Matter of A.J. Valdez

Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 496 (BIA 2018) Interim Decision #3948

引用为 27 I&N Dec. 496 (BIA 2018) 临时决定 #3948

U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review

美国司法部 移民审查执行办公室

Board of Immigration Appeals

移民上诉委员会

(1) An alien makes a willful misrepresentation under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) (2012), when he or she knows of or authorizes false statements in an application filed on the alien’s behalf. (2) An alien’s signature on an immigration application establishes a strong presumption that he or she knows of and has assented to the contents of the application, but the alien can rebut the presumption by establishing fraud, deceit, or other wrongful acts by another person. FOR RESPONDENT: Matthew B. Weber, Esquire, Miami, Florida FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Kyung Auh, Assistant Chief Counsel BEFORE: Board Panel: MALPHRUS and LIEBOWITZ, Board Members; MORRIS, Temporary Board Member MALPHRUS, Board Member: In a decision dated July 3, 2017, an Immigration Judge found the respondents removable under section 237(a)(1)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A) (2012), as aliens who were inadmissible at the time of adjustment of status under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) (2012), because of their fraud or willful misrepresentation of a material fact. 1 The respondents have appealed from that decision. The appeal will be dismissed.

(1) 当外国人知道或授权他人以其名义提交的申请中的虚假陈述时，该外国人即构成《移民与国籍法》第212(a)(6)(C)(i)条、8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) (2012) 所指的故意虚假陈述。 (2) 外国人在移民申请上的签名确立了一项强有力的推定，即其知道并同意申请的内容，但该外国人可以通过证明他人存在欺诈、欺骗或其他不当行为来推翻该推定。 被申请人代理律师：Matthew B. Weber, Esquire, Miami, Florida 国土安全部代理律师：Kyung Auh, Assistant Chief Counsel 审理法官：委员会合议庭：MALPHRUS 和 LIEBOWITZ，委员会成员；MORRIS，临时委员会成员 MALPHRUS，委员会成员： 在2017年7月3日的决定中，移民法官认定被申请人根据《移民与国籍法》第237(a)(1)(A)条、8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A) (2012) 可被驱逐，理由是其作为在调整身份时根据该法第212(a)(6)(C)(i)条、8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) (2012) 不可入境的外国人，因其实施欺诈或对重要事实的故意虚假陈述。1 被申请人对该决定提出上诉。上诉将被驳回。

1 The respondents were also charged with removability under section 237(a)(1)(A) of the Act based on their inadmissibility under section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), as aliens who did not possess valid immigrant visas, and under section 237(a)(1)(B), as nonimmigrants who remained in the United States longer than permitted. The Immigration Judge did not sustain the charge based on section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) and the Government has not appealed that issue, so it is deemed waived. Matter of N-A-I-, 27 I&N Dec. 72, 73 n.1 (BIA 2017). Given our disposition of this case, we need not address the respondents’ challenge to the Immigration Judge’s finding that they are removable under section 237(a)(1)(B).

1 被申请人还根据该法第237(a)(1)(A)条被指控可被驱逐，理由是其根据第212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)条作为未持有有效移民签证的外国人不可入境，以及根据第237(a)(1)(B)条作为超过许可期限滞留美国的非移民不可入境。移民法官未支持基于第212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)条的指控，且政府未对该问题提出上诉，因此视为放弃。Matter of N-A-I-, 27 I&N Dec. 72, 73 n.1 (BIA 2017)。鉴于我们对本案的处理，我们无需处理被申请人对移民法官认定其根据第237(a)(1)(B)条可被驱逐的质疑。

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Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 496 (BIA 2018) Interim Decision #3948

