Matter of Teixeira

Interim Decision #3273

临时决定第3273号

File A38 067 409 - Hartford

案卷号A38 067 409 - 哈特福德

Decided April 23, 1996

1996年4月23日决定

U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals

美国司法部 移民审查执行办公室 移民上诉委员会

In a decision dated December 17, 1993, an Immigration Judge found the respondent deportable pursuant to section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(C) (Supp. V 1993). The respon- dent has appealed from that decision. The respondent’s request for oral argu- ment before the Board is denied. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(e) (1995). The appeal will be sustained and the deportation proceedings will be terminated.

在1993年12月17日的决定中，一名移民法官根据《移民与国籍法》第241(a)(2)(C)条、8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(C)（Supp. V 1993）裁定被申请人可被驱逐出境。被申请人对该决定提出上诉。被申请人要求向委员会进行口头辩论的请求被驳回。参见8 C.F.R. § 3.1(e)（1995）。上诉获准，驱逐出境程序终止。

I. ISSUE

一、问题

The issue raised by the appeal is whether a police report may be consid- ered to determine whether an alien is deportable under section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Act, as an alien convicted of a firearms violation. We hold that a police report such as in this case may not be considered to determine whether an alien is deportable under section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Act. We also hold that where the statute under which an alien was convicted encompasses offenses that constitute firearms violations and offenses that do not, the determination whether the alien was convicted of a firearms violation is limited to an exami- nation of the statute, the “record of conviction,” and any other documents described by the regulations as admissible as evidence in proving a criminal conviction.

上诉提出的问题是，是否可以依据警察报告来确定外国人是否作为被定罪 firearms violation 的外国人而根据《移民与国籍法》第241(a)(2)(C)条可被驱逐出境。我们裁定，像本案这样的警察报告不得用于确定外国人是否根据《移民与国籍法》第241(a)(2)(C)条可被驱逐出境。我们还裁定，当外国人被定罪所依据的法规既包含构成 firearms violations 的罪行，也包含不构成 firearms violations 的罪行时，确定该外国人是否被定罪 firearms violation 仅限于审查该法规、“定罪记录”以及法规描述为可作为证明刑事定罪的证据采纳的任何其他文件。

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

二、程序历史

The respondent, a 28-year-old native and citizen of Portugal, was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident on February 7, 1985. On October 7, 1992, the Immigration and Naturalization Service issued an Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing (Form I-221) charging the respondent with deportability under section 241(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act. In his December 17, 1993, decision, the Immigration Judge determined that the Service had not sustained its burden of establishing the respondent’s deportability pursu- ant to section 241(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act. The Service has not appealed from that determination, and it is not at issue. On October 5, 1993, the Service issued Additional Charges of Deportability (Form I-261), charging the respondent with deportability under section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Act, as an alien convicted of a firearms violation. The Service alleged that the respondent was “on October 28, 1988, convicted in the Superior Court, Bridgeport, Connecticut, for the offense of having a weapon in a motor vehicle, to wit; a .25 cal. Beretta handgun, serial no. M39305, in violation of section 29-38 of the Connecticut General Statutes.” At a deportation hearing held on December 17, 1993, the respondent denied the factual allegation on the Additional Charges of Deportability, as well as deportability under section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Act. The respondent filed an Application for Advance Permission to Return to Unrelinquished Domicile (Form I-191) pursuant to section 212(c) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (Supp. V 1993). The Immigration Judge admitted into evidence a record of plea, verdict, and sentence prepared by the State of Connecticut Superior Court. This document reflects that on October 28, 1988, the respondent was con- victed under section 29-38 of the Connecticut General Statutes, but does not reflect the specific “weapon” in issue. The Immigration Judge also admitted into evidence, over the objection of counsel for the respondent, a police incident report of the Police Department

