Matter of Keisha Munroe

Cite as 26 I&N Dec. 428 (BIA 2014) Interim Decision #3817

引用为 26 I&N Dec. 428 (BIA 2014) 临时决定 #3817

U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals

美国司法部 移民审查执行办公室 移民上诉委员会

For purposes of establishing an alien’s eligibility for a waiver under section 216(c)(4)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(A) (2012), the relevant period for determining whether an alien’s removal would result in extreme hardship is the 2-year period for which the alien was admitted as a conditional permanent resident. FOR RESPONDENT: Spiro Serras, Esquire, New York, New York FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Diane Kier, Associate Legal Advisor BEFORE: Board Panel: COLE and PAULEY, Board Members; DONOVAN, Temporary Board Member. DONOVAN, Temporary Board Member: In a decision dated September 27, 2010, an Immigration Judge found the respondent removable under section 237(a)(1)(D)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(D)(i) (2006), as an alien whose conditional permanent resident status has been terminated. The Immigration Judge also granted the respondent’s request for a waiver under section 216(c)(4)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(A) (2006), determining that her removal would result in extreme hardship. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) has appealed from that decision. The appeal will be sustained and the record will be remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings.

为确定外国人是否符合《移民与国籍法》第216(c)(4)(A)条、8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(A) (2012) 规定的豁免资格之目的，确定该外国人的遣返是否会导致极端困境的相关期间，是该外国人作为有条件永久居民获准入境所依据的2年期间。 被申请人代理律师：Spiro Serras，Esquire，纽约州纽约市 国土安全部代理：Diane Kier，副法律顾问 审理法官：委员会合议庭：COLE 和 PAULEY，委员会成员；DONOVAN，临时委员会成员。 DONOVAN，临时委员会成员： 在2010年9月27日的决定中，移民法官认定被申请人可根据《移民与国籍法》第237(a)(1)(D)(i)条、8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(D)(i) (2006) 被遣返，理由是其有条件永久居民身份已被终止。移民法官还批准了被申请人根据该法第216(c)(4)(A)条、8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(A) (2006) 提出的豁免请求，认定其遣返将导致极端困境。国土安全部（“DHS”）对该决定提出上诉。上诉将获支持，案件记录将发回移民法官进一步审理。

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The respondent is a native and citizen of Guyana who was admitted to the United States on July 3, 1997, as a conditional permanent resident pursuant to section 216 of the Act, on the basis of her April 11, 1996, marriage to a United States citizen. She was admitted as a conditional permanent resident for a 2-year period. The respondent and her husband separated after about 2 weeks and were divorced on March 24, 1999. She was therefore unable to meet the requirements for filing a joint petition to

I. 事实与程序历史 被申请人是圭亚那本土出生公民，于1997年7月3日根据该法第216条作为有条件永久居民获准进入美国，依据是其1996年4月11日与美国公民的婚姻。她作为有条件永久居民获准入境，期限为2年。被申请人与丈夫在约2周后分居，并于1999年3月24日离婚。因此，她无法满足根据该法第216(c)(1)条提交联合申请以

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Cite as 26 I&N Dec. 428 (BIA 2014) Interim Decision #3817

