Matter of Yauri

Cite as 25 I&N Dec. 103 (BIA 2009) Interim Decision #3659

引用为 25 I&N Dec. 103 (BIA 2009) 临时决定 #3659

File A071 610 438 - Los Angeles, California

案卷 A071 610 438 - 加利福尼亚州洛杉矶

Decided October 28, 2009

2009年10月28日裁定

U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals

美国司法部 移民审查执行办公室 移民上诉委员会

(1) With a narrow exception not applicable to this case, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate an arriving alien’s application for adjustment of status under 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(1) (2009) and agrees that it retains jurisdiction to adjudicate the application even where an unexecuted administratively final order of removal remains outstanding.

(1) 除不适用于本案的一项狭窄例外，美国公民及移民服务局（“USCIS”）对根据 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(1) (2009) 裁定入境外国人调整身份申请拥有专属管辖权，并同意即使存在未执行的行政终局驱逐令，其仍保留裁定该申请的管辖权。

(2) The Board of Immigration Appeals generally lacks authority to reopen the proceedings of aliens under final orders of exclusion, deportation, or removal who seek to pursue relief over which the Board and the Immigration Judges have no jurisdiction, especially where reopening is sought simply as a mechanism to stay the final order while the collateral matter is resolved by the agency or court having jurisdiction to do so.

(2) 移民上诉委员会通常无权重新开启处于驱逐出境、递解出境或驱逐最终命令下的外国人的程序，如果该外国人寻求的救济是委员会和移民法官没有管辖权的，尤其是在仅仅将重新开启作为一项机制、以便在拥有管辖权的机构或法院解决附带事项期间中止最终命令的情况下。

(3) With regard to untimely or number-barred motions to reopen, the Board will not generally exercise its discretion to reopen proceedings sua sponte for an arriving alien to pursue adjustment of status before the USCIS.

(3) 对于不及时或受数量限制的重新开启动议，委员会通常不会行使裁量权，依职权重新开启入境外国人的程序，以便其向 USCIS 寻求调整身份。

FOR RESPONDENT: Stuart I. Folinsky, Esquire, Los Angeles, California

被申请人代理律师：Stuart I. Folinsky 律师，加利福尼亚州洛杉矶

AMICUS CURIAE: 1 Mary A. Kenney, Esquire, Washington, D.C.

法庭之友：1 Mary A. Kenney 律师，华盛顿哥伦比亚特区

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: James M. Left, Senior Attorney

国土安全部代理律师：James M. Left，高级律师

BEFORE: Board Panel: HOLMES and HESS, Board Members; KENDALL CLARK, Temporary Board Member.

审理者：委员会合议庭：HOLMES 和 HESS，委员会成员；KENDALL CLARK，临时委员会成员。

HOLMES, Board Member:

HOLMES，委员会成员：

This matter was last before the Board on December 2, 2003, when we entered the final administrative order in these removal proceedings, dismissing the respondent’s appeal from the Immigration Judge’s April 30, 2002, decision. On March 24, 2008, over 4 years after that final order, the

本事项上一次由委员会审理是在2003年12月2日，当时我们在这些驱逐程序中作出了行政终局命令，驳回了被申请人对移民法官2002年4月30日决定的上诉。2008年3月24日，即该终局命令作出4年多之后，

1 We acknowledge and appreciate the very helpful briefs submitted by the parties and by amicus curiae, representing the American Immigration Law Foundation.

1 我们认可并感谢各方以及代表美国移民法基金会的法庭之友提交的非常有益的陈述。

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引用为 25 I&N Dec. 103 (BIA 2009) 临时决定 #3659

respondent filed an untimely motion to reopen to pursue an application for adjustment of status. With certain exceptions not applicable to the respondent’s motion, a motion to reopen in any case previously the subject of a final decision by the Board must be filed no later than 90 days after the date of that decision. Section 240(c)(7)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2009). The respondent’s motion is therefore untimely. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) filed an opposition to the motion to reopen. The respondent concedes that her motion is untimely, but she nevertheless urges that sua sponte reopening by the Board is warranted because of a change of law and because exceptional circumstances are present in her case. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a); see also Matter of G-D-, 22 I&N Dec. 1132 (BIA 1999); Matter of J-J-, 21 I&N Dec. 976 (BIA 1997). She acknowledges that she is an “arriving alien” who must pursue her application for adjustment of status with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), an agency within the DHS. However, she contends that the 2006 regulatory changes affecting this group of adjustment applicants and the USCIS’s rejection of her adjustment application necessitate the reopening of the removal proceedings against her. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1.1(q), 1001.1(q) (2009) (defining the term “arriving alien”); 8 C.F.R. §§ 245.2(a)(1) (setting forth the jurisdiction of the USCIS over adjustment applications for arriving aliens), 1245.2(a)(1)(ii) (2009) (setting forth the limited circumstances in which an Immigration Judge will have jurisdiction over the adjustment application of an arriving alien); see also Eligibility of Arriving Aliens in Removal Proceedings To Apply for Adjustment of Status and Jurisdiction To Adjudicate Applications for Adjustment of Status, 71 Fed. Reg. 27,585-92 (May 12, 2006) (interim rule implementing changes to the regulations and providing a process through which arriving aliens may apply for adjustment of status). She argues that we should reopen her removal proceedings and continue them indefinitely so that she does not have an outstanding order of removal pending against her while she pursues her application before the USCIS. On June 1, 2009, after the submission of supplemental briefs in this matter, and after the issues raised in the respondent’s motion had been considered by the Board, the DHS filed a separate motion to reopen and terminate these removal proceedings on the basis that the USCIS had adjudicated the respondent’s adjustment of status application and had granted that application on February 25, 2009. We will address this separate motion later in this decision, but first we will adjudicate the respondent’s pending motion to reopen. The grant of lawful permanent resident status to the respondent does not obviate the need for the Board to provide guidance to the Immigration Judges, the parties, and the general public with regard to recurring issues

