Matter of W-Y-U-

Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 17 (BIA 2017) Interim Decision #3889

引用为 27 I&N Dec. 17 (BIA 2017) 临时决定 #3889

U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review

美国司法部 移民审查执行办公室

(1) The primary consideration for an Immigration Judge in evaluating whether to administratively close or recalendar proceedings is whether the party opposing administrative closure has provided a persuasive reason for the case to proceed and be resolved on the merits. Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. 688 (BIA 2012), clarified. (2) In considering administrative closure, an Immigration Judge cannot review whether an alien falls within the enforcement priorities of the Department of Homeland Security, which has exclusive jurisdiction over matters of prosecutorial discretion. FOR RESPONDENT: Pro se BEFORE: Board Panel: MALPHRUS, MULLANE, and CREPPY, Board Members. MALPHRUS, Board Member:

(1) 移民法官在评估是否行政关闭或重新排期程序时，首要考虑的是反对行政关闭的一方是否提供了有说服力的理由，使案件应继续进行并依实体审理解决。Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. 688 (BIA 2012) 予以澄清。 (2) 在考虑行政关闭时，移民法官不能审查外国人是否属于国土安全部的执法优先事项，该事项属于起诉裁量权的专属管辖范围。 被申请人代表：自行代理 审理：委员会合议庭：MALPHRUS、MULLANE 和 CREPPY，委员会成员。 MALPHRUS，委员会成员：

On April 13, 2015, an Immigration Judge granted an oral motion of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) seeking administrative closure of the respondent’s removal proceedings. The respondent opposed the DHS’s motion and later filed a motion to recalendar the proceedings, which the Immigration Judge denied on July 8, 2015. 1 The respondent has filed an interlocutory appeal from that decision. The appeal will be sustained and the record will be remanded to the Immigration Judge. 2

2015年4月13日，一名移民法官批准了国土安全部（“DHS”）的口头动议，寻求对被申请人的驱逐程序进行行政关闭。被申请人反对DHS的动议，随后提出重新排期程序的动议，移民法官于2015年7月8日予以驳回。1 被申请人就该决定提出了中间上诉。上诉将获支持，案件记录将发回移民法官。2

The respondent is a native and citizen of China who entered the United States on October 7, 2008. He filed a timely application for asylum and related relief and protection, which he seeks to have the Immigration Judge review in removal proceedings. The respondent argues that the administrative closure of his case prevents him from pursuing that relief.

被申请人是中国国民和中国公民，于2008年10月7日进入美国。他及时提交了庇护及相关救济和保护的申请，并寻求让移民法官在驱逐程序中审理该申请。被申请人主张，其案件的行政关闭阻止了他寻求该救济。

“Administrative closure . . . is used to temporarily remove a case from an Immigration Judge’s active calendar or from the Board’s docket.” 1 The Immigration Judge also denied as moot the respondent’s motion to change venue. Given our disposition of this case, the respondent may raise the issue of venue on remand. 2 Although we do not ordinarily entertain interlocutory appeals, we find it appropriate to address the merits of this appeal because it “raises an important question regarding the administration of proceedings under our immigration laws.” Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. 688, 688–89 (BIA 2012).

“行政关闭……用于将案件暂时从移民法官的活跃日程或委员会的案卷中移除。” 1 移民法官还以无实际意义为由驳回了被申请人变更地点的动议。鉴于我们对本案的处理，被申请人可以在发回后提出地点问题。 2 尽管我们通常不受理中间上诉，但我们认为处理本上诉的实体问题适当，因为它“提出了关于根据我们的移民法管理程序的重要问题。”Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. 688, 688–89 (BIA 2012)。

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Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 17 (BIA 2017) Interim Decision #3889

引用为 27 I&N Dec. 17 (BIA 2017) 临时决定 #3889

Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. 688, 692 (BIA 2012). It is a docket management tool that is used to temporarily pause removal proceedings. Id. at 690, 694. Administrative closure is not a form of relief from removal and does not provide an alien with any immigration status. After a case has been administratively closed, either party may move to recalendar it before the Immigration Court, as the respondent did here, or to reinstate the appeal before the Board. See id. at 695 & n.5.

Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. 688, 692 (BIA 2012)。它是一种案卷管理工具，用于暂时暂停驱逐程序。Id. at 690, 694。行政关闭不是驱逐救济的一种形式，也不为外国人提供任何移民身份。案件被行政关闭后，任何一方均可向移民法院动议重新排期，如被申请人在此所做的那样，或向委员会动议恢复上诉。See id. at 695 & n.5。

In Matter of Avetisyan, we determined for the first time that Immigration Judges and the Board have the authority to administratively close a case when appropriate, even if a party opposes it. Id. at 690, 694. 3 Thus, we held that “it is improper to afford absolute deference to a party’s objection” to administrative closure. Id. (overruling Matter of Gutierrez, 21 I&N Dec. 479, 480 (BIA 1996)). We stated that in evaluating whether to grant a request for administrative closure, an Immigration Judge should consider the following factors:

在 Matter of Avetisyan 中，我们首次认定，移民法官和委员会有权在适当时行政关闭案件，即使一方反对。Id. at 690, 694。3 因此，我们裁定“对一方对行政关闭的反对给予绝对遵从是不适当的。”Id.（推翻 Matter of Gutierrez, 21 I&N Dec. 479, 480 (BIA 1996)）。我们指出，在评估是否批准行政关闭请求时，移民法官应考虑以下因素：

(1) the reason administrative closure is sought; (2) the basis for any opposition to administrative closure; (3) the likelihood the respondent will succeed on any petition, application, or other action he or she is pursuing outside of removal proceedings; (4) the anticipated duration of the closure; (5) the responsibility of either party, if any, in contributing to any current or anticipated delay; and (6) the ultimate outcome of removal proceedings . . . when the case is recalendared. Id. at 696. 4 This individualized evaluation prevents a party from keeping a case on an Immigration Court’s active docket absent a reasoned explanation or justification. Cf. Matter of Lamus, 25 I&N Dec. 61, 65 (BIA 2009) (concluding that a party’s opposition to a motion to reopen, “in and of itself, should [not] be dispositive of the motion without regard to the merit of that opposition”); Matter of Hashmi, 24 I&N Dec. 785, 791 (BIA 2009) (noting that the DHS’s “unsupported opposition” to a continuance “does not carry much weight”).

(1) 寻求行政关闭的理由；(2) 反对行政关闭的任何依据；(3) 被申请人在驱逐程序之外正在寻求的任何请愿、申请或其他行动中获得成功的可能性；(4) 关闭的预期持续时间；(5) 任何一方对造成当前或预期延迟的责任（如有）；以及 (6) 案件重新排期时驱逐程序的最终结果。 Id. at 696。4 这种个别化评估防止一方在没有合理解释或正当理由的情况下将案件保留在移民法院的活跃案卷上。Cf. Matter of Lamus, 25 I&N Dec. 61, 65 (BIA 2009)（认定一方对重新开案动议的反对“本身不应在不考虑该反对的实体价值的情况下对动议具有决定性”）；Matter of Hashmi, 24 I&N Dec. 785, 791 (BIA 2009)（指出DHS对延期审理的“无支持的反对”“不具有很大分量”）。

In this case, the Immigration Judge explained that he denied the respondent’s motion to recalendar and kept his case administratively closed to reserve the Immigration Court’s “limited adjudication resources to resolve actual cases in dispute.” First, while we recognize the Immigration Judge’s concerns regarding the most efficient use of limited resources, such matters are secondary to a party’s interest in having a case resolved on the

在本案中，移民法官解释称，他驳回了被申请人重新排期的动议，并保持其案件行政关闭，以将移民法院的“有限裁决资源保留用于解决实际存在争议的案件”。首先，虽然我们认识到移民法官对有限资源最有效利用的关切，但此类事项次于一方在实体上解决案件的利益，

3 Immigration Judges also have broad discretion to grant continuances “for good cause shown.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.29, 1240.6 (2016); see also Matter of Interiano-Rosa, 25 I&N Dec. 264, 265 (BIA 2010). In many cases, granting a continuance may be more appropriate than administratively closing a case. 4 The same factors should be weighed in evaluating a motion to recalendar or reinstate.