引用为 27 I&N Dec. 496 (BIA 2018) 临时决定 #3948

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The respondents, a husband and wife, are natives and citizens of Venezuela who were admitted to the United States on March 3, 1993, as nonimmigrant visitors with authorization to remain until September 2, 1993. 2 On December 17, 1997, a visa petition was filed in the name of St. Mark Catholic Church seeking to classify the respondent as a special immigrant religious worker, along with supporting documents claiming that he worked as a minister at the church. Although the respondent was never employed by the church, he filed an application for adjustment of status on September 30, 1998, accompanied by a Form G-325A (Biographic Information) stating that he had worked at St. Mark as a minister for several years. The respondent and his wife, who was a derivative beneficiary of his special immigrant visa petition, were granted adjustment of status on January 13, 2000, based on his status as a religious worker. On April 25, 2011, the respondents arrived at the Miami airport and applied for admission as returning residents. The respondent was referred to deferred inspection where he signed a sworn statement admitting that he never worked as a minister in the United States, yet he became a permanent resident as a religious worker. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) initiated removal proceedings, alleging that the respondents had obtained permanent resident status by fraud or willful misrepresentation of a material fact. In proceedings before the Immigration Judge, the respondent claimed that until he was in deferred inspection at the airport, he did not know his adjustment of status application falsely claimed that he worked as a minister. He testified that he entered the United States as a nonimmigrant and was referred to a person who he understood could represent him in his effort to obtain permanent immigration status. He further stated that the representative, who he believed was an attorney and pastor, told the respondent that for $15,000 he could help him become a permanent resident “through the church.” The respondent explained that his application for adjustment of status and the supporting documents were prepared by the representative and his staff. He conceded that he signed the adjustment application, but he claimed that he did not know its contents because he did not speak or read English. His wife also admitted that she signed an adjustment application, which was dependent on the respondent’s status as a religious worker, but said she did not know it contained false information.

I. 事实与程序历史 被申请人是一对夫妻，为委内瑞拉国民和公民，于1993年3月3日作为非移民访客获准入境美国，授权停留至1993年9月2日。2 1997年12月17日，以圣马可天主教堂名义提交了一份签证申请，寻求将被申请人归类为特殊移民宗教工作者，并附有支持文件，声称其在该教堂担任牧师。尽管被申请人从未受雇于该教堂，但其于1998年9月30日提交了调整身份申请，并附有G-325A表（履历信息），声明其已在圣马可担任牧师数年。被申请人及其妻子（其特殊移民签证申请的衍生受益人）于2000年1月13日基于其宗教工作者身份获得调整身份。 2011年4月25日，被申请人抵达迈阿密机场并申请作为回美居民入境。被申请人被转至 deferred inspection（延期检查），在那里其签署了一份宣誓声明，承认其从未在美国担任牧师，却以宗教工作者身份成为永久居民。国土安全部（“DHS”）启动了驱逐程序，指称被申请人通过欺诈或对重要事实的故意虚假陈述获得了永久居民身份。 在移民法官面前的程序中，被申请人声称，直到其在机场接受延期检查时，其才知道其调整身份申请中虚假声称其担任牧师。其作证称，其作为非移民进入美国，并被介绍给一个其认为可以代表其努力获得永久移民身份的人。其进一步陈述，该代表（其认为是律师和牧师）告诉被申请人，支付15,000美元即可帮助其“通过教堂”成为永久居民。 被申请人解释称，其调整身份申请及支持文件由该代表及其工作人员准备。其承认签署了调整申请，但声称其不知道内容，因为其不会说或读英语。其妻子也承认签署了一份调整申请，该申请依赖于被申请人的宗教工作者身份，但表示其不知道其中包含虚假信息。

2 Unless otherwise specified, we will refer to the husband, who is the lead respondent, as “the respondent.”

2 除非另有说明，我们将称丈夫（主要被申请人）为“被申请人”。

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Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 496 (BIA 2018) Interim Decision #3948

引用为 27 I&N Dec. 496 (BIA 2018) 临时决定 #3948

The Immigration Judge concluded that the respondents were not credible and held that they procured adjustment of status by willful misrepresentation of a material fact. He therefore found them to be removable as aliens who are inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act. 3

移民法官认定被申请人不具可信性，并裁定其通过对重要事实的故意虚假陈述获得了调整身份。因此，其认定被申请人作为根据该法第212(a)(6)(C)(i)条不可入境的外国人可被驱逐。3