被申请人提交了一份不及时的重新开启动议，以寻求调整身份申请。除某些不适用于被申请人动议的例外，在任何先前已由委员会作出最终决定的案件中，重新开启动议必须在该决定作出之日起90日内提交。移民和国籍法第240(c)(7)(C)(i)条，8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) (2006)；8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2009)。因此，被申请人的动议不及时。国土安全部（“DHS”）提交了对重新开启动议的反对意见。被申请人承认其动议不及时，但仍主张，由于法律变化以及其案件中存在特殊情况，委员会依职权重新开启是正当的。8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a)；另见 Matter of G-D-, 22 I&N Dec. 1132 (BIA 1999)；Matter of J-J-, 21 I&N Dec. 976 (BIA 1997)。她承认自己是“入境外国人”，必须向美国公民及移民服务局（“USCIS”）——DHS 下属机构——寻求调整身份申请。然而，她主张，影响这一调整身份申请人群体的2006年法规变化以及 USCIS 驳回其调整身份申请，使得有必要重新开启针对她的驱逐程序。8 C.F.R. §§ 1.1(q), 1001.1(q) (2009)（界定“入境外国人”一词）；8 C.F.R. §§ 245.2(a)(1)（规定 USCIS 对入境外国人调整身份申请的管辖权）、1245.2(a)(1)(ii) (2009)（规定移民法官对入境外国人调整身份申请拥有管辖权的有限情形）；另见 Eligibility of Arriving Aliens in Removal Proceedings To Apply for Adjustment of Status and Jurisdiction To Adjudicate Applications for Adjustment of Status, 71 Fed. Reg. 27,585-92 (May 12, 2006)（实施法规变化的临时规则，并提供入境外国人申请调整身份的程序）。她主张，我们应重新开启其驱逐程序并无限期延续，以便她在向 USCIS 寻求申请期间，不会有针对她的未决驱逐令。 2009年6月1日，在本事项补充陈述提交后，且在委员会审议了被申请人动议提出的问题后，DHS 提交了一份单独的重新开启并终止这些驱逐程序的动议，理由是 USCIS 已裁定被申请人的调整身份申请，并于2009年2月25日批准了该申请。我们将在本决定后文处理这份单独的动议，但首先我们将裁定被申请人待决的重新开启动议。授予被申请人合法永久居民身份并不免除委员会就反复出现的问题向移民法官、各方和公众提供指导的必要性，

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presented in her motion, which otherwise are often overcome by events before they can be separately addressed.

这些问题在其动议中提出，否则往往在能够单独处理之前就因情况变化而失去意义。

I.

I.

As a preliminary matter, aside from motions to reconsider, motions before the Board fall into three broad categories: (1) motions to remand that are filed in the course of ongoing, “open” proceedings before the Board; (2) motions to reopen proceedings that satisfy the time and number requirements set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); and (3) motions that do not meet the time and number requirements imposed by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). See also sections 240(c)(7)(A), (C)(i) of the Act. Each category of motion has its own separate requirements that must be satisfied to allow or warrant reopening. We note this at the outset because it is not unusual for these separate filing requirements to be inadequately addressed or simply overlooked in motions pending before the Board, and perhaps at times not adequately addressed in the adjudication of the motion by the Board. Where motions do not meet the filing requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) and do not qualify for a statutory or regulatory exception to those requirements, proceedings can only be reopened under the Board’s sua sponte authority. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). We emphasize that untimely motions to reopen to pursue an application for adjustment of status, even for cases that do not involve an “arriving alien,” do not fall within any of the statutory or regulatory exceptions to the time limits for motions to reopen before the Board and will ordinarily be denied. 2 Sections 240(c)(7)(C)(ii)-(iv) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). The only applications for adjustment of status that are specifically excepted from the motion time limits are those that involve a self-petition by a battered spouse, child, or parent of a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident. Section 240(c)(7)(C)(iv) of the Act. The respondent does not assert that she falls within this exception, or any other exception to the time limits, and her motion reflects that the visa petition was filed on her behalf by her United States

作为初步事项，除重新审议动议外，委员会面前的动议分为三大类：(1) 在委员会正在进行的“未决”程序中提交的发回重审动议；(2) 满足 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) 规定的时间和数量要求的重新开启程序动议；以及 (3) 不符合 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) 规定的时间和数量要求的动议。另见该法第240(c)(7)(A)、(C)(i)条。每一类动议都有各自必须满足的单独要求，才能允许或构成重新开启的理由。我们在开头指出这一点，是因为这些单独的提交要求未在委员会待决动议中得到充分处理或直接被忽视的情况并不罕见，有时在委员会裁定动议时也可能未得到充分处理。 如果动议不符合 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) 的提交要求，且不符合对这些要求的法定或监管例外，则程序只能根据委员会的依职权权限重新开启。8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a)。我们强调，为寻求调整身份申请而提出的不及时重新开启动议，即使是不涉及“入境外国人”的案件，也不属于委员会重新开启动议时限的任何法定或监管例外，通常将被驳回。2 该法第240(c)(7)(C)(ii)-(iv)条；8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)。具体豁免动议时限的调整身份申请仅限于涉及美国公民或合法永久居民的受虐配偶、子女或父母自行提出的申请。该法第240(c)(7)(C)(iv)条。被申请人未主张其属于该例外或时限的任何其他例外，且其动议反映签证申请是由其美国

2 The parties have raised various arguments regarding the applicability of the Board’s decision in Matter of Velarde, 23 I&N Dec. 253 (BIA 2002), to the respondent’s case. However, Velarde involved a timely motion to reopen before the Board, and that decision listed the timely filing of a motion as the first criterion for the reasoning of that decision to apply. Id. at 256. The respondent’s motion is not timely. Moreover, the principles set forth in Velarde relate only to unadjudicated marriage-based visa petitions, whereas the visa petition at issue in this case was filed on the respondent’s behalf by her United States citizen daughter. Thus, Velarde has no applicability to the respondent’s case.

