Matter of Cross

Cite as 26 I&N Dec. 485 (BIA 2015) Interim Decision #3826

引用为 26 I&N Dec. 485 (BIA 2015) 临时决定 #3826

U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review

美国司法部 移民审查执行办公室

Board of Immigration Appeals

移民上诉委员会

A person born out of wedlock may qualify as a legitimated “child” of his or her biological parents under section 101(c)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(c)(1) (2012), for purposes of citizenship if he or she was born in a country or State that has eliminated all legal distinctions between children based on the marital status of their parents or had a residence or domicile in such a country or State (including a State within the United States), if otherwise eligible. Matter of Hines, 24 I&N Dec. 544 (BIA 2008), and Matter of Rowe, 23 I&N Dec. 962 (BIA 2006), overruled in part. Matter of Clahar, 18 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1981), and Matter of Goorahoo, 20 I&N Dec. 782 (BIA 1994), reaffirmed. FOR RESPONDENT: Crescenzo DeLuca, Esquire, Whethersfield, Connecticut FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Amit Patel, Assistant Chief Counsel BEFORE: Board Panel: COLE, PAULEY, and WENDTLAND, Board Members: COLE, Board Member: In a decision dated May 25, 2011, an Immigration Judge ordered the respondent removed from the United States. The respondent has appealed from that decision. The appeal will be sustained and the proceedings will be terminated. The only question on appeal is whether the respondent derived United States citizenship upon the naturalization of his father pursuant to section 320(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1431(a) (2000). The Immigration Judge, relying on Board precedent, determined that the respondent—who was born out of wedlock in Jamaica to parents who never married—had not been “legitimated” under Jamaican law and thus did not qualify as his father’s “child” within the meaning of the citizenship provisions of the Act. See section 101(c)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(c)(1) (2012) (defining the term “child” for purposes of title III of the Act, which is entitled “Nationality and Naturalization”). We now hold that a person born abroad to unmarried parents can qualify as a legitimated “child” under section 101(c)(1) of the Act if he or she was born in a country or State that has eliminated all legal distinctions between

非婚生子女可能有资格作为其亲生父母的合法化“子女”，根据《移民与国籍法》第101(c)(1)条，8 U.S.C. § 1101(c)(1) (2012)，为公民身份目的，如果他或她出生在一个已消除基于父母婚姻状况对子女的所有法律区别的国家或州，或在该国家或州（包括美国境内的一个州）有住所或居所，如果其他方面符合资格。Matter of Hines, 24 I&N Dec. 544 (BIA 2008) 和 Matter of Rowe, 23 I&N Dec. 962 (BIA 2006) 部分被推翻。Matter of Clahar, 18 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1981) 和 Matter of Goorahoo, 20 I&N Dec. 782 (BIA 1994) 被重申。 被申请人代表：Crescenzo DeLuca, Esquire, Whethersfield, Connecticut 国土安全部代表：Amit Patel, 助理首席法律顾问 审理：委员会小组：COLE, PAULEY, 和 WENDTLAND，委员会成员： COLE，委员会成员： 在2011年5月25日的决定中，一名移民法官命令将被申请人驱逐出美国。被申请人对该决定提出上诉。上诉将被支持，程序将被终止。 上诉中唯一的问题是，被申请人是否根据《移民与国籍法》第320(a)条，8 U.S.C. § 1431(a) (2000)，在其父亲归化时衍生美国公民身份。移民法官依据委员会先例，认定被申请人——在牙买加非婚出生，父母从未结婚——未根据牙买加法律被“合法化”，因此不符合该法公民身份条款中其父亲的“子女”含义。见该法第101(c)(1)条，8 U.S.C. § 1101(c)(1) (2012)（为该法第三编目的定义“子女”一词，该编标题为“国籍与归化”）。 我们现在认为，在国外非婚出生的人可以根据该法第101(c)(1)条有资格作为合法化“子女”，如果他或她出生在一个已消除基于父母婚姻状况对子女的所有法律区别的国家或州，或在该国家或州（包括美国境内的一个州）有住所或居所，无论该国家或州是否规定了其他合法化法律手段。在如此裁定时，我们退出 Matter of Hines, 24 I&N Dec. 544 (BIA 2008) 和 Matter of Rowe, 23 I&N Dec. 962 (BIA 2006)，在这些决定认为“合法化”概念必须在该法统一解释的范围内，包括为签证优先分类目的。因此，我们在 Matter of Clahar, 18 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1981) 和 Matter of Goorahoo, 20 I&N Dec. 782 (BIA 1994) 中的裁定在此恢复并重申。

485

485

Cite as 26 I&N Dec. 485 (BIA 2015) Interim Decision #3826

引用为 26 I&N Dec. 485 (BIA 2015) 临时决定 #3826

children based on the marital status of their parents or has a residence or domicile in such a country or State (including a State within the United States), irrespective of whether the country or State has prescribed other legal means of legitimation. In so holding, we recede from Matter of Hines, 24 I&N Dec. 544 (BIA 2008), and Matter of Rowe, 23 I&N Dec. 962 (BIA 2006), to the extent these decisions hold that the concept of “legitimation” must be interpreted uniformly throughout the Act, including for purposes of visa preference classification. Consequently, our holdings in Matter of Clahar, 18 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1981), and Matter of Goorahoo, 20 I&N Dec. 782 (BIA 1994), are hereby reinstated and reaffirmed.

