Matter of Jean

Cite as 23 I&N Dec. 373 (A.G. 2002) Interim Decision #3472

引用为 23 I&N Dec. 373 (A.G. 2002) 临时决定第3472号

File A25 452 154

案卷号 A25 452 154

Decided May 2, 2002

2002年5月2日决定

U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Attorney General

美国司法部 总检察长办公室

(1) The 30-day period set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 3.38(b) (2002) for filing an appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals is mandatory and jurisdictional, and it begins to run upon the issuance of a final disposition in the case.

(1) 8 C.F.R. § 3.38(b) (2002) 规定的向移民上诉委员会提起上诉的30天期限是强制性的且具有管辖权，该期限自案件最终处理结果发布之日起开始计算。

(2) The Board of Immigration Appeals’ authority under 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(c) (2002) to certify cases to itself in its discretion is limited to exceptional circumstances, and is not meant to be used as a general cure for filing defects or to otherwise circumvent the regulations, where enforcing them might result in hardship.

(2) 移民上诉委员会根据 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(c) (2002) 享有的自行决定将案件调卷至自身审理的权力仅限于特殊情形，不得用作补救申请缺陷的通用手段，也不得在严格执行法规可能造成困难时用以规避法规。

(3) In evaluating the propriety of granting an otherwise inadmissible alien a discretionary waiver to permit adjustment of status from refugee to lawful permanent resident pursuant to section 209(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1159(c) (2000), any humanitarian, family unity preservation, or public interest considerations must be balanced against the seriousness of the criminal offense that rendered the alien inadmissible.

(3) 在评估是否适宜给予原本不可入境的外国人自由裁量豁免，以允许其根据《移民与国籍法》第209(c)条，8 U.S.C. § 1159(c) (2000)，将身份从难民调整为合法永久居民时，任何人道主义、家庭团聚维护或公共利益方面的考量，都必须与导致该外国人不可入境的刑事犯罪的严重性进行权衡。

(4) Aliens who have committed violent or dangerous crimes will not be granted a discretionary waiver to permit adjustment of status from refugee to lawful permanent resident pursuant to section 209(c) of the Act except in extraordinary circumstances, such as those involving national security or foreign policy considerations, or cases in which an alien clearly demonstrates that the denial of status adjustment would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. Depending on the gravity of the alien’s underlying criminal offense, such a showing of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship might still be insufficient.

(4) 犯有暴力或危险罪行的外国人，除特殊情形外，不得根据该法第209(c)条获得允许其将身份从难民调整为合法永久居民的自由裁量豁免，此类特殊情形例如涉及国家安全或外交政策考量，或外国人明确证明拒绝调整身份将导致特殊且极其不寻常的困难。取决于该外国人 underlying 刑事犯罪的严重程度，此种特殊且极其不寻常困难的证明仍可能不足。

(5) Aliens who have committed violent or dangerous crimes will not be granted asylum, even if they are technically eligible for such relief, except in extraordinary circumstances, such as those involving national security or foreign policy considerations, or cases in which an alien clearly demonstrates that the denial of status adjustment would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. Depending on the gravity of the alien’s underlying criminal offense, such a showing of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship might still be insufficient.

(5) 犯有暴力或危险罪行的外国人，即使其在技术上符合此类救济的资格，除特殊情形外，也不得获得庇护，此类特殊情形例如涉及国家安全或外交政策考量，或外国人明确证明拒绝调整身份将导致特殊且极其不寻常的困难。取决于该外国人 underlying 刑事犯罪的严重程度，此种特殊且极其不寻常困难的证明仍可能不足。

IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS

在驱逐程序中

By previous Order, I directed the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or “Board”) to refer this case to me for review pursuant to 8 C.F.R.

根据先前的命令，我指示移民上诉委员会（“BIA”或“委员会”）根据 8 C.F.R. 将本案提交给我审查。

In publishing this opinion in its current format, the Attorney General is invoking his discretion pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 208.6(a) (2002).

总检察长以当前格式发布本意见，系行使 8 C.F.R. § 208.6(a) (2002) 项下的自由裁量权。

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§ 3.1(h)(1)(i) (2002). 2 Overruling the decision of an immigration judge, a BIA panel declared that the respondent’s conviction for second-degree manslaughter did not render her ineligible for asylum or withholding of removal, and that the likely hardship her family would endure if she were returned to Haiti merited adjusting her status from refugee to lawful permanent resident. For the reasons set forth below, I now reverse the BIA’s decision and hold that the interests of the respondent’s family and the general public would be ill-served by granting her lawful permanent residency in the United States. I further conclude that the respondent is not entitled to any alternative relief from removal. 3

§ 3.1(h)(1)(i) (2002)。2 一个BIA合议庭推翻了移民法官的决定，宣布被申请人因二级过失杀人罪的定罪并不使其丧失庇护或暂缓驱逐的资格，并且如果她被遣返回海地，其家庭可能遭受的困难值得将其身份从难民调整为合法永久居民。基于下述理由，我现在撤销BIA的决定，并裁定给予被申请人在美国的合法永久居留权将不利于其家庭和公众的利益。我还进一步认定，被申请人无权获得任何替代性驱逐救济。3

I.

I.

Respondent Melanie Beaucejour Jean is a forty-five-year-old foreign national from Plaisance, Haiti. Accompanied by her husband and five children, she was conditionally admitted into the United States as a refugee in November 1994 pursuant to section 207 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (1994). 4

被申请人Melanie Beaucejour Jean是一名45岁的外国国民，来自海地Plaisance。1994年11月，她与丈夫和五个子女一起，根据《移民与国籍法》（“INA”）第207条，8 U.S.C. § 1157 (1994)，作为难民有条件入境美国。4

In August 1995, the respondent pled guilty in the County Court for Monroe County, New York, to one count of second-degree manslaughter in connection with the March 30, 1995 death of nineteen-month-old R-J-. According to the respondent’s signed confession, R-J- had been left in her care that day by the boy’s mother – who was also the sister-in-law of the respondent’s husband – in an apartment the two families shared in Rochester, New York. Early in the afternoon, the young child fell off a couch in the apartment and began to cry. The respondent reacted by striking the toddler’s buttocks two or three times with her open hand in an attempt to quiet him. When this effort proved unsuccessful, she picked the boy up by the armpits and shook him. She then

1995年8月，被申请人在纽约州门罗县法院就一项二级过失杀人罪认罪，该罪与1995年3月30日19个月大的R-J-死亡有关。根据被申请人签署的供词，当天男孩的母亲——同时也是被申请人丈夫的姐妹——将R-J-留在她照看下，地点是两家人在纽约州罗切斯特合住的公寓。下午早些时候，这名幼童从公寓的沙发上摔下并开始哭泣。被申请人反应是用张开的手掌打幼儿的臀部两三次，试图让他安静。当这一努力未果时，她抓住男孩的腋下将他举起并摇晃他。随后她

2 My review of BIA decisions is de novo. See Deportation Proceedings of Joseph Patrick Doherty, 12 Op. O.L.C. 1, 4 (1988) (“[W]hen the Attorney General reviews a case pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(h), he retains full authority to receive additional evidence and to make de novo factual determinations.”). 3 This published decision is binding on the BIA and is intended to overrule any BIA decisions with which it is inconsistent. See Iran Air v. Kugelman, 996 F.2d 1253, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (administrative judges “are entirely subject to the agency on matters of law”); see also 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(g). 4 The opinions of both the immigration judge and the BIA inaccurately characterize the nature of the respondent’s entry into the United States. She was neither paroled nor permanently admitted into the country. Rather, she was conditionally admitted as a refugee under INA § 207, which had the effect of deferring her admissibility inspection and examination by federal immigration officials. See Matter of Garcia-Alzugaray, 19 I&N Dec. 407, 408-10 (BIA 1986).

2 我对BIA决定的审查是de novo。见 Deportation Proceedings of Joseph Patrick Doherty, 12 Op. O.L.C. 1, 4 (1988)（“[W]当总检察长根据 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(h) 审查案件时，他保留接收额外证据并作出de novo事实认定的全部权力。”）。 3 本公布的决定对BIA具有约束力，并旨在推翻任何与其不一致的BIA决定。见 Iran Air v. Kugelman, 996 F.2d 1253, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1993)（行政法官“在法律问题上完全服从于机构”）；另见 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(g)。 4 移民法官和BIA的意见均不准确地描述了被申请人进入美国的性质。她既不是被假释入境，也不是被永久接纳进入该国。相反，她是根据INA第207条作为难民有条件入境，其效果是推迟了联邦移民官员对她的入境检查。见 Matter of Garcia-Alzugaray, 19 I&N Dec. 407, 408-10 (BIA 1986)。

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hit him two or three times on the top of his head with her fist. Finally, she picked him up again and shook him until he lost consciousness. Upon observing that the child was no longer breathing and that his eyes, although open, had stopped blinking, the respondent placed him on a bed just off the living room. She neither called 911 nor sought any other emergency assistance. When her husband returned to the apartment with the child’s mother approximately one hour later, the respondent told them that R-J- had passed out in their absence.