引用为 26 I&N Dec. 428 (BIA 2014) 临时决定 #3817

remove the conditions on her residence under section 216(c)(1) of the Act. On August 19, 1999, the respondent requested a waiver of the general joint petition requirement, which the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) denied on August 6, 2004. On January 13, 2005, the DHS issued a notice to appear charging the respondent with removability under section 237(a)(1)(D)(i) of the Act. While in proceedings on May 31, 2005, the respondent filed a second application for a waiver of the joint petition requirement under section 216(c)(4)(B) of the Act, claiming that she had entered into the now terminated marriage in good faith and was not at fault in terminating the marriage. The USCIS denied her second waiver application on March 8, 2006. The respondent married her current lawful permanent resident husband on May 4, 2007. They have three United States citizen children born in November 2001, December 2004, and September 2007. On January 17, 2008, the respondent filed a third waiver application under section 216(c)(4)(A) of the Act, this time claiming that she would suffer extreme hardship if she were deported, primarily because she would be separated from her second husband and her children. The USCIS found that the period for determining extreme hardship began on July 3, 1997, when the respondent was granted conditional permanent resident status, and ended on July 3, 1999, when her status automatically terminated. On April 8, 2009, the USCIS denied the respondent’s application because the hardship she claimed was not based on circumstances occurring during that 2-year period. Each time the respondent filed a Petition to Remove Conditions on Residence (Form I-751), the USCIS issued a notice informing her that her conditional permanent resident status was extended for 1 year. Each time the respondent’s Form I-751 was denied, the USCIS informed her that her conditional permanent resident status was terminated. She was instructed that her “previously accorded” permanent resident status was terminated on August 6, 2004, March 8, 2006, and April 8, 2009. Before the Immigration Judge, the respondent conceded that she is removable as charged and sought to renew her request for an extreme hardship waiver under section 216(c)(4)(A) of the Act. The Immigration Judge found that the relevant period for determining extreme hardship began on July 3, 1997. Although she did not specify an end date for the hardship calculation, the Immigration Judge stated that it continued at least until August 6, 2004, when the USCIS denied the respondent’s first waiver application. The Immigration Judge therefore considered the claimed hardship related to the respondent’s first child, who was born in November 2001. However, because she found that the respondent’s period of conditional permanent residence ended on August 6, 2004, the

根据该法第216(c)(1)条解除其居留条件。 1999年8月19日，受益人申请豁免一般联合申请要求，美国公民及移民服务局（“USCIS”）于2004年8月6日予以拒绝。 2005年1月13日，DHS发出出庭通知，指控受益人根据该法第237(a)(1)(D)(i)条可被驱逐。在2005年5月31日的程序进行期间，受益人根据该法第216(c)(4)(B)条提交了第二份联合申请要求豁免申请，声称她是以善意缔结现已终止的婚姻，且婚姻终止并非她的过错。USCIS于2006年3月8日拒绝了她的第二份豁免申请。受益人于2007年5月4日与其现任合法永久居民丈夫结婚。他们有三名美国公民子女，分别出生于2001年11月、2004年12月和2007年9月。 2008年1月17日，受益人根据该法第216(c)(4)(A)条提交了第三份豁免申请，这次声称如果她被驱逐出境将遭受极端困难，主要是因为她将与第二任丈夫和子女分离。USCIS认定，确定极端困难的期间始于1997年7月3日，即受益人获得有条件永久居民身份之日，止于1999年7月3日，即其身份自动终止之日。2009年4月8日，USCIS拒绝了受益人的申请，因为她声称的困难并非基于该2年期间发生的情况。 受益人每次提交解除居留条件申请（I-751表）时，USCIS均发出通知告知她其有条件永久居民身份延长1年。受益人每次I-751表被拒时，USCIS均告知她其有条件永久居民身份已终止。她被告知其“先前给予的”永久居民身份于2004年8月6日、2006年3月8日和2009年4月8日终止。 在移民法官面前，受益人承认其如所指控可被驱逐，并寻求根据该法第216(c)(4)(A)条重新提出极端困难豁免请求。移民法官认定，确定极端困难的相关期间始于1997年7月3日。尽管她未指定困难计算的结束日期，移民法官表示该期间至少持续至2004年8月6日，即USCIS拒绝受益人第一份豁免申请之日。因此，移民法官考虑了与受益人第一个孩子（出生于2001年11月）相关的所称困难。然而，由于她认定受益人的有条件永久居留期间于2004年8月6日结束，该

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Cite as 26 I&N Dec. 428 (BIA 2014) Interim Decision #3817

引用为 26 I&N Dec. 428 (BIA 2014) 临时决定 #3817

Immigration Judge did not consider whether there was hardship related to the two children who were born after that date or to the respondent’s lawful permanent resident spouse, whom she married on May 4, 2007. Finding that the respondent established eligibility for the waiver, the Immigration Judge granted her application.

移民法官未考虑是否存在与该日期之后出生的两个孩子或与被申请人于2007年5月4日结婚的合法永久居民配偶相关的困境。认定被申请人已证明符合豁免资格后，移民法官批准了她的申请。

II. ISSUE The issue on appeal involves the relevant time period for determining extreme hardship for a waiver under section 216(c)(4)(A) of the Act. To decide what that period is, we must address the key sentence of section 216(c)(4)(A), which states: “In determining extreme hardship, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall consider circumstances occurring only during the period that the alien was admitted for permanent residence on a conditional basis.” For the following reasons, we conclude that the relevant period for determining such hardship is the 2-year period that an alien was admitted for permanent residence on a conditional basis.

