Matter of Allied Fidelity Insurance Company

This matter comes before the Commissioner on appeal from the decision of the district director who determined that the conditions of the $5,000 bond posted by the obligor were violated when the alien was not surrendered on January 25, 1983, as demanded. Con- sequently, the bond was breached and the obligor so notified on February 1, 1983. The alien, a native and citizen of the Philippines, last entered the United States on July 17, 1978. At the time of his last entry, he was admitted as a nonimmigrant visitor, authorized to remain until October 15, 1978_ He did not depart as required. The alien was apprehended on November 7, 1979. An Order to Show Cause, Notice of Hearing, and Warrant of Arrest of Alien (Form I-221S) was served and bond was posted on the same date. In a decision dated June 24, 1981, an immigration judge found the alien deportable pursuant to section 241(a)(2) of the Immigra- tion and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1982). The immigra- tion judge denied his application for asylum and withholding of de- portation, but granted him until August 1, 1981, in which to depart the United States voluntarily.

本事项因地区主任的决定而提交至专员，该决定认定，当外国人未于1983年1月25日按要求交出时，义务人提交的5,000美元保证金的条​​件被违反。因此，保证金被违约，并于1983年2月1日通知了义务人。 该外国人，菲律宾本土出生和公民，最后一次进入美国是在1978年7月17日。在他最后一次入境时，他作为非移民访客被准入，授权停留至1978年10月15日。他未按要求离境。 该外国人于1979年11月7日被逮捕。当日送达了出庭理由令、听证通知和外国人逮捕令（表格I-221S），并提交了保证金。在1981年6月24日的决定中，移民法官根据《移民和国籍法》第241(a)(2)条，8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1982)，认定该外国人可被驱逐。移民法官驳回了他的庇护和暂缓驱逐申请，但给予他至1981年8月1日的时间自愿离开美国。

The alien appealed. that decision to the Board of Immigration Ap- peals. On December 9, 1982, the Board dismissed his appeal but granted him a period of 30 days from the date of the decision in which to voluntarily depart the United States. The alien did not depart within the granted period. On January 13, 1983, demand was served on the obligor by certified mail, return receipt request- ed, to surrender the alien for deportation at the deportation sec- tion, Los Angeles District Office, on January 25, 1983, at 8:00 a.m. The return receipt evidences that the obligor received the demand on January 17, 1983. The obligor, however, did not deliver the alien to the Immigration and Naturalization Service at the specified place, on the specified time and date. Nor did the alien present himself at the place and time prescribed. On appeal, the obligor offers three reasons that the bond should not be breached: 1) the alien placed himself under the jurisdiction of the United States district court on January 25, 1983, by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus; 2) the breach is based on narrow and technical grounds; 3) the alien's failure to surrender was a "non-substantial violation" of the conditions of the bond. Upon consideration of the record, we find the first argument un- persuasive. We note that obligor's counsel in this matter was also the alien's counsel in the deportation proceedings and habeas corpus action. We further note that the obligor first engaged coun- sel in this matter on. February 11, 1983, after the Notice—Immigra- tion Bond Breached. (Form 1-323) was served on obligor. Counsel was, therefore, neither in privity with nor representing the obligor during the entire term of the deportation proceedings or the habeas corpus action. Delivery bonds are formal instruments governed by the general provisions of 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.6 (a), (1)), and (e) (1984). These instru- ments create a contract between the Service, the bonding agent and attorney-in-fact, and the surety company. There is, however, no contract between the Service and one who posts collateral with the bonding agent to secure the delivery bond, or between the Serv- ice and the named alien, or his attorney. The delivery bond constitutes a contract between the United States Government and the obligor to produce and deliver a named alien upon each and every request by an officer of the Service. United States v. Olson, 47 F.2d. 1070 (8th Cir. 1931). The conditions of a delivery bond are specific. They are violated if the obligor fails to cause the alien to be produced upon each and every request until deportation proceedings in the case are finally terminated, or until the alien is actually accepted by an immigration officer for detention or deportation. Matter of Smith, 16 I&N Dec. 146, 151