用拳头打了他头顶两三次。最后，她再次将他举起并摇晃他，直到他失去意识。在观察到孩子不再呼吸且眼睛虽然睁开但已停止眨眼后，被申请人将他放在客厅旁的床上。她既没有拨打911，也没有寻求任何其他紧急援助。大约一小时后，当她的丈夫与孩子的母亲返回公寓时，被申请人告诉他们R-J-在他们不在时昏过去了。

The medical examiner’s report described bruises to R-J-’s head, chest, and back; internal hemorrhages of the lungs, pancreas, and diaphragm; and acute subdural and spinal epidural hemorrhages. The report determined that R-J- died from bleeding and swelling inside his skull caused by blunt trauma, and that the death was a homicide.

法医报告描述了R-J-头部、胸部和背部的瘀伤；肺、胰腺和膈肌的内部出血；以及急性硬膜下和脊髓硬膜外出血。报告认定R-J-死于钝器创伤导致的颅内出血和肿胀，死亡方式为凶杀。

During her plea colloquy with the Monroe County Court judge, the respondent maintained that she did not attempt to contact emergency personnel after shaking the child into an unconscious state because, in the interim, she was preoccupied with a long-distance telephone conversation and thought the boy was in bed sleeping. She added that phoning emergency officials would have been difficult inasmuch as she does not speak English well and thus may not have been understood. 5 A month after the plea hearing, the court sentenced her to two-to-six years’ incarceration.

在与门罗县法院法官的认罪问答中，被申请人坚称，在将孩子摇晃至失去意识后，她没有尝试联系急救人员，因为在此期间她忙于一个长途电话，并认为男孩在床上睡觉。她补充说，拨打紧急电话会很困难，因为她英语说得不好，因此可能不被理解。5 认罪听证会一个月后，法院判处她2至6年监禁。

Following the completion of her state sentence, the respondent requested an adjustment of her status from “refugee” to “lawful permanent resident” pursuant to INA § 209(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). The Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) denied this application in July 1999 and commenced formal removal proceedings against her as an inadmissible alien convicted of a crime of moral turpitude. 6 See INA §§ 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 240(a), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 1229a(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). Although the respondent did not contest the fact that she

在完成州刑期后，被申请人根据INA第209(a)条，8 U.S.C. § 1159(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999)，请求将其身份从“难民”调整为“合法永久居民”。移民与归化局（“INS”）于1999年7月拒绝了该申请，并作为因道德败坏罪被定罪而不可入境的外国人，对她启动了正式驱逐程序。6 见INA §§ 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 240(a), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 1229a(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999)。尽管被申请人未对以下事实提出异议：她

5 At the plea colloquy, the respondent also sought to retreat from some of the more damning admissions in her earlier written confession. Without making any factual findings regarding these post hoc attacks on the confession, the Monroe County judge, in a not altogether clear discussion, seemingly concluded that New York law permitted him to accept the respondent’s guilty plea to second-degree manslaughter as charged in the indictment based on her failure to seek medical help when R-J- stopped breathing.

5 在认罪问答中，被申请人还试图撤回其先前书面供词中一些更为不利的承认。门罗县法官未对这些事后对供词的攻击作出任何事实认定，在一段不完全清晰的论述中，似乎认定纽约州法律允许他基于被申请人在R-J-停止呼吸时未寻求医疗帮助，接受其对起诉书所指控的二级过失杀人罪的认罪。

A month earlier, the INS had prematurely initiated removal proceedings against the respondent without affording her an opportunity to seek an adjustment of status under INA § 209. The agency corrected this deficiency by terminating the earlier removal proceeding, adjudicating her application, and commencing a new removal proceeding. See Hr’g Tr. (July 21, 1999) at 13-14.

一个月前，INS过早地对被申请人启动了驱逐程序，未给予她根据INA第209条寻求调整身份的机会。该机构通过终止先前的驱逐程序、裁定其申请并启动新的驱逐程序纠正了这一缺陷。见 Hr’g Tr. (July 21, 1999) at 13-14。

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was inadmissible in light of her manslaughter conviction – indisputably, a crime of moral turpitude – she sought a waiver of inadmissibility under INA § 209(c), citing her fear of persecution upon return to Haiti as well as her desire to keep her family together in the United States. In addition, she requested asylum pursuant to INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (Supp. V 1999), and withholding or deferral of removal pursuant to both INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (Supp. V 1999), and Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“Convention Against Torture”), see 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16-208.18 (2002) (regulations implementing Convention).

鉴于其过失杀人罪定罪——无可争议地属于道德败坏罪——而不可入境，她根据INA第209(c)条寻求不可入境豁免，援引其返回海地后对迫害的恐惧以及将家庭团聚在美国的愿望。此外，她根据INA第208条，8 U.S.C. § 1158 (Supp. V 1999)，请求庇护，并根据INA第241(b)(3)条，8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (Supp. V 1999)，以及《禁止酷刑和其他残忍、不人道或有辱人格的待遇或处罚公约》（“《禁止酷刑公约》”）第3条，请求暂缓或推迟驱逐，见 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16-208.18 (2002)（实施该公约的法规）。

An immigration judge ruled that the respondent’s second-degree manslaughter conviction constituted an “aggravated felony” within the meaning of the INA and, on this basis, declared her ineligible for all relief from removal. 7 IJ Oral Decision (Aug. 18, 1999) at 1-2. The respondent appealed to the BIA, which reversed the immigration judge’s decision. Relying on its opinion in Matter of Sweetser, Interim Decision 3390 (BIA 1999), the Board concluded that the respondent’s criminal conviction did not amount to a “crime of violence” – the necessary predicate for classifying the offense as an “aggravated felony” under the facts of this case – “because there was no substantial risk that physical force would be used in the commission of the crime.” BIA Decision (Dec. 16, 1999) at 2. The Board then remanded the case back to the immigration judge for the purpose of giving the respondent “an opportunity to apply for any relief from removal for which she may be eligible.” Id.

一名移民法官裁定，被申请人的二级过失杀人罪定罪构成INA意义上的“加重重罪”，并据此宣布她无资格获得任何驱逐救济。7 IJ口头决定（1999年8月18日）第1-2页。被申请人向BIA提出上诉，BIA推翻了移民法官的决定。委员会依据其在 Matter of Sweetser, Interim Decision 3390 (BIA 1999) 中的意见，认定被申请人的刑事定罪不构成“暴力犯罪”——在本案事实下将该罪行归类为“加重重罪”的必要前提——“因为在犯罪实施过程中不存在使用身体力量的实质性风险。”BIA决定（1999年12月16日）第2页。委员会随后将案件发回移民法官，目的是给予被申请人“申请其可能符合资格的任何驱逐救济的机会。”同上。

7 Although the immigration judge’s reasoning is not entirely clear from his brief oral decision, he appears to have improperly analyzed the respondent’s adjustment of status application under INA § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1994 & Supp. V 1999), which bars relief to aliens convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude, see INA § 245(a)(2) (restricting adjustments of status to aliens who meet INA § 212 standards of admissibility), rather than INA § 209, which contains no such express proscription. As noted in Part III.A., infra, individuals like the respondent who have been admitted (or conditionally admitted) into the United States as refugees can seek an adjustment of status only under section 209. With respect to the respondent’s INA-based claims for asylum and withholding of removal, the immigration judge obviously grounded his ineligibility determination on statutory provisions precluding the grant of such relief to aliens convicted of “aggravated felonies,” see id. § 208(b)(2) (asylum), or “particularly serious crimes,” see id. § 241(b)(3)(B) (withholding of removal). But the rationale for the judge’s denial of all relief under the Convention Against Torture is nowhere reflected in the decision. An aggravated felony conviction could not have formed the necessary predicate because an alien’s criminal history is irrelevant in examining his or her entitlement to deferral of removal under the Convention. See Matter of Y-L-, A-G- & R-S-R-, 23 I&N Dec. 270, 279 (A.G. 2002).

7 尽管移民法官在其简短的口头决定中的推理并不完全清楚，但他似乎不当依据《移民与国籍法》第245条、8 U.S.C. § 1255（1994及1999年第五号补充）分析了答辩人的调整身份申请，该条禁止向被判定犯有涉及道德败坏罪行的外国人提供救济，见《移民与国籍法》第245(a)(2)条（将调整身份限于符合《移民与国籍法》第212条入境资格标准的外国人），而非依据第209条，该条不含此类明示禁止。如下文第三部分A所述，像答辩人这样作为难民被接纳（或有条件接纳）进入美国的人，只能依据第209条寻求调整身份。关于答辩人基于《移民与国籍法》提出的庇护和暂缓遣返请求，移民法官显然将其不合格裁定建立在排除向被判定犯有“加重重罪”的外国人授予此类救济的法定条款上，见同法第208(b)(2)条（庇护），或“特别严重罪行”，见同法第241(b)(3)(B)条（暂缓遣返）。但法官驳回《禁止酷刑公约》下所有救济的理由在决定中毫无体现。加重重罪定罪不可能构成必要前提，因为外国人的犯罪史在审查其是否有权获得《公约》下的暂缓遣返时无关紧要。见Matter of Y-L-, A-G- & R-S-R-, 23 I&N Dec. 270, 279 (A.G. 2002)。

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On remand, the immigration judge conducted several evidentiary hearings and issued two decisions which, in combination, denied all relief requested by the respondent. Addressing the adjustment of status issue, the judge found that a determination regarding the propriety of such a discretionary grant of relief required a balancing of “the adverse factors evidencing [the respondent’s] undesirability as a permanent resident [against] the social and humane considerations presented on her behalf.” IJ Decision (May 4, 2000) at 3. After weighing these considerations, the judge concluded that there was no sound basis for a grant of lawful permanent residency to the respondent. Id. at 3-5.