II. ANALYSIS According to section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act, “Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.” Misrepresentations are willful if they are “deliberately made with knowledge of their falsity.” Matter of S- and B-C-, 9 I&N Dec. 436, 445 (BIA 1960; A.G. 1961); see also Suite v. INS, 594 F.2d 972, 973 (3d Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (stating that “knowledge of the falsity of a representation is sufficient to satisfy the scienter element” of willfulness, which “entail[s] voluntary and deliberate activity”); Matter of Kai Hing Hui, 15 I&N Dec. 288, 289–90 (BIA 1975) (noting that, unlike fraud, a finding of willfulness does not require an “intent to deceive”). A misrepresentation is material when it has a “natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decision-making body to which it was addressed.” United States v. Boffil-Rivera, 607 F.3d 736, 741 (11th Cir. 2010) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). To establish the respondents’ removability, the DHS offered a number of documents into evidence, including the visa petition to classify the respondent as a special immigrant religious worker. Supporting documents filed with the visa petition purported to certify that the respondent was an ordained minister who was a salaried employee at St. Mark Catholic Church. The respondent’s application for adjustment of status also stated that his occupation was a minister, and his biographic information form indicated that he worked at St. Mark from May 1995 to September 30, 1998, the date the documents were signed. The DHS also submitted a transcript of the respondent’s 2011 airport interview, in which he admitted to immigration officials that he had signed papers to apply for immigration benefits as a religious worker and had been granted permanent resident status on that basis, but he had never worked at the church. In holding that the respondents made willful misrepresentations, the Immigration Judge found that they knew of or authorized the false statements their representative made on their behalf in their applications

II. 分析 根据该法第212(a)(6)(C)(i)条，“任何外国人，通过欺诈或故意虚假陈述重要事实，寻求获得（或已寻求获得或已获得）签证、其他文件、或入境美国或本法提供的其他利益，均不可入境。”虚假陈述如果是“在知道其虚假性的情况下故意作出的”，则为故意。Matter of S- and B-C-, 9 I&N Dec. 436, 445 (BIA 1960; A.G. 1961)；另见 Suite v. INS, 594 F.2d 972, 973 (3d Cir. 1979)（per curiam）（指出“知道陈述的虚假性足以满足故意性的明知要素”，该故意性“涉及自愿和故意的活动”）；Matter of Kai Hing Hui, 15 I&N Dec. 288, 289–90 (BIA 1975)（指出与欺诈不同，认定故意性不需要“欺骗意图”）。虚假陈述在具有“影响或能够影响其针对的决策机构的决定的自然倾向”时即为重要。United States v. Boffil-Rivera, 607 F.3d 736, 741 (11th Cir. 2010)（原文有改动）（引文省略）。 为证明被申请人可被驱逐，DHS提交了多份文件作为证据，包括将被申请人归类为特殊移民宗教工作者的签证申请。随签证申请提交的支持文件声称证明被申请人是受薪受雇于圣马可天主教堂的受任牧师。被申请人的调整身份申请也声明其职业为牧师，其履历信息表表明其从1995年5月至1998年9月30日（文件签署日期）在圣马可工作。DHS还提交了被申请人2011年机场面谈的记录，其中其向移民官员承认其签署了作为宗教工作者申请移民利益的文件，并基于此获得永久居民身份，但其从未在教堂工作。 在认定被申请人作出故意虚假陈述时，移民法官认定其知道或授权其代表在申请中以其名义作出的虚假陈述

3 The Immigration Judge also denied the respondents’ request for a waiver of their removability under section 237(a)(1)(H) of the Act. However, they have not raised that issue on appeal, so it is deemed waived. Matter of N-A-I-, 27 I&N Dec. at 73 n.1.

3 移民法官还驳回了被申请人根据该法第237(a)(1)(H)条请求豁免其可驱逐性的申请。然而，其未在上诉中提出该问题，因此视为放弃。Matter of N-A-I-, 27 I&N Dec. at 73 n.1。

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Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 496 (BIA 2018) Interim Decision #3948