3 移民法官还拥有广泛裁量权，可“在有正当理由的情况下”批准延期审理。8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.29, 1240.6 (2016)；see also Matter of Interiano-Rosa, 25 I&N Dec. 264, 265 (BIA 2010)。在许多案件中，批准延期审理可能比行政关闭案件更为适当。 4 在评估重新排期或恢复的动议时，应权衡相同的因素。

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Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 17 (BIA 2017) Interim Decision #3889

引用为 27 I&N Dec. 17 (BIA 2017) 临时决定 #3889

merits. See Matter of C-B-, 25 I&N Dec. 888, 890 (BIA 2012) (noting that docket efficiency does not override an alien’s “invocation of procedural rights and privileges”). In fact, Matter of Avetisyan does not list court resources as a factor to consider in evaluating whether administrative closure is appropriate. In a similar context, we held that “[c]ompliance with . . . case completion goals . . . is not a proper factor in deciding a continuance request.” Matter of Hashmi, 24 I&N Dec. at 793–94.

See Matter of C-B-, 25 I&N Dec. 888, 890 (BIA 2012)（指出案卷效率不能凌驾于外国人“援引程序权利和特权”之上）。事实上，Matter of Avetisyan 并未将法院资源列为评估行政关闭是否适当时应考虑的因素。在类似背景下，我们裁定“[遵守]……案件完成目标……不是决定延期审理请求的适当因素。”Matter of Hashmi, 24 I&N Dec. at 793–94。

Second, to the extent that the Immigration Judge concluded that this matter does not present an “actual case[] in dispute,” we do not agree. An alien in removal proceedings has a right to seek asylum and related relief from persecution. See Matter of E-F-H-L-, 26 I&N Dec. 319, 321–23 (BIA 2014) (holding that an alien in removal proceedings generally has a right to a full evidentiary hearing on applications for relief from persecution); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(c)(3) (2016). Therefore, assuming that his application was properly filed and that he is eligible for the relief sought, the respondent has a right to a hearing on the merits of his claim. If his application is successful, he may be eligible for lawful status in the United States, while administrative closure provides him no legal status. This is not a case where an alien has filed for asylum with no intent to proceed on the application to a resolution.

其次，就移民法官认定本事项不构成“实际存在争议的案件”而言，我们不同意。驱逐程序中的外国人有权寻求庇护及免于迫害的相关救济。See Matter of E-F-H-L-, 26 I&N Dec. 319, 321–23 (BIA 2014)（认定驱逐程序中的外国人通常有权就免于迫害的救济申请获得完整证据听证）；8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(c)(3) (2016)。因此，假设其申请已适当提交且他符合所寻求救济的资格，被申请人有权就其主张的实体问题进行听证。如果其申请成功，他可能有资格在美国获得合法身份，而行政关闭不为其提供任何法律身份。这不是外国人提交庇护申请但无意推进申请至解决的条件。

Moreover, the fact that the DHS sought administrative closure in this case is not dispositive of whether the respondent’s case is actually in dispute. The role of the Immigration Courts and the Board is to adjudicate whether an alien is removable and eligible for relief from removal in cases brought by the DHS. We lack the authority to review the DHS’s decision to institute proceedings, which involves the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. See Matter of G-N-C-, 22 I&N Dec. 281, 284 (BIA 1998); Matter of Yazdani, 17 I&N Dec. 626, 630 (BIA 1981). Since prosecutorial discretion is a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DHS, it follows that in considering administrative closure, an Immigration Judge cannot review whether an alien falls within the DHS’s enforcement priorities or will actually be removed from the United States. See Matter of Quintero, 18 I&N Dec. 348, 350 (BIA 1982) (stating that “deferred action status is a function of the District Director’s prosecutorial authority,” which neither Immigration Judges nor the Board can review); cf. Matter of P-C-M-, 20 I&N Dec. 432, 434 (BIA 1991) (stating that the likelihood that an alien will be deported is not a factor to be considered in a bond determination). Thus, while the DHS’s actions may suggest that the respondent’s case is not a priority for enforcement, they are not dispositive of whether the case is in dispute.

此外，DHS在本案中寻求行政关闭的事实，对于被申请人的案件是否实际存在争议并不具有决定性。移民法院和委员会的职责是裁决在DHS提起的案件中外国人是否可被驱逐以及是否有资格获得驱逐救济。我们缺乏审查DHS决定启动程序的权力，该决定涉及起诉裁量权的行使。See Matter of G-N-C-, 22 I&N Dec. 281, 284 (BIA 1998)；Matter of Yazdani, 17 I&N Dec. 626, 630 (BIA 1981)。由于起诉裁量权属于DHS专属管辖范围内的事项，因此在考虑行政关闭时，移民法官不能审查外国人是否属于DHS的执法优先事项或是否实际会被驱逐出美国。See Matter of Quintero, 18 I&N Dec. 348, 350 (BIA 1982)（指出“暂缓行动身份是地区局长起诉权力的职能”，移民法官和委员会均不能审查）；cf. Matter of P-C-M-, 20 I&N Dec. 432, 434 (BIA 1991)（指出外国人被驱逐的可能性不是保释裁定中应考虑的因素）。因此，虽然DHS的行动可能表明被申请人的案件不是执法优先事项，但它们对于案件是否存在争议并不具有决定性。