发回重审后，移民法官举行了数次证据听证会并作出两项决定，两项决定合起来驳回了答辩人请求的所有救济。在处理调整身份问题时，法官认定，裁定是否适当行使此类自由裁量救济需要权衡“表明[答辩人]不宜作为永久居民的不利因素[与]为其提出的社会和人道考量”。IJ决定（2000年5月4日）第3页。在权衡这些考量后，法官得出结论，没有可靠依据向答辩人授予合法永久居留权。同上，第3-5页。

The immigration judge next held that the respondent had no right to asylum. He noted that not only did the respondent fail to demonstrate an objectively reasonable fear of persecution in Haiti, but the nature of her criminal conviction rendered her ineligible for such relief. Id. at 5-10. On the latter point, the judge reasoned that, unlike the Colorado criminally negligent child abuse statute that the BIA examined in Sweetser, second-degree manslaughter in New York required an affirmative act on the part of the offender. Id. at 8-10. As a result, the offense satisfied the criteria for a “crime of violence,” and thus qualified as an “aggravated felony” under the INA. Id.

移民法官接下来认定答辩人无权获得庇护。他指出，答辩人不仅未能证明在海地存在客观合理的迫害恐惧，而且其刑事定罪的性质使其无资格获得此类救济。同上，第5-10页。关于后一点，法官推理认为，与BIA在Sweetser案中审查的科罗拉多州刑事过失虐待儿童法规不同，纽约州二级过失杀人罪要求犯罪人实施积极行为。同上，第8-10页。因此，该罪行符合“暴力犯罪”的标准，从而构成《移民与国籍法》下的“加重重罪”。同上。

The immigration judge’s finding regarding the risk of persecution to the respondent also supported the rejection of her application for withholding of removal under INA § 241. Having determined that the respondent failed to demonstrate the “well-founded fear of persecution” necessary to qualify for asylum, the judge held that the respondent necessarily fell short in her effort to meet the far more demanding “clear probability of persecution” standard required to obtain relief under section 241. Id. at 10 (citing INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 430 (1984)).

移民法官关于答辩人面临迫害风险的认定也支持驳回其依据《移民与国籍法》第241条提出的暂缓遣返申请。在认定答辩人未能证明获得庇护资格所需的“有充分理由的迫害恐惧”后，法官认定，答辩人在满足第241条下获得救济所需的远为严格的“迫害的明确可能性”标准方面必然不足。同上，第10页（引用INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 430 (1984)）。

In a separate opinion issued weeks later, the judge denied the respondent’s claims for withholding or deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture as well. He found that the record failed to support the respondent’s allegation that those individuals or entities in Haiti who had purportedly attacked her husband and burned her family’s home years earlier continued to persecute opponents of the former military regime. See IJ Decision (May 25, 2000) at 3. He further noted that there was no credible evidence that such individuals or entities, to the extent they are still engaged in political violence, would find the respondent if she took up residence somewhere other than the village where she had previously lived. Id.

在数周后作出的另一份意见中，法官还驳回了答辩人依据《禁止酷刑公约》提出的暂缓或推迟遣返请求。他认定，记录未能支持答辩人的指控，即海地那些据称多年前袭击其丈夫并烧毁其家宅的个人或实体仍在迫害前军事政权的反对者。见IJ决定（2000年5月25日）第3页。他进一步指出，没有可信证据表明，此类个人或实体（在其仍从事政治暴力的范围内）会在答辩人居住于其先前所住村庄以外的地方时找到她。同上。

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Following the issuance of these adverse decisions, the respondent pursued a second administrative appeal to the BIA, which once again reversed the immigration judge. In a cursory opinion, the Board chastised the immigration judge for not adhering to its earlier ruling that the respondent’s second-degree manslaughter conviction did not represent a “crime of violence.” BIA Decision (Mar. 1, 2001) at 1-2. The Board then held that, under its own view of the evidence, the respondent had established her eligibility for a waiver of inadmissibility and an adjustment of status from refugee to lawful permanent resident. Id. at 2. Finally, the Board concluded in a single sentence that “the equities,” when weighed against the respondent’s criminal conviction, warranted the grant of such discretionary relief. 8 Id.

在这些不利决定作出后，答辩人向BIA提起第二次行政上诉，BIA再次推翻了移民法官。在一份简略的意见中，BIA斥责移民法官未遵守其先前的裁定，即答辩人的二级过失杀人定罪不构成“暴力犯罪”。BIA决定（2001年3月1日）第1-2页。BIA随后认定，根据其自身对证据的看法，答辩人已证明其有资格获得入境豁免以及从难民调整为合法永久居民。同上，第2页。最后，BIA用一句话得出结论：“衡平因素”在与答辩人的刑事定罪权衡后， warrant 授予此类自由裁量救济。8 同上。

II.

II.

Before turning to the merits, I must first examine the INS’s contention that the BIA lacked jurisdiction to hear the respondent’s post-remand appeal because it was untimely. INS regulations dictate that appeals from the rulings of immigration judges must “be filed directly with the [BIA] within 30 calendar days after the stating of an Immigration Judge’s oral decision or the mailing of an Immigration Judge’s written decision.” 8 C.F.R. § 3.38(b) (2002). The effective date of any such appeal is the day the notice of appeal is received by the Board. Id. § 3.38(c). This deadline is mandatory and jurisdictional. Da Cruz v. INS, 4 F.3d 721, 722 (9th Cir. 1993).

在进入实体问题之前，我必须首先审查INS的论点，即BIA缺乏审理答辩人发回重审后上诉的管辖权，因为该上诉不及时。INS法规规定，对移民法官裁定的上诉必须“在移民法官口头决定作出或移民法官书面决定邮寄后30个日历日内直接向[BIA]提交”。8 C.F.R. § 3.38(b)（2002）。任何此类上诉的生效日期是BIA收到上诉通知之日。同上第3.38(c)条。该期限是强制性和管辖性的。Da Cruz v. INS, 4 F.3d 721, 722 (9th Cir. 1993)。

Counsel for the respondent filed two post-remand notices of appeal with the BIA in this case, responding separately to the immigration judge’s two post-remand decisions. The immigration judge’s initial decision on remand, which denied the respondent’s applications for adjustment of status, asylum, and withholding of removal under the INA, was dated May 4, 2000. It was mailed to the respondent that same day, see Karimian-Kaklaki v. INS, 997 F.2d 108, 111 (5th Cir. 1993) (date of INS transmittal letter accepted as dispositive evidence of the mailing date, absent specific evidence to the contrary), accompanied by a notification form warning that the decision would become final unless an appeal was filed with the BIA “within 30 calendar days of the date of the mailing of this written decision.” The immigration judge later issued a second post-remand decision, denying the respondent’s remaining claims under the Convention Against Torture, on May 25, 2000. This latter decision was also mailed on the date of its issuance, and contained

答辩人的律师在本案中向BIA提交了两份发回重审后的上诉通知，分别回应移民法官发回重审后的两项决定。移民法官在发回重审后的初始决定驳回了答辩人依据《移民与国籍法》提出的调整身份、庇护和暂缓遣返申请，日期为2000年5月4日。该决定于同日邮寄给答辩人，见Karimian-Kaklaki v. INS, 997 F.2d 108, 111 (5th Cir. 1993)（在没有相反的具体证据时，INS转递函日期被接受为邮寄日期的决定性证据），并附有一份通知表，警告除非在“本书面决定邮寄之日起30个日历日内”向BIA提交上诉，该决定将成为最终决定。移民法官后来于2000年5月25日作出第二项发回重审后决定，驳回答辩人依据《禁止酷刑公约》提出的其余请求。后一决定也在其作出之日邮寄，并载有

8 Having granted the respondent’s application for adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident, the BIA did not address her claims for asylum and withholding or deferral of removal.

8 在批准答辩人从难民调整为合法永久居民的申请后，BIA未处理其庇护和暂缓或推迟遣返请求。

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an identical warning that it would become final unless appealed within thirty days.

相同的警告，即除非在三十日内上诉，该决定将成为最终决定。

The respondent’s first notice of appeal, which was filed on June 6, 2000, indicated explicitly that she was appealing from the immigration judge’s May 4 ruling. Her second notice of appeal, which was filed on June 28, 2000, stated specifically that she was challenging the immigration judge’s May 25 ruling. The INS maintains that both appeals were untimely inasmuch as the first was filed thirty-three days after the first decision, while the second was filed thirty-four days after the second decision. Although I agree with the INS that the respondent failed to preserve her challenge to the immigration judge’s adverse decision on the Convention Against Torture claim, I reach this conclusion for different reasons than those advanced by the INS. As for the respondent’s appeal of the denial of her other requested relief, I find that her notice was timely.

