并不会产生荒谬后果。

The so-called savings clause on which the respondent relies erects a default presumption of inadmissibility for any alien described in the various paragraphs of section 212(a), but it allows that presumption to be overcome where the Act “provides” otherwise. In the context of statutory drafting, the phrase “except as provided otherwise in this Act” most naturally denotes an explicit proviso or stipulation that supplies a condition, exception, or limitation on other statutory language. Yet the respondent has identified no actual provision of “this Act” that can be construed as annulling or waiving the admissibility requirement of section 245(i)(2)(A) as it relates to aliens described in section 212(a)(9)(C). Instead, the respondent wants us to infer that section 212(a)(9)(C) is inapplicable because, in his view, a contrary interpretation would defeat the remedial purposes of section 245(i) adjustment. We find no justification for drawing such an inference.

被上诉人所依赖的所谓保留条款为第 212(a) 条各款所述任何外国人设定了一项不可入境的默认推定，但允许在《移民与国籍法》“另有规定”的情况下推翻该推定。在法规起草语境中，“except as provided otherwise in this Act”一语最自然地指对其他法定语言设定条件、例外或限制的明确但书或规定。然而，被上诉人并未指出“本《移民与国籍法》”中任何实际条文可被解释为在与第 212(a)(9)(C) 条所述外国人相关的事项上废止或豁免第 245(i)(2)(A) 条的可入境要求。相反，被上诉人希望我们推断第 212(a)(9)(C) 条不适用，因为在他看来，相反解释会挫败第 245(i) 条调整身份的补救目的。我们认为没有理由作出此种推断。

The respondent contends that the language of section 245(i)(1)(A) of the Act, which makes adjustment of status available to aliens who have “entered the United States without inspection,” would be rendered superfluous if such relief were denied to the class of aliens described in section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I). However, this argument proceeds from the mistaken premise that the classes of aliens described in sections 245(i)(1)(A) and 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) are coextensive. They are not. Section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) does not apply to any alien who has “entered the United States without inspection,” or even to any alien who has been unlawfully present in the United States for more than 1 year. Instead, it applies only to that subset of such aliens who are recidivists, that is, those who have departed the United States after accruing an aggregate period of “unlawful presence” of more than 1 year and who thereafter entered or attempted to reenter

被上诉人主张，如果此类救济被拒绝给予第 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) 条所述的那类外国人，《移民与国籍法》第 245(i)(1)(A) 条中使“未经检查入境美国”的外国人可获得调整身份的语言将被架空。然而，该论点基于一个错误前提，即第 245(i)(1)(A) 条和第 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) 条所述的外国人类别完全重合。它们并不重合。第 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) 条不适用于任何“未经检查入境美国”的外国人，甚至不适用于任何在美国非法居留超过 1 年的外国人。相反，它仅适用于此类外国人中的累犯子集，即那些在累计超过 1 年的“非法居留”期后已离开美国、并在此后非法入境或试图再入境

7 DHS policy memoranda that have not been embodied in regulations are not binding on the Immigration Judges or this Board, although the policies contained in such memoranda can be adopted by the Board when appropriate. Matter of M/V Saru Meru, 20 I&N Dec. 592, 595-96 (BIA 1992) (citing Matter of Cavazos, 17 I&N Dec. 215 (BIA 1980)).

7 未纳入法规的 DHS 政策备忘录对移民法官或本委员会不具有约束力，尽管本委员会在适当时可以采纳此类备忘录所载政策。Matter of M/V Saru Meru, 20 I&N Dec. 592, 595-96 (BIA 1992)（引用 Matter of Cavazos, 17 I&N Dec. 215 (BIA 1980)）。

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the United States unlawfully. See Matter of Rodarte, supra, at 909 (explaining that the various subparagraphs of section 212(a)(9) are concerned with punishing and preventing recidivist immigration violations, and not mere unlawful presence).