II. 问题 上诉中的问题涉及根据该法第216(c)(4)(A)条确定极端困境豁免的相关时间段。为确定该期间是什么，我们必须处理第216(c)(4)(A)条的关键句，该句规定：“在确定极端困境时，国土安全部长必须仅考虑该外国人作为有条件永久居民获准入境期间发生的情况。”基于以下理由，我们认定确定此类困境的相关期间是外国人作为有条件永久居民获准入境所依据的2年期间。

III. ANALYSIS

III. 分析

A. Statutory Scheme for Conditional Permanent Residents Interpreting the statute requires an understanding of the statutory scheme that governs conditional permanent resident status. Section 216 of the Act was enacted to deter marriage fraud as part of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, § 2, 100 Stat. 3537, 3537. It created a system under which aliens who acquire lawful permanent resident status based on a marriage of less than 2 years’ duration are granted that status on a conditional basis for 2 years. This system allows the USCIS to check the bona fides of the marriage after the 2-year period to ensure that the marriage was not entered into for immigration purposes. See Matter of Mendes, 20 I&N Dec. 833, 835 (BIA 1994). Section 216 of the Act allows aliens to remove the conditions on their residence in one of two ways. First, within 90 days of the second anniversary of the date the alien obtained conditional permanent resident status, the alien and his or her spouse may file a joint petition with the USCIS to remove the conditions. Section 216(c)(1) of the Act. The petition must be accompanied by documentation that demonstrates the bona fides of the marriage. 8 C.F.R. §§ 216.4(a)(1), (5), 1216.4(a)(1), (5) (2014). If the USCIS approves the petition, the conditions on the alien’s permanent resident status are removed. Section 216(c)(3)(B) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. §§ 216.4(c)(4), 1216.4(c)(4). If the USCIS denies the petition,

A. 有条件永久居民的法律制度 解释该法需要理解规范有条件永久居民身份的法律制度。该法第216条作为1986年《移民婚姻欺诈修正案》的一部分颁布，旨在遏制婚姻欺诈，Pub. L. No. 99-639, § 2, 100 Stat. 3537, 3537。它建立了一种制度，根据该制度，基于持续时间不足2年的婚姻获得合法永久居民身份的外国人，以有条件方式获得该身份，期限为2年。该制度允许USCIS在2年期间后核查婚姻的真实性，以确保婚姻并非为移民目的而缔结。参见 Matter of Mendes, 20 I&N Dec. 833, 835 (BIA 1994)。 该法第216条允许外国人通过两种方式之一解除其居留条件。第一，在外国人获得有条件永久居民身份之日起第二个周年日后的90天内，外国人和其配偶可以向USCIS提交联合申请以解除条件。该法第216(c)(1)条。申请必须附有证明婚姻真实性的文件。8 C.F.R. §§ 216.4(a)(1), (5), 1216.4(a)(1), (5) (2014)。如果USCIS批准申请，外国人永久居民身份的条件即被解除。该法第216(c)(3)(B)条；8 C.F.R. §§ 216.4(c)(4), 1216.4(c)(4)。如果USCIS拒绝申请，

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引用为 26 I&N Dec. 428 (BIA 2014) 临时决定 #3817

the alien may renew it in removal proceedings. 8 C.F.R. §§ 216.4(d)(2), 1216.4(d)(2). Second, an alien who cannot file the joint petition can file an application to waive the joint petition requirement under section 216(c)(4) of the Act by demonstrating that (1) extreme hardship would result if the alien is removed from the United States; (2) the qualifying marriage was entered into in good faith but was terminated through no fault of the alien; or (3) the alien was subjected to abuse by either the spouse or the intended spouse. Sections 216(c)(4)(A)–(D) of the Act. See generally Matter of Anderson, 20 I&N Dec. 888 (BIA 1994) (discussing the various waiver options under section 216(c)(4) of the Act). There is no specified time frame for filing a waiver application. See Matter of Stowers, 22 I&N Dec. 605, 611 (BIA 1999); 8 C.F.R. §§ 216.5(a)(2), 1216.5(a)(2) (2014). If the USCIS approves the waiver application, it removes the conditions on the alien’s permanent resident status. The regulations provide that the denial of a waiver application may be reviewed in removal proceedings. 8 C.F.R. §§ 216.5(f), 1216.5(f). An alien whose conditional permanent resident status has been terminated is removable pursuant to section 237(a)(1)(D)(i) of the Act. Conditional permanent resident status can be terminated in three ways. First, the USCIS can affirmatively terminate such status before the 2-year conditional period has elapsed. Section 216(b)(1) of the Act. Second, conditional permanent resident status terminates automatically if the alien and his or her spouse fail to timely file the joint petition or appear for the interview. Section 216(c)(2)(A) of the Act. Third, the USCIS can terminate an alien’s conditional permanent resident status if it determines that the information provided in the joint petition is not true. Section 216(c)(3)(C) of the Act.