子女基于其父母的婚姻状况，或在该国家或州（包括美国境内的一个州）有住所或居所，无论该国家或州是否规定了其他合法化法律手段。在如此裁定时，我们退出 Matter of Hines, 24 I&N Dec. 544 (BIA 2008) 和 Matter of Rowe, 23 I&N Dec. 962 (BIA 2006)，在这些决定认为“合法化”概念必须在该法统一解释的范围内，包括为签证优先分类目的。因此，我们在 Matter of Clahar, 18 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1981) 和 Matter of Goorahoo, 20 I&N Dec. 782 (BIA 1994) 中的裁定在此恢复并重申。

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On July 3, 1988, the respondent was born out of wedlock in Jamaica to parents who were not then citizens or nationals of the United States. At the time of the respondent’s birth, the Jamaican Status of Children Act (“JSCA”) of 1976 had eliminated the legal distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate children in that country. Before the respondent was born, we had also issued Matter of Clahar, which interpreted the JSCA and held that a Jamaican child who was born out of wedlock after the effective date of the JSCA is legitimated under Jamaican law for purposes of visa preference classification. In 1995, the respondent’s father, who was then a native and citizen of Jamaica, placed his name on the respondent’s Jamaican birth registration form, thereby qualifying the respondent as a legitimated child for purposes of visa preference classification under the Act. See Matter of Pagan, 22 I&N Dec. 547, 549 & n.1 (BIA 1999) (indicating that a Jamaican birth certificate amended to include the father’s name may, in light of other evidence of record, be sufficient for visa preference classification). The respondent’s father eventually immigrated to the United States and subsequently accorded the respondent preference classification as his “child.”1 On September 2, 2000, at the age of 12, the respondent was admitted to the United States as an immigrant and thereafter resided in this country as a lawful permanent resident. On August 3, 2001, the respondent’s father became a United States citizen by naturalization while the respondent was in his father’s legal custody. On January 15, 2010, the respondent was convicted of burglary in Connecticut, prompting the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) to initiate removal proceedings. The respondent moved to terminate the

一、事实与程序历史 1988年7月3日，被申请人在牙买加非婚出生，父母当时不是美国公民或国民。在被申请人出生时，1976年牙买加《儿童地位法》（“JSCA”）已消除该国合法子女与非婚生子女之间的法律区别。在被申请人出生前，我们还发布了 Matter of Clahar，该案解释JSCA并认定在JSCA生效日期后非婚出生的牙买加子女根据牙买加法律为签证优先分类目的被合法化。1995年，被申请人的父亲，当时是牙买加本土公民，将其姓名列入被申请人的牙买加出生登记表，从而使被申请人有资格作为该法签证优先分类目的的合法化子女。见 Matter of Pagan, 22 I&N Dec. 547, 549 & n.1 (BIA 1999)（表明经修订以包括父亲姓名的牙买加出生证明，结合记录中的其他证据，可能足以用于签证优先分类）。 被申请人的父亲最终移民美国，随后给予被申请人作为其“子女”的优先分类。1 2000年9月2日，被申请人12岁时作为移民被准入美国，此后作为合法永久居民居住在此国。2001年8月3日，被申请人的父亲通过归化成为美国公民，当时被申请人处于其父亲的法定监护下。 2010年1月15日，被申请人在康涅狄格州被判入室盗窃罪，促使国土安全部（“DHS”）启动驱逐程序。被申请人提出动议终止程序，然而，理由是他父亲2001年8月归化时他依法成为美国公民。2 为支持其公民身份主张，被申请人援引该法第320(a)条，该条在所有相关时间规定如下：

1 Section 101(b)(1) of the Act defines the term “child” for purposes of visa preference classification, as well as matters pertaining to removal proceedings.

1 该法第101(b)(1)条为签证优先分类目的以及涉及驱逐程序的事项定义了“子女”一词。

486

486

Cite as 26 I&N Dec. 485 (BIA 2015) Interim Decision #3826

引用为 26 I&N Dec. 485 (BIA 2015) 临时决定 #3826

proceedings, however, on the ground that he became a United States citizen by operation of law when his father naturalized in August 2001. 2 In support of his citizenship claim, the respondent invoked section 320(a) of the Act, which at all relevant times has provided as follows:

程序，然而，理由是他父亲2001年8月归化时他依法成为美国公民。2 为支持其公民身份主张，被申请人援引该法第320(a)条，该条在所有相关时间规定如下：

A child born outside of the United States automatically becomes a citizen of the United States when all of the following conditions have been fulfilled:

