Matter of Mendez-Moralez

Interim Decision #3272

临时决定第3272号

File A41 940 178 - Lincoln

案卷号A41 940 178 - 林肯

Decided April 12, 1996

1996年4月12日决定

U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals

美国司法部 移民审查执行办公室 移民上诉委员会

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

一、程序历史

In a decision dated November 22, 1994, an Immigration Judge found the respondent deportable as charged under section 241(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Immi- gration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(i) (1994), as an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within 5 years of entry into the United States. He also denied his application for adjustment of status under section 245(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (1994), as well as his corresponding application for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (1994), and ordered him deported from the United States to Mexico. The respondent has appealed from that decision. The appeal will be dismissed.

在1994年11月22日的决定中，移民法官认定被申请人根据《移民与国籍法》第241(a)(2)(A)(i)条，8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(i) (1994)，作为在入境美国后5年内犯有涉及道德败坏罪行的外籍人士而被指控可驱逐。他还拒绝了被申请人根据该法第245(a)条，8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (1994)提出的调整身份申请，以及其根据该法第212(h)条，8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (1994)提出的相应的不予受理豁免申请，并命令将其从美国驱逐至墨西哥。被申请人对该决定提出上诉。上诉将被驳回。

II. ISSUE PRESENTED

二、提出的问题

The respondent, a 42-year-old native and citizen of Mexico, was first admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident on May 2, 1988. He was convicted in a Nebraska court by a jury verdict on November 19, 1992, of first degree sexual assault, in violation of section 28-319(1)(c) of the Nebraska Revised Statutes. For this crime, committed in April or May 1992, the respondent was sentenced on January 5, 1993, to an indeterminate sen- tence of 2 to 3 years. Reportedly, he was released from prison on parole in January 1995, after having served 1 year of his sentence. The respondent con- ceded his deportability during the proceedings and has not contested his deportability on appeal. The only issue before us is whether the Immigration Judge properly denied the respondent’s application for adjustment of status under section 245 of the Act and, in the exercise of discretion, the corre- sponding waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Act. We find that he did.

被申请人，42岁，墨西哥本土公民，于1988年5月2日首次作为合法永久居民入境美国。他于1992年11月19日在内布拉斯加州法院经陪审团裁决被判犯有一级性侵犯罪，违反了《内布拉斯加州修订法规》第28-319(1)(c)条。对于该罪行，发生于1992年4月或5月，被申请人于1993年1月5日被判处2至3年的不定期刑。据报道，他于1995年1月在服刑1年后被假释出狱。被申请人在诉讼中承认其可驱逐性，且在上诉中未对其可驱逐性提出异议。我们面前唯一的问题是移民法官是否正确拒绝了被申请人根据该法第245条提出的调整身份申请，以及行使自由裁量权根据该法第212(h)条提出的相应的不予受理豁免。我们认定他确实正确拒绝了。

III. ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS UNDER SECTION 245

三、根据第245条调整身份

Section 245 of the Act provides that the Attorney General may in her dis- cretion adjust the status of an alien inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if the alien applies for adjustment, the alien is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United States for permanent residence, and an immigrant visa is immediately available. An alien subject to deportation pro- ceedings may also apply for adjustment of status before the Immigration

该法第245条规定，司法部长可以自行决定将经检查并准许入境或假释入境美国的外籍人士的身份调整为合法永久居民，如果该外籍人士申请调整身份，有资格获得移民签证并可入境美国永久居留，且移民签证可立即获得。处于驱逐程序中的外籍人士也可以在移民法官面前申请调整身份，并且，如果根据该法第212(a)条不予受理，还可以申请豁免不予受理理由。见8 C.F.R. § 242.17(a) (1995)。在我们面前的案件中，被申请人的调整身份申请基于其1987年2月20日与美国公民的婚姻以及她代表他提交的近亲属签证申请，该申请于1994年11月21日被移民与归化局批准。因此，被申请人似乎有资格获得可立即获得的移民签证。他作为合法永久居民的事实并不妨碍他根据第245条申请调整身份。Tibke v. INS, 335 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1964); Matter of Parodi, 17 I&N Dec. 608 (BIA 1980); Matter of Loo Bing Sun, 15 I&N Dec. 307 (BIA 1975); Matter of Krastman, 11 I&N Dec. 720 (BIA 1966); 另见 Matter of Gabryelsky, 20 I&N Dec. 750 (BIA 1993)。

Judge and, if inadmissible under section 212(a) of the Act, may also apply for a waiver of the ground of inadmissibility. See 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(a) (1995). In the case before us the respondent’s application for adjustment of status is based on his February 20, 1987, marriage to a United States citizen and the immediate relative visa petition she filed on his behalf, which was approved by the Immigration and Naturalization Service on November 21, 1994. As such, it appears that the respondent is eligible for an immigrant visa that is immediately available to him. The fact that he is a lawful permanent resident does not preclude him from applying for adjustment of status under section 245. Tibke v. INS, 335 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1964); Matter of Parodi, 17 I&N Dec. 608 (BIA 1980); Matter of Loo Bing Sun, 15 I&N Dec. 307 (BIA 1975); Mat- ter of Krastman, 11 I&N Dec. 720 (BIA 1966); see also Matter of Gabryelsky, 20 I&N Dec. 750 (BIA 1993).

法官面前，并且，如果根据该法第212(a)条不予受理，还可以申请豁免不予受理理由。见8 C.F.R. § 242.17(a) (1995)。在我们面前的案件中，被申请人的调整身份申请基于其1987年2月20日与美国公民的婚姻以及她代表他提交的近亲属签证申请，该申请于1994年11月21日被移民与归化局批准。因此，被申请人似乎有资格获得可立即获得的移民签证。他作为合法永久居民的事实并不妨碍他根据第245条申请调整身份。Tibke v. INS, 335 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1964); Matter of Parodi, 17 I&N Dec. 608 (BIA 1980); Matter of Loo Bing Sun, 15 I&N Dec. 307 (BIA 1975); Matter of Krastman, 11 I&N Dec. 720 (BIA 1966); 另见 Matter of Gabryelsky, 20 I&N Dec. 750 (BIA 1993)。

IV. WAIVER OF INADMISSIBILITY UNDER SECTION 212(h)

四、根据第212(h)条豁免不予受理

However, the respondent is not admissible to the United States as required for eligibility under section 245. By virtue of his conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude, he is inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act. An alien who is inadmissible under this section as an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude may seek a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Act. Section 212(h) may be used to waive inadmissibility which would otherwise preclude adjustment of status. See Osuchukwu v. INS, 744 F.2d 1136, 1139 (5th Cir. 1984); Matter of Goldeshtein, 20 I&N Dec. 382 (BIA 1991), rev’d on other grounds, 8 F.3d 645 (9th Cir. 1993); Matter of Parodi, supra; Matter of Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 218 (BIA 1980); Matter of Shaughnessy, 12 I&N Dec. 810 (BIA 1968). Section 212(h) provides:

然而，被申请人不符合第245条资格要求中的可入境美国条件。由于他因涉及道德败坏的罪行被定罪，根据该法第212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)条，他不予受理。根据该条作为因涉及道德败坏的罪行被定罪的外籍人士而不予受理的外籍人士，可以根据该法第212(h)条寻求不予受理豁免。第212(h)条可用于豁免原本会妨碍调整身份的不予受理。见Osuchukwu v. INS, 744 F.2d 1136, 1139 (5th Cir. 1984); Matter of Goldeshtein, 20 I&N Dec. 382 (BIA 1991), 因其他理由被撤销，8 F.3d 645 (9th Cir. 1993); Matter of Parodi, 同上; Matter of Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 218 (BIA 1980); Matter of Shaughnessy, 12 I&N Dec. 810 (BIA 1968)。第212(h)条规定：

No waiver shall be provided under this subsection in the case of an alien who has been convicted of (or who has admitted committing acts that consti- tute) murder or criminal acts involving torture. The amended version of section 212(h) essentially creates two categories of immigrants eligible for section 212(h) relief. The first category includes any immigrant who meets eligibility criteria that largely concern the type of exclusion ground involved or when the excludable activity occurred, as well as issues of the alien’s rehabilitation and the national welfare, safety, or secu- rity of the United States. The second category includes immigrants who dem- onstrate the requisite relationship to a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident, and establish that their exclusion would result in extreme hardship to that relative. See Matter of Alarcon, 20 I&N Dec. 557 (BIA 1992). In the case at hand, the respondent, who is assimilated to the position of an immigrant for purposes of seeking adjustment of status, is married to a United States citizen and has three United States citizen children. As such, he may demonstrate eligibility under section 212(h)(1)(B) of the Act by estab- lishing extreme hardship to his United States citizen wife or children if he were excluded. In his decision the Immigration Judge in fact found that extreme hardship to the wife and children had been established, and that the respondent conse- quently was eligible for section 212(h) relief. However, he denied the section 212(h) waiver in the exercise of discretion, and accordingly found him ineli- gible for adjustment of status because of his inadmissibility resulting from his criminal conviction.