外国人可以在遣返程序中重新提出。8 C.F.R. §§ 216.4(d)(2), 1216.4(d)(2)。 第二，无法提交联合申请的外国人可以根据该法第216(c)(4)条提交豁免联合申请要求的申请，证明：(1) 如果外国人被遣返美国将导致极端困境；(2) 符合条件的婚姻是以善意缔结的，但非因外国人的过错而终止；或 (3) 外国人遭受配偶或意图配偶的虐待。该法第216(c)(4)(A)–(D)条。一般参见 Matter of Anderson, 20 I&N Dec. 888 (BIA 1994)（讨论该法第216(c)(4)条下的各种豁免选项）。提交豁免申请没有规定的时间框架。参见 Matter of Stowers, 22 I&N Dec. 605, 611 (BIA 1999)；8 C.F.R. §§ 216.5(a)(2), 1216.5(a)(2) (2014)。如果USCIS批准豁免申请，即解除外国人永久居民身份的条件。法规规定，豁免申请的拒绝可以在遣返程序中复审。8 C.F.R. §§ 216.5(f), 1216.5(f)。 有条件永久居民身份已被终止的外国人可根据该法第237(a)(1)(D)(i)条被遣返。有条件永久居民身份可以通过三种方式终止。第一，USCIS可以在2年有条件期间届满前主动终止该身份。该法第216(b)(1)条。第二，如果外国人和其配偶未能及时提交联合申请或未能出席面谈，有条件永久居民身份自动终止。该法第216(c)(2)(A)条。第三，如果USCIS认定联合申请中提供的信息不真实，可以终止外国人的有条件永久居民身份。该法第216(c)(3)(C)条。

B. Extreme Hardship Waiver

B. 极端困境豁免

1. Unambiguous Meaning of the Statutory Text Congress instructed that in determining extreme hardship under section 216(c)(4) of the Act, the DHS should “consider circumstances occurring only during the period that the alien was admitted for permanent residence on a conditional basis.” As with all cases involving statutory construction, we assume that “the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words” Congress chose to use. Matter of A-A-, 20 I&N Dec. 492, 495 (BIA 1992) (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987), and INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 189 (1984)). When the language of the controlling statute is plain, there is no issue of

1. 法律文本的明确含义 国会指示，在根据该法第216(c)(4)条确定极端困境时，DHS应“仅考虑该外国人作为有条件永久居民获准入境期间发生的情况”。与所有涉及法律解释的案件一样，我们假定“立法目的通过国会选择使用的词语的通常含义来表达”。Matter of A-A-, 20 I&N Dec. 492, 495 (BIA 1992)（引用 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987)，以及 INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 189 (1984)）。当控制性法律的语言明确时，不存在