2 各方就委员会在 Matter of Velarde, 23 I&N Dec. 253 (BIA 2002) 中的裁决对被申请人案件的适用性提出了各种论点。然而，Velarde 涉及向委员会提出的及时重新开启动议，且该裁决将及时提交动议列为适用该裁决推理的第一项标准。Id. at 256。被申请人的动议不及时。此外，Velarde 中确立的原则仅涉及未裁定的基于婚姻的签证申请，而本案所涉签证申请是由被申请人的美国公民女儿代表其提交的。因此，Velarde 对被申请人的案件没有适用性。

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citizen daughter in July 2007, over 3½ years after the Board’s final order in this case. The respondent’s motion to reopen therefore turns on whether sua sponte reopening is warranted. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a); see also Matter of G-D-, 22 I&N Dec. 1132; Matter of J-J-, 21 I&N Dec. 976.

公民女儿于2007年7月提交，即委员会在本案作出终局命令3年半多之后。因此，被申请人的重新开启动议取决于依职权重新开启是否正当。8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a)；另见 Matter of G-D-, 22 I&N Dec. 1132；Matter of J-J-, 21 I&N Dec. 976。

II.

II.

We also find it necessary to address whether the Board or the Immigration Judge has jurisdiction over the respondent’s underlying adjustment application and, if not, whether the USCIS has jurisdiction to adjudicate the adjustment application of an arriving alien who is under a final order of removal. This question arises in the context of regulations promulgated in May 2006, which repealed an earlier regulation that barred “arriving aliens” from applying for adjustment of status and conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the USCIS to adjudicate adjustment applications filed by arriving aliens, with the limited exception of adjustment applications filed by arriving aliens who had been paroled into the United States to pursue a previously filed adjustment application. 8 C.F.R. §§ 245.2(a)(1), 1245.2(a)(1)(ii); 71 Fed. Reg. at 27,591-92. The respondent does not contend that she falls within the limited exception under which the Immigration Judge would have jurisdiction over her adjustment application, and the record reflects that she was not paroled into the United States to pursue a previously filed adjustment application. She did, however, present evidence that the USCIS rejected the adjustment application that she had filed in July 2007. The USCIS rejected the application because a warrant of deportation had been issued against the respondent in 2004, and she was therefore under removal proceedings before the Executive Office for Immigration Review, of which the Board is the ultimate decision-making body. Given the apparent confusion regarding the USCIS’s jurisdiction under the regulations to adjudicate the respondent’s adjustment application, the Board requested supplemental briefing by the parties to specifically address this question. The parties provided supplemental briefing, and a brief was also filed on the respondent’s behalf by amicus curiae. In these briefs, the parties have stated their agreement that, under the regulations promulgated on May 12, 2006, jurisdiction over the respondent’s adjustment application lies with the USCIS, and not with the Immigration Judge or the Board. Moreover, the DHS has stated that it recognizes that the USCIS’s jurisdiction over the adjustment application of an arriving alien exists regardless of whether there is an unexecuted removal order that remains outstanding against the alien. In the amicus brief filed by counsel from the American Immigration Law Foundation, USCIS jurisdiction over such applications was acknowledged. It was also acknowledged that most local offices of the USCIS recognize

我们还认为有必要处理移民上诉委员会或移民法官是否对受访人的基础调整身份申请拥有管辖权的问题，以及如果没有，美国公民及移民服务局是否对处于最终递解令下的入境外国人调整身份申请拥有裁决管辖权。这一问题产生于2006年5月颁布的法规背景之下，该法规废止了先前禁止“入境外国人”申请调整身份并赋予美国公民及移民服务局专属管辖权以裁决入境外国人提交的调整身份申请的法规，但有一项有限例外，即入境外国人假释进入美国以继续先前提交的调整身份申请的情形。8 C.F.R. §§ 245.2(a)(1), 1245.2(a)(1)(ii); 71 Fed. Reg. at 27,591-92。受访人不主张她属于移民法官对其调整身份申请拥有管辖权的有限例外情形，且记录显示她并非为继续先前提交的调整身份申请而假释进入美国。然而，她确实提交了证据证明美国公民及移民服务局驳回了她于2007年7月提交的调整身份申请。美国公民及移民服务局驳回该申请是因为2004年已对受访人签发递解令，因此她正处于移民审查执行办公室的递解程序中，而移民上诉委员会是该办公室的最终决策机构。 鉴于对美国公民及移民服务局根据法规裁决受访人调整身份申请的管辖权存在明显混淆，移民上诉委员会要求各方提交补充简报以专门处理该问题。各方提交了补充简报，法庭之友亦代表受访人提交了简报。在这些简报中，各方表示同意，根据2006年5月12日颁布的法规，对受访人调整身份申请的管辖权属于美国公民及移民服务局，而非移民法官或移民上诉委员会。此外，国土安全部表示其认识到，美国公民及移民服务局对入境外国人调整身份申请的管辖权存在与否，不论是否存在针对该外国人的未执行且仍然有效的递解令。在美国移民法律基金会律师提交的法庭之友简报中，美国公民及移民服务局对此类申请的管辖权得到了承认。还承认美国公民及移民服务局大多数地方办事处认可