被申请人是一名28岁的葡萄牙本土公民，于1985年2月7日作为合法永久居民获准进入美国。1992年10月7日，移民和归化局签发了说明理由令和听证通知（表格I-221），指控被申请人根据《移民与国籍法》第241(a)(2)(B)(i)条可被驱逐出境。在1993年12月17日的决定中，移民法官认定，该局未能履行其根据《移民与国籍法》第241(a)(2)(B)(i)条确立被申请人可被驱逐出境的责任。该局未对该认定提出上诉，且该认定不属争议事项。 1993年10月5日，该局签发了额外驱逐出境指控（表格I-261），指控被申请人作为被定罪 firearms violation 的外国人，根据《移民与国籍法》第241(a)(2)(C)条可被驱逐出境。该局指称，被申请人“于1988年10月28日在康涅狄格州布里奇波特高等法院被定罪，罪名是在机动车内持有武器，即一支.25口径Beretta手枪，序列号M39305，违反《康涅狄格州一般法规》第29-38条。” 在1993年12月17日举行的驱逐出境听证会上，被申请人否认了额外驱逐出境指控中的事实指称，也否认了根据《移民与国籍法》第241(a)(2)(C)条可被驱逐出境。被申请人根据《移民与国籍法》第212(c)条、8 U.S.C. § 1182(c)（Supp. V 1993）提交了提前许可返回未放弃住所申请（表格I-191）。移民法官采纳了康涅狄格州高等法院准备的认罪、裁决和判刑记录作为证据。 该文件显示，1988年10月28日，被申请人根据《康涅狄格州一般法规》第29-38条被定罪，但未反映所涉的具体“武器”。 移民法官还在被申请人律师反对的情况下，采纳了警察局的警察事件报告作为证据。

of Bridgeport, Connecticut. The police report reflects that on August 14, 1988, officers of the Police Department of Bridgeport, Connecticut, stopped the respondent in his vehicle, arrested him, and discovered in the vehicle a “gun . . . described as follows[:] a Mod. 950 .25 Cal. B-Cal. 6.35 Beretta Serial #M39305" with ”six live rounds in the clip." In his decision, the Immigration Judge stated: “Based on the record of con- viction and the police report submitted in connection therewith, . . . deportability has been established by clear, convincing, and unequivocal evi- dence with respect to the weapons violation charge.”

康涅狄格州布里奇波特警察局的报告。警察报告显示，1988年8月14日，康涅狄格州布里奇波特警察局的警员在被申请人的车内将其拦停、逮捕，并在车内发现一把“枪……描述如下[:] 一支Mod. 950 .25 Cal. B-Cal. 6.35 Beretta，序列号#M39305”，且“弹匣内有六发实弹”。 在其决定中，移民法官表示：“基于定罪记录及与此相关提交的警察报告，……关于武器违规指控，驱逐出境已通过明确、令人信服且毫不含糊的证据得以确立。”

III. CONSIDERATION OF POLICE REPORT TO DETERMINE DEPORTABILITY UNDER SECTION 241(a)(2)(C) OF THE ACT

三、为根据《移民与国籍法》第241(a)(2)(C)条确定驱逐出境而考虑警察报告

A. Divisible Weapons Statute

A. 可分割的武器法规

Any alien who at any time after entry “is convicted” under any law of pos- sessing or carrying any weapon which is a firearm is deportable. See section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Act. In contrast to other grounds of deportation, where an alien’s conduct is made the focus of the inquiry, e.g., section 241(a)(2)(B)(ii) of the Act (making deportable a “drug abuser or addict”), the firearms offense provision directs the inquiry to whether the alien stands “convicted under any law” of certain generally described firearms or destructive device violations. To determine whether the respondent was convicted of a firearms violation, we look first to the provisions of the law under which he stands convicted. The respondent was convicted under section 29-38 of the Connecticut General Statutes. That section, captioned “Weapons in vehicles,” provides, in relevant part:

任何外国人在入境后任何时间，根据任何法律“被定罪”持有或携带任何属于 firearm 的武器，即可被驱逐出境。参见《移民与国籍法》第241(a)(2)(C)条。与其他驱逐出境理由不同——在其他理由中，外国人的行为成为调查焦点，例如《移民与国籍法》第241(a)(2)(B)(ii)条（使“吸毒者或成瘾者”可被驱逐出境）——firearms offense 条款将调查指向外国人是否“根据任何法律被定罪”犯有某些一般描述的 firearms 或破坏性装置违规行为。为确定被申请人是否被定罪 firearms violation，我们首先查看其被定罪所依据的法律规定。 被申请人根据《康涅狄格州一般法规》第29-38条被定罪。该条标题为“车辆中的武器”，相关部分规定：