美国的外国人。见 Matter of Rodarte, supra, at 909（解释第 212(a)(9) 条各目关注的是惩罚和防止累犯性移民违规，而非单纯的非法居留）。

This interpretation of section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) springs from the statutory language taken in context and is amply supported by both the title of the statute and its legislative history. Section 212(a)(9)(C) is entitled “Aliens unlawfully present after previous immigration violations.” (Emphasis added.) This language clearly reflects that Congress was concerned with recidivists, not first-time immigration violators. INS v. Nat’l Center for Immigrants’ Rights, 502 U.S. 183, 189 (1991) (stating that “the title of a statute or section can aid in resolving an ambiguity in the legislation’s text” and citing Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 490 U.S. 714, 723 (1989), and FTC v. Mandel Bros., Inc., 359 U.S. 385, 388-89 (1959)). Moreover, with respect to the language that would subsequently be codified at section 212(a)(9)(C), the Conference Committee Report issued at the time of the IIRIRA’s enactment provides as follows:

对第212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I)条的这一解释源于结合上下文理解的法定语言，并得到该法规标题及其立法历史的充分支持。第212(a)(9)(C)条的标题为“先前移民违规后非法居留的外国人”。（强调为后加。）该语言清楚表明，国会关注的是累犯，而非初次移民违规者。INS v. Nat'l Center for Immigrants' Rights, 502 U.S. 183, 189 (1991)（指出“法规或条文的标题有助于解决立法文本中的歧义”，并引用Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 490 U.S. 714, 723 (1989)及FTC v. Mandel Bros., Inc., 359 U.S. 385, 388-89 (1959)）。此外，就随后将编纂为第212(a)(9)(C)条的语言而言，IIRIRA颁布时发布的会议委员会报告规定如下：

[A]n alien who has been present unlawfully in the United States for more than 1 year or has been ordered removed from the United States, and who subsequently enters or attempts to enter the United States without being lawfully admitted, is permanently barred from admission. Such an alien may be admitted not earlier than 10 years after the alien’s last departure from the United States, but only if the Attorney General gives prior consent to the alien’s reapplying for admission.

[A]在美国非法居留超过1年或已被命令驱逐出美国，且随后未经合法许可进入或试图进入美国的外国人，被永久禁止入境。该外国人可在其最后一次离开美国之日起10年后方可入境，但须经司法部长事先同意其重新申请入境。

H.R. Rep. No. 104-828, at 208 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), 1996 WL 563320 (emphasis added). It is the entry or attempted entry of an alien subsequent to his accrual of more than 1 year of unlawful presence that triggers inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I), and not mere unlawful presence for more than 1 year.

H.R. Rep. No. 104-828, at 208 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), 1996 WL 563320（强调为后加）。根据第212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I)条触发不可入境的是外国人在累积超过1年非法居留后的入境或试图入境，而非仅仅超过1年的非法居留。

Hence, from the perspective of section 245(i), no easy correlation exists between the section 212(a)(9)(C) inadmissibility grounds at issue here and the section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) ground that was the subject of the February 1997 Memorandum of the former INS’ General Counsel. Although no alien who is inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) alone would have been excludable prior to the effective date of the IIRIRA, the same cannot be said for many aliens who are currently inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(C). Specifically, prior to the IIRIRA many aliens who are presently inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(C) by virtue of having reentered the United States after removal would have been excludable under former section 212(a)(6)(B) of the Act and therefore, by extension, ineligible for section 245(i) adjustment. Thus, were we to declare the section 212(a)(9)(C) grounds of inadmissibility “waived” by operation of the savings clause, we would in effect be making section 245(i) adjustment available to a whole new class of aliens who had never been

因此，从第245(i)条的角度来看，此处所涉第212(a)(9)(C)条不可入境理由与前INS总法律顾问1997年2月备忘录所涉第212(a)(6)(A)(i)条理由之间不存在简单的对应关系。尽管仅因第212(a)(6)(A)(i)条而不可入境的外国人在IIRIRA生效日期之前均不可被排除，但对于目前因第212(a)(9)(C)条而不可入境的许多外国人而言，情况并非如此。具体而言，在IIRIRA之前，许多目前因在被驱逐后重新进入美国而依第212(a)(9)(C)条不可入境的外国人，本应依该法原第212(a)(6)(B)条被排除，并因此延伸而言，不符合第245(i)条调整身份的资格。因此，如果我们宣布第212(a)(9)(C)条不可入境理由因保留条款的运作而“被豁免”，我们实际上将使第245(i)条调整身份适用于一整类从未