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their jurisdiction or, in cases where they initially failed to do so, the issue of jurisdiction was resolved once the regulations were brought to that office’s attention. Upon consideration of the supplemental briefs, we find no dispute over the question of which agency has jurisdiction to adjudicate the respondent’s adjustment of status application. Jurisdiction lies with the USCIS under the applicable regulations, because the respondent is an arriving alien who does not fall within the limited exception that would confer jurisdiction over the application on the Immigration Judge or the Board. 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(1). Moreover, we emphasize that the existence of a final order of removal does not preclude the USCIS from granting adjustment of status to an arriving alien who is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status.

其管辖权，或者在其最初未能认可的情况下，一旦法规提请该办事处注意，管辖权问题即得到解决。 经审议补充简报，我们认定各方对哪个机构拥有裁决受访人调整身份申请的管辖权问题不存在争议。根据适用法规，管辖权属于美国公民及移民服务局，因为受访人是一名入境外国人，不属于将管辖权赋予移民法官或移民上诉委员会的有限例外情形。8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(1)。此外，我们强调，最终递解令的存在并不妨碍美国公民及移民服务局向其他方面符合调整身份资格的入境外国人授予调整身份。

III.

III.

Given that the Board has no jurisdiction over the underlying application, the question arises whether we can or should reopen proceedings in which a final administrative order has been entered while such an application is being pursued before the USCIS. We have long been of the view that administratively final exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings should not be reopened for matters over which neither the Immigration Judge nor the Board has jurisdiction, and that referencing the absence of such jurisdiction was a rational basis in itself to decline to reopen proceedings. See, e.g., Matter of Castro, 21 I&N Dec. 379 (BIA 1996) (declining to reopen exclusion proceedings for adjustment of status where the Immigration Judge did not have jurisdiction in exclusion proceedings over an adjustment of status application under the applicable regulations). Nevertheless, some courts of appeals have recently remanded cases in which the Board denied motions solely on the basis of the lack of jurisdiction over the underlying applications. See, e.g., Kalilu v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2008); Sheng Gao Ni v. Bd. of Immigration Appeals, 520 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2008); Potdar v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 2007), rev’d on reh’g sub nom. Potdar v. Mukasey, 550 F.3d 594 (7th Cir. 2008). In Sheng Gao Ni v. Board of Immigration Appeals, 520 F.3d at 130, for example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that the “likely purpose” of a such an adjustment of status motion filed in removal proceedings “was to permit petitioners to press their adjustment applications before the USCIS without remaining subject to final orders of removal.” The court ruled that a “rote recital of a jurisdictional statement—even if technically accurate—does not adequately discharge the BIA’s duty to ‘consider the facts of record relevant to the motion’ and provide a ‘rational explanation’ for its

鉴于移民上诉委员会对基础申请没有管辖权，问题在于，当此类申请正在美国公民及移民服务局审理期间，我们能否或是否应当重新开启已作出最终行政命令的程序。我们长期以来认为，对于移民法官和移民上诉委员会均无管辖权的事项，不应重新开启行政终局的驱逐、递解或遣返程序，且援引缺乏此类管辖权本身即是拒绝重新开启程序的合理依据。参见，例如，Matter of Castro, 21 I&N Dec. 379 (BIA 1996)（在驱逐程序中，根据适用法规移民法官对调整身份申请无管辖权，故拒绝为调整身份重新开启驱逐程序）。然而，一些上诉法院最近将案件发回重审，这些案件中移民上诉委员会仅以对基础申请缺乏管辖权为由驳回了动议。参见，例如，Kalilu v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2008); Sheng Gao Ni v. Bd. of Immigration Appeals, 520 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2008); Potdar v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 2007), rev'd on reh'g sub nom. Potdar v. Mukasey, 550 F.3d 594 (7th Cir. 2008)。 例如，在Sheng Gao Ni v. Board of Immigration Appeals, 520 F.3d at 130案中，美国第二巡回上诉法院指出，在遣返程序中提交此类调整身份动议的“可能目的”“是允许请愿人在不继续受最终递解令约束的情况下向美国公民及移民服务局推进其调整身份申请”。法院裁定，“对管辖权声明的机械复述——即使技术上准确——不足以适当履行移民上诉委员会‘考虑与动议相关的记录事实’并提供‘合理解释’以支持其

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ruling.” Id. at 129-30 (quoting Melnitsenko v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 42, 50 (2d Cir. 2008)). It remanded the case for the Board to reconsider the issue and provide adequate reasons for denying the motion. In Kalilu v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d at 1218, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the opportunity that the new regulation affords for an arriving alien in removal proceedings to establish his eligibility for adjustment of status “is rendered worthless where the BIA . . . denies a motion to reopen . . . that is sought in order to provide time for USCIS to adjudicate a pending application.” The Ninth Circuit further opined that, without reopening, an alien with a prima facie valid Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130) or an adjustment application pending before the USCIS could be removed and, if removed, his or her adjustment application would be deemed abandoned. Id. Given these decisions, we will attempt to more fully explain our general position regarding motions to reopen proceedings that involve applications for relief or other matters over which neither the Board nor the Immigration Judge has jurisdiction. To the extent that these decisions from the circuit courts can be read to address respondents who are under administratively final orders of removal, the decisions appear to indicate that the Board should be considering whether our proceedings should be used as a vehicle, in effect, to “stay” execution of the administratively final order of exclusion, deportation, or removal while the arriving alien’s adjustment application is resolved by the USCIS. 3 This presents the question whether the Board can or should exercise its discretion