在国外出生的子女在满足以下所有条件时自动成为美国公民：

(1) At least one parent of the child is a citizen of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization. (2) The child is under the age of eighteen years. (3) The child is residing in the United States in the legal and physical custody of the citizen parent pursuant to a lawful admission for permanent residence. The Immigration Judge found that the respondent did not derive United States citizenship because the respondent met all of the requirements of section 320(a), except he did not qualify as his father’s “child” under section 101(c)(1), which provides that the term “child” means

(1) 子女至少一方父母是美国公民，无论是通过出生或归化。 (2) 子女未满十八岁。 (3) 子女在美国居住，由公民父母合法和实际监护，依据合法永久居留准入。 移民法官认定被申请人未衍生美国公民身份，因为被申请人满足第320(a)条的所有要求，除了他不符合第101(c)(1)条其父亲的“子女”，该条规定“子女”一词指

an unmarried person under twenty-one years of age and includes a child legitimated under the law of the child’s residence or domicile, or under the law of the father’s residence or domicile, whether in the United States or elsewhere . . . , if such legitimation . . . takes place before the child reaches the age of 16 years . . . , and the child is in the legal custody of the legitimating . . . parent or parents at the time of such legitimation . . . . As these provisions make clear, for derivative citizenship purposes, a person born out of wedlock is considered a “child” of his United States citizen parent or parents only if he was “legitimated” under the law of his own residence or domicile (or that of his father) before turning 16 and while in the legitimating parent’s legal custody. The Immigration Judge concluded that the respondent had not been “legitimated” under Jamaican law because his biological parents never married. 3 In reaching that conclusion, the Immigration Judge relied on Matter of Hines, a derivative citizenship case arising under former section 321(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a) (1988), where we held that the sole means of “legitimating”

未满二十一岁的未婚人士，包括根据子女居住地或住所地法律，或父亲居住地或住所地法律，无论是在美国或其他地方被合法化的子女……，如果该合法化……发生在子女年满16岁之前……，且子女在合法化……父母一方或双方的法律监护下在该合法化时……。 如这些规定明确表明，为衍生公民身份目的，非婚出生的人仅在其根据自己居住地或住所地（或其父亲）法律在16岁前且在合法化父母法律监护下被“合法化”时，才被视为其美国公民父母的“子女”。移民法官得出结论，被申请人未根据牙买加法律被“合法化”，因为其亲生父母从未结婚。3 在得出该结论时，移民法官依据 Matter of Hines，一个根据该法前第321(a)条，8 U.S.C. § 1432(a) (1988) 产生的衍生公民身份案件，我们在该案中认为“合法化”非婚出生子女根据牙买加法律的唯一手段是子女自然父母的婚姻。4 24 I&N Dec. at 547–48。

2 In removal proceedings, evidence of foreign birth gives rise to a presumption of alienage, which the respondent may rebut by coming forward with evidence to substantiate his claim to United States citizenship. E.g., Matter of Rodriguez-Tejedor, 23 I&N Dec. 153, 164 (BIA 2001). 3 The Immigration Judge also found that the respondent’s father never legitimated him under the procedures prescribed for that purpose by the State of Connecticut.

2 在驱逐程序中，外国出生证据产生外国人身份的推定，被申请人可以通过提出证据证实其美国公民身份主张来反驳。例如，Matter of Rodriguez-Tejedor, 23 I&N Dec. 153, 164 (BIA 2001)。 3 移民法官还认定被申请人的父亲从未根据康涅狄格州为此目的规定的程序合法化他。

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Cite as 26 I&N Dec. 485 (BIA 2015) Interim Decision #3826

引用为 26 I&N Dec. 485 (BIA 2015) 临时决定 #3826

a child born out of wedlock under Jamaican law was the marriage of the child’s natural parents.4 24 I&N Dec. at 547–48. The respondent argues that he was the legitimated child of his father under Board precedents issued before Matter of Hines. He further asserts that Hines has an impermissible retroactive effect as applied to his case because it embodies a different understanding of the “legitimation” concept from that which was in effect at the time of his father’s naturalization. See generally SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (stating that the retroactivity resulting from a new principle “announced by a court or by an administrative agency . . . must be balanced against the mischief of producing a result which is contrary to a statutory design or to legal and equitable principles”).

非婚出生子女根据牙买加法律的唯一手段是子女自然父母的婚姻。4 24 I&N Dec. at 547–48。 被申请人主张，根据 Matter of Hines 之前发布的委员会先例，他是其父亲的合法化子女。他进一步声称，Hines 适用于其案件具有不允许的追溯效力，因为它体现了与父亲归化时生效的“合法化”概念不同的理解。见 generally SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947)（指出由“法院或行政机构宣布”的新原则产生的追溯力“必须与产生违反法定设计或法律与公平原则的结果的危害相平衡”）。