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eligible for it. We decline to take such an unwarranted leap. And while we recognize that the respondent did not reenter the United States after a prior removal, the fact is that Congress drafted section 301(b) of the IIRIRA, 110 Stat. at 3009-577, to define a unitary ground of inadmissibility that may be predicated on various types of conduct. The provision draws no substantive distinction between aliens who have reentered the United States illegally after removal and those who, like the respondent, have done so after committing a prior immigration violation for which they managed to avoid removal. The provision makes both groups inadmissible permanently, and it precludes either group from procuring permission to be readmitted for at least 10 years after their last departure from the United States. Where Congress has not seen fit to distinguish between these two groups for purposes of inadmissibility, we see no justification for distinguishing between them as candidates for section 245(i) adjustment.

有资格获得该调整的新外国人群体。我们拒绝采取这种无根据的跳跃。尽管我们认识到被申请人并未在先前被驱逐后重新进入美国，但事实是国会起草了IIRIRA第301(b)条，110 Stat. at 3009-577，以界定一个统一的不可入境理由，该理由可基于各种类型的行为。该条款未在因被驱逐后非法重新进入美国的外国人与像被申请人这样在犯下先前移民违规并设法避免驱逐后重新进入美国的外国人之间作出实质性区分。该条款使这两类人均永久不可入境，并禁止这两类人在其最后一次离开美国后至少10年内获得重新入境许可。在国会认为不宜为不可入境目的区分这两类人的情况下，我们认为没有理由在作为第245(i)条调整身份候选人方面区分他们。

Furthermore, we deem it of crucial importance that in every other case where Congress has extended eligibility for adjustment of status to inadmissible aliens (in other words, where Congress has “otherwise provide[d]” within the meaning of the savings clause) it has done so unambiguously, either by negating certain grounds of inadmissibility outright or by providing for discretionary waivers of inadmissibility, or both. See sections 209(c), 210(a)(1)(C), (c)(2)(A), 245(h)(2)(A), 245A(b)(1)(C)(i), (d)(2)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1159(c), 1160(a)(1)(C), (c)(2)(A), 1255(h)(2)(A), 1255a(b)(1)(C)(i), (d)(2)(A) (2000). Indeed, even in those other instances where Congress has enacted special remedial legislation extending adjustment of status to aliens who are unlawfully present in the United States, it has seen the necessity of expressly negating the applicability of section 212(a)(9)(C).

此外，我们认为至关重要的是，在国会将调整身份的资格扩展至不可入境外国人的所有其他案件中（换言之，在国会于保留条款含义内“另有规定”的情况下），国会均以明确方式这样做，要么直接否定某些不可入境理由，要么规定不可入境理由的酌情豁免，或两者兼有。见该法第209(c)、210(a)(1)(C)、(c)(2)(A)、245(h)(2)(A)、245A(b)(1)(C)(i)、(d)(2)(A)条，8 U.S.C. §§ 1159(c)、1160(a)(1)(C)、(c)(2)(A)、1255(h)(2)(A)、1255a(b)(1)(C)(i)、(d)(2)(A) (2000)。事实上，即使在国会颁布特别补救立法将调整身份扩展至非法居留美国的外国人的其他情况下，国会也认为有必要明确否定第212(a)(9)(C)条的适用性。

In 1997 and 1998, for instance, Congress made adjustment of status available to certain Cuban, Central American, and Haitian aliens who were physically present in the United States but not otherwise eligible to normalize their status, usually because their presence in this country was unlawful. See Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 105-100, § 202, 111 Stat. 2193, 2193 (1997) (“NACARA”); Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998, tit. IX, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 902, 112 Stat. 2681-538, 2681-538 (“HRIFA”). As originally enacted, the NACARA and HRIFA contained provisions expressly nullifying a number of inadmissibility grounds related to unlawful presence and unlawful employment because it was evident that such grounds would prevent most potential applicants from proving that they were “otherwise admissible to the United States for permanent residence.” NACARA § 202(a)(1)(B), 111 Stat. at 2193; HRIFA § 902(a)(1)(B), 112 Stat. at 2681-538. Yet section 212(a)(9)(C) was not initially included among the waivable inadmissibility grounds.