裁决的义务。”Id. at 129-30（引用Melnitsenko v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 42, 50 (2d Cir. 2008)）。法院将案件发回，要求移民上诉委员会重新考虑该问题并提供驳回动议的充分理由。 在Kalilu v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d at 1218案中，第9巡回法院认定，新法规为处于遣返程序中的入境外国人提供的证明其调整身份资格的机会“在移民上诉委员会……驳回重新开启动议……而该动议旨在为美国公民及移民服务局裁决待决申请提供时间时，即变得毫无价值”。第9巡回法院进一步认为，如果不重新开启，拥有表面有效的亲属移民申请（I-130表格）或调整身份申请正在美国公民及移民服务局待决的外国人可能被遣返，且如果被遣返，其调整身份申请将被视为放弃。Id. 鉴于这些裁决，我们将尝试更全面地解释我们关于涉及救济申请或其他移民上诉委员会和移民法官均无管辖权事项的重新开启程序动议的一般立场。 如果这些巡回法院的裁决可被解读为针对处于行政终局递解令下的受访人，则这些裁决似乎表明移民上诉委员会应考虑是否应将我们的程序用作一种工具，实际上在入境外国人的调整身份申请由美国公民及移民服务局解决期间“中止”行政终局的驱逐、递解或遣返命令的执行。3 这提出了移民上诉委员会能否或是否应行使自由裁量权的问题

3 The Ninth Circuit, in which this case arises, held in Kalilu v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d at 1217-18, that the Board abused its discretion in denying “solely on jurisdictional grounds” an arriving alien’s motion to reopen to seek adjustment of status. In our decision, we had determined that reopening and a remand were unwarranted because jurisdiction over any adjustment application that the alien might file resided exclusively with the USCIS. However, we had not discussed whether reopening could or should be granted in order to “stay” the alien’s removal while the USCIS resolved his adjustment application on its merits. Consequently, we do not view the Ninth Circuit’s subsequent reversal as foreclosing us from now engaging in an examination of the extent of our authority to effectuate a “stay” through the reopening of proceedings, although we acknowledge and will herein address the court’s above-cited expression of concern about the potential ramifications of denying reopening under such circumstances. Additionally, Kalilu involved a timely motion to reopen (indeed, the motion apparently had been filed during the pendency of a Board appeal and therefore was actually a pre-final-order motion to remand), as well as circumstances that the court found to be governed by Matter of Velarde, 23 I&N Dec. 253. Kalilu v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d at 1218. In contrast, in this case the respondent’s motion to reopen was untimely (as further discussed infra), and Velarde is inapposite. See supra note 2.

3 本案所在的第9巡回法院在Kalilu v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d at 1217-18案中认定，移民上诉委员会“仅以管辖权为由”驳回入境外国人寻求调整身份的重新开启动议构成滥用自由裁量权。在我们的裁决中，我们曾认定重新开启和发回重审没有必要，因为对外国人可能提交的任何调整身份申请的管辖权专属属于美国公民及移民服务局。然而，我们未曾讨论是否能够或应当批准重新开启以在美国公民及移民服务局根据案情解决其调整身份申请期间“中止”该外国人的遣返。因此，我们不认为第9巡回法院随后的推翻裁决阻止我们现在审查我们通过重新开启程序实现“中止”的权力范围，尽管我们承认并将在此处理法院上述对在此类情况下拒绝重新开启潜在后果的关切。此外，Kalilu涉及一项及时的重新开启动议（实际上，该动议显然是在移民上诉委员会上诉待决期间提交的，因此实际上是最终命令前的发回重审动议），以及法院认定受Matter of Velarde, 23 I&N Dec. 253管辖的情形。Kalilu v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d at 1218。相比之下，在本案中受访人的重新开启动议不及时（如下文进一步讨论），且Velarde不适用。参见上文脚注2。

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to reopen proceedings to effectively grant such a “stay” of a final order while the alien pursues an independent adjustment of status application with the USCIS. 4 We do not view the Board’s authority to consider stays of execution of final orders, which we have been granted under Federal regulations, to extend this far. In particular, we have been granted limited stay authority under the regulations, which is almost exclusively tied to pending motions before the Board. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(f). Under that authority, if there is no automatic stay under the regulations, we may determine whether to grant a stay of execution of the final deportation or removal order while we consider the motion that is pending before us. Id. Likewise, an Immigration Judge also has authority to stay execution of a final order while a motion is pending before the Immigration Court. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1)(v) (2009). The stay authority granted to the Board and Immigration Judges does not provide general authority to grant stays of administratively final orders in conjunction with matters over which we have no authority. Rather, the limited stay authority provides the opportunity to stay proceedings while a pending motion is adjudicated. That stay authority also terminates upon adjudication of the pending motion. It is our understanding of the law that if an alien under a final order of exclusion, deportation, or removal is seeking some form of relief from a third party 5 over which the Immigration Judges and the Board lack jurisdiction, the question whether the alien is either entitled to a stay of removal or warrants a stay as a matter of discretion while such application or request is pending is not within our jurisdiction. Any stay request should go to the agency or court that does have jurisdiction over the matter. In this case, the parties agree that the USCIS has jurisdiction over the respondent’s adjustment application, and her request for a stay should therefore go to the DHS. 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.6(a), 1241.6(a) (2009). 6 If an arriving alien under