II. ANALYSIS The respondent qualified as a legitimated child of his father for visa preference purposes under Matter of Clahar, 18 I&N Dec. at 2–3. In that case, we held that the JSCA eliminated the legal disabilities between legitimate and illegitimate children by operation of law and conferred equality of rights. We also acknowledged the existence of the Legitimation Act of Jamaica, which required the parents to marry for an out-of-wedlock child to be legitimated, and concluded that the illegitimate status distinction was consequently not eliminated by law. Nevertheless, we found that the JSCA, which conferred equality of rights, was determinative for according visa petition benefits. In addition, we credited a memorandum from the Jamaican Ministry of Justice, which represented that under the JSCA, “the legal duties and obligations of a father towards a child born out of wedlock are in all

二、分析 被申请人根据 Matter of Clahar, 18 I&N Dec. at 2–3，有资格作为其父亲的合法化子女用于签证优先目的。在该案中，我们认定JSCA依法消除了合法子女与非婚生子女之间的法律障碍并赋予权利平等。我们还承认牙买加《合法化法》的存在，该法要求父母结婚才能使非婚子女合法化，并得出结论非婚地位区别因此未被法律消除。然而，我们认定赋予权利平等的JSCA对于给予签证申请福利具有决定性。 此外，我们采信了牙买加司法部的一份备忘录，该备忘录表示根据JSCA，“父亲对非婚出生子女的法律义务和责任在所有

4 Former section 321(a) of the Act provided, in pertinent part, as follows:

4 该法前第321(a)条在相关部分规定如下：

A child born outside of the United States of alien parents . . . becomes a citizen of the United States upon fulfillment of the following conditions: . . . (3) The naturalization of the . . . mother if the child was born out of wedlock and the paternity of the child has not been established by legitimation . . . . (Emphasis added.) This statute was repealed and replaced by section 320(a) of the Act, effective February 27, 2001. See Child Citizenship Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-395, §§ 101(a), 103(a), 104, 114 Stat. 1631−33. However, the new citizenship provisions were not retroactive, so former section 321(a) continues to apply to any derivative citizenship claim made by an individual who turned 18 before the statute’s effective date. See Matter of Rodriguez-Tejedor, 23 I&N Dec. at 162.

在美国境外出生的外籍父母所生子女……在满足以下条件时成为美国公民： …… （3）如果子女系非婚生且亲子关系尚未通过合法化确立，则该……母亲归化入籍。 （强调为后加。）该法规已被《移民与国籍法》第320(a)条废止并取代，自2001年2月27日起生效。见《2000年儿童公民法》，Pub. L. No. 106-395，§§ 101(a), 103(a), 104, 114 Stat. 1631−33。然而，新的公民身份条款不具有溯及力，因此，对于在法规生效日期前年满18岁的个人提出的任何派生公民身份主张，原第321(a)条继续适用。见Matter of Rodriguez-Tejedor, 23 I&N Dec. at 162。

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Cite as 26 I&N Dec. 485 (BIA 2015) Interim Decision #3826

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significant respects the same as those of a child born in wedlock.” Id. at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted). As we noted, however, that memorandum also acknowledged that Jamaican law retained some “minor statutory distinctions” between children based on the marital status of their parents in order “to minimize the problems associated with determining rights and status in an area where difficulties may arise in identifying the natural father of a child.” Id. In a similar visa petition case, we addressed the Guyanese Children Born Out of Wedlock (Removal of Discrimination) Act of 1983, which effectively eliminated the legal distinction between children born in wedlock and those born out of wedlock. Matter of Goorahoo, 20 I&N Dec. at 783−85. We held that for purposes of visa preference classification, children born out of wedlock in Guyana after the law’s May 18, 1983, effective date are deemed legitimate and those under the age of 18 years prior to that date are legitimated children. Unlike the JSCA, the Guyanese law did not contain any broad provision purporting to eliminate all legal distinctions between children based on the marital status of their parents; rather, it simply amended preexisting Guyanese laws on an individual basis. Id. at 783. Nevertheless, based on an analysis conducted by the Library of Congress, we concluded that children born out of wedlock in Guyana have rights equal to those of children born in wedlock. Id. at 784. Subsequently, in the context of determining derivative citizenship, we interpreted former section 321(a)(3) of the Act, which provided in relevant part that a child born out of wedlock to alien parents could derive United States citizenship through the naturalization of his or her mother, but only if “the paternity of the child has not been established by legitimation.” See Matter of Hines, 24 I&N Dec. at 546; Matter of Rowe, 23 I&N Dec. at 963. Considering the apparent legislative purpose of that language, we held that individuals born out of wedlock in Jamaica and Guyana could derive United States citizenship through the naturalization of their mothers so long as they could prove that their fathers had not confirmed or established their paternity “by legitimation” under the domestic relations laws of those countries.5 See Matter of Hines, 24 I&N Dec. at 547–48; Matter of Rowe, 23 I&N Dec. at 967. In each case, we 5 Although there is little legislative history regarding former section 321(a)(3), it has generally been understood that the language requiring a putative United States citizen to prove that his or her paternity has not been established by legitimation was devised by Congress as a means of safeguarding the parental rights of alien fathers. See, e.g., Brandao v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 654 F.3d 427, 429–30 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2011); Barthelemy v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003); Wedderburn v. INS, 215 F.3d 795, 800 (7th Cir. 2000).