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interpretation because we “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). It is clear that when the words of the operative sentence in section 216(c)(4) are given their ordinary meaning, the time limitation created by Congress refers to the 2-year period for which the alien was admitted as a conditional permanent resident. The most instructive words in the statute are the phrase “the period” and its modifying clause “was admitted for permanent residence on a conditional basis.” The use of the phrase “the period” refers to a set time frame, not an open-ended status. The modifying clause, which is phrased in the past tense, indicates that the period of time will have already been established by the time the alien applies for the waiver. Congress could have simply described this period in terms of the period of conditional permanent residence or by reference to the termination of conditional permanent resident status. But it did not, instead referring to a particular fixed period of time for which the alien had already been admitted. Significantly, Congress chose to use the phrase “was admitted” in this context. This is particularly instructive because the statutory scheme acknowledges an open-ended termination point for conditional permanent resident status. Congress clearly chose to avoid relying on a variable period of time, the termination of status, as the end point for the relevant hardship period. Instead, it directed us to consider “the period” for which the alien “was admitted.” There is only one time when an alien is “admitted” as a conditional permanent resident—when he or she is originally granted that status. Section 216(a)(1) of the Act. All conditional permanent residents are admitted for a 2-year period. See 8 C.F.R. § 1235.11(a)(1) (2014) (explaining that where the conditions of section 216 of the Act apply, “the alien shall be admitted conditionally for a period of 2 years”). Therefore, according to the plain language of the statute, we hold that the relevant period for determining whether extreme hardship would result from an alien’s removal for purposes of establishing eligibility for a waiver under section 216(c)(4)(A) of the Act is the 2-year period for which the alien was admitted as a conditional permanent resident. Both parties argue that the statutory language is open to interpretation by pointing out the flexibility the USCIS retains in terminating or extending conditional permanent resident status. We disagree that this fact renders the language of section 216(c)(4) ambiguous. The USCIS has the ability to alter the date on which conditional residence is ultimately terminated, either, for example, by terminating status early pursuant to section 216(b)(1) of the Act or by extending the conditional residence period while a waiver application is pending. But it cannot alter the period of time for

解释，因为我们必须“赋予国会明确表达的意图以效力”。Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)。显然，当第216(c)(4)条中操作性句子的词语被赋予其通常含义时，国会创设的时间限制指的是外国人作为有条件永久居民被准入的2年期间。 法规中最具指导意义的词语是“该期间”这一短语及其修饰从句“以有条件为基础被准入为永久居民”。“该期间”这一短语的使用指的是一个固定的时间框架，而非一个开放式的身份。该修饰从句以过去时表述，表明该时间段在外国人申请豁免时已经确立。国会本可以简单地以有条件永久居民期间或通过提及有条件永久居民身份的终止来描述这一期间。但它没有这样做，而是指外国人已经被准入的某一特定固定时间段。 值得注意的是，国会在这一语境中选择使用“被准入”这一短语。这尤其具有指导意义，因为法定方案承认有条件永久居民身份有一个开放式的终止点。国会显然选择避免依赖一个可变的时间段——身份的终止——作为相关困难期间的终点。相反，它指示我们考虑外国人“被准入”的“该期间”。 外国人作为有条件永久居民“被准入”的时间只有一个——即他或她最初被授予该身份之时。该法第216(a)(1)条。所有有条件永久居民均被准入2年期间。见 8 C.F.R. § 1235.11(a)(1) (2014)（解释称，在该法第216条的条件适用的情况下，“外国人应被有条件准入2年期间”）。因此，根据法规的平实语言，我们裁定，为确定外国人被驱逐是否会对其造成极端困难、从而确立该法第216(c)(4)(A)条下豁免资格之目的，相关期间是外国人作为有条件永久居民被准入的2年期间。 双方均主张法规语言可作多种解释，并指出USCIS在终止或延长有条件永久居民身份方面保留的灵活性。我们不同意这一事实使第216(c)(4)条的语言变得模糊。USCIS有能力改变有条件居留最终终止的日期，例如依据该法第216(b)(1)条提前终止身份，或在豁免申请待决期间延长有条件居留期间。但它不能改变外国人“被准入”为有条件永久居民的

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which an alien “was admitted” as a conditional permanent resident. Thus, the USCIS may not retroactively alter the period of admission, saying that the alien was only admitted for an 18- or 23-month period when the status was granted. The period of time for which an alien “was admitted” remains the same 2-year period regardless of any subsequent actions by the USCIS. Therefore the statutory language is unambiguous, and we must apply it accordingly. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. at 843.

该时间段。因此，USCIS不得追溯性地改变准入期间，声称外国人在身份授予时仅被准入18个月或23个月期间。无论USCIS随后采取任何行动，外国人“被准入”的时间段仍为相同的2年期间。因此法规语言是明确的，我们必须相应地适用它。见 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. at 843。