该外国人向移民上诉委员会对该决定提出上诉。1982年12月9日，委员会驳回了他的上诉，但给予他自决定之日起30天的时间自愿离开美国。该外国人未在授予的期限内离境。1983年1月13日，通过认证邮件、要求回执，向义务人送达了要求，要求其于1983年1月25日上午8:00在洛杉矶地区办公室驱逐科交出外国人以进行驱逐。回执证明义务人于1983年1月17日收到了该要求。然而，义务人未在指定的时间和日期将外国人交付至移民和归化局指定的地点。外国人亦未在指定的地点和时间到场。 在上诉中，义务人提出三个理由认为保证金不应被违约：1) 外国人于1983年1月25日通过提交人身保护令状申请，将自己置于美国地区法院的管辖之下；2) 违约是基于狭窄和技术性的理由；3) 外国人未交出是保证金条​​件的“非实质性违反”。 经考虑记录，我们认为第一个论点没有说服力。我们注意到，本事项中义务人的律师也是驱逐程序和人身保护令状诉讼中外国人的律师。我们进一步注意到，义务人首次在本事项中聘请律师是在1983年2月11日，即在向义务人送达保证金违约通知（表格1-323）之后。因此，律师在整个驱逐程序或人身保护令状诉讼期间，既与义务人无利害关系，也不代表义务人。 交付保证金是受8 C.F.R. §§ 103.6 (a), (1)), 和 (e) (1984)一般规定管辖的正式文书。这些文书在服务局、保证代理人和事实代理人以及担保公司之间建立了合同。然而，服务局与向保证代理人提交抵押品以确保交付保证金的人之间，或服务局与指定外国人或其律师之间，没有合同。 交付保证金构成美国政府与义务人之间的合同，要求应服务局官员的每一次要求出示和交付指定外国人。United States v. Olson, 47 F.2d. 1070 (8th Cir. 1931)。交付保证金的条件是具体的。如果义务人未能在案件中的驱逐程序最终终止之前，或在外国人实际被移民官员接受拘留或驱逐之前，应每一次要求促使外国人出庭，则条件被违反。Matter of Smith, 16 I&N Dec. 146, 151

(R.C. 1977). The obligor's duty to deliver the named alien is not lessened because the alien, on advice of counsel, does not believe that he is required to appear. See Matter of L-, 3 I&N Dec. 862 (C.O. 1950). The contract, on the face of the Immigration Bond (Form I-352) at paragraph C, provides for a sum as liquidated damages, and not as a penalty. See Matta v. Tillinghast, 33 F.2d 64 (1st Cir. 1929); United States v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co., 152 F. Supp. 840 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). Liquidated damages are a well -known remedy. Con- gress has even required that liquidated damage clauses be inserted in certain situations, such as building contracts. Liquidated damage provisions are civil in nature, and, when reasonable, are not to be regarded as penalties. Rex Trailer Company v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956) (citing in part United States v. United Engineering and Contracting Co., 234 U.S. 236 (1914)). The courts have sustained the concept of liquidated damages in the context of an immigration bond on. several occasions. In part, these dmusges are viewed generally, as required. to maintain an agency to enforce the immigration laws. They are also viewed spe- cifically, in that the Government must investigate the whereabouts of a certain alien and is put to what the courts characterize as oth- erwise unnecessary trouble and expense. The courts have also taken cognizance of the confusion which would result if an alien could be surrendered at any time it suited the alien's, his attor- ney's, or his surety's convenience. Earle v. United States, 254 F.2d 384 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 822 (1958); United States v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co., supra; Matter of Arbelaez-Naranjo, 18 I&N Dec. 403 (R.C. 1983); Matter of supra; see also United States v. Goldberg 40 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1930). The obligor is not relieved of its duty to deliver and surrender the alien merely because the alien's attorney sought relief through a petition for writ of habeas corpus on the date that the alien was to be surrendered, unless an order directed to the Service prior to the time of delivery relieves obligor of this duty. This fact is par- ticularly true when the alien's counsel is neither in privity with, nor counsel for, the obligor, as is the case here, and when the alien's personal appearance in federal district court is not neces- sary to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and when it cannot be presumed that the writ which is sought will be issued in fact. We therefore find the obligor's failure to surrender the alien as re- quired a violation of the conditions to which the obligor agreed upon posting of the immigration bond on the alien's behalf. Obligor also raises issues that any finding of such violation is, or would be, based on narrow and technical grounds, and that the