对于曾被判犯有（或承认实施构成）谋杀或涉及酷刑的犯罪行为的外籍人士，不得根据本款提供豁免。 经修订的第212(h)条基本上创建了两类有资格获得第212(h)条救济的移民。第一类包括任何符合资格标准的移民，这些标准主要涉及排除理由的类型或可排除活动发生的时间，以及外籍人士的改造和美国国家福利、安全或保障问题。第二类包括证明与美国公民或合法永久居民有必需关系，并证明其排除将导致该亲属极端困难的移民。见Matter of Alarcon, 20 I&N Dec. 557 (BIA 1992)。在本案中，被申请人为了寻求调整身份的目的被视为移民，与美国公民结婚并有三名美国公民子女。因此，他可以通过证明如果被排除将对其美国公民妻子或子女造成极端困难来证明符合该法第212(h)(1)(B)条的资格。 在其决定中，移民法官事实上认定已证明对妻子和子女的极端困难，因此被申请人有资格获得第212(h)条救济。然而，他在行使自由裁量权时拒绝了第212(h)条豁免，并因此认定由于他的刑事定罪导致的不予受理，他没有资格调整身份。

A. Exercise of Discretion Under Section 212(h)(1)(B): Factors Considered

A. 根据第212(h)(1)(B)条行使自由裁量权：考虑的因素

On appeal, the respondent has contested the discretionary denial of relief, arguing that he merited a favorable exercise of discretion in light of his equi- ties and the hardship to his family if he were deported. In the respondent’s view, the Immigration Judge erred in ruling that he had not demonstrated rehabilitation and in placing too much emphasis on his claim of innocence of the crime of which he was convicted. According to the respondent, the Immi- gration Judge also erred in requiring that rehabilitation be shown. As is true for other discretionary forms of relief, the burden is on the appli- cant to establish that a grant of a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h)(1)(B) of the Act is warranted in the exercise of discretion. See Matter of Fernandez, 14 I&N Dec. 24 (BIA 1972). This has been held to be the case for other waivers of inadmissibility. See Matter of Marin, 16 I&N Dec. 581 (BIA 1978) (section 212(c) waiver). As is also true for other waivers of inad- missibility that would allow an alien to be admitted to the United States as a

在上诉中，被上诉人（respondent）对酌情拒绝给予救济提出异议，主张鉴于其衡平因素以及若被驱逐出境将给其家庭造成的困难，他理应获得有利的酌情裁量。在被上诉人看来，移民法官裁定其未证明已改过自新，以及过分强调其声称对所定罪之罪行无罪，均属错误。据被上诉人所述，移民法官要求必须证明已改过自新亦属错误。 如同其他酌情形式的救济一样，申请人负有举证责任，证明根据该法第212(h)(1)(B)条授予不予受理豁免在行使酌情权时是有正当理由的。见Matter of Fernandez, 14 I&N Dec. 24 (BIA 1972)。对于其他不予受理豁免，亦已如此认定。见Matter of Marin, 16 I&N Dec. 581 (BIA 1978)（第212(c)条豁免）。同样如同其他允许外国人作为

lawful permanent resident, the Immigration Judge must balance the adverse factors evidencing an alien’s undesirability as a permanent resident with the social and humane considerations presented on his behalf to determine whether the grant of relief in the exercise of discretion appears to be in the best interests of this country. See id. We find this use of Matter of Marin, supra, as a general guide to be appro- priate. For the most part, it is prudent to avoid cross application, as between different types of relief, of particular principles or standards for the exercise of discretion. Id. However, our reference to Matter of Marin, supra, is only for the purpose of the approach taken in that case regarding the balancing of favorable and unfavorable factors within the context of the relief being sought under section 212(h)(1)(B) of the Act. See, e.g., Palmer v. INS, 4 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 1993) (balancing of discretionary factors under section 212(h)). We find this guidance to be helpful and applicable, given that both forms of relief address the question of whether aliens with criminal records should be admitted to the United States and allowed to reside in this country permanently. What we do not find applicable is the analysis for determining whether adjustment of status under section 245 of the Act is warranted in the exercise of discretion, as set forth in Matter of Arai, 13 I&N Dec. 494 (BIA 1970). There, the Board ruled that generally where there are adverse factors present, favorable factors such as family ties, hardship, length of residence in the United States, etc., will be considered as countervailing factors meriting a favorable exercise of discretion, and that in the absence of adverse factors, adjustment will be ordinarily granted in discretion. See also Matter of Blas, 15 I&N Dec. 626 (BIA 1974; A.G. 1976). This approach has no application to relief under section 212(h) of the Act. A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h) necessarily involves at least one adverse consideration, spe- cifically the criminal conviction or activity constituting the ground of exclu- sion sought to be waived. See Matter of Marin, supra, at 585. Thus, there can be no presumption that relief is warranted in the exercise of discretion. Fur- ther, this criminal conviction or activity would usually be more severe than any adverse factor present in the application for adjustment of status, presum- ing admissibility and general eligibility for adjustment of status. These principles taken from Matter of Marin, supra, are to be applied in the context of the particular considerations that will arise in an application for section 212(h)(1)(B) relief. Section 212(h)(1)(B) relief is its own distinct form of waiver, with the balancing of factors to be undertaken in view of the particular purposes either stated or inherent in the statute. To exemplify, we would emphasize two considerations that do not often arise in an application for section 212(c) relief. First, a section 212(h) applicant seeking to adjust his status need not be, and in most cases is not already, a lawful permanent resi- dent, and those lawful permanent residents that do apply may not necessarily have the length of residency attained by those eligible for section 212(c)

合法永久居民入境美国的不予受理豁免一样，移民法官必须权衡证明外国人不适宜作为永久居民的不利因素与其所提出的社会和人道考量，以确定在行使酌情权时授予救济是否似乎符合本国的最佳利益。见同上。 我们认为将上述Matter of Marin案作为一般指导予以运用是适当的。在大多数情况下，审慎的做法是避免在不同类型的救济之间交叉适用行使酌情权的特定原则或标准。同上。然而，我们援引上述Matter of Marin案，仅是为了该案在根据该法第212(h)(1)(B)条寻求救济的背景下权衡有利和不利因素所采取的方法。见，例如，Palmer v. INS, 4 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 1993)（根据第212(h)条权衡酌情因素）。我们认为这一指导是有益且可适用的，因为两种形式的救济均涉及有犯罪记录的外国人是否应被准许入境美国并获准在本国永久居留的问题。 我们认为不适用的是Matter of Arai, 13 I&N Dec. 494 (BIA 1970)中所阐述的、用于确定根据该法第245条在行使酌情权时调整身份是否有正当理由的分析。在该案中，委员会裁定，一般而言，在存在不利因素的情况下，家庭关系、困难、在美国居留的时间等有利因素将被视为值得有利行使酌情权的抵销因素，而在不存在不利因素的情况下，通常应酌情批准调整身份。另见Matter of Blas, 15 I&N Dec. 626 (BIA 1974; A.G. 1976)。这一方法不适用于该法第212(h)条下的救济。根据第212(h)条的不予受理豁免必然涉及至少一项不利考量，即构成寻求豁免之排除理由的刑事定罪或活动。见上述Matter of Marin案，第585页。因此，不能推定在行使酌情权时救济是有正当理由的。此外，该刑事定罪或活动通常比调整身份申请中存在的任何不利因素更为严重，前提是具备可受理性和调整身份的一般资格。 上述Matter of Marin案中的这些原则将在第212(h)(1)(B)条救济申请中出现的特定考量背景下予以适用。第212(h)(1)(B)条救济是其自身独特的豁免形式，因素的权衡应结合法规所明示或固有的特定目的进行。举例而言，我们要强调两项在第212(c)条救济申请中不常出现的考量。第一，寻求调整身份的第212(h)条申请人不必是、且在大多数情况下并非已是合法永久居民，而那些确实提出申请的合法永久居民未必具有有资格获得第212(c)条

relief. Secondly, those found eligible for relief under section 212(h)(1)(B) will by definition have already established extreme hardship to qualified family members, which would be a factor favorable to the alien in exercising discretion. We emphasize that establishing extreme hardship and eligibility for sec- tion 212(h)(1)(B) relief does not create any entitlement to that relief. Extreme hardship is a requirement for eligibility, but once established it is but one favorable discretionary factor to be considered. We would note, however, that an application for discretionary relief, including a waiver under section 212(h), may be denied in the exercise of discretion without express rulings on the question of statutory eligibility. Matter of Goldeshtein, supra; see also Silva v. Carter, 326 F.2d 315, 320 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 917 (1964); cf. INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444, 449 (1985); INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976). We also emphasize that the discretion- ary analysis discussed is specifically applicable only to those aliens applying for relief under subsection (B) of 212(h)(1), subsection (A) having particular eligibility criteria that, if met, will affect the exercise of discretion. In evaluating whether section 212(h)(1)(B) relief is warranted in the exer- cise of discretion, the factors adverse to the applicant include the nature and underlying circumstances of the exclusion ground at issue, the presence of additional significant violations of this country’s immigration laws, the exis- tence of a criminal record and, if so, its nature, recency and seriousness, and the presence of other evidence indicative of an alien’s bad character or undesirability as a permanent resident of this country. See e.g., Matter of Marin, supra, and cases cited therein. The favorable considerations include family ties in the United States, residence of long duration in this country (particularly where the alien began his residency at a young age), evidence of hardship to the alien and his family if he is excluded and deported, service in this country’s Armed Forces, a history of stable employment, the existence of property or business ties, evidence of value and service to the community, evidence of genuine rehabilitation if a criminal record exists, and other evi- dence attesting to the alien’s good character (e.g., affidavits from family, friends, and responsible community representatives). See, e.g., id., and cases cited therein. Upon review of the record as a whole, the Immigration Judge is required to balance the equities and adverse matters to determine whether discretion should be favorably exercised. The basis for the Immigration Judge’s deci- sion must be enunciated in his opinion. See, e.g., id. The equities that the applicant for section 212(h)(1)(B) relief must bring forward to establish that he merits a favorable exercise of administrative discretion will depend in each case on the nature and circumstances of the ground of exclusion sought to be waived and on the presence of any additional adverse matters, and as the negative factors grow more serious, it becomes incumbent upon the applicant to introduce additional offsetting favorable evidence. See, e.g., id.