例如，在1997年和1998年，国会使某些实际身在美国但通常因在美国居留非法而原本无资格使其身份正常化的古巴、中美洲和海地外国人可以获得调整身份。见Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 105-100, § 202, 111 Stat. 2193, 2193 (1997)（“NACARA”）；Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998, tit. IX, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 902, 112 Stat. 2681-538, 2681-538（“HRIFA”）。NACARA和HRIFA最初颁布时包含明确使若干与非法居留和非法就业相关的不可入境理由无效的条款，因为显然此类理由将阻止大多数潜在申请人证明其“在其他方面可入境美国以获得永久居留”。NACARA § 202(a)(1)(B), 111 Stat. at 2193；HRIFA § 902(a)(1)(B), 112 Stat. at 2681-538。然而第212(a)(9)(C)条最初并未被列入可豁免的不可入境理由之中。

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As the Government began to implement the NACARA and HRIFA adjustment programs, however, it became clear that a number of potential applicants were unable to qualify for relief, either because they were inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(C) or because they were subject to having prior removal orders reinstated against them, or both. Congress addressed this perceived problem in December 2000 by promulgating sections 1505(a) and (b) of the LIFE Act Amendments, which provided the Attorney General with discretionary authority to waive the section 212(a)(9)(C) grounds of inadmissibility for NACARA and HRIFA adjustment applicants. NACARA § 202(a)(2), 111 Stat. at 2193-94; HRIFA § 902(a)(2), 112 Stat. at 2681-538; see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 1245.13(c)(2), 1245.15(e)(3) (2007).

然而，随着政府开始实施NACARA和HRIFA调整方案，情况变得清楚：许多潜在申请人无法获得救济，或者因为他们依第212(a)(9)(C)条不可入境，或者因为他们可能面临先前驱逐令被恢复执行，或两者兼有。国会在2000年12月通过颁布LIFE Act Amendments第1505(a)和(b)条解决了这一被认为存在的问题，该条款赋予司法部长酌情权，可为NACARA和HRIFA调整申请人豁免第212(a)(9)(C)条不可入境理由。NACARA § 202(a)(2), 111 Stat. at 2193-94；HRIFA § 902(a)(2), 112 Stat. at 2681-538；另见8 C.F.R. §§ 1245.13(c)(2), 1245.15(e)(3) (2007)。

That Congress deemed it necessary to provide for such waivers in the NACARA and HRIFA contexts is strong evidence that Congress understood an alien’s inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(C) to be a barrier even to those forms of adjustment that were reserved for aliens unlawfully present in the United States. Furthermore, the enactment of section 1505 of the LIFE Act Amendments demonstrates that when Congress wants to make adjustment of status available to aliens despite their inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(C), it knows how to do so. Indeed, it is particularly significant that Congress chose the LIFE Act Amendments as its vehicle for promulgating these discretionary waivers of section 212(a)(9)(C). Section 1505 of those amendments, discussed above, shows that Congress was attentive to the fact that inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(C) was an impediment to adjustment that needed to be overcome, if at all, by means of affirmative legislation. Yet section 1502 of those very same amendments, which materially modified section 245(i) by extending the filing deadline for qualifying visa petitions, contains no comparable language removing section 212(a)(9)(C) as an obstacle to section 245(i) adjustment. See also H.R. Rep. No. 106-1048, at 230 (2001), 2001 WL 67919; Berrum-Garcia v. Comfort, 390 F.3d 1158, 1167-68 (10th Cir. 2004). As the Supreme Court has explained, “‘“[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”’” INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 (1987) (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972))). We see no reason why this presumption should not apply here.