2. Legislative Intent We acknowledge that there has been confusion over the meaning of the phrase “was admitted.” In our view the only period to which this statutory language could refer is the 2-year period for which an alien is admitted in conditional permanent resident status. However, even assuming that Congress’ decision not to spell out a beginning and an end point for the hardship period renders the statutory language ambiguous, we hold that ours is the most reasonable construction of section 216(c)(4). Our interpretation is consistent with the statute as a whole and the legislative purpose behind the statute. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 484–85 (1996) (noting that although analysis of a statute begins with its text, an understanding of the statutory language does not occur in a contextual vacuum). The statutory scheme for conditional permanent residents provides that at the end of the 2-year period, an alien may either jointly apply with his or her spouse to remove the conditions on permanent residence or apply for a waiver of the joint petition requirement. The “no fault” waiver allows an alien spouse who is not at fault in terminating a good-faith marriage to individually remove the conditions on his or her residence. Section 216(c)(4)(B) of the Act. The “abuse waiver” allows an alien spouse (or intended spouse) who has been abused by a petitioner to individually remove the conditions. Sections 216(c)(4)(C), (D) of the Act. These waivers are clearly intended to address matters related to the marriage that generated the conditional permanent resident status. It follows that the hardship waiver of section 216(c)(4)(A) should also relate in some way to that marriage. Limiting the hardship period to the 2-year conditional residence period ensures that the waiver will only address hardships related to the marriage and will not become so open-ended and diffuse that it essentially creates an entirely new avenue for relief. If we adopted the respondent’s position that the hardship period ends only when the USCIS denies the waiver application, a conditional permanent resident could unilaterally extend the hardship period by

2. 立法意图 我们承认，对于“被准入”这一短语的含义一直存在混淆。我们认为，这一法规语言所能指的唯一期间是外国人被准入为有条件永久居民身份的2年期间。然而，即使假定国会未明确规定困难期间的起点和终点使法规语言变得模糊，我们仍裁定我们的解释是第216(c)(4)条最合理的构造。 我们的解释与整部法规以及法规背后的立法目的相一致。见 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 484–85 (1996)（指出尽管对法规的分析始于其文本，但对法规语言的理解并非在语境真空中进行）。有条件永久居民的法定方案规定，在2年期间结束时，外国人可以与其配偶共同申请解除永久居留的条件，或申请豁免共同申请要求。 “无过错”豁免允许对善意婚姻的终止无过错的外国人配偶单独解除其居留的条件。该法第216(c)(4)(B)条。“虐待豁免”允许被申请人虐待的外国人配偶（或意图配偶）单独解除条件。该法第216(c)(4)(C)、(D)条。这些豁免显然旨在处理与产生有条件永久居民身份的婚姻相关的事项。因此，第216(c)(4)(A)条的困难豁免也应在某种程度上与该婚姻相关。将困难期间限定为2年有条件居留期间，确保豁免仅处理与婚姻相关的困难，而不会变得过于开放和分散，以致实质上创设了一条全新的救济途径。 如果我们采纳答辩人的立场，即困难期间仅在USCIS拒绝豁免申请时才结束，那么有条件永久居民可以通过

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continuing to apply for waivers until extreme hardship was accumulated. An alien in this situation would be able to claim hardship that is completely unrelated to the underlying status that gave rise to the waiver. The respondent does not claim hardship that is in any way related to her first marriage. Instead, her hardship claim is only related to the difficulty that may occur as a result of her separation from her second husband and the children born of that relationship. There is no indication that Congress intended the hardship waiver to extend to situations such as this. Although there is little legislative history for this particular provision, Congress gave some insight into its meaning when it explained an earlier version of the waiver in a report from the Committee on the Judiciary. In relevant part, the report stated:

持续申请豁免直至累积出极端困难，从而单方面延长困难期间。处于这种情况的外国人将能够主张与产生豁免的 underlying 身份完全无关的困难。 答辩人未主张与其第一次婚姻有任何关系的困难。相反，她的困难主张仅与因与第二任丈夫分离以及该关系所生子女而可能产生的困难有关。没有迹象表明国会意图将困难豁免延伸至此类情况。尽管这一特定条款的立法历史很少，但国会在司法委员会的一份报告中解释该豁免的早期版本时，对其含义提供了一些见解。在相关部分，该报告指出：