救济者所达到的居留时长。第二，被认定有资格获得第212(h)(1)(B)条救济者，按定义已证明对合格家庭成员造成极端困难，这将是行使酌情权时有利于该外国人的一项因素。 我们强调，证明极端困难及具备第212(h)(1)(B)条救济资格并不产生获得该救济的任何权利。极端困难是资格的一项要求，但一旦证明，它仅是应予考虑的一项有利酌情因素。然而，我们要指出，酌情救济申请，包括第212(h)条下的豁免，可以在未对法定资格问题作出明确裁定的情况下，在行使酌情权时被拒绝。上述Matter of Goldeshtein案；另见Silva v. Carter, 326 F.2d 315, 320 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 917 (1964)；参见INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444, 449 (1985)；INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976)。我们还强调，所讨论的酌情分析仅具体适用于根据第212(h)(1)条(B)款申请救济的外国人，(A)款具有特定的资格标准，若满足该标准，将影响酌情权的行使。 在评估根据第212(h)(1)(B)条在行使酌情权时救济是否有正当理由时，对申请人不利的因素包括所涉排除理由的性质和基本情形、是否存在其他重大违反本国移民法的行为、是否存在犯罪记录以及若存在其性质、近期性和严重性，以及是否存在表明外国人人格不良或不适宜作为本国永久居民的其他证据。见，例如，上述Matter of Marin案及其中引用的案例。有利考量包括在美国的家庭关系、在本国的长期居留（特别是外国人年幼时即开始居留的情况）、若被排除和驱逐出境将给外国人及其家庭造成困难的证据、在本国武装部队服役、稳定就业的历史、财产或商业关系的存在、对社区的价值和服务的证据、若存在犯罪记录则真正改过自新的证据，以及证明外国人品格良好的其他证据（例如，来自家人、朋友和负责任的社区代表的宣誓书）。见，例如，同上及其中引用的案例。 在审查整体记录后，移民法官须权衡衡平因素和不利事项，以确定是否应有利地行使酌情权。移民法官决定的依据必须在其意见中阐明。见，例如，同上。第212(h)(1)(B)条救济申请人必须提出以证明其理应获得有利行使行政酌情权的衡平因素，将视寻求豁免的排除理由的性质和情形以及是否存在任何其他不利事项而在每个案件中有所不同，并且随着负面因素变得更为严重，申请人有责任提出额外的抵销性有利证据。见，例如，同上。

The underlying significance of the adverse and favorable factors is also to be taken into account. For example, if the alien has relatives in the United States, the quality of their relationship must be considered in determining the weight to be awarded this equity. Further, the equity of a marriage and the weight given to any hardship to the spouse is diminished if the parties married after the commencement of deportation proceedings, with knowledge that the alien might be deported. Ghassan v. INS, 972 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 971 (1993). Similarly, if the alien has a history of employ- ment, it is important to consider the type of employment and its length and stability. Further, when looking at the length of the alien’s presence in the United States, the nature of his presence during this period must be evaluated. For example, a period of residency marked by a term of imprisonment dimin- ishes the significance of the period of residency. See generally Douglas v. INS, 28 F.3d 241 (2d. Cir. 1994) (residency marked by criminal activity).

不利和有利因素的潜在意义也应予以考虑。例如，如果外国人在美国有亲属，在确定应赋予这一衡平因素多大权重时，必须考虑其关系的质量。此外，如果双方在驱逐程序开始后结婚，且明知该外国人可能被驱逐出境，则婚姻这一衡平因素以及赋予对配偶任何困难的权重均会减损。Ghassan v. INS, 972 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 971 (1993)。同样，如果外国人有就业历史，考虑就业类型及其时长和稳定性很重要。此外，在考察外国人在美国居留的时间长度时，必须评估其在此期间居留的性质。例如，以一段监禁期为标志的居留期会减损该居留期的意义。参见Douglas v. INS, 28 F.3d 241 (2d. Cir. 1994)（以犯罪活动为标志的居留）的一般论述。

B. Exercise of Discretion in Respondent’s Case

B. 被上诉人案件中的酌情权行使

Having reviewed the record and the Immigration Judge’s decision, and the contentions made on appeal, we agree with the Immigration Judge that a favorable exercise of discretion is not warranted. The respondent has demon- strated equities that may be characterized as substantial. Although he has only been in this country lawfully for a little more than 7 years, he does have significant family ties, including his United States citizen wife of 8 years. His United States citizen children include a 9-year-old stepson, a 7-year-old daughter, and a 4-year-old son. According to the wife’s testimony, the respondent has been a loving father and the children are close to him emo- tionally. The respondent also has a consistent history of employment as an agricultural worker and mechanic at various ranches, and he has testified that his most recent employer has assured him of a position as a mechanic at $6 an hour upon his release from prison. The record also reflects that the respon- dent has continuously supported his family financially before his incarcera- tion, except for a period in 1991 when he injured his back. The family began receiving food stamps that year, and since his incarceration they have also received welfare payments and housing assistance as well. The respondent’s wife last worked as a cashier for a department store from 1989 to 1991, when she was terminated from her employment because she was pregnant. The respondent also has other family ties in the United States, including two lawful permanent resident brothers living in Colorado and Kansas, a sis- ter living in Colorado, and his lawful permanent resident parents, who also live in Colorado and who are self-supporting. The respondent testified that his sister was not a lawful permanent resident, but he did not elaborate as to her specific status in this country. The respondent also testified that he has two children in Mexico, but he has no contact with them and does not know their whereabouts.

经审查案卷、移民法官的裁决以及上诉中提出的主张，我们同意移民法官的意见，即不应当作出有利的自由裁量行使。被申请人已证明具有可被定性为重大的衡平因素。尽管他合法居留于本国仅略多于7年，但他确实拥有重要的家庭纽带，包括与其结婚8年的美国公民妻子。他的美国公民子女包括一名9岁的继子、一名7岁的女儿和一名4岁的儿子。根据妻子的证词，被申请人一直是一位慈爱的父亲，孩子们在情感上与他亲近。被申请人还拥有在各牧场担任农业工人和机械师的持续就业记录，并且他作证称，其最近的雇主已向他保证，在他出狱后将获得一份时薪6美元的机械师职位。案卷还反映，被申请人在入狱前一直持续为家庭提供经济支持，但1991年他背部受伤的一段时间除外。该家庭当年开始领取食品券，自他入狱以来，他们还领取了福利金和住房援助。被申请人的妻子最后一份工作是在1989年至1991年期间在一家百货商店担任收银员，后因怀孕而被解雇。被申请人在美国还有其他家庭纽带，包括两名分别居住在科罗拉多州和堪萨斯州的合法永久居民兄弟、一名居住在科罗拉多州的姐妹，以及同样居住在科罗拉多州且自食其力的合法永久居民父母。被申请人作证称，他的姐妹不是合法永久居民，但他未详细说明她在本国的具体身份。被申请人还作证称，他在墨西哥有两名子女，但他与他们没有联系，也不知道他们的下落。

As noted above, the Immigration Judge found that the respondent’s depar- ture would cause extreme hardship to his wife and children, as they are dependent upon him financially and are emotionally close to him. The wife testified that if her husband were deported she would remain in the United States with the children and likely move to Kansas with her adoptive father. She also testified that she was receiving psychiatric treatment for depression, noting that she had attempted to commit suicide in 1992 after the criminal charges were filed against her husband, and observing that she was attempt- ing to obtain disability payments. She also observed that she had a medical condition involving her spine and hips that precluded her from lifting things. In sum, the respondent has demonstrated substantial equities in his favor, including hardship to his wife and children if he were deported. Some hard- ship to the respondent is also apparent in view of his ties to this country and the poor economic conditions in Mexico, as documented by news articles submitted by the respondent, although he has not demonstrated that he would be virtually precluded from finding employment in Mexico. However, his equities must be balanced against the adverse factors in his case, particularly the serious crime of which he was convicted. The seriousness of his crime can be seen from a reading of the statute under which he was convicted and the surrounding circumstances. The Nebraska statute in question provides: Sexual assault; first degree; penalty.

如上所述，移民法官认定，被申请人的离境将对其妻子和子女造成极端困难，因为他们在经济上依赖他，并且在情感上与他亲近。妻子作证称，如果她的丈夫被驱逐出境，她将与子女留在美国，并很可能与其养父一起搬到堪萨斯州。她还作证称，她正在接受抑郁症的精神治疗，并指出她曾在1992年对其丈夫提起刑事指控后试图自杀，还表示她正在试图获得残疾补助。她还表示，她患有涉及脊柱和髋部的疾病，使她无法提举物品。总之，被申请人已证明对其有利的重大衡平因素，包括若他被驱逐出境将对其妻子和子女造成的困难。鉴于他与本国的联系以及墨西哥糟糕的经济状况（如被申请人提交的新闻文章所记载），被申请人显然也面临一些困难，尽管他并未证明他将在墨西哥实际上无法找到工作。然而，他的衡平因素必须与本案中的不利因素相权衡，特别是他所被定罪的严重罪行。从他的定罪所依据的法规及周围情况的解读中可以看出其犯罪的严重性。所涉内布拉斯加州法规规定：性侵；一级；刑罚。

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-319 (1992). The respondent was convicted under section 28-319(1)(c) of sexually pen- etrating a victim under the age of 16. In fact the record before the Immigra- tion Judge made clear that the respondent’s victim was 13 years old at the time of the sexual assault, at a time when he was 40 years of age. 1 The young girl, who lived in the same apartment building, frequented the respondent’s home. Apparently she practically lived there, reportedly because her own mother was mentally disabled to some degree and did not exert much