国会认为有必要在NACARA和HRIFA背景下规定此类豁免，这有力证明国会理解外国人依第212(a)(9)(C)条不可入境构成障碍，甚至对那些保留给非法居留美国的外国人的调整形式也是如此。此外，LIFE Act Amendments第1505条的颁布表明，当国会希望使外国人尽管依第212(a)(9)(C)条不可入境仍可获得调整身份时，国会知道如何做到。事实上，特别重要的是，国会选择LIFE Act Amendments作为颁布这些第212(a)(9)(C)条酌情豁免的工具。如上所述，这些修正案的第1505条表明，国会注意到依第212(a)(9)(C)条不可入境是调整身份的一项障碍，如有必要，须通过肯定性立法予以克服。然而，正是同一批修正案中实质性修改第245(i)条、延长合格签证申请提交截止日期的第1502条，并未包含消除第212(a)(9)(C)条作为第245(i)条调整身份障碍的类似语言。另见H.R. Rep. No. 106-1048, at 230 (2001), 2001 WL 67919；Berrum-Garcia v. Comfort, 390 F.3d 1158, 1167-68 (10th Cir. 2004)。正如最高法院所解释的，“‘[W]当国会在一部法规的某一条中包含特定语言而在同一法案的另一条中省略该语言时，通常推定国会在这种不同的包含或排除中是有意和刻意为之。’”INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 (1987)（引用Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)（引用United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972)））。我们认为没有理由为何这一推定不应适用于此。

The respondent makes much of the fact that section 245(i)(1)(C) requires that any principal beneficiary of a visa petition filed after January 14, 1998, must prove that he was physically present in the United States on

被申请人非常强调以下事实：第245(i)(1)(C)条要求1998年1月14日之后提交的签证申请的任何主受益人必须证明其在

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December 21, 2000, in order to qualify for section 245(i) adjustment. 8 According to the respondent, this presence requirement (which was added by the LIFE Act Amendments), gives rise to a negative inference that Congress intended to permit aliens whose visa petitions were filed on or before January 14, 1998, to adjust status even if they had been outside the United States on December 21, 2000. And therefore, the respondent asserts, since any alien absent from the United States on December 21, 2000, must necessarily reenter the country in order to adjust status under section 245(i), it follows that Congress must necessarily have intended to permit such an alien to do so.

2000年12月21日实际身在美国，才有资格获得第245(i)条调整身份。8 据被申请人称，这一在场要求（由LIFE Act Amendments添加）产生了一项否定性推论，即国会意图允许签证申请在1998年1月14日或之前提交的外国人调整身份，即使他们在2000年12月21日身在美国境外。因此，被申请人主张，由于任何在2000年12月21日不在美国的外国人必须重新进入美国才能依第245(i)条调整身份，因此国会必然意图允许该外国人这样做。

We acknowledge that this argument has some force, but in the final analysis we remain unpersuaded. First, the legislative purpose of the December 21, 2000, physical presence requirement was not to draw distinctions between existing beneficiaries of qualifying visa petitions, but to prevent aliens who had never been beneficiaries of such petitions from viewing the renewed availability of section 245(i) adjustment as an invitation to enter the United States unlawfully. See 146 Cong. Rec. S11850, S11851-52 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 2000), 2000 WL 1847188 (Joint Memorandum Concerning the Legal Immigration Family Equity Act of 2000 and the LIFE Act Amendments of 2000 submitted by Senators Kennedy and Abraham) (“The function of this [physical presence] requirement is to make sure that the renewed availability of section 245(i) does not operate to encourage anyone to violate our immigration laws.”). We cannot reasonably interpret statutory language that was expressly designed to prohibit one class of aliens from violating the immigration law as somehow countenancing such violations by a different class of aliens.