在重大方面与婚生子女相同。”同上，第2页（内部引号省略）。然而，正如我们指出的，该备忘录也承认，牙买加法律保留了基于父母婚姻状况的子女之间的一些“轻微法定区别”，以“尽量减少在可能难以确定子女自然父亲的领域内确定权利和地位所涉及的问题”。同上。 在一个类似的签证申请案件中，我们处理了1983年《圭亚那非婚生子女（消除歧视）法》，该法实际上消除了婚生子女与非婚生子女之间的法律区别。Matter of Goorahoo, 20 I&N Dec. at 783−85。我们裁定，就签证优先分类而言，在该法1983年5月18日生效日期之后在圭亚那出生的非婚生子女被视为婚生子女，而在此之前未满18岁者则为合法化子女。与《牙买加儿童地位法》不同，圭亚那法律不包含任何旨在消除基于父母婚姻状况的子女之间所有法律区别的宽泛条款；相反，它仅逐项修订了原有的圭亚那法律。同上，第783页。尽管如此，根据国会图书馆进行的分析，我们得出结论，在圭亚那出生的非婚生子女享有与婚生子女同等的权利。同上，第784页。 随后，在确定派生公民身份时，我们解释了《移民与国籍法》原第321(a)(3)条，该条相关部分规定，外籍父母所生的非婚生子女可以通过其母亲归化入籍而派生美国公民身份，但前提是“该子女的亲子关系尚未通过合法化确立”。见Matter of Hines, 24 I&N Dec. at 546; Matter of Rowe, 23 I&N Dec. at 963。考虑到该措辞明显的立法目的，我们裁定，在牙买加和圭亚那出生的非婚生子女，只要能够证明其父亲未根据这些国家的家庭关系法“通过合法化”确认或确立其亲子关系，就可以通过其母亲归化入籍而派生美国公民身份。5 见Matter of Hines, 24 I&N Dec. at 547–48; Matter of Rowe, 23 I&N Dec. at 967。在每个案件中，我们 5 尽管关于原第321(a)(3)条的立法历史很少，但普遍理解，要求 putative 美国公民证明其亲子关系尚未通过合法化确立的措辞，是国会为保护外籍父亲的父母权利而设计的。见，例如，Brandao v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 654 F.3d 427, 429–30 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2011); Barthelemy v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003); Wedderburn v. INS, 215 F.3d 795, 800 (7th Cir. 2000)。

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concluded that where a jurisdiction requires an affirmative act to legitimate an out-of-wedlock child, paternity is not established without the requisite act, even if the jurisdiction has enacted a law to place children on equal footing without regard to the circumstances of their birth. Although Jamaica and Guyana enacted laws that effectively eliminated the legal distinction between children born in wedlock and those born out of wedlock, both countries retained a formal means of legitimating—the marriage of the biological parents. We therefore held that for derivative citizenship purposes, paternity could be established by legitimation only through the affirmative act of parental marriage. Thus, the respondents in Hines and Rowe could derive citizenship from the naturalization of their mothers under former section 321(a)(3) because paternity had not been established by the marriage of their parents, which was the only means of legitimation. We continue to espouse that holding and believe it embodies the correct understanding of former section 321(a)(3). Nevertheless, we find it necessary to recede from Matter of Hines and Matter of Rowe to the extent they addressed matters beyond the scope of former section 321(a)(3) and overruled Matter of Clahar and Matter of Goorahoo, respectively. In Hines and Rowe, we declared that the term “legitimation” should not have two separate meanings within the Act, regardless of variations in statutory context. Thus, we found that our interpretation of the term under section 321(a)(3), which makes the establishment of “paternity . . . by legitimation” a barrier to citizenship, was controlling in all other statutory contexts, including those that make proof of legitimation a prerequisite for eligibility for a benefit, such as visa preference classification. See Matter of Hines, 24 I&N Dec. at 548; Matter of Rowe, 23 I&N Dec. at 967. Although neither Hines nor Rowe elucidates the Board’s reasons for concluding that “legitimation” must be interpreted uniformly throughout the Act, we apparently understood it to be required by the Supreme Court’s decision in Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005). In that case, the Court held that a single statutory phrase cannot have different meanings in different factual contexts. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. at 386 (rejecting “the dangerous principle that judges can give the same statutory text different meanings in different cases”). Thus, Clark would forbid us from giving the statutory phrase “paternity . . . has not been established by legitimation” one meaning for people born in Jamaica and another for those born in Guyana. Id. at 378 (“To give [the] same words a different meaning . . . would be to invent a statute rather than interpret one.”). In Hines and Rowe, however, we read Clark much more broadly, as if it required us to interpret the term “legitimation” identically throughout the Act, regardless of variations in statutory context. That understanding was