《内布拉斯加州修订法规》第28-319条（1992年）。 被申请人根据第28-319(1)(c)条被定罪，罪名是对一名未满16岁的被害人实施性插入。事实上，移民法官面前的案卷明确显示，被申请人的被害人在性侵发生时年仅13岁，而他当时40岁。1 这名住在同一公寓楼的小女孩经常出入被申请人的家。显然她实际上住在那里，据报告是因为她自己的母亲在某种程度上精神残疾，没有施加太多

parental control, and the respondent and his wife were not willing to force her to leave. The respondent has acknowledged that their unwillingness to force her to leave led to situations where the young girl was present when he and his wife were watching sexually explicit movies or engaging in sexual inter- course themselves. He has also admitted soliciting the victim’s mentally dis- abled mother for sex, as repayment for money the mother had borrowed from him. According to the respondent, he did this in order to discourage her from asking to borrow more money. The circumstances of his crime clearly show its egregiousness. We point out that as a matter of law, a 13-year-old child is incapable of consent where the act is being perpetrated by a grown man 27 years older. Where a statute makes sexual acts with a child under a specified age a crime, without regard to consent, such statutes are construed as fixing the age of consent. The purpose of these statutes is to protect children from illicit acts by rendering them incapable of consenting. See Matter of Dingena, 11 I&N Dec. 723 (BIA 1966). Given the nature of the respondent’s crime, we do not find that his equities are sufficient to counterbalance its seriousness. We find this to be particularly so given that his equities do not include any persuasive evidence of rehabili- tation. We do not find his release from prison after 1 year due to his good con- duct in following prison rules in a controlled setting to be persuasive evidence of rehabilitation from his criminal act of sexually assaulting a young child. At his hearing, the respondent denied that the sexual assault ever occurred, stated that he had been “falsely accused,” and did not express remorse for his crime. In addition, when asked whether he had attempted to get any “sexual offender treatment,” he responded, “I believe that I do not have a sexual problem.” The respondent argues on appeal that his assertion of innocence should not be used against him because he is, in fact, innocent and the criminal justice system makes mistakes, and he therefore should not be forced to be dishonest with himself. However, in ascertaining the effect of a criminal conviction, neither the Board nor the Immigration Judge may go beyond the judicial record to determine the guilt or innocence of an alien. See Matter of Edwards, 20 I&N Dec. 191 (BIA 1990); Matter of Khalik, 17 I&N Dec. 518 (BIA 1980). He must be considered guilty of the crime. Taking responsibility and showing remorse for one’s criminal behavior does constitute some evidence of rehabilitation. See Gonzalez v. INS, 996 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1993); Villareal-San Miguel v. INS, 975 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1992); Akrap v. INS, 966 F.2d 267 (7th Cir. 1992). This is not to say that an alien who claims innocence and does not express remorse could never present persuasive evidence of rehabilitation by other means. But the fact remains that in the case before us, there is no evidence of remorse or of acknowledgement of guilt. Moreover, the claim of innocence is inconsistent with the jury verdict and the

父母的管束，而被申请人及其妻子不愿强迫她离开。被申请人已承认，他们不愿强迫她离开导致出现这样的情况：当他和妻子观看色情电影或自己进行性交时，这名小女孩在场。他还承认曾向被害人的精神残疾母亲招揽性行为，作为该母亲向他借款的偿还。据被申请人称，他这样做是为了阻止她再向他借钱。其犯罪的情况清楚地表明了其恶劣性。 我们指出，作为法律问题，当行为是由一名年长27岁的成年男子实施时，13岁的儿童无能力同意。当法规将与未满特定年龄儿童的性行为定为犯罪，而不论是否同意时，此类法规被解释为确定了同意年龄。这些法规的目的是通过使儿童无能力同意来保护他们免受非法行为侵害。见 Matter of Dingena, 11 I&N Dec. 723 (BIA 1966)。 鉴于被申请人犯罪的性质，我们不认为他的衡平因素足以抵消其严重性。我们尤其这样认为，因为他的衡平因素不包括任何有说服力的康复证据。我们不认为他因在受控环境中遵守监狱规则表现良好而在1年后获释，构成其性侵幼童犯罪行为康复的有说服力证据。在听证会上，被申请人否认性侵曾经发生，称他“被诬告”，并且未对其罪行表示悔意。此外，当被问及他是否曾尝试接受任何“性犯罪者治疗”时，他回答说：“我相信我没有性问题。” 被申请人在上诉中主张，他不应因主张无罪而被不利对待，因为他事实上是无罪的，刑事司法制度会犯错，因此他不应被迫对自己不诚实。然而，在确定刑事定罪的效果时，本委员会和移民法官均不得超出司法记录来确定外国人的有罪或无罪。见 Matter of Edwards, 20 I&N Dec. 191 (BIA 1990)；Matter of Khalik, 17 I&N Dec. 518 (BIA 1980)。必须认定他有罪。对自己的犯罪行为承担责任并表示悔意，确实构成一些康复证据。见 Gonzalez v. INS, 996 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1993)；Villareal-San Miguel v. INS, 975 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1992)；Akrap v. INS, 966 F.2d 267 (7th Cir. 1992)。这并不是说，主张无罪且不表示悔意的外国人永远不能通过其他方式提出有说服力的康复证据。但事实仍然是，在我们面前的案件中，没有悔意或承认有罪的证据。此外，无罪主张与陪审团裁决和

respondent’s own pre-trial admission that he had engaged in sexual inter- course with the victim. 2 The Board acknowledges the humanitarian concerns in this case, particu- larly the hardship to the respondent’s wife and children, but the Board also has the obligation to consider the welfare and safety of the other citizens and residents of this country in making its discretionary determination. In the case before us, we have an individual who sexually assaulted a 13-year-old girl. After serving a short period of imprisonment, he has not offered any sig- nificant evidence that he is rehabilitated from his criminal behavior. As pointed out by the respondent on appeal, a showing of rehabilitation is not an absolute prerequisite in all cases involving an alien with a criminal record. However, rehabilitation or the lack thereof is a factor to be considered in the exercise of discretion, and it may be ultimately determinative in some cases. See Matter of Edwards, supra. There will be cases where such a show- ing is necessary before a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted in view of the other aspects of the case. Thus, while the lack of persuasive evidence of rehabilitation may not in itself be an adverse factor, the absence of this equity in the alien’s favor may ultimately be determinative in a given case, particu- larly where an alien has engaged in serious misconduct and there are ques- tions whether the alien will revert to criminal behavior. Conversely, evidence of rehabilitation in some cases may constitute the factor that raises the signif- icance of the alien’s equities in total so as to be sufficient to counterbalance the adverse factors in the case and warrant a favorable exercise of discretion. However, having weighed the respondent’s equities in this case, which do not include persuasive evidence of rehabilitation, against the extremely seri- ous nature of his criminal behavior involving a sexual offense against a child, the Board agrees that the respondent has not met his burden of establishing that a grant of section 212(h) relief is warranted in the exercise of discretion. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed. ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

respondent’s own pre-trial admission that he had engaged in sexual inter- course with the victim. 2 The Board acknowledges the humanitarian concerns in this case, particu- larly the hardship to the respondent’s wife and children, but the Board also has the obligation to consider the welfare and safety of the other citizens and residents of this country in making its discretionary determination. In the case before us, we have an individual who sexually assaulted a 13-year-old girl. After serving a short period of imprisonment, he has not offered any sig- nificant evidence that he is rehabilitated from his criminal behavior. As pointed out by the respondent on appeal, a showing of rehabilitation is not an absolute prerequisite in all cases involving an alien with a criminal record. However, rehabilitation or the lack thereof is a factor to be considered in the exercise of discretion, and it may be ultimately determinative in some cases. See Matter of Edwards, supra. There will be cases where such a show- ing is necessary before a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted in view of the other aspects of the case. Thus, while the lack of persuasive evidence of rehabilitation may not in itself be an adverse factor, the absence of this equity in the alien’s favor may ultimately be determinative in a given case, particu- larly where an alien has engaged in serious misconduct and there are ques- tions whether the alien will revert to criminal behavior. Conversely, evidence of rehabilitation in some cases may constitute the factor that raises the signif- icance of the alien’s equities in total so as to be sufficient to counterbalance the adverse factors in the case and warrant a favorable exercise of discretion. However, having weighed the respondent’s equities in this case, which do not include persuasive evidence of rehabilitation, against the extremely seri- ous nature of his criminal behavior involving a sexual offense against a child, the Board agrees that the respondent has not met his burden of establishing that a grant of section 212(h) relief is warranted in the exercise of discretion. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed. ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION: Paul W. Schmidt, Chairman, in which John W. Guendelsberger, Board Member, joined