答辩人的第一份上诉通知于2000年6月6日提交，明确表明她对移民法官5月4日裁定提出上诉。她的第二份上诉通知于2000年6月28日提交，具体表明她挑战移民法官5月25日裁定。INS主张两份上诉均不及时，因为第一份是在第一项决定后三十三日提交，第二份是在第二项决定后三十四日提交。尽管我同意INS的意见，即答辩人未能保留其对移民法官关于《禁止酷刑公约》请求的不利决定的挑战，但我得出这一结论的理由与INS提出的不同。至于答辩人对驳回其其他请求救济的上诉，我认定其通知是及时的。

At the time of the immigration judge’s initial post-remand ruling, there was no final disposition in the case. Any appeal at that moment, therefore, would have been interlocutory in nature. Yet interlocutory appeals are discouraged in immigration proceedings, and the BIA properly declines to review non-final decisions of immigration judges except in highly unusual circumstances. See Matter of Morales, 21 I&N Dec. 130, 131-32 (BIA 1996) (BIA ordinarily does not consider interlocutory appeals, but makes occasional exceptions “to address important jurisdictional questions regarding the administration of the immigration laws or to correct recurring problems in the handling of cases before” immigration judges). In light of this practice, I believe it would be unreasonable to construe 8 C.F.R. § 3.38(b) to require litigants to file notices of appeal with the BIA from non-final decisions in order to preserve their objections to such rulings. Accordingly, the notice of appeal filed by the respondent on June 6 – twelve days after the issuance of the May 25 final decision in the case – was timely.

在移民法官作出发回重审后初始裁定时，案件尚无最终处置。因此，当时的任何上诉本质上都是中间性的。然而，移民程序中不鼓励中间上诉，BIA通常拒绝审查移民法官的非最终决定，除非在极不寻常的情况下。见Matter of Morales, 21 I&N Dec. 130, 131-32 (BIA 1996)（BIA通常不考虑中间上诉，但偶尔作出例外，“以处理关于移民法实施的重要管辖权问题，或纠正移民法官面前案件处理中反复出现的问题”）。鉴于这一做法，我认为将8 C.F.R. § 3.38(b)解释为要求诉讼当事人对非最终决定向BIA提交上诉通知以保留其对这类裁定的异议，是不合理的。因此，答辩人于6月6日提交的上诉通知——即在本案5月25日最终决定作出后十二日——是及时的。

The June 6 notice of appeal did not, however, preserve the respondent’s objections to the substance of the immigration judge’s May 25 decision, i.e., the rejection of her application for relief under the Convention Against Torture. To perfect an appeal to the BIA, a litigant must file a timely notice on a Form EOIR-26. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.38(b). The instructions therein state unequivocally that the appellant must “specify the reasons for appeal” on that form, even if a separate brief or statement will be filed. See Form EOIR-26, Notice of Appeal to the BIA of Decision of Immigration Judge (General Instructions VII-VIII). The failure to adhere to this directive may result in the dismissal of the appeal. See Soriano v. INS, 45 F.3d 287, 287 (8th Cir.

然而，6月6日的上诉通知并未保留答辩人对移民法官5月25日决定实质内容（即驳回其依据《禁止酷刑公约》提出的救济申请）的异议。为完善向BIA的上诉，诉讼当事人必须使用EOIR-26表格及时提交通知。见8 C.F.R. § 3.38(b)。其中的说明明确表示，上诉人必须在该表格上“具体说明上诉理由”，即使将另行提交简报或陈述。见EOIR-26表格，向BIA提交的移民法官决定上诉通知（一般说明VII-VIII）。不遵守该指示可能导致上诉被驳回。见Soriano v. INS, 45 F.3d 287, 287 (8th Cir.

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1995) (per curiam); Nazakat v. INS, 981 F.2d 1146, 1148 (10th Cir. 1992); Matter of Lodge, 19 I&N Dec. 500, 501 (BIA 1987); 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(2)(i)(D).

1995)（每 curiam）；Nazakat v. INS, 981 F.2d 1146, 1148 (10th Cir. 1992)；Matter of Lodge, 19 I&N Dec. 500, 501 (BIA 1987)；8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(2)(i)(D)。

The respondent’s June 6 notice of appeal refers exclusively to the immigration judge’s May 4 decision denying her application for relief under the INA, and contains no reference whatsoever to the May 25 decision denying her Convention Against Torture claim. Although this latter claim is identified in the respondent’s subsequent June 28 notice of appeal, that notice was rendered nugatory because it was filed more than thirty days after the immigration judge’s final disposition in the case. 9 While there may be rare cases where special circumstances would support a decision to consider issues not properly presented to the BIA in a timely-filed Form EOIR-26, this is not such a case. The Board here, as it often does, ordered simultaneous briefing on the merits, an approach that allows a more expeditious resolution of cases on the docket, and one that would not be feasible if the Board failed to enforce the requirement that appellants clearly specify the reasons for their appeals. Because the record in this case provides no indication of the kind of special circumstances that might justify an exception to this procedural requirement, the respondent’s appeal of the adverse ruling on her Convention Against Torture claim shall be dismissed. 10

答辩人6月6日的上诉通知仅提及移民法官5月4日驳回其根据《移民与国籍法》申请救济的决定，完全没有提及5月25日驳回其《禁止酷刑公约》主张的决定。尽管这一后一主张在答辩人随后6月28日的上诉通知中被指明，但该通知因在移民法官对案件作出最终处置后超过三十日才提交而归于无效。9 虽然可能存在特殊情形支持考虑未在及时提交的EOIR-26表格中适当向BIA提出的问题的罕见案件，但本案并非此类案件。委员会在此一如既往地命令就实体问题进行同时简报，这种方法有助于更迅速地解决待审案件，而如果委员会不执行上诉人必须明确说明其上诉理由的要求，这种方法将不可行。由于本案记录未显示任何可能证明例外于这一程序要求的特殊情形，答辩人对其《禁止酷刑公约》主张不利裁决的上诉应予驳回。10

9 There is a suggestion in the supplemental briefing that the BIA could have asserted jurisdiction over the Convention Against Torture claim via certification pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(c). See 8 C.F.R. § 3.39 (2002) (“Except when certified to the Board, the decision of the Immigration Judge becomes final . . . upon expiration of the time to appeal . . . .”). The Board, however, never certified any issue in this case, and such certification cannot be done implicitly. Moreover, while section 3.1(c) allows the Board to certify issues “in its discretion,” that discretion is not unbounded. To the contrary, much like discretionary decisions to reopen proceedings sua sponte under section 3.2(c), it is limited to “exceptional” circumstances and “is not meant to be used as a general cure for filing defects or to otherwise circumvent the regulations, where enforcing them might result in hardship.” Matter of J-J-, 21 I&N Dec. 976, 984 (BIA 1997). 10 As an alternative holding, I find that the respondent’s Convention Against Torture claim also fails on the merits. For largely the same reasons articulated in the discussion in Part III.C. of the respondent’s claim for withholding of removal, I find she has failed to establish that she is more likely than not to endure torture upon return to Haiti. Nor has she demonstrated, as the Convention requires, that the harms she fears would be inflicted by, or with the acquiescence of, government officials acting under color of law. See Matter of Y-L-, A-G- & R-S-R-, 23 I&N Dec. at 279. Finally, it is not at all clear that much of the harm to which the respondent alleges she would be exposed is even covered by Article 3 of the Convention. See Matter of J-E-, 23 I&N Dec. 291, 297-303 (BIA 2002).

9 补充简报中有一项建议，即BIA本可根据8 C.F.R. § 3.1(c)通过认证对《禁止酷刑公约》主张行使管辖权。见8 C.F.R. § 3.39 (2002)（“除经认证至委员会外，移民法官的决定在上诉期届满后成为最终决定……”）。然而，委员会从未在本案中认证任何问题，且此种认证不能默示进行。此外，尽管第3.1(c)条允许委员会“酌情”认证问题，但该裁量权并非不受限制。相反，与根据第3.2(c)条自行决定重新启动程序的裁量决定非常相似，它限于“特殊”情形，“不得被用作纠正申请缺陷的一般补救措施，或以其他方式规避法规，而执行法规可能导致困难。” Matter of J-J-, 21 I&N Dec. 976, 984 (BIA 1997)。 10 作为替代性裁决，我认为答辩人的《禁止酷刑公约》主张在实体上也不能成立。基于与第三部分C节中讨论答辩人暂缓遣返主张基本相同的理由，我认为她未能证明她返回海地后更有可能遭受酷刑。她也未能证明，如《公约》所要求，她所担心的伤害将由以法律名义行事的政府官员实施或经其默许。见Matter of Y-L-, A-G- & R-S-R-, 23 I&N Dec. at 279。最后，完全不清楚答辩人声称将遭受的许多伤害是否甚至属于《公约》第3条的范围。见Matter of J-E-, 23 I&N Dec. 291, 297-303 (BIA 2002)。

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III.