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-38 (1988). The statute under which the respondent was convicted is divisible; it encompasses offenses that constitute firearms violations and offenses that do not. Possession of a firearm is not an essential element of the crime of which the respondent was convicted. Where the statute under which an alien was convicted is divisible, we look to the record of conviction, and to other docu- ments admissible as evidence in proving a criminal conviction, to determine whether the specific offense for which the alien was convicted constitutes a firearms violation within the meaning of section 241(a)(2)(C) of Act. 8

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-38（1988）。 被申请人被定罪所依据的法规是可分割的；它既包含构成 firearms violations 的罪行，也包含不构成 firearms violations 的罪行。持有 firearm 并非被申请人被定罪罪行的必要要素。当外国人被定罪所依据的法规可分割时，我们查阅定罪记录以及可作为证明刑事定罪的证据采纳的其他文件，以确定该外国人所被定罪的具体罪行是否构成《移民与国籍法》第241(a)(2)(C)条所指的 firearms violation。8

C.F.R. § 3.41 (1995); cf., e.g., Matter of Short, 20 I&N Dec. 136, 137 (BIA 1989) (involving deportability for crimes of moral turpitude under section 241(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Act). Therefore, we look to the respondent’s record of conviction, and to other documents admissible as evidence in proving a crim- inal conviction, to determine whether the specific offense of which he was convicted constitutes a firearms violation within the meaning of section 241(a)(2)(C) of Act.

C.F.R. § 3.41（1995）；参见，例如，Matter of Short，20 I&N Dec. 136, 137（BIA 1989）（涉及根据《移民与国籍法》第241(a)(2)(A)(i)条因道德败坏罪行而可被驱逐出境）。因此，我们查阅被申请人的定罪记录以及可作为证明刑事定罪的证据采纳的其他文件，以确定其所被定罪的具体罪行是否构成《移民与国籍法》第241(a)(2)(C)条所指的 firearms violation。

B. Police Report and “Record of Conviction”

B. 警察报告与“定罪记录”

The police report indicates that the respondent may, in actual fact, have had a firearm in his car at the time of his arrest. However, the issue before us is not whether the respondent unlawfully had a firearm in his car as a matter of fact, but whether he was convicted of such misconduct. None of the docu- ments contained in the record of proceedings of the kind that we have previ- ously recognized as parts of a “record of conviction” establishes that “fact.” See, e.g., Matter of Rodriguez-Cortes, 20 I&N Dec. 587, 588 (BIA 1992) (including an information in “record of conviction”); Matter of Short, supra, at 137-38 (including indictment, plea, verdict, and sentence in “record of conviction”); Matter of Mena, 17 I&N Dec. 38 (BIA 1979) (considering tran- script from proceedings of arraignment in which alien accepted guilty plea as part of “record of conviction”); Matter of Esfandiary, 16 I&N Dec. 659, 661 (BIA 1979) (including charge or indictment, plea, verdict, and sentence in “record of conviction”); Matter of Ghunaim, 15 I&N Dec. 269, 270 (BIA 1975) (including charge or indictment, plea, judgment or verdict, and sen- tence in “record of conviction”). While the Service argues for reliance on the police report, it does not claim that the police report is actually part of the “record of conviction” in this case. Nor does the Service expressly challenge the established case law holding that one looks to the record of conviction to determine the nature of a conviction.1 The only document introduced into evidence that we consider to be part of the respondent’s “record of conviction,” or that fits any of the regulatory descriptions found at 8 C.F.R. § 3.41 for documents that are admissible as evidence in any proceeding before an Immigration Judge in proving a crimi- nal conviction, is the record of plea, verdict, and sentence. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.41(a)(2), (5), (6). The police report is not part of a “record of convic- tion,” nor does it fit any of the regulatory descriptions. Cf. 8 C.F.R. § 3.41.2 Therefore, the police report should not have been considered to determine