协同与异议意见：Paul W. Schmidt，主席，John W. Guendelsberger，委员会成员，加入

I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. I concur in the analysis of the general criteria to be applied in exercising discretion under section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(h) (1994), as con- tained in parts I, II, III, and IV(A) of the majority opinion. However, I dissent from the application of those criteria to the facts of this case, as contained in Part IV(B) of the majority opinion. As recognized by the majority, the respondent has very substantial family equities in the United States. He has a United States citizen wife of 8 years, two United States citizen children, a 7-year-old daughter and a 4-year-old son, and a 9-year-old United States citizen stepson. His wife suffers from severe depression and other medical conditions. She has not worked in 4 years. There has been a finding that the respondent’s deportation would cause extreme hardship to his wife and children, as they are dependent upon him financially and are emotionally close to him. The respondent also has other family ties to the United States, including two lawful permanent resident brothers and lawful permanent resident par- ents. The majority acknowledges that the respondent’s economic outlook in Mexico is bleak, thereby inhibiting his ability to contribute to the support of his family in the United States. It also seems unlikely that his family will be able to afford to visit the respondent in Mexico. The respondent’s ability to visit his family in the United States will depend upon the willingness of the United States Depart- ment of State to recommend, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service to grant, a waiver of inadmissibility to an inadmissible nonimmigrant. More- over, from my experience, it is quite possible that, even with a waiver, the respondent would be precluded from future visits as a nonimmigrant because the presence of an immediate family in the United States would be consid- ered evidence of a lack of “proper nonimmigrant intent” on the respondent’s part. Therefore, the respondent’s deportation is likely to permanently sever the family unit. The respondent’s crime is serious, involving sexual misconduct with a minor. However, the respondent, who is 42 years old with no known prior history of sexual offenses, was required to serve only 1 year of a potential 3-year sentence. That indicates at least some confidence on the part of the State of Nebraska that the respondent’s sexual offense was unlikely to be repeated and that its citizens did not need the extra protection from the respondent that a longer sentence might have offered. As described by the majority, the respondent was convicted under a Nebraska statute that made the element of consent by the minor irrelevant. It appears that the rather unusual interrelationship between the respondent’s family and the victim’s family, which provided the context for the sexual

我部分协同、部分异议。我同意多数意见第I、II、III和IV(A)部分所载关于根据《移民与国籍法》第212(h)条，8 U.S.C. 1182(h) (1994)，行使自由裁量权时应适用的一般标准的分析。但是，我不同意将这些标准适用于本案事实，如多数意见第IV(B)部分所载。 正如多数意见所承认，申请人在美国拥有非常重大的家庭权益。他有一位结婚8年的美国公民妻子、两名美国公民子女——一个7岁的女儿和一个4岁的儿子，以及一名9岁的美国公民继子。他的妻子患有严重抑郁症和其他疾病。她已4年未工作。已有认定表明，申请人的驱逐出境将对其妻子和子女造成极端困难，因为他们在经济上依赖他，且在情感上与他亲近。 申请人还与在美国的其他家庭成员有联系，包括两名合法永久居民兄弟和合法永久居民父母。多数意见承认申请人在墨西哥的经济前景黯淡，从而抑制其资助在美国的家人的能力。 其家人似乎也不太可能负担得起前往墨西哥探望申请人的费用。申请人能否前往美国探望家人，将取决于美国国务院是否建议、以及移民与归化局是否批准对不可入境非移民的不可入境豁免。此外，根据我的经验，即使获得豁免，申请人也很可能被禁止今后以非移民身份访问，因为其在美国有直系亲属将被视为缺乏“适当非移民意图”的证据。因此，申请人的驱逐出境很可能永久割裂家庭单元。 申请人的罪行严重，涉及与未成年人的性行为不当。然而，申请人现年42岁，无已知的先前性犯罪记录，仅需服完可能3年刑期中的1年。这至少表明内布拉斯加州有一定信心认为申请人的性犯罪不太可能重演，其公民不需要通过更长刑期可能提供的额外保护来防范申请人。 正如多数意见所述，申请人根据内布拉斯加州一项使未成年人同意要件无关的法规被定罪。看来，申请人的家庭与受害人的家庭之间相当不寻常的相互关系——其为对13岁受害人的性侵提供了背景——已不复存在，且不太可能重现。因此，尽管我们大家都承认缺乏先见之明，但根据本记录，有理由相信申请人严重性行为不当的重演不太可能。 除犯罪性质外，多数意见拒绝给予救济的其他主要理由相互关联，涉及申请人在移民法官听证中面对其罪行时未能表现出悔意、诚实和康复。这些相互关联的不利考量虽然严重，但在我看来，并不足以 warrant 拒绝给予申请人第212(h)条豁免。见 Matter of Edwards, 20 I&N Dec. 191 (BIA 1990)。 诚然，这是一个接近的案例。但是，我认为申请人美国公民家庭将遭受的极端困难、他与美国的广泛家庭联系，以及记录中表明累犯行为风险相对较低的证据，超过了多数意见同事所依赖的不利因素。因此，我会给予申请人第212(h)条豁免。 因此，我谨对多数意见第IV(B)部分在行使自由裁量权时拒绝第212(h)条豁免表示异议。

assault on the 13-year-old victim, no longer exists and is unlikely to be repli- cated. Therefore, although we all admittedly lack clairvoyance, there is some reason, based on this record, to believe that a repetition of the respondent’s serious sexual misconduct is unlikely. In addition to the nature of the crime, the majority’s other primary reasons for denying relief are interrelated and involve the respondent’s failure to demonstrate remorsefulness, truthfulness, and rehabilitation when con- fronted with his crime during the hearing before the Immigration Judge. These interrelated adverse considerations, while serious, do not, in my opin- ion, warrant a denial of the section 212(h) waiver to the respondent. See Mat- ter of Edwards, 20 I&N Dec. 191 (BIA 1990). This is admittedly a close case. However, I believe that the extreme hard- ship that will be suffered by the respondent’s United States citizen family, his extensive family ties to the United States, and the evidence of record suggest- ing a relatively low risk of recidivist behavior outweigh the adverse factors relied upon by my colleagues in the majority. I therefore would grant the respondent a section 212(h) waiver. Consequently, I respectfully dissent from Part IV(B) of the majority deci- sion which denies the section 212(h) waiver in the exercise of discretion.

对13岁受害人的性侵，已不复存在，且不太可能重现。因此，尽管我们大家都承认缺乏先见之明，但根据本记录，有理由相信申请人严重性行为不当的重演不太可能。 除犯罪性质外，多数意见拒绝给予救济的其他主要理由相互关联，涉及申请人在移民法官听证中面对其罪行时未能表现出悔意、诚实和康复。这些相互关联的不利考量虽然严重，但在我看来，并不足以 warrant 拒绝给予申请人第212(h)条豁免。见 Matter of Edwards, 20 I&N Dec. 191 (BIA 1990)。 诚然，这是一个接近的案例。但是，我认为申请人美国公民家庭将遭受的极端困难、他与美国的广泛家庭联系，以及记录中表明累犯行为风险相对较低的证据，超过了多数意见同事所依赖的不利因素。因此，我会给予申请人第212(h)条豁免。 因此，我谨对多数意见第IV(B)部分在行使自由裁量权时拒绝第212(h)条豁免表示异议。

DISSENTING OPINION: Lory D. Rosenberg, Board Member

异议意见：Lory D. Rosenberg，委员会成员

I respectfully dissent. This case involves an individual who has been convicted of one serious crime of moral turpitude. As a result he has applied for a waiver and demon- strated that he is statutorily qualified for the waiver he needs, as his wife and children will suffer extreme hardship in the event of his deportation. Despite this, the Immigration Judge denied his waiver application and the majority of this Board affirms that denial. At issue in the resolution of this appeal is this Board’s interpretation of the statute governing applications for waivers under section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (1994), and this Board’s application of the standard it employs in the exercise of discretion in such cases. My quarrel with the reasoning and conclusion adopted by the majority goes beyond a disagreement over the weight to be given the favorable and adverse factors of record and the outcome of that balancing exercise. In my view, the majority makes a fundamental error when it embraces exclusively this Board’s articulation of discretionary factors which make up the entirety of a waiver adjudication under section 212(c) of the Act. Matter of Marin, 16 I&N Dec. 581 (BIA 1978). Such an analysis fails to give meaning to the unique statutory language which characterizes a waiver under section 212(h) and distinguishes it from other waivers provided by the Act. While the major- ity cautions that “it is prudent to avoid cross-application” between different principles or standards for the exercise of discretion, these well-intentioned

我谨表示异议。 本案涉及一名因一项严重道德败坏犯罪而被定罪的个人。因此，他申请了豁免，并证明其在法律上符合所需豁免的资格，因为若他被驱逐出境，其妻子和子女将遭受极端困难。尽管如此，移民法官仍拒绝其豁免申请，而本委员会多数意见维持该拒绝。解决本上诉的争议点在于本委员会对《移民与国籍法》第212(h)条，8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (1994)，下豁免申请所适用法规的解释，以及本委员会对此类案件行使自由裁量权时所采用标准的适用。 我对多数意见所采纳的推理和结论的异议，超出了对记录中有利和不利因素应给予的权重以及该权衡结果的分歧。在我看来，多数意见完全采纳本委员会对构成《法》第212(c)条下豁免裁决全部内容的自由裁量因素的阐述，犯了一个根本性错误。Matter of Marin, 16 I&N Dec. 581 (BIA 1978)。此种分析未能赋予第212(h)条下豁免的独特法定语言以含义，也未能将其与《法》规定的其他豁免区分开来。尽管多数意见告诫“避免在不同原则或自由裁量权行使标准之间交叉适用是审慎的”，但这些善意的

words of caution do not prevent its inevitable descent down this slippery slope.