III.

The BIA addressed only one of the proposed forms of relief in this case. Its determination that the respondent was entitled to a waiver of inadmissibility and a discretionary adjustment of status from refugee to lawful permanent resident effectively mooted her requests for asylum and withholding of removal. Because I find the Board’s resolution of the adjustment of status issue to be in error, I must examine the respondent’s eligibility for these alternative remedies.

BIA在本案中仅处理了拟议救济形式中的一种。其裁定答辩人有权获得不可入境豁免和从难民到合法永久居民的酌情调整身份，实际上使她的庇护和暂缓遣返请求变得无实际意义。由于我认为委员会对调整身份问题的处理有误，我必须审查答辩人获得这些替代救济的资格。

A. Adjustment of Refugee Status

A. 难民身份调整

Aliens, like the respondent, who have been admitted (or conditionally admitted) into the United States as refugees can seek an adjustment of status only under INA § 209. See 8 C.F.R. § 209.1 (2002) (“The provisions of this section [implementing section 209 of the INA] shall provide the sole and exclusive procedure for adjustment of status by a refugee admitted under section 207 of the [INA] whose application is based on his or her refugee status.”). Section 209(a) provides that a refugee who has been physically present in the United States for at least one year and whose conditional admission status has not been previously terminated must return (or be returned) to INS custody for inspection and examination to determine eligibility for lawful permanent residency. If, after conducting this examination, an immigration officer concludes that the alien seeking permanent residency “is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted,” he or she must be detained for a removal proceeding. See INA § 235(b)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (2000). The INS is free to charge the alien in the ensuing proceeding, which is overseen by an immigration judge, with any applicable ground of inadmissibility or deportability. See INA § 240(a).

像答辩人这样已作为难民被接纳（或有条件接纳）进入美国的外国人，只能根据INA § 209寻求调整身份。见8 C.F.R. § 209.1 (2002)（“本节[实施INA第209条]的规定应提供根据[INA]第207条接纳的难民基于其难民身份申请调整身份的唯一和排他程序。”）。第209(a)条规定，已在美国实际居留至少一年且其有条件接纳身份此前未被终止的难民，必须返回（或被带回）INS羁押以进行检查和审查，以确定其合法永久居民资格的资格。如果在此检查后，移民官员认为寻求永久居留的外国人“并非明确且毫无疑问地有权被接纳”，则必须将其拘留以进行遣返程序。见INA § 235(b)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (2000)。INS可在由移民法官监督的后续程序中以任何适用的不可入境或可遣返理由对该外国人提出指控。见INA § 240(a)。

In the case at bar, the INS charged the respondent with being inadmissible by virtue of her conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude. See id. § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). She did not contest this charge and, indeed, conceded her statutory inadmissibility. Nevertheless, she sought a waiver pursuant to INA § 209(c), a provision empowering the Attorney General to waive most disqualifying barriers to an alien refugee’s admissibility under INA § 212(a) “for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest.” 11

在本案中，INS指控答辩人因涉及道德败坏的犯罪定罪而不可入境。见同上§ 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)。她未对该指控提出异议，并且确实承认了其法定不可入境性。尽管如此，她根据INA § 209(c)寻求豁免，该条款授权司法部长“为人道主义目的、确保家庭团聚或在其他符合公共利益的情况下”豁免外国难民根据INA § 212(a)可入境性的大多数 disqualifying 障碍。11

11 In accordance with the governing regulatory scheme, the respondent initially submitted her (continued...)

11 根据适用的监管方案，答辩人最初直接向INS提交了她的（续……）

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Although INA § 209(c) was enacted into law more than twenty years ago as part of the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201(b), 94 Stat. 102, 106, there appears to be only one published decision discussing the merits of a requested discretionary waiver of inadmissibility under this provision. Specifically, in Matter of H-N-, Interim Decision 3414 (BIA 1999), the BIA upheld an immigration judge’s grant of lawful permanent residency under INA § 209(c) to an otherwise inadmissible refugee who had been convicted of second-degree robbery. I find the majority opinion in H-N- to be wholly unconvincing. The majority there treated the applicant’s crime – participation in a burglary in which one of the applicant’s co-conspirators shot a woman to death in front of her children – as a virtual afterthought. Citing nothing more than the American citizenship of the applicant’s children, the legal residency of her husband, and a number of letters from family and friends, the majority found “strong equities” in the applicant’s favor and thus affirmed the immigration judge’s discretionary grant of relief. The seriousness of the underlying offense was all but lost on the Board. Part II of the opinion of Board Member Filppu, who dissented from the decision to confer lawful permanent residency on the applicant, combines a far more thorough review of the record with a much greater appreciation of the harmfulness of the criminal conduct at issue, and reflects the result I would reach if that case were before me today. 12

尽管INA § 209(c)作为1980年《难民法》的一部分在二十多年前颁布成为法律，Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201(b), 94 Stat. 102, 106，但似乎只有一项已公布的裁决讨论了根据该条款请求酌情豁免不可入境性的实体问题。具体而言，在Matter of H-N-, 临时决定3414 (BIA 1999)中，BIA维持了移民法官根据INA § 209(c)给予一名因二级抢劫罪被定罪的本不可入境难民合法永久居留权的决定。我认为H-N-中的多数意见完全令人无法信服。多数意见将申请人的罪行——参与一起入室盗窃，其中一名同谋在孩子们面前枪杀了一名妇女——几乎视为事后想法。多数意见仅援引申请人子女的美国公民身份、其丈夫的合法居留权以及家人和朋友的一些信件，便认定申请人有“强有力的衡平因素”，从而维持了移民法官的酌情救济批准。 underlying 罪行的严重性在委员会那里几乎被遗忘了。委员会成员Filppu的意见第二部分——他不同意给予申请人合法永久居留权的决定——结合了对记录更为彻底的审查和对所涉犯罪行为危害性的更深刻认识，反映了我如果今天审理该案会得出的结果。12

As deeply troubling as the ruling in H-N- is, I find the Board’s decision in this case even more difficult to accept. The Board here cited testimony and “lengthy letters” provided by members of the respondent’s family, as well as the fact that the respondent’s husband and children are permanent legal residents, as evidence that her removal would cause the family “severe emotional hardship.” BIA Decision (Mar. 1, 2001) at 2. On the strength of this scant summary, the Board found that she “met the standard for granting” a waiver of inadmissibility and an adjustment of status. Id.

尽管H-N-的裁决令人深感不安，但我认为委员会在本案中的决定更难以接受。委员会在此援引了答辩人家属提供的证词和“长信”，以及答辩人的丈夫和子女是永久合法居民这一事实，作为证据证明她的遣返将给家庭造成“严重的情感困难”。BIA决定（2001年3月1日）第2页。凭借这一简略摘要，委员会认定她“符合批准”不可入境豁免和调整身份的标准。同上。

(...continued) application for an adjustment of status directly to the INS. See 8 C.F.R. § 209.1(b). After she received an adverse decision, she renewed the claim in her removal proceeding before an immigration judge. See id. § 209.1(e) (“There is no appeal of the denial of an application [for status adjustment] by the [INS], but such denial will be without prejudice to the alien’s right to renew the application in removal proceedings under [INA § 240].”). 12 A threshold legal issue in H-N-, which was the focus of most of the opinions in that case, involved a jurisdictional issue regarding the authority of immigration judges and the Board to adjudicate waivers of inadmissibility under INA § 209(c). I do not address that issue here.

（……续） 调整身份申请直接向INS提交。见8 C.F.R. § 209.1(b)。在她收到不利决定后，她在移民法官面前的遣返程序中重新提出了该主张。见同上§ 209.1(e)（“对[INS]拒绝[身份调整]申请没有上诉权，但此种拒绝不影响外国人在[INA § 240]下的遣返程序中重新提出申请的权利。”）。 12 H-N-中的一个门槛法律问题——该案大多数意见的焦点——涉及移民法官和委员会根据INA § 209(c)裁决不可入境豁免的管辖权问题。我在此不处理该问题。

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The Board’s analysis, which makes no attempt to balance claims of hardship to the respondent’s family against the gravity of her criminal offense, is grossly deficient. The opinion marginalizes the depravity of her crime, stating simply that the panel had “weighed the equities in this case against the respondent’s criminal conviction” and concluded that discretionary relief was warranted. Id. Little or no significance appears to have been attached to the fact that the respondent confessed to beating and shaking a nineteen-month- old child to death, or that her confession was corroborated by a coroner’s report documenting a wide-ranging collection of extraordinarily severe injuries.

委员会的分析未试图将答辩人家庭的困难主张与其刑事罪行的严重性进行权衡，存在严重缺陷。该意见边缘化了其罪行的恶劣性，仅称合议庭已“权衡了本案中的衡平因素与答辩人的刑事定罪”并得出结论认为酌情救济是合理的。同上。对于答辩人承认殴打并摇晃一名19个月大的儿童致其死亡，或其供述得到验尸报告证实记录了各种极其严重的伤害这一事实，似乎几乎没有或完全没有赋予重要意义。

To be sure, the respondent’s removal will undoubtedly impose a strain on her family. Her husband and children testified as to the difficulties they experienced during her nearly six years of incarceration in the custody of the State of New York and the INS. Although the record makes clear that the respondent’s family exhibited admirable strength and resiliency during that period, I do not doubt that her removal to Haiti will be a source of additional hardship for them. Administrative evaluations of requests for waivers of inadmissibility under INA § 209(c) cannot, however, focus solely on family hardships, but must consider the nature of the criminal offense that rendered an alien inadmissible in the first place.