引用为 27 I&N Dec. 496 (BIA 2018) 临时决定 #3948

for permanent resident status. The respondents claim that because the documents were in English, they could not read them and were unaware of their contents. Citing Ortiz-Bouchet v. U.S. Attorney General, 714 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam), the respondents argue that the Immigration Judge erred because the evidence in the record is not sufficient to support the conclusion that they made a willful misrepresentation. We disagree. Courts have held “in various contexts, including immigration cases, [that] one’s signature on a form or contract establishes a strong presumption” that the signer knows its contents and has assented to them, absent evidence of fraud or other wrongful acts by another person. Thompson v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 638, 647 (6th Cir. 2015); see also, e.g., United States v. Baptist, 759 F.3d 690, 696 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding that an alien’s failure to read a waiver form containing clear warnings of its consequences was insufficient to prove that the waiver was invalid, absent evidence that he was tricked or pressured into signing it); cf. Bingham v. Holder, 637 F.3d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that in the absence of fraud or other wrongful act on the part of another, a person who signs a contract is presumed to know its contents and to assent to them). The regulations also support this legal principle. For example, the asylum regulations provide that an “applicant’s signature [on an asylum application] establishes a presumption that the applicant is aware of the contents of the application.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.3(c)(2), 1208.3(c)(2) (2018); see also Matter of Y-L-, 24 I&N Dec. 151, 161 (BIA 2007) (rejecting the respondent’s assertion that his attorney was to blame for including incorrect information in his asylum application). Thus, an alien’s signature on an immigration application establishes a strong presumption that he or she knows the contents of the application and has assented to them. See Hanna v. Gonzales, 128 F. App’x 478, 480 (6th Cir. 2005) (stating that “the law . . . charges [an applicant] with knowledge of the application’s contents”). When an alien challenges the accuracy of the contents of a signed application, the Immigration Judge must evaluate the alien’s explanations and consider the facts of the particular case to determine whether he or she has rebutted the presumption of knowledge of the document’s contents. See Zhi Wei Pang v. BCIS, 448 F.3d 102, 107–08 (2d Cir. 2006). However, an alien may not deliberately avoid reading the application or having it explained or translated in an attempt to circumvent the presumption. See Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289, 1301 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting “the general principle that ‘[o]ne who has executed a written contract and is ignorant of its contents cannot set up that ignorance to avoid the obligation absent fraud and misrepresentation’” (citation omitted)); cf. United States v. Puente, 982 F.2d 156, 159 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that “a defendant who

以获得永久居民身份。被申请人声称，由于文件是英文的，他们无法阅读，也不了解其内容。被申请人援引 Ortiz-Bouchet v. U.S. Attorney General, 714 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2013)（per curiam），主张移民法官存在错误，因为记录中的证据不足以支持他们作出故意虚假陈述的结论。我们不同意。 法院已认定，“在各种语境下，包括移民案件中，[某人]在表格或合同上的签名确立了一项强有力的推定”，即签署人知悉其内容并已同意，除非有证据表明存在欺诈或他人的其他不法行为。Thompson v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 638, 647 (6th Cir. 2015)；另见，例如，United States v. Baptist, 759 F.3d 690, 696 (7th Cir. 2014)（认定外国人未阅读含有明确后果警告的豁免表格，不足以证明该豁免无效，除非有证据表明其被欺骗或被施压签署该表格）；cf. Bingham v. Holder, 637 F.3d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 2011)（指出在不存在他人欺诈或其他不法行为的情况下，签署合同的人被推定知悉其内容并同意之）。 相关法规亦支持这一法律原则。例如，庇护法规规定，“申请人[在庇护申请上]的签名确立一项推定，即申请人知悉申请的内容。”8 C.F.R. §§ 208.3(c)(2), 1208.3(c)(2) (2018)；另见 Matter of Y-L-, 24 I&N Dec. 151, 161 (BIA 2007)（驳回被申请人关于其律师应对在其庇护申请中列入不正确信息负责的主张）。因此，外国人在移民申请上的签名确立了一项强有力的推定，即其知悉申请的内容并已同意之。See Hanna v. Gonzales, 128 F. App’x 478, 480 (6th Cir. 2005)（指出“法律……要求[申请人]知悉申请的内容”）。 当外国人对已签署申请内容的准确性提出质疑时，移民法官必须评估该外国人的解释，并考虑具体案件的事实，以确定其是否已推翻关于知悉文件内容的推定。See Zhi Wei Pang v. BCIS, 448 F.3d 102, 107–08 (2d Cir. 2006)。然而，外国人不得故意避免阅读申请或要求对其进行解释或翻译，以试图规避该推定。See Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289, 1301 (11th Cir. 2005)（指出“一般原则，即‘已签署书面合同但对其内容不知情者，不能以该不知情为由逃避义务，除非存在欺诈和虚假陈述’”（引文省略））；cf. United States v. Puente, 982 F.2d 156, 159 (5th Cir. 1993)（认定“故意避免阅读其所签署表格的被告