得出结论，如果某一司法管辖区要求采取肯定行为才能使非婚生子女合法化，则在没有必要行为的情况下，亲子关系未确立，即使该司法管辖区已颁布法律使子女享有平等地位而不论其出生情况。 尽管牙买加和圭亚那颁布了法律，实际上消除了婚生子女与非婚生子女之间的法律区别，但两国都保留了正式的合法化方式——亲生父母结婚。因此，我们裁定，就派生公民身份而言，亲子关系只能通过父母结婚的肯定行为来通过合法化确立。因此，Hines和Rowe案中的 respondent 可以根据原第321(a)(3)条通过其母亲归化入籍而派生公民身份，因为亲子关系尚未通过其父母结婚（这是唯一的合法化方式）确立。我们继续坚持该裁定，并认为它体现了对原第321(a)(3)条的正确理解。 然而，我们认为有必要在Matter of Hines和Matter of Rowe涉及超出原第321(a)(3)条范围的事项并分别推翻Matter of Clahar和Matter of Goorahoo的范围内，撤回这些裁定。在Hines和Rowe案中，我们宣布“合法化”一词在《移民与国籍法》中不应具有两种不同含义，无论法定上下文如何变化。因此，我们认为，我们对第321(a)(3)条下该术语的解释——该解释使“通过合法化确立亲子关系”成为公民身份的障碍——在所有其他法定上下文中具有控制力，包括那些使合法化证明成为获得福利资格（如签证优先分类）先决条件的上下文。见Matter of Hines, 24 I&N Dec. at 548; Matter of Rowe, 23 I&N Dec. at 967。尽管Hines和Rowe均未阐明委员会得出“合法化”必须在整个《移民与国籍法》中统一解释的结论的理由，但我们显然认为这是最高法院在Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005)案中裁决所要求的。 在该案中，法院裁定，单一法定短语在不同事实背景下不能具有不同含义。Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. at 386（拒绝“法官可以在不同案件中赋予同一法定文本不同含义的危险原则”）。因此，Clark将禁止我们赋予法定短语“亲子关系……尚未通过合法化确立”一种含义适用于在牙买加出生的人，另一种含义适用于在圭亚那出生的人。同上，第378页（“赋予[相同]词语不同含义……将是发明法规而非解释法规。”）。 然而，在Hines和Rowe案中，我们对Clark的解读要宽泛得多，仿佛它要求我们在整个《移民与国籍法》中相同地解释“合法化”一词，无论法定上下文如何变化。这种理解是

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erroneous and conflicts with the well-settled rule that “[m]ost words have different shades of meaning and consequently may be variously construed, not only when they occur in different statutes, but when used more than once in the same statute or even in the same section.” Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 574 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In short, “[a] given term in the same statute may take on distinct characters from association with distinct statutory objects calling for different implementation strategies,” even if the term is statutorily defined. Id. (citing Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997)). Therefore, in finding that Clark v. Martinez required us to interpret the concepts of “legitimation” in section 101(c) of the Act and “paternity . . . established by legitimation” in former section 321(a)(3) as the same, we misconstrued the Supreme Court’s decision. Upon further consideration, we conclude that the interpretation of “paternity . . . established by legitimation” that we have adopted for purposes of former section 321(a)(3)—which requires an affirmative act by the father in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction—cannot properly be extended to the interpretation of “legitimation” for purposes of the definition of a “child” in sections 101(b)(1) and (c)(1) of the Act.6 To illustrate this point, we consider the language of former section 321(a)(3) itself, which requires a person born out of wedlock to prove both that he was a “child” when his mother naturalized and that his “paternity . . . ha[d] not been established by legitimation” at that time. Clearly, if “legitimation” has the same meaning in section 101(c)(1) as “paternity . . . established by legitimation” does in section 321(a)(3), then the statutes are in conflict. A person born out of wedlock seeking to qualify as a “child” has to prove “legitimation,” yet if he did so, he would be unable to prove the absence of “paternity . . . established by legitimation” required by section 321(a)(3). Conversely, anyone who proves that his “paternity . . . has not been established by legitimation” under section 321(a)(3) would accordingly be unable to qualify as a “child.” The necessary corollary of this paradox is that the term “legitimation” in section 101(c)(1) must mean something different from what “paternity . . . established by legitimation” means in former section 321(a)(3).