我们承认这一论点有一定说服力，但归根结底，我们仍未被说服。首先，2000年12月21日实际居留要求的立法目的并非在符合条件的签证申请既有受益人之间作出区分，而是防止从未成为此类申请受益人之外国人将第245(i)条调整身份之重新适用视为非法进入美国之邀请。见146 Cong. Rec. S11850, S11851-52（每日版，2000年12月15日），2000 WL 1847188（肯尼迪参议员与亚伯拉罕参议员就《2000年合法移民家庭公平法》及《2000年LIFE法修正案》提交的联合备忘录）（“这一[实际居留]要求的功能在于确保第245(i)条之重新适用不会起到鼓励任何人违反我国移民法之作用。”）。我们无法合理地将明确旨在禁止一类外国人违反移民法之法定语言解释为以某种方式纵容另一类外国人之此类违反行为。

Moreover, any suggestion that Congress assumed section 245(i) adjustment to apply to recidivist immigration violators is belied by its enactment of former section 212(o) of the Act, which was created by means of the same 1994 legislation that created section 245(i). See 1995 Appropriations Act § 506(a), 108 Stat. at 1765. Former section 212(o) made most aliens who had been physically present in the United States inadmissible for 90 days if they departed, and it was aimed quite specifically at discouraging potential beneficiaries of section 245(i) adjustment from leaving the United States. Indeed, the whole purpose of section 245(i) adjustment was to keep families together by permitting aliens then inside the United States to remain here, rather than having to travel abroad to acquire immigrant visas. Thus, it would

此外，任何关于国会假定第245(i)条调整身份适用于累犯移民违反者之主张，均被其颁布该法原第212(o)条所否定，而该条正是通过创设第245(i)条之同一1994年立法所创设。见1995 Appropriations Act § 506(a), 108 Stat. at 1765。原第212(o)条规定，大多数曾实际居留于美国之外国人若离境，则在90天内不可入境，且其针对性极为明确，旨在阻止第245(i)条调整身份之潜在受益人离开美国。的确，第245(i)条调整身份之全部目的就在于通过允许当时在美国境内之外国人留在此地，而非必须出国获取移民签证，以维系家庭团聚。因此，若认为国会会对违背该目的而实施之移民违反行为漠不关心，那确实会很奇怪。

Pursuant to section 111(a) of the 1998 Appropriations Act, 111 Stat. at 2458, section 245(i) adjustment was available to any alien whose qualifying visa petition had been filed on or before January 14, 1998. The LIFE Act Amendments extended this deadline to April 30, 2001.

依据1998 Appropriations Act第111(a)条，111 Stat. at 2458，第245(i)条调整身份适用于任何其符合条件的签证申请已于1998年1月14日或之前提交之外国人。《LIFE法修正案》将该截止日期延长至2001年4月30日。

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be strange indeed to suppose that Congress would have been indifferent to immigration violations undertaken in defiance of that purpose.

认为国会对违背该目的而实施之移民违反行为漠不关心，那确实会很奇怪。

Furthermore, to the extent that the December 21, 2000, physical presence requirement creates tension in the language of section 245(i), that tension does not lead to any absurd contradiction that would allow us to discount the ordinary meaning of the admissibility requirement. Specifically, although it may be true that section 245(i) only makes sense if some aliens who were outside the United States on December 21, 2000, are permitted to apply for adjustment, it does not logically follow that such permission must be granted to all aliens who were outside the United States on that date. After all, even if the aliens described by section 212(a)(9)(C) are disqualified from section 245(i) adjustment, several other classes of aliens who were outside the United States on December 21, 2000, can still qualify for such relief if they are the beneficiaries of visa petitions filed before January 14, 1998. These classes include aliens who entered the United States without admission after December 21, 2000, but who had no prior period of unlawful presence, as well as aliens who entered the United States unlawfully on numerous occasions but who never accrued the requisite prior period of unlawful presence, typically because their last departure from the United States occurred less than 1 year after the effective date of the IIRIRA. The point is that to give life to the December 21, 2000, physical presence requirement, one need not do violence to the plain language of the admissibility requirement of section 245(i)(2)(A), e.g., by simply declaring it inapplicable to the class of aliens described in section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I).