There is an important public interest in the finality of immigration proceedings. INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 107 (1988) (“There is a strong

移民程序的终局性存在重要的公共利益。INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 107 (1988)（“存在强烈的

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引用为 27 I&N Dec. 17 (BIA 2017) 临时决定 #3889

public interest in bringing litigation to a close as promptly as is consistent with the interest in giving the adversaries a fair opportunity to develop and present their respective cases.”). That interest is particularly clear here, since it is the respondent who is opposed to continuing administrative closure for an indefinite period and requests that his case proceed to a conclusion on the merits. An unreasonable delay in the resolution of the proceedings may operate to the detriment of aliens by preventing them from obtaining relief that can provide lawful status or, on the other hand, it may “thwart the operation of statutes providing for removal” by allowing aliens to remain indefinitely in the United States without legal status. Ukpabi v. Mukasey, 525 F.3d 403, 408 (6th Cir. 2008) (discussing the competing interests to be considered in evaluating a motion for continuance). The considerations regarding administrative closure should apply equally to respondents and the DHS.

公共利益，即在给予对方当事人公平机会发展和陈述各自案件的前提下，尽可能迅速地将诉讼终结。”）。该利益在此尤为明显，因为是被申请人反对在无限期内继续行政关闭，并请求其案件在实体上推进至结论。程序解决中的不合理延迟可能对外国人不利，使其无法获得可提供合法身份的救济，或者另一方面，可能通过允许外国人在无法律身份的情况下无限期留在美国而“阻碍驱逐法规的实施”。Ukpabi v. Mukasey, 525 F.3d 403, 408 (6th Cir. 2008)（讨论在评估延期审理动议时应考虑的相互竞争的利益）。关于行政关闭的考虑应同等适用于被申请人和DHS。

While Matter of Avetisyan provides a list of factors to be considered, we now clarify that decision and hold that the primary consideration for an Immigration Judge in determining whether to administratively close or recalendar proceedings is whether the party opposing administrative closure has provided a persuasive reason for the case to proceed and be resolved on the merits. 5

虽然 Matter of Avetisyan 提供了一系列应考虑的因素，但我们现在澄清该决定并裁定，移民法官在决定是否行政关闭或重新排期程序时的首要考虑是，反对行政关闭的一方是否提供了有说服力的理由，使案件应继续进行并依实体审理解决。5

The respondent is opposed to the continuation of administrative closure and has requested recalendaring of the proceedings. He has explained that he wants to pursue his application for asylum to its resolution. Under these circumstances, recalendaring of the proceedings is appropriate. Accordingly, we will sustain the respondent’s appeal, reinstate his removal proceedings, and remand the record for further proceedings. 6

被申请人反对继续行政关闭，并请求重新排期程序。他解释称，他希望将其庇护申请推进至解决。在此情况下，重新排期程序是适当的。因此，我们将支持被申请人的上诉，恢复其驱逐程序，并将案件记录发回进一步审理。6

5 This decision is intended to provide additional guidance where one of the parties opposes administrative closure. However, it is not applicable to cases in which the parties jointly agree to administrative closure, recalendaring, or reinstatement. Moreover, we continue to hold that neither party has “absolute veto power over administrative closure requests.” Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. at 692. 6 If the DHS had sought termination of the proceedings, which it chose not to do, this case would present a different question. If the proceedings were terminated, the charges against the respondent would be dismissed. He would therefore not have the same interest in having his case resolved on the merits.

5 本决定旨在为一方当事人反对行政关闭的情形提供额外指引。然而，本决定不适用于双方当事人共同同意行政关闭、重新排期或恢复程序的情形。此外，我们继续认为，任何一方均不拥有“对行政关闭请求的绝对否决权”。Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. at 692。 6 如果DHS曾寻求终止程序（其选择不这样做），本案将呈现不同的问题。如果程序被终止，对respondent的指控将被驳回。因此，他在案件实体审理获得解决方面的利益将有所不同。

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