Of special concern to the Committee are cases which involve children. The Committee intends that a waiver be granted in cases where there is genuine humanitarian need based upon unusual hardship. For example, there may be the case of a marriage that lasts less than two years that involves a U.S. citizen parent, an alien parent, and a U.S. citizen child. In establishing the conditional residency provision, the Committee did not intend to separate parents and minor children, nor did the Committee want an alien parent’s resident status to be an issue in a court decision on a custody question. . . . [T]he Committee views this provision as a safety mechanism to ensure that cases in which there is genuine humanitarian need will not be without recourse. S. Rep. No. 99-491, at 8 (1986). Congress was clearly contemplating situations that might arise as a result of the marriage, such as a custody dispute, and sought to alleviate hardships that could be exacerbated by the conditional nature of the alien’s status. However, there is no indication that Congress intended to enact a broad waiver under this provision. To the contrary, that would be inconsistent with the entire statutory scheme, which is aimed at preventing marriage fraud. Allowing an open-ended period for an alien to claim hardship unrelated to his or her original marriage would likely foster marriage fraud, rather than discourage it. Finally, an open-ended hardship period, even if limited to the actual date of termination as the DHS suggests, would permit the hardship period to differ from case to case and alien to alien and thus create an unequal playing field for applicants. By limiting the hardship period to the period for which an alien was admitted as a conditional permanent resident, we apply the same 2-year period to all such aliens seeking a waiver. For these reasons, even if the statutory language may be considered ambiguous, our approach results in the most reasonable interpretation of section 216(c)(4) of the Act.

委员会特别关注涉及儿童的案件。委员会意图在存在基于异常困难的真实人道主义需求的情况下授予豁免。例如，可能存在一段持续不到2年的婚姻，涉及一名美国公民父母、一名外国人父母和一名美国公民子女。在设立有条件居留条款时，委员会不打算分离父母和未成年子女，委员会也不希望外国人父母的居民身份成为法院监护权裁决中的问题。……委员会认为该条款是一种安全机制，以确保存在真实人道主义需求的案件不会没有救济途径。 S. Rep. No. 99-491, at 8 (1986)。 国会显然在考虑可能因婚姻而产生的情况，例如监护权纠纷，并寻求缓解可能因外国人身份的有条件性质而加剧的困难。然而，没有迹象表明国会意图根据该条款制定一项广泛的豁免。相反，这将与整个旨在防止婚姻欺诈的法定方案不一致。允许外国人以开放式期间主张与其原始婚姻无关的困难，很可能助长而非阻止婚姻欺诈。 最后，开放式的困难期间，即使如DHS所建议限于实际终止日期，也将使困难期间因案而异、因人而异，从而为申请人创造不平等的竞争环境。通过将困难期间限定为外国人被准入为有条件永久居民的期间，我们对所有寻求豁免的此类外国人适用相同的2年期间。基于这些原因，即使法规语言可能被视为模糊，我们的方法也得出了该法第216(c)(4)条最合理的解释。

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3. Clarification of Prior Precedent We previously considered the relevant period for determining extreme hardship in Matter of Singh, 24 I&N Dec. 331 (BIA 2007). The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in whose jurisdiction the respondent’s case arises, had remanded the record in Matter of Singh for us to address a “clear conflict” between section 216(c)(4)(A) and the applicable regulations. Singh v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 461 F.3d 290, 295 (2d Cir. 2006). As the court noted, the statute provided both a start date and an end date for the hardship period, but the regulations for the hardship waiver stated that “the director shall take into account only those factors that arose subsequent to the alien’s entry as a conditional permanent resident.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 216.5(e)(1), 1216.5(e)(1). We found that there was no conflict because the regulations did not “contain any language that specifically contradicts the language of the statute.” Matter of Singh, 24 I&N Dec. at 333. The Second Circuit affirmed our decision and found that we “permissibly construed the regulation so as to harmonize it with the statute.” Singh v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir. 2008). However, neither we nor the Second Circuit named the end point of the extreme hardship period. Id. at 152 (noting that we “simply adopted the end date provided in the statute,” which was a more limited time frame); Matter of Singh, 24 I&N Dec. at 334 (rejecting the respondent’s open-ended time frame because “the termination point is clearly set out” in the statute). We now clarify that the end date of the hardship period under section 216(c)(4) of the Act is the last day of the 2-year period of an alien’s admission as a conditional permanent resident. Our holding finds additional support from two other circuits that have directly addressed this issue. Hammad v. Holder, 603 F.3d 536, 545 (9th Cir. 2010) (concluding that the alien was not eligible for a hardship waiver because the circumstances on which he based his hardship “did not exist during his two-year conditional residence status”); Abdulahad v. Holder, 581 F.3d 290, 296–97 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that the Immigration Judge correctly determined that the hardship period ended on the second anniversary of the alien’s lawful admission for permanent residence under section 216(c)(2)(A) of the Act).