诚然，答辩人的遣返无疑将给其家庭带来压力。她的丈夫和子女作证讲述了在她被纽约州和INS羁押的近六年监禁期间所经历的困难。尽管记录清楚表明答辩人的家庭在此期间表现出令人钦佩的力量和韧性，但我不怀疑将她遣返海地将给他们带来额外的困难。然而，根据INA § 209(c)对不可入境豁免请求的行政评估不能仅关注家庭困难，而必须考虑最初导致外国人不可入境的犯罪行为的性质。

In my judgment, that balance will nearly always require the denial of a request for discretionary relief from removal where an alien’s criminal conduct is as serious as that of the respondent. Congress has authorized the Attorney General under section 209(c) to waive an alien’s inadmissibility, notwithstanding certain otherwise disqualifying convictions, “for humanitarian reasons, to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest.” Congress did not compel the Attorney General to do so. 13 It would not be a prudent exercise of the discretion afforded to me by this provision to grant favorable adjustments of status to violent or dangerous individuals except in extraordinary circumstances, such as those involving national security or foreign policy considerations, or cases in which an alien clearly demonstrates that the denial of status adjustment would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. Moreover, depending on the gravity of the alien’s underlying criminal offense, such a showing might still be insufficient. From

依我的判断，当外国人的犯罪行为与 respondent 一样严重时，这种权衡几乎总是要求驳回其免于遣返的酌情救济请求。国会已根据第 209(c) 条授权司法部长豁免外国人的不可入境性，尽管存在某些原本会导致丧失资格的定罪，但须“出于人道主义理由、为确保家庭团聚，或在其他符合公共利益的情况下”。国会并未强制司法部长这样做。13 除特殊情况外，例如涉及国家安全或外交政策考虑的情形，或外国人明确证明拒绝调整身份将导致特殊且极其异常的困难的情形，对暴力或危险个人给予有利的身份调整，并非对本条赋予我的自由裁量权的审慎行使。此外，视外国人 underlying 刑事犯罪的严重程度而定，此种证明可能仍不充分。从

13 By drafting INA § 209(c) to provide that the Attorney General “may” waive certain bars to admission, Congress clearly left this matter to my discretion. Cf. Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 238-42 (2001) (statute providing that Bureau of Prisons “may” reduce sentences of inmates completing drug treatment program imposes no obligation to do so and allows for categorical exclusions; application is left to the Bureau’s sound discretion).

13 国会将 INA § 209(c) 起草为规定司法部长“可以”豁免某些入境禁令，显然将此事留由我自由裁量。参见 Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 238-42 (2001)（规定监狱管理局“可以”为完成药物治疗项目的囚犯减刑的法规不施加如此做的义务，并允许分类排除；适用留由该局的合理裁量）。

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its inception, the United States has always been a nation of immigrants; it is one of our greatest strengths. But aliens arriving at our shores must understand that residency in the United States is a privilege, not a right. For those aliens, like the respondent, who engage in violent criminal acts during their stay here, this country will not offer its embrace. The BIA’s grant of lawful permanent residency is reversed.

自建国以来，美国始终是一个移民国家；这是我们最大的优势之一。但抵达我们海岸的外国人必须明白，在美国居留是一种特权，而非权利。对于像 respondent 这样在此居留期间实施暴力犯罪行为的外国人，这个国家不会给予拥抱。BIA 授予合法永久居留权的决定被撤销。

B. Asylum

B. 庇护

The respondent also sought asylum pursuant to INA § 208. Eligibility for such relief is restricted to aliens who may be classified as a “refugees” under the INA, i.e., persons who are “unable or unwilling to return to [their native country] because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2000); see also INA § 208(b)(1) (“The Attorney General may grant asylum to an alien . . . if the Attorney General determines that such alien is a refugee within the meaning of section 101(a)(42)(A).”). The applicant bears the burden of proving his or her “refugee” status. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (2002).

respondent 还根据 INA § 208 寻求庇护。此类救济的资格仅限于可被归类为 INA 下“难民”的外国人，即“因种族、宗教、国籍、特定社会团体成员身份或政治观点而遭受迫害或有充分理由恐惧迫害，而无法或不愿返回[其本国]”的人。INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2000)；另见 INA § 208(b)(1)（“司法部长可以给予外国人庇护……如果司法部长认定该外国人属于第 101(a)(42)(A) 条含义内的难民。”）。申请人承担证明其“难民”身份的责任。参见 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (2002)。

Establishing “refugee” status is not the only hurdle an alien seeking asylum must clear in order to be considered eligible for such relief. Indeed, there are a series of exceptions outlined in INA § 208(b)(2) under which all aliens – including “refugees” – are statutorily barred from asylum. As relevant here, an alien convicted of a “particularly serious crime,” defined for these purposes as any “aggravated felony,” may not be granted asylum under any circumstances. See INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(ii), (B)(i). Furthermore, even if asylum eligibility is established, the decision whether to grant an application is committed to the Attorney General’s discretion. See INS v. Aguirre- Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 420 (1999).

确立“难民”身份并非寻求庇护的外国人为被视为有资格获得此类救济而必须跨越的唯一障碍。事实上，INA § 208(b)(2) 列出了一系列例外，根据这些例外，所有外国人——包括“难民”——均被法定禁止获得庇护。就本案相关而言，被判定犯有“特别严重罪行”的外国人——为此目的定义为任何“加重重罪”——在任何情况下均不得获得庇护。参见 INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(ii), (B)(i)。此外，即使确立了庇护资格，是否批准申请的决定也交由司法部长自由裁量。参见 INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 420 (1999)。

The immigration judge declared the respondent ineligible for asylum for two independently sufficient reasons. First, he found that the respondent failed to demonstrate “a continuing[,] genuine and credible fear of persecution” if removed to Haiti or, alternatively, a history of persecution so severe as to justify an unwillingness to return there irrespective of current conditions in the country. IJ Decision (May 4, 2000) at 7. This finding is well-supported in the record.

移民法官基于两个各自独立的充分理由宣布 respondent 无资格获得庇护。首先，他认定 respondent 未能证明若被遣返海地会存在“持续、真实且可信的迫害恐惧”，或者，未能证明存在严重到足以证明无论该国当前状况如何都不愿返回的迫害历史。IJ Decision (May 4, 2000) at 7。该认定在记录中得到充分支持。

The judge also found that the respondent had been convicted of an aggravated felony. Although Congress has delineated multiple categories of

法官还认定 respondent 已被判定犯有加重重罪。尽管国会已划定多个类别的

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offenses that constitute “aggravated felonies” – a term of art defined in INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2000) – the only category pertinent here is “crimes of violence.” See INA § 101(a)(43)(F) (an aggravated felony includes “a crime of violence (as defined in [18 U.S.C. § 16]) . . . for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year”). After examining the elements of the second-degree manslaughter statute to which the respondent pled guilty, the judge held that this offense represented a “crime of violence” and thus met the definition of an “aggravated felony.”

构成“加重重罪”的罪行——这是 INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2000) 中定义的法律术语——此处唯一相关的类别是“暴力犯罪”。参见 INA § 101(a)(43)(F)（加重重罪包括“暴力犯罪（定义见 [18 U.S.C. § 16]）……且监禁刑期至少为一年”）。在审查 respondent 认罪的二级过失杀人法规的要素后，法官认定该罪行属于“暴力犯罪”，因而符合“加重重罪”的定义。

The BIA subsequently rejected the immigration judge’s “crime of violence” determination, concluding that the absence of a “substantial risk that physical force would be used in the commission of the crime” foreclosed such a characterization. I question the validity of the Board’s reasoning. An individual is guilty of second-degree manslaughter under New York law when he or she “recklessly causes the death of another person.” N.Y. Penal Law § 125.15(1) (McKinney 1998). At least two federal judges have squarely held that second-degree manslaughter in New York represents a “crime of violence” for purposes of the INA. See Gibson v. Ashcroft, No. 01-Civ-9400, 2002 WL 461579, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002); Johnson v. Vomacka, No. 97-Civ-5687, 2000 WL 1349251, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2000).