重新开启程序，以便在该外国人向USCIS寻求独立的调整身份申请期间，实际上给予该最终命令这样的“暂缓执行”。4 我们认为，联邦法规授予我们的、审议最终命令执行暂缓的委员会权力，并不延伸至此。特别是，法规授予我们的暂缓权限是有限的，几乎完全与委员会待决的动议相关联。8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(f)。根据该权限，如果法规下不存在自动暂缓，我们可以决定是否在我们审议待决于我们面前的动议期间，准予暂缓执行最终驱逐或遣返命令。同上。同样，移民法官也有权在移民法院待决动议期间暂缓执行最终命令。8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1)(v) (2009)。授予委员会和移民法官的暂缓权限，并不提供在涉及我们无权管辖的事项时准予暂缓执行行政最终命令的一般权力。相反，有限的暂缓权限提供了在待决动议得到裁决期间暂缓程序的机会。该暂缓权限也在待决动议裁决后终止。 我们对法律的理解是，如果处于最终排斥、驱逐或遣返命令之下的外国人正在向第三方5寻求某种形式的救济，而移民法官和委员会对该救济缺乏管辖权，那么在该申请或请求待决期间，该外国人是否有权获得暂缓遣返，或作为裁量事项是否应获得暂缓，该问题不属于我们的管辖范围。任何暂缓请求都应提交给对该事项确实拥有管辖权的机构或法院。在本案中，双方同意USCIS对答辩人的调整申请拥有管辖权，因此她的暂缓请求应提交给DHS。8 C.F.R. §§ 241.6(a), 1241.6(a) (2009)。6 如果处于

4 In our view, whether phrased in terms of “staying” removal, or “lifting” an order of removal, or reopening the proceedings to provide time for the USCIS to adjudicate a pending application without the alien “being subject to a final order of removal,” the actual remedy sought is a stay of removal pending adjudication of an application by the USCIS. See, e.g., Kalilu v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 1215; Sheng Gao Ni v. Bd. of Immigration Appeals, 520 F.3d 125; Potdar v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 680. 5 In this instance, jurisdiction over the matter at issue is with the USCIS. However, parties could raise similar arguments with regard to matters pending in other forums. 6 In its supplemental brief, the DHS outlines the process for obtaining a stay of the final removal order, as well as the process for obtaining deferred enforcement of the outstanding removal order. The DHS also points out that the respondent did not present any evidence (continued...)

4 我们认为，无论是以“暂缓”遣返、“解除”遣返命令的措辞，还是以重新开启程序以便为USCIS裁决待决申请提供时间、使该外国人“不受最终遣返命令约束”的措辞表述，实际寻求的救济都是在USCIS裁决申请期间暂缓遣返。参见，例如，Kalilu v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 1215；Sheng Gao Ni v. Bd. of Immigration Appeals, 520 F.3d 125；Potdar v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 680。 5 在本案中，对所涉事项的管辖权属于USCIS。然而，当事人可以就其他论坛中待决的事项提出类似论点。 6 DHS在其补充简报中概述了获得最终遣返命令暂缓的程序，以及获得未执行遣返命令延期执行的程序。DHS还指出，答辩人未提供任何证据（续...）

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a final order of removal has the right to remain in the United States to pursue an adjustment application, proceedings should not need to be reopened to protect it. On the other hand, if the alien does not have such a right, then the discretion to allow him or her to remain in the United States until the application is adjudicated lies, if at all, with the agency or court having jurisdiction over the application, here the DHS. The DHS also has its separate authority to grant a respondent deferred action in the exercise of its prosecutorial discretion, which is not subject to review by the Board or the Immigration Judges. See Matter of Quintero, 18 I&N Dec. 349, 349-50 (BIA 1982); see also Barahona-Gomez v. Reno, 236 F.3d 1115, 1119 n.3 (9th Cir. 2001); Matter of Singh, 21 I&N Dec. 427, 433 (BIA 1996). Accordingly, we conclude that we have not been granted authority to reopen the proceedings of respondents who are under a final administrative order of removal to pursue matters that could affect their removability if we have no jurisdiction over such matters. This is especially so where reopening is sought simply as a mechanism to stay a final order of removal while the collateral matter is being resolved.

处于最终遣返命令之下的外国人有权留在美国寻求调整申请，则不应需要重新开启程序来保护该权利。另一方面，如果该外国人没有此种权利，那么允许其留在美国直至申请得到裁决的裁量权（如果有的话）属于对申请拥有管辖权的机构或法院，在此即DHS。DHS还拥有其独立的权力，可在行使起诉裁量权时准予答辩人延期行动，该权力不受委员会或移民法官的审查。参见 Matter of Quintero, 18 I&N Dec. 349, 349-50 (BIA 1982)；另参见 Barahona-Gomez v. Reno, 236 F.3d 1115, 1119 n.3 (9th Cir. 2001)；Matter of Singh, 21 I&N Dec. 427, 433 (BIA 1996)。 因此，我们得出结论，我们未被授予权力重新开启处于最终行政遣返命令之下的答辩人的程序，以寻求可能影响其可遣返性的、而我们对此类事项没有管辖权的事项。当重新开启仅仅被作为在附带事项解决期间暂缓最终遣返命令的机制而寻求时，尤其如此。

IV.

IV.