警方报告表明，实际上，被申请人在被捕时可能在其车内持有枪支。然而，摆在我们面前的问题不是被申请人事实上是否非法在其车内持有枪支，而是他是否因此类不当行为被定罪。诉讼记录中没有任何我们此前认定为“定罪记录”组成部分的那类文件能够证明该“事实”。参见，例如，Matter of Rodriguez-Cortes, 20 I&N Dec. 587, 588 (BIA 1992)（将起诉书纳入“定罪记录”）；Matter of Short, supra, at 137-38（将起诉书、认罪、裁决和判刑纳入“定罪记录”）；Matter of Mena, 17 I&N Dec. 38 (BIA 1979)（将外国人接受认罪的提审程序笔录视为“定罪记录”的一部分）；Matter of Esfandiary, 16 I&N Dec. 659, 661 (BIA 1979)（将指控或起诉书、认罪、裁决和判刑纳入“定罪记录”）；Matter of Ghunaim, 15 I&N Dec. 269, 270 (BIA 1975)（将指控或起诉书、认罪、判决或裁决以及判刑纳入“定罪记录”）。虽然移民局主张依赖警方报告，但它并未声称警方报告实际上是本案“定罪记录”的一部分。移民局也没有明确质疑已确立的判例法，即应查阅定罪记录以确定定罪的性质。1 在我们看来属于被申请人“定罪记录”一部分、或符合8 C.F.R. § 3.41中关于在移民法官面前任何程序中可作为证明刑事定罪的证据予以采纳的文件之任何监管描述的、唯一被引入证据的文件，是认罪、裁决和判刑记录。参见8 C.F.R. §§ 3.41(a)(2), (5), (6)。警方报告不是“定罪记录”的一部分，也不符合任何监管描述。比较8 C.F.R. § 3.41。2因此，不应考虑警方报告以确定

whether the specific offense of which the respondent was convicted consti- tutes a firearms violation.

被申请人被定罪的具体罪行是否构成枪支违规。

C. Materiality of Police Report

C. 警方报告的实质性

The crux of the Service’s argument on appeal is that the police report is “probative of the circumstances surrounding the respondent’s arrest and con- viction as well as identify[ing] the type of weapon with specificity.” We rec- ognize that reliable police reports can be very useful in determining the circumstances surrounding an arrest. But, a particular criminal incident can often result in the violation of multiple criminal provisions of law. The arrest report typically will not tell us what charges the prosecution chose to pursue, nor which of those charges actually resulted in a “conviction.” There may be a wide gulf between the most serious offense an individual may have com- mitted and what he ultimately is convicted of having done. As the firearms ground of deportability hinges on the existence of a conviction, the material evidence is that which discloses what type of offense the conviction encom- passes. General evidence related to what a respondent has done—as opposed to specific evidence of what he was actually convicted of doing—is not rele- vant to the issue of deportability under section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Act, because neither an Immigration Judge nor this Board can try or retry the criminal case (i.e., deportation proceedings cannot result in a “conviction”). INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039 (1984) (stating that an Immigra- tion Judge “cannot adjudicate guilt”). The Service also argues that under the regulations the police report should be considered to determine the respondent’s deportability because the report is “material and relevant to the issues in the case.” 8 C.F.R. § 242.14(c) (1995). We disagree. The police report may be relevant to the issue of whether the respondent was convicted of a firearms violation, inasmuch as it may make the existence of the “fact” that the respondent was convicted of a firearms violation more probable than it would be without the police report. Black’s Law Dictionary 1160 (5th ed. 1979). However, material evidence refers to evidence that by itself or in connection with other evidence is deter- minative of the case. Id. at 881. We decide today that only reference to a “record of conviction” or other document admissible under 8 C.F.R. § 3.41 will determine whether an alien was in fact convicted of a firearms violation. Because the police report in this case is neither part of a “record of convic- tion,” nor a document admissible under 8 C.F.R. § 3.41, it is not material to the respondent’s deportability under section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Act, and 8 C.F.R. § 242.14(c) does not require that it be considered to determine whether the respondent is deportable under that section.