BIA 随后驳回了移民法官的“暴力犯罪”认定，结论是缺乏“在犯罪实施中使用身体力量的重大风险”排除了此种定性。我对 Board 推理的有效性存疑。根据纽约州法律，个人“轻率地导致他人死亡”即构成二级过失杀人罪。N.Y. Penal Law § 125.15(1) (McKinney 1998)。至少两名联邦法官已明确认定，纽约州二级过失杀人罪就 INA 而言属于“暴力犯罪”。参见 Gibson v. Ashcroft, No. 01-Civ-9400, 2002 WL 461579, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002)；Johnson v. Vomacka, No. 97-Civ-5687, 2000 WL 1349251, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2000)。

Ultimately, however, it is unnecessary for me to resolve whether the respondent’s conviction constitutes a “crime of violence” or whether she has otherwise satisfied the eligibility standards for asylum. Even assuming that the respondent not only qualifies as a “refugee,” but that her criminal conviction does not preclude her eligibility, she is manifestly unfit for a discretionary grant of relief. For the same reasons articulated in the earlier discussion of the respondent’s application for adjustment of status, I am highly disinclined to exercise my discretion – except, again, in extraordinary circumstances, such as those involving national security or foreign policy considerations, or cases in which an alien clearly demonstrates that the denial of relief would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship – on behalf of dangerous or violent felons seeking asylum. As with applications for adjustment of status, even a showing of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship may be inadequate to justify a grant of asylum, depending on the nature of the alien’s crime. The respondent’s criminal conduct in connection with the homicide of R-J- is sufficiently severe as to make the conferral of asylum upon her entirely inappropriate. Her claim, therefore, is denied.

然而，最终我无需解决 respondent 的定罪是否构成“暴力犯罪”，或她是否以其他方式满足庇护资格标准。即使假定 respondent 不仅符合“难民”资格，而且其刑事定罪不排除其资格，她显然不适合获得酌情救济。基于前文讨论 respondent 调整身份申请时阐述的相同理由，我极不愿——再次强调，除特殊情况外，例如涉及国家安全或外交政策考虑的情形，或外国人明确证明拒绝救济将导致特殊且极其异常的困难的情形——为寻求庇护的危险或暴力重罪犯行使自由裁量权。与调整身份申请一样，即使证明存在特殊且极其异常的困难，视外国人犯罪的性质而定，也可能不足以证明给予庇护的正当性。respondent 与 R-J- 凶杀有关的犯罪行为足够严重，以致给予她庇护完全不适当。因此，她的主张被驳回。

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C. Withholding of Removal

C. 暂缓遣返

Finally, the respondent asserts that she is legally entitled to withholding of removal pursuant to INA § 241(b)(3)(A), a statute prohibiting the Attorney General from returning an alien to a country where the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened because of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. The applicant bears the burden of proving his or her right to such relief, 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b), and must make the requisite showing by a preponderance of the evidence. Matter of S-V-, Interim Decision 3430 (BIA 2000) (citing Stevic, 467 U.S. at 429-30).

最后，respondent 主张她依法有权根据 INA § 241(b)(3)(A) 获得暂缓遣返，该法规禁止司法部长将外国人遣返至其生命或自由会因其种族、宗教、国籍、特定社会团体成员身份或政治观点而受到威胁的国家。申请人承担证明其有权获得此类救济的责任，8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)，并必须以优势证据作出必要证明。Matter of S-V-, 临时决定 3430 (BIA 2000)（引用 Stevic, 467 U.S. at 429-30）。

As was the case with the respondent’s asylum claim, the immigration judge and BIA disagreed over the impact of the respondent’s criminal conviction on her threshold eligibility for withholding of removal. INA § 241(b)(3)(B) provides that aliens convicted of any “aggravated felony” for which an aggregate term of imprisonment of at least five years was imposed are statutorily ineligible for withholding of removal. 14 Based on the reasoning set forth in the preceding section, I find the Board’s determination that second- degree manslaughter in New York is not a “crime of violence” (and thus not an “aggravated felony”) to be quite suspect. There is, as noted earlier, on-point authority to the contrary.

与 respondent 的庇护主张一样，移民法官和 BIA 对 respondent 的刑事定罪对其暂缓遣返门槛资格的影响存在分歧。INA § 241(b)(3)(B) 规定，被判定犯有任何“加重重罪”且被判处总计至少五年监禁刑期的外国人，法定无资格获得暂缓遣返。14 基于上一节阐述的推理，我认为 Board 关于纽约州二级过失杀人罪不属于“暴力犯罪”（因而并非“加重重罪”）的认定相当可疑。如前所述，存在相反的确切权威。

Once again, however, it is unnecessary for me to address the proper characterization of the respondent’s criminal offense because there are other, clearer grounds for the denial of her claim for relief. In particular, she has failed to prove that her life or freedom would be threatened in Haiti on the basis of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.

然而，我再次无需处理 respondent 刑事犯罪的适当定性，因为还有其他更明确的理由驳回她的救济主张。特别是，她未能证明其生命或自由会在海地因种族、宗教、国籍、特定社会团体成员身份或政治观点而受到威胁。

The respondent seeks to avail herself of the regulatory presumption of future persecution. Under this doctrine, if an applicant can demonstrate that he or she “suffered past persecution in the proposed country of removal” on account of one of the five factors enumerated in section 241(b)(3)(A), then “it

respondent 试图利用未来迫害的监管推定。根据该原则，如果申请人能够证明其“在拟遣返国因第 241(b)(3)(A) 条所列五项因素之一而遭受过迫害”，则“应

14 The respondent received an indeterminate two-to-six-year sentence upon her conviction for second-degree manslaughter. Sentences for variable periods of time generally are treated as sentences for the maximum period specified. See, e.g., United States v. Galicia-Delgado, 130 F.3d 518, 520-21 (2d Cir. 1997); People v. Washington, 191 N.E. 7, 8 (N.Y. 1934). In the immigration context in particular, the courts and the BIA, in applying statutory provisions that categorize crimes by length of incarceration, have found that indeterminate sentences should be treated as sentences for the maximum term imposed. See, e.g., Picardo v. INS, 104 F.3d 756, 759 (5th Cir. 1997); Matter of S-S-, 21 I&N Dec. 900, 901-03 (BIA 1997).

14 respondent 因二级过失杀人罪被判处 2 至 6 年的不定期刑。不定期刑通常被视为所规定最高刑期的刑罚。参见，例如，United States v. Galicia-Delgado, 130 F.3d 518, 520-21 (2d Cir. 1997)；People v. Washington, 191 N.E. 7, 8 (N.Y. 1934)。特别是在移民语境中，法院和 BIA 在适用按监禁时长对犯罪进行分类的法定条款时，已认定不定期刑应被视为所判处最高刑期的刑罚。参见，例如，Picardo v. INS, 104 F.3d 756, 759 (5th Cir. 1997)；Matter of S-S-, 21 I&N Dec. 900, 901-03 (BIA 1997)。

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shall be presumed that the applicant’s life or freedom would be threatened in the future in the country of removal on the basis of the original claim.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1)(i). 15 This presumption may be rebutted, however, if the immigration judge finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that:

推定申请人的生命或自由未来在遣返国会基于原始主张受到威胁。” 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1)(i)。15 然而，如果移民法官以优势证据认定以下情况，该推定可以被反驳：

(A) There has been a fundamental change in circumstances such that the applicant’s life or freedom would not be threatened on account of any of the five grounds mentioned in this paragraph upon the applicant’s removal to that country; or

(A) 情况已发生根本变化，以致申请人被遣返至该国后，其生命或自由不会因本段所述五项理由中的任何一项而受到威胁；或

(B) The applicant could avoid a future threat to his or her life or freedom by relocating to another part of the proposed country of removal and, under all the circumstances, it would be reasonable to expect the applicant to do so.

(B) 申请人可以通过搬迁到拟遣返国的另一地区来避免其生命或自由未来受到的威胁，并且在所有情况下，期望申请人这样做是合理的。

Id. § 208.16(b)(1)(i)(A), (B).

同上 § 208.16(b)(1)(i)(A)、(B)。

The respondent maintains that she is likely to be persecuted by members of the former Haitian Army as well as the Ton Ton Macoutes, a private Haitian death squad first organized by former President François Duvalier. To support this claim, the respondent and her husband testified at the removal hearing that the husband was assaulted and nearly killed in the early 1990s as a result of his work with the Fanmi Lavalas, a political party headed by then-opposition leader Jean-Bertrand Aristide. They further alleged that Haitian soldiers burned the home shared by the respondent and her husband, as well as the homes of many of their relatives. The soldiers also purportedly killed the father and two cousins of the respondent’s husband.