(R.C. 1977)。义务人交付指定外国人的义务并不因外国人在律师建议下认为自己无需出庭而减轻。见 Matter of L-, 3 I&N Dec. 862 (C.O. 1950)。 该合同在移民保证金（表格I-352）的C段正面规定了一笔金额作为预定损害赔偿，而非罚款。见 Matta v. Tillinghast, 33 F.2d 64 (1st Cir. 1929); United States v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co., 152 F. Supp. 840 (S.D.N.Y. 1957)。预定损害赔偿是一种众所周知的救济。国会甚至要求在特定情况下（如建筑合同）插入预定损害赔偿条款。预定损害赔偿条款本质上是民事的，当合理时，不应被视为罚款。Rex Trailer Company v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956)（部分引用 United States v. United Engineering and Contracting Co., 234 U.S. 236 (1914)）。 法院多次在移民保证金背景下支持预定损害赔偿的概念。部分地，这些损害赔偿被普遍视为维持机构执行移民法所必需。它们也被具体视为政府必须调查某外国人的下落，并陷入法院所描述的否则不必要的麻烦和费用。法院也注意到如果外国人可以在适合外国人、其律师或担保人方便的任何时间被交出，将会导致的混乱。Earle v. United States, 254 F.2d 384 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 822 (1958); United States v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co., supra; Matter of Arbelaez-Naranjo, 18 I&N Dec. 403 (R.C. 1983); Matter of supra; 另见 United States v. Goldberg 40 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1930)。 义务人并不因外国人的律师在外国人应被交出之日通过人身保护令状申请寻求救济而免除其交付和交出外国人的义务，除非在交付时间之前向服务局发出的命令免除了义务人的这一义务。当外国人的律师既与义务人无利害关系，也不是义务人的律师（如本案情况），且外国人亲自出现在联邦地区法院对于人身保护令状申请并非必要，且不能推定所寻求的令状实际上会被签发时，这一事实尤其真实。因此，我们认定义务人未按要求交出外国人违反了义务人在代表外国人提交移民保证金时同意的条件。 义务人还提出，任何此类违反的认定是或将是基于狭窄和技术性的理由，以及

alien's failure to surrender is a "non-substantial violation" of the conditions of the bond. For the reasons set forth below, we also find these reasons unpersuasive. Immigration. and Naturalization Service regulations provide that a bond is breached when there is a substantial violation of the stip- ulated conditions. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(e) (1984). The rule regarding strict performance of stipulated bond conditions is relaxed in deliv- ery bond cases, however, where there is a substantial performance of benefit to the Government. Matter of Nguyen, 15 I&N Dec. 176 (R.C. 1975). The interpretation of "substantial performance" and "substantial violation" is, therefore, critical to the resolution of this matter. Substantial performance exists where there is no willful viola- tion of the terms or conditions of the bond, where the conditions are honestly and faithfully complied with, and where the only vari- ance from their strict and literal performance consists of technical or unimportant occurrences_ Substantial violations are those acts which constitute a willful departure from the terms or conditions of the bond, or the failure to comply or adhere to the essential ele- ments of those terms or conditions. Matter of Arbelaez-Naranjo, supra; Matter of Nguyen, supra. Determining whether a violation is "substantial" within the meaning of 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(e) (1984) requires consideration of the following factors:

外国人未交出是保证金条​​件的“非实质性违反”。基于下述理由，我们也认为这些理由没有说服力。 移民和归化局法规规定，当存在对规定条件的实质性违反时，保证金即被违约。见8 C.F.R. § 103.6(e) (1984)。然而，在交付保证金案件中，关于严格履行规定保证金条件的规则被放宽，如果存在对政府的实质性履行利益。Matter of Nguyen, 15 I&N Dec. 176 (R.C. 1975)。因此，“实质性履行”和“实质性违反”的解释对于解决本事项至关重要。 实质性履行存在于没有故意违反保证金条款或条件、条件被诚实和忠实遵守、且与严格和字面履行的唯一差异在于技术性或无关紧要的事件时。实质性违反是构成故意偏离保证金条款或条件的行为，或未能遵守或坚持这些条款或条件的基本要素。Matter of Arbelaez-Naranjo, supra; Matter of Nguyen, supra。 确定违反是否为8 C.F.R. § 103.6(e) (1984)意义上的“实质性”需要考虑以下因素：