告诫之词并不能阻止其不可避免地沿着这条滑坡下滑。

I. IMPROPER CONSTRUCTION OF THE STATUTE

I. 对法规的不当解释

The starting point of any interpretation begins with a construction of the statute. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). If the statutory language is clear, both the courts and the Board must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. Matter of Farias, 21 I&N Dec. 269 (BIA 1996) (Holmes, Rosenberg, concur- ring); Matter of Hou, 20 I&N Dec. 513, 519-20 (BIA 1992); see also K Mart v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (in ascertaining “plain meaning,” the Board must look not only to the statutory language at issue, but to the lan- guage and design of the statute as a whole). The text of the particular section at issue here, which provides a discre- tionary waiver for acts of prostitution and crimes involving moral turpitude, is found in the opinion of the majority. Notably, as most recently amended in 1990, it contains two subsections: one, section 212(h)(1)(A), governs appli- cations by persons who seek a waiver for offenses which occurred more than 15 years before the application and explicitly requires a showing of rehabili- tation, but does not require either that certain family relationships exist or that a showing of extreme hardship to those persons be made as a predicate for the exercise of discretion. The other, section 212(h)(1)(B), with which we are concerned here, does require both the existence of specific family rela- tionships and evidence of extreme hardship to those designated persons in the absence of a waiver. There is no statutory requirement either that any particu- lar amount of time must have passed since the offense giving rise to the need for the waiver, or that rehabilitation be demonstrated or that admission be in the national interest. This Board, acknowledging the principle underlying the Supreme Court’s decision in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987), has stated: “It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that, in cases in which Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits that language in another . . ., a presumption arises that the disparate inclusion and exclusion was intentional and purposeful.” Matter of Hou, supra. I believe that the reasoning employed and the result reached by the majority in this case depart without reason from this important maxim. In my opinion, to best effectuate the intent of Congress as expressed by the statutory language of any discretionary waiver within the Act, the equities should be weighed and balanced differently relative to the statutory eligibil- ity factors required. If that is not done in this case, then the statutory language distinct to section 212(h)(1)(B), as compared to other waivers provided by the statute, is rendered meaningless.

任何解释的起点都始于对法规的建构。Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)。如果法规语言清晰，法院和Board都必须赋予国会明确表达的意图以效力。Matter of Farias, 21 I&N Dec. 269 (BIA 1996) (Holmes, Rosenberg, 同意)；Matter of Hou, 20 I&N Dec. 513, 519-20 (BIA 1992)；另见 K Mart v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988)（在确定“平实含义”时，Board必须不仅审视所涉法规语言，还要审视整个法规的语言和设计）。 此处所涉特定条款的文本，即为卖淫行为和涉及道德败坏犯罪提供自由裁量豁免的条款，载于多数意见中。值得注意的是，该条款最近于1990年修订，包含两个小节：其一，section 212(h)(1)(A)，管辖为申请前超过15年发生的罪行寻求豁免的人的申请，并明确要求证明康复，但不要求存在某些家庭关系，也不要求证明对这些人的极端困难作为行使自由裁量的前提条件。另一小节，即我们此处关注的section 212(h)(1)(B)，则确实要求存在特定家庭关系以及在无豁免情况下对这些指定人员造成极端困难的证据。法规既不要求自引起豁免需要的罪行以来必须经过任何特定时间，也不要求证明康复或入境符合国家利益。 本Board承认最高法院在INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987)判决中所依据的原则，并指出：“法规解释的一项既定规则是，在国会将特定语言纳入法规某一节但省略另一节中的该语言……的案件中，产生一种推定，即这种不同的纳入和排除是有意和有目的的。”Matter of Hou, supra。我认为，多数意见在本案中采用的推理和达成的结果无理由地背离了这一重要准则。 在我看来，为最好地实现国会通过《法案》内任何自由裁量豁免的法规语言所表达的意图，衡平因素应相对于所要求的法定资格因素以不同方式权衡和平衡。如果在本案中不这样做，那么section 212(h)(1)(B)相对于法规提供的其他豁免所特有的法规语言便变得毫无意义。

A. Section 212(h)(1)(B) Explicitly Requires Evidence of Extreme Hardship to Family Members

A. Section 212(h)(1)(B)明确要求对家庭成员造成极端困难的证据

In a section 212(h)(1)(B) case, the statutory emphasis is on the existence of specified close family members and a showing of extreme hardship to those family members. Close family ties and a compelling level of economic, personal, or professional harm or suffering amounting to extreme hardship are statutory predicates for the exercise of discretion. By contrast, in section 212(c) applications, they are no more than individual considerations, albeit important and arguably primary ones, in the overall exercise of discretion. While it might constitute a reasonable exercise of discretion to deny a waiver under section 212(c) despite evidence of close family ties and hard- ship on the basis that these are merely factors on the positive side of the dis- cretionary equation, I cannot conclude that comparable treatment of the same factors in a section 212(h) waiver case would be appropriate. The majority tends to ignore the statutory distinction between these waiver provisions, and fails to treat the section 212(h) waiver applicant as entering into the discre- tionary arena already having met a significant mandatory standard which itself necessitates the assembly of impressive favorable factors. Rather, the majority appears to give little if any weight in the subsequent exercise of dis- cretion to the fact that a section 212(h) applicant has already established close family ties and extreme hardship. 1 Further, I take issue with the conclusion of the majority that the precedent decisions issued by this Board pertaining to adjustment of status under sec- tion 245 of the Act are inapposite. A waiver under section 212(h) historically and literally arises in connection with an application for admission, since, to date, this Board has not recognized the availability of this waiver to those within the United States only seeking to avoid deportation. Cf. Yeung v. INS, 76 F.3d 337 (l1th Cir. 1996). The typical waiver applicant either is not yet a lawful permanent resident or is a lawful permanent resident seeking that sta- tus anew. See Matter of Gabreylsky, 20 I&N Dec. 750 (BIA 1994). 2 While some immigrant visas are provided for those approved in asylee, refugee, or employment-based categories, over two-thirds of immigration to the United States is based upon family relationships, and family reunification is a

在section 212(h)(1)(B)案件中，法规的重点在于特定近亲属的存在以及对这些家庭成员造成极端困难的证明。密切的家庭关系和达到极端困难程度的令人信服的经济、个人或职业伤害或痛苦是行使自由裁量的法定前提条件。相比之下，在section 212(c)申请中，它们不过是整体行使自由裁量时的个别考量因素，尽管是重要且可以说是主要的因素。 尽管在section 212(c)下，基于密切家庭关系和困难仅是自由裁量方程正面因素的理由而拒绝豁免可能构成合理的自由裁量行使，但我不能得出结论认为在section 212(h)豁免案件中对相同因素进行类似处理是适当的。多数意见倾向于忽视这些豁免条款之间的法规区别，并且未能将section 212(h)豁免申请人视为进入自由裁量领域时已经满足了重要的强制性标准，该标准本身就需要汇集令人印象深刻的有力因素。相反，多数意见在随后的自由裁量行使中似乎对section 212(h)申请人已经证明密切家庭关系和极端困难这一事实给予很少（如果有的话）权重。1 此外，我对多数意见关于本Board发布的有关《法案》section 245下调整身份的先前判决不适用这一结论持异议。section 212(h)下的豁免在历史上和字面上都与入境申请相关，因为迄今为止，本Board尚未承认该豁免适用于仅寻求避免驱逐出境的美国境内人员。Cf. Yeung v. INS, 76 F.3d 337 (l1th Cir. 1996)。典型的豁免申请人要么尚未成为合法永久居民，要么是寻求重新获得该身份的合法永久居民。见 Matter of Gabreylsky, 20 I&N Dec. 750 (BIA 1994)。2 虽然一些移民签证提供给在庇护、难民或就业类别中获得批准的人，但超过三分之二的美国移民是基于家庭关系，而家庭团聚是

fundamental purpose underlying the terms of Act. I cannot agree that our decisions concerning the exercise of discretionary factors involving the admission of close family relatives have no applicability here. 3

《法案》条款的根本目的。我不能同意我们关于涉及近亲属入境自由裁量因素行使的判决在此不适用。3

B. Section 212(h)(1)(B) Explicitly Does Not Require Evidence of Rehabilitation

B. Section 212(h)(1)(B)明确不要求康复证据

The majority finds not only that the statutory standard has been satisfied but that substantial equities exist. That being the case, one might ask, why then does the majority conclude the waiver is not warranted? The only bases articulated by the majority are the nature of the conviction involved and the issue of rehabilitation in the respondent’s case. While these are not improper factors for consideration in the ultimate discretionary equation in either a sec- tion 212(c) or a section 212(h) case, it is notable that the factor of rehabilita- tion specifically is not a statutory prerequisite to the exercise of discretion in a section 212(h) application submitted under section 212(h)(1)(B). In my view, however, by importing without distinction the established dis- cretionary factors applicable in a section 212(c) adjudication (where rehabili- tation is an equity, see Matter of Marin, supra) into a section 212(h) adjudication, the majority has skewed the basis for a reasonable adjudication consistent with the governing statutory section and the fair exercise of discre- tion. 4 Not only does the majority consider rehabilitation in this case, but it elevates rehabilitation as at least one of two determinative factors in its denial. A reading of the majority decision suggests that the statutorily required elements of close family ties and extreme hardship pale next to the presence or absence of rehabilitation. Moreover, I believe that the emphasis given its finding that rehabilitation is not present (which I dispute) constitutes an improper assessment of rehabilitation contrary to our holdings in both Matter of Arreguin, 21 I&N Dec. 38 (BIA 1995) (stating that absence of one or more favorable factors does not convert such factors into adverse consid- erations), and Matter of Edwards, 20 I&N Dec. 191 (BIA 1990) (holding that absolute rehabilitation is not required).