Finally, and separately from any question of jurisdiction, with regard to untimely or number-barred motions to reopen, we conclude that sua sponte reopening of exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings pending a third party’s adjudication of an underlying application that is not itself within our jurisdiction ordinarily would not be warranted as a matter of discretion. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a); see also Matter of G-D-, 22 I&N Dec. 1132; Matter of J-J-, 21 I&N Dec. 976. 7 As a practical matter, Immigration Judges and the Board have limited and finite adjudicative and administrative resources, and those resources are best allocated to matters over which we do have jurisdiction. Among the costs of reopening final proceedings in cases such as the one before us, where we have no jurisdiction over the underlying relief requested, are the practical and administrative difficulties associated with maintaining open cases that would rely on outside considerations and would become part

最后，与任何管辖权问题分开而言，关于不及时或受次数限制的重新开启动议，我们得出结论，在第三方裁决本身不属于我们管辖范围的底层申请待决期间，主动重新开启排斥、驱逐或遣返程序，通常作为裁量事项不会得到准许。8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a)；另参见 Matter of G-D-, 22 I&N Dec. 1132；Matter of J-J-, 21 I&N Dec. 976。7 实际上，移民法官和委员会拥有有限且有限的裁决和行政资源，这些资源最好分配给属于我们管辖范围的事项。在像我们面前这样的案件中重新开启最终程序——我们对其所寻求的底层救济没有管辖权——的成本之一，是与维持开放案件相关的实际和行政困难，这些案件将依赖外部考量，并会成为已经拥挤的案卷的一部分。

(...continued) that she attempted to request a stay from the DHS, or that such a request was denied by that agency. 7 The respondent also urges that the Board should reopen proceedings sua sponte based on a change in law. Matter of G-D-, 22 I&N Dec. 1132. However, because we do not find that the change at issue here, i.e., the 2006 regulations, conferred jurisdiction over the underlying application on the Board, this argument is not persuasive.

（...续） 她曾试图向DHS请求暂缓，或该请求被该机构拒绝。 7 答辩人还敦促委员会基于法律变化主动重新开启程序。Matter of G-D-, 22 I&N Dec. 1132。然而，由于我们不认为此处所涉的变化，即2006年法规，将底层申请的管辖权授予了委员会，该论点不具有说服力。

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of already-crowded dockets. Immigration Judges, for example, would be required to schedule and oversee matters over which they play no substantive role, because the cases would once again be on their docket. If the application is ultimately denied, the Immigration Judge is placed in the position of having to enter a further order or decision that simply sets forth information provided by others, assuming such information is actually provided to the Immigration Judge in a timely manner. There would be nothing to preclude the respondent from filing an appeal to the Board from such an order, unnecessarily adding to our pending case load, and despite the fact that we would have no review authority over aspects of that decision. When the matters are ones over which the Board and the Immigration Judges actually do have jurisdiction, these are simply the necessary “costs” of an adjudication system. But such is not the case if we are obliged to reopen proceedings while third parties resolve matters over which we have no direct or review authority. 8 Given our lack of jurisdiction over this category of adjustment applications, and because a process exists for requesting a stay from the DHS, the administrative and practical costs of reopening weigh heavily in our discretionary analysis. Thus, we will generally decline to exercise our discretion to reopen proceedings sua sponte under such circumstances. Matter of G-D-, 22 I&N Dec. at 1133-34 (recognizing that sua sponte authority is “an extraordinary remedy reserved for truly exceptional circumstances”); see also Matter of J-J-, 21 I&N Dec. 976. In sum, we conclude that we generally lack authority to reopen final exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings where an alien seeks to pursue relief over which neither the Board nor the Immigration Judge has jurisdiction. In addition, we find that the stay authority we have been granted by regulation

例如，移民法官将被要求安排和监督他们不发挥实质作用的案件，因为这些案件将再次出现在他们的案卷上。如果申请最终被拒绝，移民法官将处于不得不作出进一步命令或决定的位置，而该命令或决定只是陈述他人提供的信息，假设此类信息确实及时提供给移民法官。没有什么能阻止答辩人对此类命令向委员会提出上诉，不必要地增加我们的待决案件量，尽管我们对该决定各方面没有审查权。 当事项属于委员会和移民法官实际拥有管辖权的事项时，这些只是裁决系统的必要“成本”。但如果我们有义务在第三方解决我们无直接或审查权的事项时重新开启程序，情况就不是这样。8 鉴于我们对这类调整申请缺乏管辖权，并且存在向DHS请求暂缓的程序，重新开启的行政和实际成本在我们的裁量分析中权重很大。因此，在此类情况下，我们通常会拒绝行使裁量权主动重新开启程序。Matter of G-D-, 22 I&N Dec. at 1133-34（承认主动权限是“保留给真正特殊情况的特殊救济”）；另参见 Matter of J-J-, 21 I&N Dec. 976。 总之，我们得出结论，当外国人寻求寻求委员会和移民法官均无管辖权的救济时，我们通常缺乏权力重新开启最终排斥、驱逐或遣返程序。此外，我们认为，法规授予我们的暂缓权限

8 The “practical” concerns in ongoing proceedings that have not become final are fundamentally different. There can be sound reasons to continue or administratively close proceedings while matters outside the Immigration Judge’s jurisdiction are resolved, often including reasons directly related to administrative efficiency and the best utilization of adjudicative resources. See, e.g., Matter of Hashmi, 24 I&N Dec. 785 (BIA 2009) (setting forth considerations for granting a continuance when a family-based visa petition is pending before the USCIS). Further, the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security have solicited comments “on the standards for the granting of continuances to arriving aliens in removal proceedings while applications for adjustment of status are pending with USCIS.” 71 Fed. Reg. at 27,589 (Supplementary Information). Thus, while we acknowledge the arguments raised surrounding the question whether proceedings can or should be continued when an arriving alien’s adjustment application is pending with the USCIS, our decision in this case does not resolve that issue. Different considerations also may arise in the context of joint motions to reopen, where the parties are in agreement that the time limits should not apply to the motion to reopen and that proceedings should be reopened for agreed-upon purposes. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(iii).