(d) Whether the alien took steps to make amends, or to put himself in compliance. International Fidelity Insurance Company v. Crosland, 490 F. Supp. 446 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); see also Mohomed v. Vician, 490 F. Supp. 954 (S.D.N_Y. 1980); Matter of Kubacki, 18 I&N Dec. 43 (R.C. 1981). The conditions imposed on the obligor were to deliver and sur- render the alien at a particular place by a particular time on a particular day as previously specified. The alien was not delivered on that day, nor at any time subsequent to that day, until ordered to surrender by a United States magistrate of the Central District of California. There is no evidence of record that the obligor would have deliv- ered the alien, or that the alien would have surrendered, but for that court order. We therefore find that the extent of this breach is substantial on its face.

(d) 外国人是否采取措施弥补或使自己合规。International Fidelity Insurance Company v. Crosland, 490 F. Supp. 446 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); 另见 Mohomed v. Vician, 490 F. Supp. 954 (S.D.N_Y. 1980); Matter of Kubacki, 18 I&N Dec. 43 (R.C. 1981)。 施加于义务人的条件是在先前指定的特定日期的特定时间将外国人交付和交出至特定地点。外国人未在该日交付，也未在该日之后的任何时间交付，直到被加利福尼亚中区美国治安法官命令交出。 没有记录证据表明，若非该法院命令，义务人会交付外国人，或外国人会交出。因此，我们认定此违约的程度表面上是实质性的。

The facts of this matter also reveal an intentional violation of the conditions of the bond. There is no evidence of record that the obligor made any attempt to effect delivery and surrender of the alien. The obligor only appears to have become involved upon re- ceiving the notice that the immigration bond was breached. This involvement, however, did not occur until after the alien surren- dered himself on February 1, 1983, under court order of the United States magistrate. The alien, on the other hand, filed a motion to reopen deporta- tion proceedings with the Board of Immigration Appeals on Friday, January 21, 1983, based on his marriage to a United States citizen 2 days earlier. At no time prior to the day on which the obligor was required to deliver and surrender him, however, did the alien seek an administrative stay of deportation. On Tuesday, January 25, 1983, the alien, through counsel, made a telephonic request to the Board of Immigration Appeals for an emergency stay of deportation pending decision on his motion to reopen. This request was denied on the same day. Not until Janu- ary 27, 1983, 2 days after the obligor was required to deliver him, did the alien request an administrative stay of deportation from the district director at Los Angeles. Yet, it was this official who re- quired his delivery and surrender. The obligor's failure to show interest in the alien's case until after receiving the Notice—Immigration Bond Breached cannot be construed as an accidental violation of the conditions of the bond. Nor can the alien's seeking judicial remedies to stay his deporta- tion on the day of his delivery and surrender be considered as evi- dence of an accidental violation. The failure to seek an administra- tive stay of deportation from either the district director or the Board of Immigration Appeals on the day he filed his motion to reopen or the 2 working days thereafter, prior to the day demand- ed for his delivery and surrender, is ample evidence that the condi- tions of the bond were not accidently violated. As stated above, the alien placing himself under the jurisdiction of the United States district court at Los Angeles on the day de- manded for his delivery and surrender does not establish substan- tial compliance with the conditions of the bond Nor does the fact that the alien did not abscond or disappear show substantial com- pliance. Delivery hands are exacted to insure that aliens will be produced by the obligor for hearings or deportation when required by officers of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Proceedings regard- ing administrative stays of deportation before a district director or