被申请人坚持认为她很可能受到前海地军队成员以及通通马库特（Ton Ton Macoutes）的迫害，后者是由前总统弗朗索瓦·杜瓦利埃（François Duvalier）最初组织的一支海地私人行刑队。为支持这一主张，被申请人及其丈夫在遣返听证会上作证称，丈夫在1990年代初因其与范米拉瓦拉斯（Fanmi Lavalas）——一个由时任反对派领袖让-贝特朗·阿里斯蒂德（Jean-Bertrand Aristide）领导的政治党派——的工作而遭到殴打并险些丧生。他们进一步声称，海地士兵烧毁了被申请人及其丈夫共同居住的房屋，以及他们许多亲属的房屋。士兵们还据称杀害了被申请人丈夫的父亲和两名堂表兄弟。

Although clearly tragic, these events do not demonstrate that any past persecution was directed at the respondent. As the immigration judge correctly noted, the attacks described at the hearing were all targeted at the respondent’s husband, not at the respondent herself. 16 IJ Decision (May 4, 2000) at 7. The respondent did testify that she was a member of “Committee

尽管这些事件显然是悲惨的，但它们并不能证明任何过去的迫害是针对被申请人的。正如移民法官正确指出的，听证会上描述的袭击全部针对被申请人的丈夫，而非被申请人本人。16 移民法官决定（2000年5月4日）第7页。被申请人确实作证称她是“委员会

15 If, on the other hand, an applicant cannot show that the fear of future threat to life or freedom is related to past persecution, then the applicant continues to bear the burden of proof that it is more likely than not he or she would suffer such harm in the future. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1)(iii). 16 It bears noting here that the respondent never argued in her removal proceeding that a presumption of persecution could be established through an “imputed political opinion” theory – i.e., that the alleged persecutors put her life or freedom in jeopardy because they attributed the political views of her husband to her. See, e.g., Lwin v. INS, 144 F.3d 505, 509-0 (7th Cir. 1998); Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482, 1489-0 (9th Cir. 1997). Even if such a contention had been made, however, its merit would be questionable. Indeed, the record suggests that the violence inflicted upon the respondent’s home and non-blood relatives was committed in an effort to find the respondent’s husband, not on account of political opinions attributed (erroneously or otherwise) to the respondent.

15 另一方面，如果申请人不能证明对未来生命或自由威胁的恐惧与过去的迫害有关，那么申请人继续承担举证责任，证明其未来更有可能遭受此类伤害。见 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1)(iii)。 16 此处值得注意的是，被申请人在其遣返程序中从未主张可以通过“推定政治意见”理论来确立迫害推定——即所称的迫害者因将其丈夫的政治观点归于她而使其生命或自由处于危险之中。见，例如，Lwin v. INS, 144 F.3d 505, 509-0 (7th Cir. 1998); Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482, 1489-0 (9th Cir. 1997)。然而，即使提出了此类主张，其 merits 也会存疑。事实上，记录表明，对被申请人住宅和非血亲亲属施加的暴力是为了寻找被申请人的丈夫，而非因为归于被申请人（无论错误与否）的政治观点。

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1991 Haiti,” a social group supposedly regarded by the Haitian Army as an opposition political faction. See Hr’g Tr. (Feb. 11, 2000) at 92. Yet, she offered no evidence that this affiliation would have been sufficient to make her an independent target of either the Haitian Army or the Ton Ton Macoutes.

1991年海地”的成员，该社会群体据称被海地军队视为反对派政治派别。见听证记录（2000年2月11日）第92页。然而，她没有提供任何证据表明这种隶属关系足以使她成为海地军队或通通马库特的独立目标。

Furthermore, even assuming that the respondent could establish a presumption of future persecution based on the events detailed above, she still would be entitled to no relief here. The political climate in Haiti has changed dramatically since the respondent left in 1994, and it is no longer likely that her life or freedom would be threatened there. The respondent asserts that she is likely to suffer a loss of life or freedom at the hands of former Haitian Army soldiers or Ton Ton Macoute rebels if she returns to the country. The record, however, offers no solid basis for such a claim. The State Department’s 1998 report on Haiti, which the respondent’s counsel explicitly referenced at the removal hearing, documents the significant alteration of the Haitian political landscape since 1994. See Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Dep’t of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices – Haiti (Feb. 1999). The Report recounts not only the disbanding of the Haitian Army in 1995, but also the 1997 election of President René Preval, the Fanmi Lavalas candidate who succeeded Jean-Bertrand Aristide in the first peaceful transfer of power between elected administrations in Haiti’s post-independence history. It notes that the government, although beset by pockets of corruption, “generally respect[s] the human rights of its citizens.” Id. at 2. The Haitian National Police force, the country’s principal domestic law enforcement agency, is described as a flawed but improving organization. Id. Although excessive use of force by the police reportedly resulted in eleven deaths during 1998, the State Department concluded that “these killings generally were not political in character,” but were instead largely attributable to poor training and discipline. Id. at 3. 17

此外，即使假设被申请人可以基于上述详细事件确立未来迫害的推定，她在此仍无权获得任何救济。自被申请人于1994年离开以来，海地的政治气候已发生巨大变化，其生命或自由在那里受到威胁的可能性已不复存在。被申请人声称，如果她返回该国，她很可能在前海地军队士兵或通通马库特叛乱分子手中丧失生命或自由。然而，记录没有为此类主张提供任何坚实依据。国务院1998年关于海地的报告——被申请人的律师在遣返听证会上明确引用了该报告——记录了自1994年以来海地政治格局的重大变化。见国务院民主、人权和劳工局，《国家人权实践报告——海地》（1999年2月）。该报告不仅叙述了海地军队于1995年解散，还叙述了1997年勒内·普雷瓦尔（René Preval）总统的当选，他是范米拉瓦拉斯的候选人，接替让-贝特朗·阿里斯蒂德，这是海地独立后历史上当选政府之间首次和平的权力交接。报告指出，政府尽管受到零星腐败的困扰，“总体上尊重其公民的人权”。同上第2页。海地国家警察部队——该国主要的国内执法机构——被描述为一个有缺陷但正在改进的组织。同上。尽管据报警察过度使用武力在1998年导致11人死亡，但国务院得出结论认为“这些杀戮总体上不具有政治性质”，而主要归因于训练和纪律不佳。同上第3页。17

17 The Report references only two instances of potentially politically-motivated violence against critics of the former military regime. The incident cited by the respondent as evidence of a continuing risk to her – i.e., the shooting death of Father Jean Pierre Louis, whom the Report identifies as “an outspoken [critic] of the 1991-94 military regime” – is described as a possible political murder. Country Report at 4. The other incident involved Haitian National Police engaging in warrantless arrests and beatings of members of a political group allied with the Fanmi Lavalas. Id. These events occurred, however, in the aftermath of a riot during which members of the Fanmi Lavalas killed a police commissioner, burned his body, and stormed a prison. Id. at 4-5. There is no indication of any systemic threat to the lives or freedom of supporters of the current regime.

17 该报告仅提及两起针对前军事政权批评者的可能具有政治动机的暴力事件。被申请人引用来证明其持续风险的事件——即让·皮埃尔·路易神父（Father Jean Pierre Louis）遭枪杀，报告认定其为“1991-94年军事政权的直言不讳的[批评者]”——被描述为可能的政治谋杀。国家报告第4页。另一起事件涉及海地国家警察对与范米拉瓦拉斯结盟的政治团体成员实施无证逮捕和殴打。同上。然而，这些事件发生在一场骚乱的余波之中，期间范米拉瓦拉斯成员杀死了一名警察局长，焚烧了他的尸体，并冲击了一座监狱。同上第4-5页。没有任何迹象表明当前政权支持者的生命或自由受到任何系统性威胁。

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Although I am not required to investigate whether State Department publications that the respondent neither cited nor submitted could form the foundation of a claim for relief, I have examined the key publications and find they provide no such support. The Department of State’s latest asylum profile on Haiti, published four years ago, describes dramatic human rights improvements in Haiti following the September 1994 international intervention to restore the country’s democratically-elected government. See Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Dep’t of State, Profile of Asylum Claims and Country Conditions – Haiti (Mar. 31, 1998). The report states that “[t]he repression once found in Port-au-Prince and the countryside has been brought to an end, and people are no longer systematically subjected to human rights violations as an instrument of state policy.” Id. at 5.

尽管我没有义务调查被申请人既未引用也未提交的国务院出版物是否能够构成救济主张的基础，但我已审查了关键出版物，并发现它们不提供此类支持。国务院四年前发布的关于海地的最新庇护概况描述了1994年9月国际干预以恢复该国民主选举政府后海地人权的显著改善。见国务院民主、人权和劳工局，《庇护主张和国家状况概况——海地》（1998年3月31日）。报告指出，“曾经在太子港和乡村存在的镇压已经结束，人们不再作为国家政策工具而系统性地遭受人权侵犯。”同上第5页。

The State Department’s most recent country report also fails to bolster the respondent’s claim. See Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Dep’t of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices – Haiti (Mar. 2002). That report points out that members of the former opposition party to which the respondent’s husband belonged now occupy most key government positions, including the national law enforcement institutions. Moreover, Aristide was elected to a second term as President in February 2001, and the Fanmi Lavales maintained control of the Haitian Senate in the 2000 elections. In short, the record simply does not support the respondent’s claim that her life or freedom would be threatened if she were returned to Haiti. Accordingly, her application for withholding of removal is denied.

国务院最新的国家报告也未能支持被申请人的主张。见国务院民主、人权和劳工局，《国家人权实践报告——海地》（2002年3月）。该报告指出，被申请人丈夫所属的前反对党成员现在占据大多数关键政府职位，包括国家执法机构。此外，阿里斯蒂德于2001年2月当选连任总统，范米拉瓦拉斯在2000年选举中保持了对海地参议院的控制。简言之，记录根本不支持被申请人关于如果她返回海地其生命或自由将受到威胁的主张。因此，她的暂缓遣返申请被驳回。

IV.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the BIA is reversed and the case is remanded with instructions to dismiss the respondent’s appeal.

基于上述理由，BIA的决定被撤销，案件发回并指示驳回被申请人的上诉。

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