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Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 496 (BIA 2018) Interim Decision #3948

deliberately avoids reading the form he is signing cannot avoid criminal sanctions for any false statements contained therein”). It is undisputed that the respondents signed adjustment applications that were based on the assertion that the respondent was employed as a religious worker at St. Mark Catholic Church. A strong presumption that they knew the contents of their documents arose from the fact that they signed the documents. To rebut the presumption, they primarily argue that they were unaware of the false statements in their applications because they did not know English and the documents were never translated for them. Given the nature and significance of immigration documents, however, it is reasonable to expect that aliens will take steps to ascertain the accuracy of documents they sign and obtain a translation, if necessary. In assessing whether the respondents knew of or authorized the false statements in their applications, the Immigration Judge found that they lacked credibility. He determined that their testimony was inconsistent in various significant respects and that their recitation of events was unpersuasive because it was vague and elusive. The Immigration Judge also found that, under the questionable circumstances of this case, it was implausible that the respondents were unaware of the inaccuracies in the documents they signed. The respondent admitted he never worked at St. Mark. He gave conflicting testimony regarding his involvement with the church, including whether he ever even attended services there. Although he initially stated that he first became a member and helped with catechism classes there sometime between 1995 and 1997, he later testified that he never attended St. Mark but, instead, went to a different Catholic church from 1996 to 1999. Moreover, the respondent’s testimony about the date he began going to St. Mark was not in agreement with that of his wife, who stated that her family only went to that church after 1998. In addition, after testifying that he told his representative he attended St. Mark, the respondent later retracted his statement and said that they never discussed whether he went to church. The respondent also admitted in his airport interview that he obtained permanent resident status as a religious worker, even though he was not a minister and was never paid a salary by a religious organization. He testified that the $15,000 he paid the representative was a lot of money and acknowledged that the promise to obtain permanent residence for him “through the church” seemed “too good to be true.” He never inquired how he could do this, despite the fact that he and his wife had several meetings with the representative and his staff. After carefully considering their testimony and the documentary evidence of record, the Immigration Judge found that the respondents were not credible and that their claim that they did not know about the

不能逃避对其中所含任何虚假陈述的刑事制裁”）。 无可争议的是，被申请人签署了调整身份申请，该申请基于被申请人在 St. Mark Catholic Church 受雇为宗教工作者的主张。他们签署了文件这一事实产生了他们知悉文件内容的强有力的推定。为推翻该推定，他们主要主张，由于他们不懂英语且文件从未为他们翻译，他们不知道申请中的虚假陈述。然而，鉴于移民文件的性质和重要性，期望外国人采取措施查明其所签署文件的准确性并在必要时获得翻译是合理的。 在评估被申请人是否知悉或授权其申请中的虚假陈述时，移民法官认定他们缺乏可信度。他认定他们的证词在多个重要方面不一致，且他们对事件的叙述因含糊和难以捉摸而不具说服力。移民法官还认定，在本案可疑的情形下，被申请人不知道其所签署文件中的不准确之处是不可信的。 被申请人承认他从未在 St. Mark 工作过。他就其与该教会的关联提供了相互矛盾的证词，包括他是否曾在那里参加礼拜。尽管他最初称他于1995年至1997年间的某个时候首次成为成员并在那里协助教理班，但他后来作证说他从未去过 St. Mark，而是从1996年到1999年去了另一家天主教堂。此外，被申请人关于他开始去 St. Mark 的日期的证词与其妻子的证词不一致，其妻子称她的家人只是在1998年之后才去该教堂。此外，在作证称他告诉其代表他去过 St. Mark 之后，被申请人后来撤回了该陈述，并称他们从未讨论过他是否去教堂。 被申请人还在其机场面谈中承认，他以宗教工作者身份获得了永久居民身份，尽管他并非牧师，也从未从宗教组织领取过薪水。他作证说，他支付给代表的15,000美元是一大笔钱，并承认承诺“通过教会”为他获得永久居留权似乎“好得令人难以置信”。他从未询问他如何能做到这一点，尽管他和妻子与代表及其工作人员多次会面。 在仔细考虑他们的证词和记录中的书面证据后，移民法官认定被申请人不具可信度，且他们关于不知道

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Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 496 (BIA 2018) Interim Decision #3948

Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 496 (BIA 2018) Interim Decision #3948

misrepresentations in their applications was implausible. The Immigration Judge was entitled to make “reasonable inferences from direct and circumstantial evidence of the record as a whole” and was not required to interpret the evidence in the manner advocated by the respondents. Matter of D-R-, 25 I&N Dec. 445, 454–55 (BIA 2011), remanded on other grounds, Radojkovic v. Holder, 599 F. App’x 646, 648 (9th Cir. 2015). Consequently, there is no clear error in the Immigration Judge’s adverse credibility finding or in his determination that the respondents were aware of or authorized the false statements the representative made on their behalf. See section 240(c)(4)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(C) (2012); Carrizo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 652 F.3d 1326, 1332 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). Even if the respondents were credible, they signed documents that contained false statements without asking that they be translated or explained. The respondent’s signature was directly below a statement certifying, under penalty of perjury, that his application and the evidence submitted with it were all true and correct. The respondent conceded that he knew that the adjustment application he signed was to obtain immigration status as a religious worker and that he had never been employed at St. Mark Catholic Church. The respondent’s wife, his derivative beneficiary, admitted that the representative told her the adjustment application was for her to become a permanent resident before she signed the same statement attesting to the truth of her application and all the supporting documents. Significantly, neither of the respondents claimed to have been misled or deceived by the representative or his staff. At a minimum, the facts and circumstances indicate that the respondents made a conscious choice to avoid knowing about the misrepresentations their applications contained. Such deliberate avoidance does not excuse their false statements. See Hanna, 128 F. App’x at 480 (rejecting an alien’s claim that he did not willfully misrepresent facts in an adjustment application that he had declined to read and finding that his “failure to apprise himself of the contents of this important document constituted deliberate avoidance—an act the law generally does not recognize as a defense to misrepresentation” (emphasis added)); see also Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1301; Puente, 982 F.2d at 159. Under the circumstances, we conclude that the Immigration Judge properly applied the presumption of knowledge and determined that the respondents knew of or authorized the falsehoods in their documents. See Thompson, 788 F.3d at 647; Diaz v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 730 F. App’x 890, 891–92 (11th Cir. 2018) (mem.) (per curiam). See generally Matter of Gomez-Beltran, 26 I&N Dec. 765, 768 (BIA 2016) (“Truthful testimony and disclosures are critical to the effective operation of the immigration court system.”).

其申请中虚假陈述的主张不可信。移民法官有权“从记录整体的直接和间接证据中作出合理推断”，且无需以被申请人所主张的方式解释证据。Matter of D-R-, 25 I&N Dec. 445, 454–55 (BIA 2011)，因其他理由发回重审，Radojkovic v. Holder, 599 F. App’x 646, 648 (9th Cir. 2015)。因此，移民法官的不利可信度认定或其关于被申请人知悉或授权代表以其名义作出的虚假陈述的认定不存在明显错误。See section 240(c)(4)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(C) (2012)；Carrizo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 652 F.3d 1326, 1332 (11th Cir. 2011)（per curiam）。 即使被申请人可信，他们签署了含有虚假陈述的文件，却未要求对其进行翻译或解释。被申请人的签名直接位于一项声明之下，该声明在伪证处罚下证明其申请及随附证据均真实正确。被申请人承认他知道其签署的调整身份申请是为了以宗教工作者身份获得移民身份，且他从未在 St. Mark Catholic Church 受雇。被申请人的妻子，即其衍生受益人，承认代表在她签署同样证明其申请及所有支持文件真实性的声明之前告诉她，该调整身份申请是为了让她成为永久居民。值得注意的是，两名被申请人均未声称被代表或其工作人员误导或欺骗。 至少，事实和情形表明被申请人作出了避免知悉其申请所含虚假陈述的有意识选择。此种故意回避不能免除其虚假陈述。See Hanna, 128 F. App’x at 480（驳回外国人关于其未在拒绝阅读的调整身份申请中故意虚假陈述事实的主张，并认定其“未能使自己了解这一重要文件的内容构成故意回避——法律一般不承认该行为为虚假陈述的抗辩”（强调为原文所加））；另见 Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1301；Puente, 982 F.2d at 159。在此情形下，我们认定移民法官正确适用了知悉推定，并认定被申请人知悉或授权了其文件中的虚假内容。See Thompson, 788 F.3d at 647；Diaz v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 730 F. App’x 890, 891–92 (11th Cir. 2018)（mem.）（per curiam）。See generally Matter of Gomez-Beltran, 26 I&N Dec. 765, 768 (BIA 2016)（“真实的证词和披露对移民法庭系统的有效运作至关重要。”）。