本事项的事实还揭示了对保释金条件的故意违反。记录中没有证据表明，义务人曾作出任何努力以实现对该外国人的交付和交回。义务人似乎只是在收到“移民保释金已被违反”的通知后才介入。然而，这种介入直到该外国人于1983年2月1日根据美国治安法官的法院命令自首之后才发生。 另一方面，该外国人于1983年1月21日星期五向移民上诉委员会提交了重新开案驱逐出境程序的动议，依据是他2天前与一名美国公民结婚。然而，在要求义务人交付和交回他的日期之前的任何时间，该外国人均未寻求驱逐出境的行政暂缓。 1983年1月25日星期二，该外国人通过律师向移民上诉委员会提出电话请求，要求在其重新开案动议作出决定之前紧急暂缓驱逐出境。该请求于同日被驳回。直到1983年1月27日，即要求义务人交付他之后2天，该外国人才向洛杉矶地区主任请求行政暂缓驱逐出境。然而，正是该官员要求将其交付和交回。 义务人在收到“通知——移民保释金已被违反”之前未对该外国人的案件表现出兴趣，不能解释为对保释金条件的意外违反。该外国人在其被交付和交回之日寻求司法救济以暂缓其驱逐出境，也不能被视为意外违反的证据。在其提交重新开案动议之日或此后的2个工作日内、在要求其交付和交回之日之前，未向地区主任或移民上诉委员会寻求行政暂缓驱逐出境，充分证明保释金条件并非被意外违反。 如上所述，该外国人在要求其交付和交回之日将自己置于洛杉矶美国联邦地区法院的管辖之下，并不确立对保释金条件的实质遵守。该外国人没有潜逃或失踪这一事实也不表明实质遵守。 要求交付是为了确保在移民和归化局官员要求时，义务人将带同外国人出席听证或驱逐出境。关于向地区主任或

the Board of Immigration Appeals are set forth by regulation. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 243.4, 3.8(a) (1984), respectively. The alien's conduct shows a disregard for these administrative procedures. Since the alien was represented by counsel, this disre- gard cannot be considered accidentaL His placing himself under the jurisdiction of the United States district court at Los Angeles by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was not an act of substantial compliance on the alien's part. It was a hastily con- ceived effort to avoid deportation after failing to even attempt to exhaust the prescribed administrative remedies which, if granted, would have stayed his deportation. Such conduct also evidences a lack of good faith belief on the part of either the obligor or the alien that there was compliance with the conditions of the bond. There is also no evidence that the alien voluntarily took steps to put himself into compliance. His compliance was exacted only by court order. Where there is a variance from the strict and literal perform- ance of the conditions of a delivery bond, an obligor must establish substantial performance which is of benefit to the Government. The obligor has admitted that the alien was not delivered and sur- rendered as dsmanded.. The obligor, however, has submitted no evi- dence to establish that any performance on this matter by either him or the alien is of benefit to the Government. From our review of the record, we find that the obligor in this matter did not establish substantial performance. We are persuad- ed by the evidence of record that there -hag been a willful depar- ture from the terms or conditions of the bond. We further find that the failure of the alien to be delivered by the obligor at the sched- uled time and place is not a mere technical or unimportant occur- rence because sometime during the day demanded for his delivery and surrender, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with a United States district court and did not abscond or disappear pend- ing resolution of that matter. After a careful review of the record, and in consideration of the foregoing, we conclude that the conditions of the bond have been substantially violated. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed. ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

移民上诉委员会的行政暂缓驱逐出境程序由法规规定。分别参见8 C.F.R. §§ 243.4、3.8(a)（1984年）。 该外国人的行为表明对这些行政程序的漠视。由于该外国人由律师代理，这种漠视不能被视为意外。他通过提交人身保护令状申请将自己置于洛杉矶美国联邦地区法院的管辖之下，并非该外国人一方的实质遵守行为。这是在甚至未尝试用尽规定的行政救济（若获准，本可暂缓其驱逐出境）之后，为避免驱逐出境而仓促构思的努力。 此类行为也证明义务人或该外国人均缺乏对保释金条件已获遵守的善意信念。也没有证据表明该外国人自愿采取措施使自己遵守条件。他的遵守仅因法院命令而被强制。 在偏离交付保释金条件的严格和字面履行时，义务人必须确立对政府有益的实质履行。义务人已承认该外国人未被按要求和交回。然而，义务人未提交任何证据以确立其本人或该外国人在本事项中的任何履行对政府有益。 根据我们对记录的审查，我们认定本事项中的义务人未确立实质履行。记录中的证据使我们确信，存在对保释金条款或条件的故意偏离。我们进一步认定，义务人未在预定时间和地点交付该外国人并非仅仅是技术性或无关紧要的事件，因为在要求其交付和交回之日的某个时候，他向美国联邦地区法院提交了人身保护令状申请，并且在事项解决期间没有潜逃或失踪。 在仔细审查记录并考虑上述情况后，我们得出结论，保释金条件已被实质违反。因此，上诉将被驳回。 命令：上诉被驳回。