3. 对先前判例的澄清 我们此前在Matter of Singh, 24 I&N Dec. 331 (BIA 2007)中审议了确定极端困难的相关期间。美国第二巡回上诉法院（ respondent 的案件在其辖区内产生）曾在Matter of Singh中将案卷发回，要求我们处理第216(c)(4)(A)条与适用法规之间的“明显冲突”。Singh v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 461 F.3d 290, 295 (2d Cir. 2006)。正如该法院所指出的，该法条既规定了困难期间的起始日期，也规定了结束日期，但困难豁免的法规规定“主任必须仅考虑在外国人作为有条件永久居民入境之后产生的那些因素”。8 C.F.R. §§ 216.5(e)(1), 1216.5(e)(1)。我们认定不存在冲突，因为法规并未“包含任何具体与法条语言相矛盾的语言”。Matter of Singh, 24 I&N Dec. at 333。 第二巡回法院维持了我们的裁定，并认定我们“对法规作出了允许的解释，以使其与法条相协调”。Singh v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir. 2008)。然而，无论是我们还是第二巡回法院，都没有指明极端困难期间的终点。Id. at 152（指出我们“只是采用了法条规定的结束日期”，这是一个更为有限的时间范围）；Matter of Singh, 24 I&N Dec. at 334（驳回 respondent 的开放式时间范围，因为法条中“明确规定了终止点”）。我们现在澄清，根据该法第216(c)(4)条，困难期间的结束日期是外国人作为有条件永久居民入境之2年期间的最后一天。我们的裁定还得到另外两个直接处理该问题的巡回法院的支持。Hammad v. Holder, 603 F.3d 536, 545 (9th Cir. 2010)（认定该外国人不符合困难豁免资格，因为其据以主张困难的情形“在其两年有条件居留身份期间并不存在”）；Abdulahad v. Holder, 581 F.3d 290, 296–97 (6th Cir. 2009)（认定移民法官正确判定，困难期间结束于该外国人根据该法第216(c)(2)(A)条合法获准永久居留之日的第二周年）。

IV. CONCLUSION The period for determining whether extreme hardship would result from an alien’s removal for purposes of establishing eligibility for a waiver under section 216(c)(4)(A) of the Act is the 2-year period for which the alien was admitted as a conditional permanent resident. For the respondent,

IV. 结论 为确定外国人被驱逐是否会对其造成极端困难、从而确立根据该法第216(c)(4)(A)条获得豁免的资格，所依据的期间是该外国人作为有条件永久居民获准入境之2年期间。对于 respondent 而言，

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that period ran from July 3, 1997, the date she was granted conditional permanent resident status, until July 3, 1999. See generally 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv) (2014) (giving the Board authority to take administrative notice of commonly known facts). We therefore conclude that the Immigration Judge erred in finding that the respondent was eligible for the hardship waiver based on circumstances related to her second marriage, which occurred after the 2-year period. Accordingly, the DHS’s appeal will be sustained. The record will be remanded to the Immigration Judge to determine whether there was any qualifying hardship during the 2-year period of the respondent’s conditional permanent resident status. On remand, the respondent should also be given an opportunity to apply for any other relief from removal for which she may be eligible. ORDER: The appeal of the Department of Homeland Security is sustained. FURTHER ORDER: The record is remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion and for the entry of a new decision.

该期间从1997年7月3日（她获准有条件永久居民身份之日）起至1999年7月3日止。参见一般性规定 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv) (2014)（赋予委员会对众所周知的事实进行行政认知的权力）。因此，我们认定移民法官错误地认定 respondent 基于与其第二次婚姻相关的情形（该婚姻发生在2年期间之后）而有资格获得困难豁免。据此，DHS 的上诉将获支持。 案卷将发回移民法官，以判定在 respondent 有条件永久居民身份的2年期间内是否存在任何符合条件的困难。发回后，还应给予 respondent 机会，申请其可能符合资格的任何其他驱逐救济。 命令：国土安全部的上诉获支持。 进一步命令：案卷发回移民法官，以按照上述意见进行进一步程序，并作出新的决定。

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