错误的，并与公认的规则相冲突，即“[大]多数词语具有不同的含义层次，因此可以有不同的解释，不仅当它们出现在不同法规中时，而且当它们在同一法规甚至同一条款中多次使用时也是如此。”Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 574 (2007)（原文有改动）（引用Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932)）（内部引号省略）。简言之，“同一法规中的特定术语可能因与需要不同实施策略的不同法定对象的关联而呈现不同特征”，即使该术语有法定定义。同上（引用Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997)）。因此，在认定Clark v. Martinez要求我们将《移民与国籍法》第101(c)条中的“合法化”概念与原第321(a)(3)条中的“通过合法化确立的亲子关系”解释为相同时，我们误解了最高法院的裁决。 经进一步考虑，我们得出结论，我们为原第321(a)(3)条目的所采用的“通过合法化确立的亲子关系”的解释——该解释要求父亲根据司法管辖区法律采取肯定行为——不能适当地扩展到为《移民与国籍法》第101(b)(1)和(c)(1)条中“子女”定义目的而对“合法化”的解释。6 为说明这一点，我们考虑原第321(a)(3)条本身的措辞，该条要求非婚生子女证明在其母亲归化时他是“子女”，并且当时其“亲子关系……尚未通过合法化确立”。显然，如果“合法化”在第101(c)(1)条中的含义与“通过合法化确立的亲子关系”在第321(a)(3)条中的含义相同，那么这些法规存在冲突。寻求符合“子女”资格的非婚生子女必须证明“合法化”，但如果他这样做了，他就无法证明第321(a)(3)条所要求的“通过合法化确立的亲子关系”的不存在。反之，任何证明其“亲子关系……尚未通过合法化确立”符合第321(a)(3)条的人，因此将无法符合“子女”资格。这一悖论的必然推论是，第101(c)(1)条中的“合法化”一词必须与“通过合法化确立的亲子关系”在原第321(a)(3)条中的含义不同。

6 Consequently, we withdraw from Hines and Rowe to the extent that they require “legitimation” to be given the same meaning throughout the Act. We also conclude that Hines and Rowe improperly overruled Clahar and Goorahoo, which were visa petition cases that interpreted the “legitimation” concept for purposes of the definition of a “child” in section 101(b)(1) of the Act. Accordingly, our holdings in Clahar and Goorahoo are reinstated and reaffirmed.

6 因此，我们在Hines和Rowe要求在整个《移民与国籍法》中赋予“合法化”相同含义的范围内撤回这些裁定。我们还得出结论，Hines和Rowe不当推翻了Clahar和Goorahoo，这些是签证申请案件，为《移民与国籍法》第101(b)(1)条中“子女”定义目的解释了“合法化”概念。因此，我们在Clahar和Goorahoo中的裁定被恢复并重申。

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The remaining question is what “legitimation” in section 101(c)(1) means. Given this section’s express provision that “legitimation” is determined by the law of the child’s (or his father’s) residence or domicile, any satisfactory answer to that question is complicated by the growing consensus—both in the United States and abroad—against labeling children “legitimate” and “illegitimate” by virtue of the marital status of their parents. In recent decades, many countries have legally marginalized the legitimation concept, retaining some of its features for purposes of settling inheritance disputes but enacting legislation that otherwise places the children of unmarried parents on the same legal footing as those born to married couples. 7 Any coherent understanding of legitimation as a stand-alone concept—rather than as a mechanism for establishing paternity, as in former section 321(a)(3)—must take this reality into account.8 In light of the foregoing, we interpret section 101(c)(1) of the Act to mean that a person born abroad to unmarried parents can be a “child” for purposes of section 320(a) if he or she is otherwise eligible and was born in a country or State that had eliminated legal distinctions between children based on the marital status of their parents or had a residence or domicile in such a country or State (including a State within the United States). 7 See, e.g., Iracheta v. Holder, 730 F.3d 419, 425 (5th Cir. 2013) (Tamaulipas, Mexico); Matter of Goorahoo, 20 I&N Dec. at 782 (Guyana); Matter of Hernandez, 19 I&N Dec. 14, 16 (BIA 1983) (Colombia); Matter of Clarke, 18 I&N Dec. 369, 371–72 (BIA 1983) (Barbados); Matter of Mesias, 18 I&N Dec. 298, 299 (BIA 1982) (Haiti); Matter of Espinoza, 17 I&N Dec. 522, 523–24 (BIA 1980) (Bolivia); Matter of Sanchez, 16 I&N Dec. 671, 672 (BIA 1979) (Honduras); Matter of Maloney, 16 I&N Dec. 650, 651–52 (BIA 1978) (Panama); Matter of Wong, 16 I&N Dec. 646, 648 (BIA 1978) (China); Matter of G-, 9 I&N Dec. 518, 519 (BIA 1961) (Hungary); Matter of K-, 8 I&N Dec. 73, 75–76 (1958) (Poland). Similarly, a number of States within the United States have enacted statutes placing the children of unwed parents on equal legal footing with those born to married couples. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-1401 (2014) (West); Cal. Fam. Code § 7602 (West 2014); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 209C, § 1 (West 2014); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 9:17-40 (West 2014); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 109.060 (West 2014); 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5102(a) (West 2014). 8 By tying the meaning of “legitimation” to the requirements of the law of the child’s residence or domicile (or that of the father), Congress anticipated that the meaning of the term would vary depending upon (1) the law in the country or State of residence or domicile and (2) the child’s date of birth. “Legitimation” is thus an evolving, rather than a fixed, concept. See, e.g., Matter of Campuzano, 18 I&N Dec. 390, 392 (BIA 1983) (holding that whether a child born out of wedlock in Ecuador qualifies as a “legitimate” child in visa petition proceedings depends on whether he was born before or after the August 7, 1970, change of Ecuadorean law); cf. Matter of Gomez, 16 I&N Dec. 72 (BIA 1976) (governing questions of legitimation of persons born out of wedlock in Ecuador before the August 7, 1970, change of law).