此外，即使2000年12月21日实际居留要求在第245(i)条语言中造成紧张，该紧张也不会导致任何荒谬矛盾，从而使我们得以贬低可入境要求之通常含义。具体而言，尽管第245(i)条只有在允许某些于2000年12月21日在美国境外之外国人申请调整身份时才有意义，这一点或许属实，但并不能由此逻辑推出必须将此种许可授予所有于该日在美国境外之外国人。毕竟，即使第212(a)(9)(C)条所述之外国人不符合第245(i)条调整身份资格，其他若干类于2000年12月21日在美国境外之外国人，若为1998年1月14日之前提交之签证申请之受益人，仍可符合此类救济资格。这些类别包括于2000年12月21日之后未经入境而进入美国、但此前无非法居留期间之外国人，以及多次非法进入美国、但从未累积所需先前非法居留期间之外国人，通常是因为其最后一次离开美国发生在IIRIRA生效日期后不足1年。关键在于，为使2000年12月21日实际居留要求具有生命力，无需对第245(i)(2)(A)条可入境要求之平实语言加以扭曲，例如，仅通过宣布其不适用于第212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I)条所述之外国人类别。

IV. CONCLUSION

IV. 结论

In view of the fact that section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) of the Act pertains only to recidivist immigration violators, we find little merit in the respondent’s argument–which seems to have been accepted by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits in Acosta v. Gonzales, supra, and Padilla-Caldera v. Gonzales, supra, respectively–that it would be incompatible with the remedial purpose of section 245(i) to make adjustment of status unavailable to such aliens. This emphasis on the remedial purpose of section 245(i) unduly discounts both the clear preclusive language of the admissibility requirement of section 245(i)(2)(A)–language which Congress has notably declined to mitigate despite having done so in analogous contexts–and the countervailing purpose underlying section 212(a)(9)(C), which is “to compound the adverse consequences of immigration violations by making it more difficult for individuals who have left the United States after committing such violations to be lawfully readmitted thereafter.” Matter of Rodarte, supra, at 909. Indeed, one of the chief purposes of the IIRIRA amendments of 1996 was to

鉴于该法第212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I)条仅涉及累犯移民违反者，我们认为答辩人以下论点几无道理——该论点似乎分别已被第9巡回法院和第10巡回法院在Acosta v. Gonzales, supra和Padilla-Caldera v. Gonzales, supra中接受——即若使此类外国人无法获得调整身份，将与第245(i)条之补救目的不相容。这种对第245(i)条补救目的之强调，过度贬低了第245(i)(2)(A)条可入境要求之明确排除性语言——国会尽管在类似语境中已作缓和，却显著拒绝缓和该语言——以及第212(a)(9)(C)条背后之对抗性目的，即“通过使在实施此类违反行为后已离开美国之个人此后更难合法再入境，以加重移民违反行为之不利后果。” Matter of Rodarte, supra, at 909。的确，1996年IIRIRA修正案之主要目的之一就是

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overcome the problem of recidivist immigration violations by increasing resources for border enforcement while escalating the punitive consequences, both civil and criminal, of illegal reentry. See IIRIRA §§ 105(a)(2), 301(b)(1), 303(a), 305(a)(3), (b)(3), 324(a), 326, 332, 353(b), 110 Stat. at 3009-556, 3009-576, 3009-585, 3009-598, 3009-606, 3009-629, 3009-630, 3009-634, 3009-641; see also H.R. Rep. No. 104-828, at 199-200, 208, 216, 219, 225. The enactment of these multifarious provisions to expedite the detection, deterrence, and punishment of recidivist immigration violators reflects a clear congressional judgment that such repeat offenses are a matter of special concern and that recidivist immigration violators are more culpable, and less deserving of leniency, than first-time offenders. Mortera-Cruz v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 246, 255-56 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1031 (2005). Thus, although implementing the admissibility requirement of section 245(i)(2)(A) of the Act in accordance with its plain language does have the effect of making adjustment of status unavailable to those repeat immigration violators who are inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I), we perceive nothing “bizarre” or “absurd” in this result. On the contrary, such an outcome seems perfectly consonant with the language, structure, and purpose of the Act, taken as a whole. Accordingly, we hold that aliens who are inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) of the Act cannot qualify for section 245(i) adjustment, absent a waiver of inadmissibility. 9