移民局在上诉中论点的核心是，警方报告“对被申请人被捕和定罪的相关情况具有证明力，并具体指明了武器类型”。我们承认，可靠的警方报告在确定逮捕相关情况方面可能非常有用。但是，某一特定犯罪事件往往可能导致违反多项刑事法律规定。逮捕报告通常不会告诉我们检方选择追究哪些指控，也不会告诉我们其中哪些指控实际上导致了“定罪”。一个人可能实施的最严重罪行与其最终被定罪的行为之间可能存在巨大鸿沟。由于驱逐出境的枪支理由取决于定罪的存在，因此实质性证据是揭示定罪涵盖何种罪行类型的证据。与被申请人实际被定罪行为的具体证据相对，与其所作所为有关的一般性证据与《移民与国籍法》第241(a)(2)(C)条下的驱逐出境问题无关，因为移民法官和本委员会均不能审判或重新审判刑事案件（即驱逐出境程序不能导致“定罪”）。INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039 (1984)（指出移民法官“不能裁定有罪”）。 移民局还主张，根据相关规定，应考虑警方报告以确定被申请人的可驱逐性，因为该报告“对案件问题具有实质性和相关性”。8 C.F.R. § 242.14(c) (1995)。我们不同意。警方报告可能与被申请人是否因枪支违规被定罪的问题相关，因为它可能使被申请人因枪支违规被定罪的“事实”之存在比没有警方报告时更具可能性。Black's Law Dictionary 1160 (5th ed. 1979)。然而，实质性证据是指本身或与其他证据结合对案件具有决定性的证据。Id. at 881。我们今天裁定，只有参照“定罪记录”或根据8 C.F.R. § 3.41可采纳的其他文件，才能确定外国人是否实际上因枪支违规被定罪。由于本案中的警方报告既不是“定罪记录”的一部分，也不是根据8 C.F.R. § 3.41可采纳的文件，因此它与《移民与国籍法》第241(a)(2)(C)条下被申请人的可驱逐性无关，8 C.F.R. § 242.14(c)也不要求考虑该报告以确定被申请人是否根据该条可被驱逐出境。

D. Police Report and Discretionary Applications

D. 警方报告与酌情申请

On appeal the Service adopts the Immigration Judge’s reasoning that our decision in Matter of Grijalva, 19 I&N Dec. 713 (BIA 1988), permits a police report to support a charge of deportability under section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Act. We do not agree with that reasoning. In Matter of Grijalva, supra, we held that inasmuch as all relevant factors regarding an alien’s arrest and con- viction should be considered in cases involving discretionary relief, police reports concerning circumstances of arrest are appropriately admitted into evidence. See Matter of Thomas, 21 I&N Dec. 20 (BIA 1995). This appeal does not involve an application for discretionary relief. Rather, it concerns whether the Service has established by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the respondent is deportable as an alien convicted of a firearms violation. See Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966); 8 C.F.R. § 242.14(a). This difference in the treatment of a police report is the result of the differ- ent issues raised by the charge of deportability under section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Act and an application for discretionary relief. The question posed by the respondent’s application for discretionary relief is whether he warrants a favorable exercise of discretion. The police report may be helpful in answer- ing that question, because it bears on the issue of the respondent’s conduct when he was arrested, and this in turn is germane to whether the respondent merits discretionary relief from deportation. The fact that an Immigration Judge may consider police reports in ruling on applications for discretionary relief does not, however, mean that such reports should also be considered in determining deportability where the Act mandates a focus on a criminal conviction, rather than on an alien’s conduct.3 Congress has tied deportability under section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Act to a conviction, not to conduct. To have drafted the law otherwise would have entailed significant costs in relation to the efficient adjudication of cases. Inquiring beyond a record of conviction to determine deportability could lead to protracted evidentiary hearings, inconsistent with the streamlined determi- nation that a deportation hearing is intended to provide. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, supra, at 1039. Although evidence of criminal activity should be considered in discretionary determinations, an Immigration Judge may in the exercise of his sound discretion limit that inquiry to the extent nec- essary to conduct the discretionary phase of the application. This reduces the risks of protracted evidentiary hearings, particularly where an application involves multiple discretionary factors.