剩下的问题是第101(c)(1)条中“准正”的含义。鉴于该条明确规定“准正”由子女（或其父亲）的居住地或住所地法律确定，对该问题的任何令人满意的回答都因日益增长的共识而变得复杂——无论在美国还是国外——即反对以父母的婚姻状况为由将子女标记为“婚生”和“非婚生”。近几十年来，许多国家在法律上边缘化了准正概念，保留其某些特征以解决继承纠纷，但颁布立法在其他方面使未婚父母的子女与已婚夫妇所生子女处于同等法律地位。7 任何将准正理解为一个独立概念——而非如原第321(a)(3)条那样作为确立亲子关系的机制——的连贯理解都必须考虑到这一现实。8 鉴于上述情况，我们将该法第101(c)(1)条解释为：在国外出生于未婚父母的人，如果其在其他方面符合资格，且出生在一个已消除基于父母婚姻状况对子女的法律区分的国家或州，或在该国家或州（包括美国境内的一个州）拥有住所或居所，则可以为第320(a)条之目的成为“子女”。 7 参见，例如，Iracheta v. Holder, 730 F.3d 419, 425 (5th Cir. 2013)（墨西哥塔毛利帕斯）；Matter of Goorahoo, 20 I&N Dec. at 782（圭亚那）；Matter of Hernandez, 19 I&N Dec. 14, 16 (BIA 1983)（哥伦比亚）；Matter of Clarke, 18 I&N Dec. 369, 371–72 (BIA 1983)（巴巴多斯）；Matter of Mesias, 18 I&N Dec. 298, 299 (BIA 1982)（海地）；Matter of Espinoza, 17 I&N Dec. 522, 523–24 (BIA 1980)（玻利维亚）；Matter of Sanchez, 16 I&N Dec. 671, 672 (BIA 1979)（洪都拉斯）；Matter of Maloney, 16 I&N Dec. 650, 651–52 (BIA 1978)（巴拿马）；Matter of Wong, 16 I&N Dec. 646, 648 (BIA 1978)（中国）；Matter of G-, 9 I&N Dec. 518, 519 (BIA 1961)（匈牙利）；Matter of K-, 8 I&N Dec. 73, 75–76 (1958)（波兰）。同样，美国境内的若干州已颁布法规，使未婚父母的子女与已婚夫妇所生子女处于同等法律地位。参见，例如，Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-1401 (2014) (West)；Cal. Fam. Code § 7602 (West 2014)；Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 209C, § 1 (West 2014)；N.J. Stat. Ann. § 9:17-40 (West 2014)；Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 109.060 (West 2014)；23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5102(a) (West 2014)。 8 通过将“准正”的含义与子女居住地或住所地（或父亲居住地或住所地）法律的要求相联系，国会预期该术语的含义将因以下因素而异：(1) 居住地或住所地所在国家或州的法律，以及 (2) 子女的出生日期。因此，“准正”是一个不断演变而非固定的概念。参见，例如，Matter of Campuzano, 18 I&N Dec. 390, 392 (BIA 1983)（裁定在厄瓜多尔非婚出生的子女在签证申请程序中是否符合“婚生”子女资格，取决于其出生是在1970年8月7日厄瓜多尔法律变更之前还是之后）；比较 Matter of Gomez, 16 I&N Dec. 72 (BIA 1976)（管辖1970年8月7日法律变更之前在厄瓜多尔非婚出生者的准正问题）。

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引用为 26 I&N Dec. 485 (BIA 2015) 临时决定第3826号

Applying this rule to the facts of this case, we conclude that the respondent is his father’s “child” within the meaning of sections 101(c)(1) and 320(a) of the Act. There is no dispute that the respondent is the biological child of the man through whom he seeks to derive United States citizenship or that he was born in Jamaica after the 1976 effective date of the JSCA. Further, the record contains no evidence to suggest that the respondent was not in his father’s legal custody at the time of his birth. See 8 C.F.R. § 322.1 (2014) (establishing a rebuttable presumption that a biological parent has legal custody of his or her child); see also Matter of Rivers, 17 I&N Dec. 419 (BIA 1980). Accordingly, the respondent’s appeal will be sustained and the removal proceedings against him will be terminated. ORDER: The appeal is sustained and the removal proceedings are terminated.

将这一规则适用于本案事实，我们认定答辩人属于该法第101(c)(1)条和第320(a)条含义内其父亲的“子女”。没有争议的是，答辩人是其寻求通过其获得美国公民身份之男子的亲生子女，且他出生于《儿童公民身份法》1976年生效日期之后的牙买加。此外，记录中没有证据表明答辩人在出生时不在其父亲的法定监护之下。参见 8 C.F.R. § 322.1 (2014)（确立亲生父母对其子女拥有法定监护权的可反驳推定）；另参见 Matter of Rivers, 17 I&N Dec. 419 (BIA 1980)。因此，答辩人的上诉将获支持，针对他的遣返程序将终止。 命令：上诉获支持，遣返程序终止。

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