通过增加边境执法资源，同时加重非法再入境之民事和刑事惩罚后果，以克服累犯移民违反行为问题。见IIRIRA §§ 105(a)(2), 301(b)(1), 303(a), 305(a)(3), (b)(3), 324(a), 326, 332, 353(b), 110 Stat. at 3009-556, 3009-576, 3009-585, 3009-598, 3009-606, 3009-629, 3009-630, 3009-634, 3009-641；另见H.R. Rep. No. 104-828, at 199-200, 208, 216, 219, 225。颁布这些多方面条款以加快对累犯移民违反者之发现、威慑和惩罚，反映出国会之明确判断，即此类重复犯罪属于特别关注事项，且累犯移民违反者比初犯者更具可责性，也更不值得宽宥。Mortera-Cruz v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 246, 255-56 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1031 (2005)。因此，尽管按照该法第245(i)(2)(A)条可入境要求之平实语言实施该要求，确实会产生使根据第212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I)条不可入境之重复移民违反者无法获得调整身份之效果，但我们认为这一结果并无任何“怪异”或“荒谬”之处。相反，此种结果似乎与该法整体之语言、结构和目的完全一致。因此，我们裁定，根据该法第212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I)条不可入境之外国人，除非获得不可入境豁免，否则不能符合第245(i)条调整身份资格。9

In conclusion, we find no reversible error in the Immigration Judge’s determinations that the respondent is inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) of the Act and that his inadmissibility under that section makes him ineligible for adjustment of status under section 245(i) of the Act by precluding him from demonstrating that he is “admissible to the United States for permanent residence.” Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

总之，我们认为移民法官以下裁定不存在可撤销错误：答辩人根据该法第212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I)条不可入境美国，且其根据该条之不可入境使其因无法证明自己“可入境美国永久居留”而不符合该法第245(i)条调整身份资格。因此，上诉将被驳回。

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. FURTHER ORDER: Pursuant to the Immigration Judge’s order and conditioned upon compliance with conditions set forth by the Immigration Judge and the statute, the respondent is permitted to voluntarily depart from the United States, without expense to the Government, within 60 days from the date of this order or any extension beyond that time as may be granted by the

命令： 上诉驳回。 进一步命令：依据移民法官之命令，并在遵守移民法官及法规所设条件之前提下，允许答辩人自本命令之日起60天内或经

9 We need not decide here whether to apply our holding in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits. See Nat’l Cable & Telecommc’n. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Serv., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005) (holding that “[a] court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion”).

9 我们无需在此决定是否在第9巡回法院和第10巡回法院适用我们的裁定。见Nat’l Cable & Telecommc’n. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Serv., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005)（裁定“法院先前对法规之司法解释，只有在先前法院判决认定其解释源自法规之明确条款、因而未给行政机关裁量留下空间时，才优先于原本享有Chevron尊让之行政机关解释”）。

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Department of Homeland Security. See section 240B(b) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b) (2000); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.26(c), (f) (2007). In the event the respondent fails to so depart, the respondent shall be removed as provided in the Immigration Judge’s order.

国土安全部批准之任何延长期限内，无需政府承担费用，自愿离开美国。见该法第240B(b)条，8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b) (2000)；8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.26(c), (f) (2007)。若答辩人未能如此离境，则答辩人应按照移民法官之命令被驱逐。

NOTICE: If the respondent fails to depart the United States within the time period specified, or any extensions granted by the DHS, the respondent shall be subject to a civil penalty of not less than $1,000 and not more than $5,000, and shall be ineligible for a period of 10 years for any further relief under section 240B and sections 240A, 245, 248, and 249 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b, 1255, 1258, and 1259 (2000). See section 240B(d) of the Act.

通知：若答辩人未在规定期限内或DHS批准之任何延长期限内离开美国，答辩人应被处以不低于$1,000且不超过$5,000之民事罚款，并在10年内不符合该法第240B条及第240A、245、248和249条，8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b, 1255, 1258, and 1259 (2000)项下任何进一步救济之资格。见该法第240B(d)条。

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