多数意见不仅认定法定标准已满足，而且认定存在重大衡平因素。既然如此，人们可能会问，那么多数意见为何得出结论认为豁免不应批准？多数意见阐述的唯一依据是所涉定罪的性质以及respondent案件中的康复问题。虽然这些在section 212(c)或section 212(h)案件的最终自由裁量方程中并非不当考量因素，但值得注意的是，康复因素具体而言并非根据section 212(h)(1)(B)提交的section 212(h)申请中行使自由裁量的法定前提条件。 然而，在我看来，多数意见将适用于section 212(c)裁决的既定自由裁量因素（其中康复是一种衡平因素，见 Matter of Marin, supra）不加区分地引入section 212(h)裁决，从而扭曲了与适用法规条款相一致且公平行使自由裁量的合理裁决基础。4 多数意见不仅在本案中考虑康复，而且将康复提升为其拒绝中至少两个决定性因素之一。阅读多数意见的决定表明，法定要求的密切家庭关系和极端困难要素与康复的存在或缺失相比黯然失色。此外，我认为，强调其关于康复不存在的认定（我对此有异议）构成对康复的不当评估，违背了我们在Matter of Arreguin, 21 I&N Dec. 38 (BIA 1995)（指出一个或多个有利因素的缺失并不将这些因素转化为不利考量）和Matter of Edwards, 20 I&N Dec. 191 (BIA 1990)（裁定不要求绝对康复）中的判决。

II. IMPROPER BALANCING OF DISCRETIONARY FACTORS

II. 自由裁量因素的不当权衡

A. Undue Emphasis on Admission of Guilt

A. 对认罪的不当强调

While rehabilitation is not a statutory requirement, it is not unreasonable to consider this factor in light of the fact that a section 212(h)(1)(B) waiver overcomes excludability based upon either criminal conduct or a conviction. However, in its discretionary determination, the majority follows the course set by the Immigration Judge and treats the absence of an outright admission of guilt by the respondent as dispositive of the absence of rehabilitation. Cf. Matter of Roberts, 20 I&N Dec. 294 (BIA 1991). In my view, this constitutes an impermissible treatment of the rehabilitative element of remorse, contrary to the decisions of this Board and the courts of appeals. See Guillen-Garcia v. INS, 999 F.2d 199 (7th Cir. 1993); Matter of Edwards, supra. I am inclined to adopt the reasoning of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which was articulated most recently in Canales-Lopez v. INS, 76 F.3d 381 (7th Cir. 1996), 5 that reliance on a failure or refusal to acknowledge guilt, no matter how framed, “does not constitute adequate consideration of all the circumstances surrounding the petitioner’s efforts to demonstrate rehabilitation.” Id. (citing Guillen-Garcia v. INS, supra, at 205); see also Guillen-Garcia v. INS, 60 F.3d 340, 344-45 (7th Cir. 1995) (upholding BIA on other grounds), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 775 (1996). Elevation of a claim of innocence as dispositive of a lack of rehabilitation actually does what we say we will not do—redetermine guilt or innocence. Cf. Matter of Roberts, supra. Matter of Roberts states clearly that for discre- tionary purposes we may look behind the conviction—but we may not rede- termine guilt or innocence. Id. at 301. If we are allowed to look at mitigating factors (and lack of culpability going to an inability to express remorse for something one has not done would fall into that zone), we should not penalize an alien who testifies to innocence under oath, barring a showing that he has intentionally given false testimony. An individual faces an untenable situa- tion if subsequent discretionary relief—be it sentencing disposition or collat- eral immigration benefits—is conditioned upon an admission of guilt. As a result, some federal courts have long recognized that even after conviction, when post-conviction options may have been exhausted, it continues to be unfair and unreasonable to require a defendant to admit guilt (contrary to his testimony in the criminal proceedings), as to do so also might be to require him to admit perjury. 6

虽然康复不是法定要求，但考虑到第212(h)(1)(B)条豁免是基于犯罪行为或定罪而克服不可入境性这一事实，考虑这一因素并非不合理。然而，在行使自由裁量权时，多数意见遵循了移民法官设定的路径，将 respondent 未直接认罪视为康复缺失的决定性因素。Cf. Matter of Roberts, 20 I&N Dec. 294 (BIA 1991)。在我看来，这构成对悔恨这一康复要素的不当处理，违背了本委员会和上诉法院的判例。See Guillen-Garcia v. INS, 999 F.2d 199 (7th Cir. 1993); Matter of Edwards, supra。我倾向于采纳美国第7巡回上诉法院的推理，该推理最近在 Canales-Lopez v. INS, 76 F.3d 381 (7th Cir. 1996), 5 中得以阐述，即依赖未能或拒绝承认罪责，无论以何种方式表述，“不构成对 petitioner 为证明康复所作努力的全部周围情况的充分考虑。”Id.（引用 Guillen-Garcia v. INS, supra, at 205）；see also Guillen-Garcia v. INS, 60 F.3d 340, 344-45 (7th Cir. 1995)（基于其他理由维持 BIA），cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 775 (1996)。 将无罪主张提升为康复缺失的决定性因素，实际上做了我们声称不会做的事——重新判定有罪或无罪。Cf. Matter of Roberts, supra。Matter of Roberts 明确指出，为自由裁量目的，我们可以审视定罪背后的情况——但我们不得重新判定有罪或无罪。Id. at 301。如果我们被允许审视减轻因素（而缺乏可责性导致无法对一个人未曾做过的事表达悔恨，应属于该范畴），我们就不应惩罚宣誓作证无罪的 alien，除非有证据表明他故意提供虚假证言。如果后续自由裁量救济——无论是量刑处置还是附带移民利益——以认罪为条件，个人将面临无法维持的处境。因此，一些联邦法院早已认识到，即使在定罪之后，当定罪后选项可能已用尽时，要求被告认罪（与其在刑事诉讼中的证言相反）仍然不公平且不合理，因为这样做也可能要求他承认伪证。6

In this case, the respondent did not plead guilty in his criminal trial but maintained his innocence and was found guilty. In the record before us, the respondent admitted to aspects of the criminal conduct in question and denied the explicit charges underlying his conviction. 7 The Immigration Judge acknowledged that the respondent testified that he recognizes the crime involved to be a serious one, for which someone should be punished. The majority emphasizes the fact of the respondent’s responses on the lie detector test administered prior to trial as compared with his testimony before the Immigration Judge. 8 This not only appears to contravene this Board’s position in Matter of Roberts, supra, but the majority fails to indicate the ulti- mate significance of either the respondent’s statement or the results of the test. 9 This is particularly so, in light of the fact that the majority itself acknowledges in the same paragraph that one who claims innocence is not categorically foreclosed from establishing that he has taken steps towards rehabilitation. Matter of Edwards, supra. In assessing rehabilitation, we are making “an estimate or prediction of an individual’s future conduct.” Palacios-Torres v. INS, 995 F.2d 96, 99 (7th Cir. 1993). The respondent and his wife are well aware of the poor judgment and unacceptable conduct which characterized their former living situation. The family has moved away from the area in which the circumstances giving

在本案中，respondent 在刑事审判中未认罪，而是坚持无罪，并被判定有罪。在我们面前的记录中，respondent 承认了相关犯罪行为的某些方面，但否认了其定罪所依据的明确指控。7 移民法官承认，respondent 作证称他认识到所涉犯罪是严重的，某人应为此受到惩罚。多数意见强调了 respondent 在审判前进行的测谎测试中的回答与他在移民法官面前的证言相比这一事实。8 这不仅似乎违背了本委员会在 Matter of Roberts, supra 中的立场，而且多数意见未能说明 respondent 的陈述或测试结果的最终意义。9 尤其考虑到多数意见本身在同一段落中承认，声称无罪者并非绝对被排除在证明其已采取康复步骤之外。Matter of Edwards, supra。 在评估康复时，我们是在“对个人未来行为作出估计或预测。”Palacios-Torres v. INS, 995 F.2d 96, 99 (7th Cir. 1993)。respondent 及其妻子充分意识到他们以前生活状况所特有的糟糕判断和不可接受行为。该家庭已搬离导致

rise to the respondent’s crime occurred. There is no evidence of any criminal conduct whatsoever by the respondent prior to the situation which underlies the respondent’s conviction. Further, there is no evidence of recidivism dur- ing the pendency of the criminal charges or since his release for good behav- ior following a 1-year period of incarceration, an early release from a 3-year sentence. 10 The majority contends that it is not holding that one who claims innocence and fails to express remorse is precluded from ever showing persuasive evi- dence of rehabilitation. However, here the respondent has presented his role in his family, his productive employment, and the absence of any other crimi- nal conduct. The majority’s failure to articulate any other basis for its rejec- tion of the respondent’s claim of rehabilitation, however, renders its treatment of the absence of an admission of guilt as being determinative of an insufficient level of rehabilitation. Canales-Lopez v. INS, supra; cf. Matter of Edwards, supra. I believe that reliance upon the absence of evidence of remorse, coupled only with the serious nature of the single criminal offense giving rise to this respondent’s need for a waiver is not a sound basis on which to deny relief in this case.

respondent 犯罪发生地。没有证据表明 respondent 在构成其定罪基础的情况之前有任何犯罪行为。此外，没有证据表明在刑事指控待决期间或他在1年监禁期后因表现良好提前释放（3年刑期提前释放）以来有累犯。10 多数意见主张，它并非认定声称无罪且未表达悔恨者永远被排除在展示有说服力的康复证据之外。然而，在此，respondent 已提交了其在家庭中的角色、其生产性就业以及没有任何其他犯罪行为的证据。然而，多数意见未能阐明其拒绝 respondent 康复主张的任何其他依据，这使得其将未认罪视为康复水平不足的决定性因素。Canales-Lopez v. INS, supra; cf. Matter of Edwards, supra。我认为，依赖缺乏悔恨证据，仅加上导致 respondent 需要豁免的单一刑事犯罪的严重性质，并非在本案中拒绝救济的可靠依据。