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Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 496 (BIA 2018) Interim Decision #3948

Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 496 (BIA 2018) Interim Decision #3948

The respondents’ reliance on Ortiz-Bouchet is misplaced. Unlike the respondents, the alien in that case claimed that he had never seen the documents and that his signature on them had been forged. In addition, the Immigration Judge in that case expressly determined that the alien “did not personally willfully misrepresent a material fact.” Ortiz-Bouchet, 714 F.3d at 1356. The court therefore found no substantial evidence that the alien “made, knew of, or authorized” the representative’s misrepresentation on his behalf. Id. at 1357. Here, the respondents have admitted that they signed their adjustment applications. Their signatures established a strong presumption that they knew the contents and assented to them. See Thompson, 788 F.3d at 647; Hanna, 128 F. App’x at 480. After reviewing all the facts of the respondents’ case, the Immigration Judge found that they were not credible because their testimony was inconsistent and evasive and their claim of ignorance about the contents of their applications was implausible. See Alhuay v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 661 F.3d 534, 546–47 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). He concluded that the respondents did not rebut the presumption of knowledge, and he made a permissible inference that they knew of or authorized the false statements the representative made on their behalf. See United States v. Gaines, 690 F.2d 849, 853 (11th Cir. 1982) (A “permissible inference . . . is a common evidentiary tool that allows, without requiring, the trier of fact to infer the existence of an elemental fact upon proof of a basic evidentiary fact”). We conclude that there is no clear error in the Immigration Judge’s adverse credibility finding or his determination that the respondents procured their adjustment of status by willful misrepresentation of a material fact. See section 240(c)(4)(C) of the Act; Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985) (stating that a finding that is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety is not clearly erroneous). Consequently, the DHS met its burden of proof to establish that they are removable under section 237(a)(1)(A) of the Act, as aliens who were inadmissible at the time of adjustment of status under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i). See section 240(c)(3)(A) of the Act; Matter of D-R-, 27 I&N Dec. 105, 113 (BIA 2017); Matter of Bosuego, 17 I&N Dec. 125, 131 (BIA 1979, 1980); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(a) (2018). Accordingly, the respondents’ appeal will be dismissed. ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

被申请人依赖Ortiz-Bouchet案是错误的。与被申请人不同，该案中的外国人声称他从未见过这些文件，且文件上他的签名系伪造。此外，该案的移民法官明确认定该外国人“并未亲自故意虚假陈述重大事实”。Ortiz-Bouchet, 714 F.3d at 1356。因此，法院认定没有实质证据表明该外国人“作出、知悉或授权”代表其本人的代理人的虚假陈述。Id. at 1357。 在此，被申请人已承认他们签署了调整身份申请。他们的签名确立了一项强有力的推定，即他们知悉申请内容并予以同意。See Thompson, 788 F.3d at 647; Hanna, 128 F. App'x at 480。在审查被申请人案件的全部事实后，移民法官认定他们不可信，因为他们的证言前后矛盾且回避，且他们声称对申请内容不知情不合情理。See Alhuay v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 661 F.3d 534, 546–47 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam)。他认定被申请人未能推翻知悉推定，并作出了一项允许的推论，即他们知悉或授权了代表其本人的代理人所作的虚假陈述。See United States v. Gaines, 690 F.2d 849, 853 (11th Cir. 1982)（“允许的推论……是一种常见的证据工具，它允许而非要求事实认定者在证明某一基本证据事实后推断某一要件事实的存在”）。 我们认定，移民法官的不利可信性认定或其关于被申请人通过故意虚假陈述重大事实取得调整身份的认定不存在明显错误。See section 240(c)(4)(C) of the Act; Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)（指出，从整体记录来看合理的认定不属于明显错误）。因此，DHS履行了其举证责任，证明根据该法第237(a)(1)(A)条，他们作为在调整身份时根据第212(a)(6)(C)(i)条不可入境的外国人，应予驱逐。See section 240(c)(3)(A) of the Act; Matter of D-R-, 27 I&N Dec. 105, 113 (BIA 2017); Matter of Bosuego, 17 I&N Dec. 125, 131 (BIA 1979, 1980); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(a) (2018)。据此，被申请人的上诉将被驳回。 命令：上诉驳回。

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