在上诉中，移民局采纳了移民法官的推理，即我们在Matter of Grijalva, 19 I&N Dec. 713 (BIA 1988)中的裁决允许警方报告支持《移民与国籍法》第241(a)(2)(C)条下的驱逐出境指控。我们不同意该推理。在Matter of Grijalva, supra中，我们裁定，由于在涉及酌情救济的案件中应考虑与外国人被捕和定罪有关的所有相关因素，因此有关逮捕情况的警方报告可适当地被采纳为证据。参见Matter of Thomas, 21 I&N Dec. 20 (BIA 1995)。本上诉不涉及酌情救济申请。相反，它涉及移民局是否已通过明确、不含糊和令人信服的证据证明被申请人作为因枪支违规被定罪的外国人可被驱逐出境。参见Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966)；8 C.F.R. § 242.14(a)。对警方报告处理的这种差异是《移民与国籍法》第241(a)(2)(C)条下驱逐出境指控与酌情救济申请所提出的不同问题所致。被申请人的酌情救济申请所提出的问题是，他是否值得酌情给予有利处理。警方报告可能有助于回答该问题，因为它涉及被申请人被捕时的行为问题，而这又与申请人是否值得获得驱逐出境的酌情救济密切相关。 然而，移民法官在裁决酌情救济申请时可以考虑警方报告这一事实，并不意味着在《移民与国籍法》要求关注刑事定罪而非外国人行为的可驱逐性确定中也应考虑此类报告。3国会将《移民与国籍法》第241(a)(2)(C)条下的可驱逐性与定罪而非行为挂钩。若以其他方式起草法律，将在案件高效裁决方面带来重大成本。在定罪记录之外进行调查以确定可驱逐性可能导致旷日持久的证据听证，这与驱逐出境听证旨在提供的简化裁定不一致。参见INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, supra, at 1039。尽管在酌情裁定中应考虑犯罪活动证据，但移民法官可行使合理酌情权，将调查限制在申请酌情阶段所必需的范围内。这降低了旷日持久证据听证的风险，特别是在申请涉及多个酌情因素的情况下。

IV. DETERMINATION OF RESPONDENT’S DEPORTABILITY UNDER SECTION 241(a)(2)(C) OF THE ACT

IV. 根据《移民与国籍法》第241(a)(2)(C)条对被申请人可驱逐性的裁定

The respondent argues on appeal that the Immigration Judge erred in find- ing him deportable under section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Act. We agree. The statute under which the respondent was convicted is divisible; it encompasses offenses that constitute firearms violations and offenses that do not. It is not possible to determine from an examination of the respondent’s record of conviction, or from any other documents admissible as evidence in proving a criminal conviction, whether the specific offense of which the respondent was convicted constitutes a firearms violation. Therefore, the Service has not established by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the respondent is deportable pursuant to section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Act. Woodby v. INS, supra.4 Accordingly, the respondent’s appeal from the Immigration Judge’s find- ing of deportability will be sustained and the deportation proceedings will be terminated. ORDER: The appeal is sustained and the deportation proceed- ings are terminated.

被申请人在上诉中主张，移民法官裁定其根据《移民与国籍法》第241(a)(2)(C)条可被驱逐出境存在错误。我们同意。 被申请人据以被定罪的法条是可分割的；它既涵盖构成枪支违规的罪行，也涵盖不构成枪支违规的罪行。通过审查被申请人的定罪记录，或通过审查在证明刑事定罪中可作为证据采纳的任何其他文件，无法确定被申请人被定罪的具体罪行是否构成枪支违规。因此，移民局未通过明确、不含糊和令人信服的证据证明被申请人根据《移民与国籍法》第241(a)(2)(C)条可被驱逐出境。Woodby v. INS, supra.4 因此，被申请人对移民法官可驱逐性裁定的上诉将获支持，驱逐出境程序将终止。 命令： 上诉获支持，驱逐出境程序终止。