8 尚未成为最终程序的进行中程序中的“实际”关切有根本不同。在移民法官管辖权之外的事项得到解决期间，继续或行政关闭程序可能有正当理由，通常包括与行政效率和裁决资源最佳利用直接相关的理由。参见，例如，Matter of Hashmi, 24 I&N Dec. 785 (BIA 2009)（列出在USCIS待决家庭类签证申请时准予延期的考虑因素）。此外，司法部长和国土安全部部长已就“在USCIS待决调整身份申请期间，准予到达外国人遣返程序延期的标准”征求评论。71 Fed. Reg. at 27,589（补充信息）。因此，虽然我们承认围绕在到达外国人的调整申请在USCIS待决时程序能否或应否继续的问题所提出的论点，但我们在本案中的决定不解决该问题。在联合重新开启动议的背景下也可能产生不同考虑，即双方一致同意时限不应适用于重新开启动议，且程序应为了商定目的而重新开启。8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(iii)。

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does not extend to granting reopening of proceedings in order to effectively grant a “stay” of an outstanding final order of exclusion, deportation, or removal while a matter over which we lack jurisdiction is resolved. Finally, we will not generally exercise our discretion to reopen proceedings sua sponte for an arriving alien to pursue an adjustment of status application before the USCIS. To do otherwise would place an arriving alien who files an untimely motion to reopen proceedings in a more favorable position than any other alien who files an untimely motion seeking adjustment of status and does not otherwise qualify for an exception to the time limits imposed on motions to reopen. In this case, the respondent has presented no exceptional circumstances, and her motion does not persuade us to sua sponte reopen these proceedings, which have been administratively final since December 2003, in order for her to pursue her application for adjustment before the USCIS. Matter of J-J-, 21 I&N Dec. 976. The respondent’s motion will therefore be denied as untimely filed.

不延伸至准予重新开启程序，以便在属于我们缺乏管辖权的事项得到解决期间，实际上准予“暂缓”未执行的最终排斥、驱逐或遣返命令。最后，我们通常不会行使裁量权主动重新开启程序，让到达外国人在USCIS寻求调整身份申请。否则，将使提交不及时重新开启程序动议的到达外国人处于比任何其他提交不及时寻求调整身份动议且不符合重新开启动议时限例外条件的其他外国人更有利的地位。 在本案中，答辩人未提出任何特殊情况，她的动议也未说服我们主动重新开启这些自2003年12月以来一直处于行政最终状态的程序，以便她在USCIS寻求其调整申请。Matter of J-J-, 21 I&N Dec. 976。因此，答辩人的动议将因不及时提交而被拒绝。

V.

V.

Having resolved the issues raised in the respondent’s motion to reopen, we turn, as a final matter, to the DHS’s motion to reopen and terminate these removal proceedings based on the USCIS’s grant of lawful permanent resident status to the respondent on February 25, 2009. As we noted earlier, it is not necessary to reopen or terminate proceedings in order to allow an alien to pursue an application for adjustment of status before the USCIS. The fact that the USCIS has, in fact, completed its adjudication of the respondent’s adjustment application—despite initially rejecting that application—and granted the respondent lawful permanent status while her motion was pending with the Board merely reinforces our determination that sua sponte reopening is not generally warranted. There is no indication that the DHS attempted to execute the removal order during that period of adjudication. However, the respondent could have sought a stay of her final removal order from the DHS, if it had been necessary. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.6(a), 1241.6(a). The respondent’s adjustment application has been processed as envisioned under the new regulations without resorting to reopening and “staying” the removal proceedings, and she has been granted the status for which she applied with the USCIS. Given these circumstances, reopening solely for termination of the proceedings is warranted and we will grant the DHS’s motion.

在解决了答辩人重新开放动议中提出的问题后，我们作为最后事项，转向国土安全部基于美国公民及移民服务局于2009年2月25日授予答辩人合法永久居民身份而提出的重新开放并终止这些遣返程序的动议。 正如我们先前所指出的，无需重新开放或终止程序即可允许外国人向美国公民及移民服务局寻求调整身份申请。美国公民及移民服务局事实上已完成对答辩人调整身份申请的裁决——尽管最初驳回了该申请——并在其动议尚待委员会审理期间授予答辩人合法永久身份，这一事实仅仅强化了我们的认定，即通常不应依职权重新开放。没有迹象表明国土安全部在该裁决期间试图执行遣返令。然而，如有必要，答辩人本可向国土安全部寻求中止其最终遣返令。 见8 C.F.R. §§ 241.6(a), 1241.6(a)。答辩人的调整身份申请已按照新法规所设想的方式得到处理，而无需诉诸重新开放和“中止”遣返程序，且她已获得其向美国公民及移民服务局申请的身份。鉴于这些情况，仅为终止程序而重新开放是有正当理由的，我们将批准国土安全部的动议。

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ORDER: The respondent’s motion to reopen is denied. FURTHER ORDER: The motion of the Department of Homeland Security to reopen and terminate is granted, and these removal proceedings are terminated.

命令：答辩人的重新开放动议被驳回。 进一步命令：国土安全部重新开放并终止的动议被批准，这些遣返程序予以终止。

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