B. Undue Weight Given Criminal Offense

B. 对刑事犯罪给予不当权重

This is a waiver we are adjudicating. It presupposes a violation of the immigration laws. An application under section 212(h) comes before us only when there has been either conduct involving prostitution or conviction or admission of a crime involving moral turpitude. No applicant will ever appear before us who has not committed an offense which we consider, in some degree, reprehensible. In my opinion, the result reached by the majority certainly appears to approach an impermissible per se basis in which to deny a discretionary waiver. See Gonzales v. INS, 996 F. 2d 804, 810 (6th Cir. 1993); cf. Matter of Burbano, 20 I&N Dec. 872, 877-78 (BIA 1995). But see Yepes-Prado v. INS, 10 F.3d 1363, 1371-72 (9th Cir. 1993). Indeed, I believe we contravene the statute when we so readily engage in the practice of finding the offense to be waived an adequate basis alone on which to deny relief. 11 Moreover, I don’t believe that one can read the

这是我们正在裁决的豁免。它预设了违反移民法。第212(h)条下的申请只有存在涉及卖淫的行为或涉及道德败坏犯罪的定罪或承认时才会来到我们面前。不会有任何未实施我们某种程度上认为应受谴责的犯罪的申请人出现在我们面前。在我看来，多数意见达成的结果显然接近于以不允许的当然依据拒绝自由裁量豁免。See Gonzales v. INS, 996 F. 2d 804, 810 (6th Cir. 1993); cf. Matter of Burbano, 20 I&N Dec. 872, 877-78 (BIA 1995)。But see Yepes-Prado v. INS, 10 F.3d 1363, 1371-72 (9th Cir. 1993)。 事实上，我认为当我们如此轻易地采取将待豁免的犯罪视为拒绝救济的充分唯一依据的做法时，我们违背了法规。11 此外，我不认为人们可以解读

majority opinion without concluding that it has relegated the significant and compelling factors of family ties and extreme hardship to the back burner. I cannot find that dismissing statutory prerequisites or treating them as no more than a threshold for a discretionary adjudication which demands other factors to overcome the adverse factor of the offense giving rise to the need for a waiver is either reasonable in the exercise of discretion or consistent with the statute. The respondent is in violation of the immigration laws on account of a sin- gle, albeit serious, conviction, giving rise to his need for a section 212(h) waiver. His crime, statutory rape of a young teenager, is not to be dismissed lightly and it should be punished—in the criminal justice system, and exam- ined further—in the exercise of our discretion to waive his deportation. Whether it is an offense such that under no circumstances should this man be allowed to remain in the United States with his family as a lawful permanent resident after being released from prison with good conduct reports and when his wife and children want and need him is another story. The respondent has established, as the majority concedes, substantial equities relating to the statutory qualifications of close family ties and extreme hardship to be suffered by the family members should the respon- dent be deported. His wife begs us to allow him to remain, and there is ample evidence in the record that she has suffered depression on account of the cir- cumstances and other hardships due to his absence, which will only be exac- erbated by his deportation. Further, his deportation would mean not only a loss of financial support to the household and his children’s loss of the pres- ence of their father, but the permanent disruption of this family. In addition to the factors emphasized explicitly by Congress, the record reflects that the respondent has resided in the United States for 13 years and has been a lawful permanent resident since 1987. There is evidence that he is a responsible husband and father who previously was regularly employed and supported his family, and that he has employment to which he will return. While in prison he studied towards receiving his GED. The record also con- tains enthusiastic commendations of his character and of his being an honest, hardworking individual. Each of these factors individually and cumulatively indicates that he has the character and family base from which he can return to society as a contributor rather than a predator, and that he has taken steps towards rehabilitation from the conduct resulting in his conviction. With regard to his conviction, I believe he attempted to provide an expla- nation for his criminal conduct, and while his unwillingness to acknowledge his offense squarely may be the product of shame or denial, I don’t find him to be either an outright liar or an unrepentant criminal. Nor do I conclude, as

多数意见，但并未认定其已将家庭纽带和极端困难这些重要且令人信服的因素置于次要地位。我无法认定，忽视法定前提条件，或将其仅视为行使自由裁量权裁断的门槛——而该裁断要求其他因素克服导致需要豁免的犯罪这一不利因素——在行使自由裁量权时是合理的，或与法律相一致。 被申请人因一项单一但严重的定罪而违反移民法，从而需要第212(h)条豁免。其罪行，即与一名年轻青少年发生的法定强奸，不应被轻描淡写，应当受到惩罚——在刑事司法系统中，并在我们行使裁量权决定是否豁免其驱逐出境时进一步审查。至于该罪行是否属于这样一种情形：无论如何都不应允许此人在因表现良好报告而获释后，作为合法永久居民与其家人留在美国，而其妻子和子女希望并需要他，则是另一回事。 如多数意见所承认，被申请人已证明与法定资格相关的重大衡平因素，即密切的家庭纽带以及若被申请人被驱逐出境其家庭成员将遭受的极端困难。其妻子恳求我们允许他留下，记录中有充分证据表明，她因相关情况而遭受抑郁，并因其缺席而遭受其他困难，而他的驱逐出境只会加剧这些困难。此外，他的驱逐出境不仅意味着家庭失去经济支持、子女失去父亲的陪伴，还意味着这个家庭的永久破裂。 除国会明确强调的因素外，记录还反映被申请人已在美国居住13年，并自1987年以来一直是合法永久居民。有证据表明，他是一个负责任的丈夫和父亲，此前定期就业并养家糊口，而且他有可返回的工作。在狱中，他学习以取得GED。记录还包含对其品格以及其为诚实、勤奋之人的热情赞扬。这些因素单独及累积表明，他具备品格和家庭基础，可以作为贡献者而非掠夺者重返社会，并且他已采取措施从导致其定罪的行为中康复。 关于其定罪，我认为他试图为其犯罪行为提供解释，虽然他不愿直接承认罪行可能是羞耻或否认的产物，但我不认为他要么是彻头彻尾的骗子，要么是毫无悔意的罪犯。我也不像

apparently the majority does, that his failure to acknowledge culpability to their satisfaction is a reliable indicia of either rehabilitation or future conduct. With the exception of the poor exercise of judgment in condoning the situa- tion which led to his commission of the crime in question, there is no evi- dence that the respondent lived other than a normal lifestyle. He has no criminal record of any kind other than the offense giving rise to these pro- ceedings. He has no prior immigration violations. He provided evidence of good conduct while in prison. I note that this crime was an aberration in his otherwise law-abiding his- tory and appeared connected to the unorthodox circumstances of the family’s living situation in relation to their former neighbors. That living situation no longer exists. In my opinion there is absolutely no reason to conclude that he would not move on from this incident, which I view as an aberration in an otherwise regular record, and continue to be a provider for his family and a contributing member of our society. I do not contend that this Board may not or should not address either the offense itself or rehabilitation in the course of adjudicating a waiver applica- tion under section 212(h) of the Act. However, in this case, the majority not only fails to address any other aspect of rehabilitation present in the record, but concludes, without citing any evidence of record or other authority, that the nature of the crime for which this applicant already has been convicted and imprisoned is serious enough to make him an undesirable member of our society in the future. I conclude that such a treatment of the record not only constitutes an abuse of our discretion, but does violence to the statutory language.

多数意见显然那样认定，他未能令其满意地承认罪责是康复或未来行为的可靠指标。除了在纵容导致其犯下本案罪行的情况方面判断力行使不当外，没有证据表明被申请人过着不正常的生活方式。除引发这些程序的罪行外，他没有任何形式的犯罪记录。他没有先前的移民违规行为。他提供了在狱中表现良好的证据。 我注意到，这一罪行在他原本守法的经历中是一个异常，似乎与其家庭相对于前邻居的非正统居住情况有关。那种居住情况已不复存在。在我看来，绝对没有理由认定他不会从这一事件中走出来——我认为这是原本正常记录中的一个异常——并继续养家糊口，成为我们社会的贡献成员。 我并不主张本委员会在根据该法第212(h)条裁断豁免申请的过程中不得或不应处理罪行本身或康复问题。然而，在本案中，多数意见不仅未处理记录中存在的康复的任何其他方面，而且在未援引任何记录证据或其他权威的情况下认定，该申请人已被定罪并监禁的犯罪性质严重到足以使其未来成为我们社会不受欢迎的成员。我认定，如此对待记录不仅构成滥用我们的自由裁量权，而且损害了法律条文。

III. CONCLUSION

III. 结论

I believe it is reasonable to look at the statute in a way which gives mean- ing and reason to its separate provisions overall. In my view the majority’s failure to truly distinguish section 212(h) from other waiver provisions according to its statutory components impermissibly skews and distorts the majority’s discretionary assessment. I believe that discretionary assessment is flawed further by the majority’s over-reliance on an admission of culpabil- ity and the specific crime involved in lieu of a fair consideration, on balance, of the overwhelming evidence of strong family ties and the hardship the fam- ily faces without the respondent, as well as the respondent’s role as a pro- vider, reports of his good conduct, affirmations of his good character, and no evidence of anything other than a good prognosis for the future. I would grant the relief requested in the exercise of discretion.

我认为，以赋予法律各独立条款整体意义和理由的方式来看待该法是合理的。在我看来，多数意见未能根据其法定组成部分真正将第212(h)条与其他豁免条款区分开来，这不适当地扭曲和歪曲了多数意见的自由裁量评估。我认为，多数意见过度依赖认罪和所涉具体犯罪，而非在权衡之下公平考虑强有力的家庭纽带和家庭在没有被申请人情况下所面临困难的压倒性证据，以及被申请人作为养家者的角色、其良好行为报告、其良好品格的确认，以及除未来良好预后外没有任何其他证据，这进一步使该自由裁量评估存在缺陷。我会在行使自由裁量权时准予所请求的救济。