Administrative precedent · Humanitarian relief

Matter of Pilch

21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996)

美国司法部移民审查执行办公室移民上诉委员会(Board of Immigration Appeals,全体审理)7 original pages

A Polish husband and wife who overstayed sought suspension of deportation, claiming extreme hardship to themselves and their three U.S. citizen children. The Board of Immigration Appeals, sitting en banc, held that ordinary economic detriment, loss of employment, reduced living standards, family separation, and cultural readjustment are normal consequences of deportation and did not establish extreme hardship, and dismissed the appeal.

Rule cited

Extreme hardship is not a term of fixed and inflexible meaning and depends on the facts of each case; ordinary economic detriment, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's standard of living or pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, cultural readjustment, and the adjustment, educational, and medical disadvantages faced by a U.S. citizen child relocating with parents do not constitute extreme hardship; the alien must show significant hardship over and above the normal economic and social disruptions of deportation.

Scope of application

Applies to the extreme hardship determination for suspension of deportation under section 244(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act; that relief was replaced by cancellation of removal under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, whose new provisions were not yet effective and did not apply to this case.

Official citation and verification records

Checked:2026-11-04 · Official decision source

The records identify official use of the cited rule. A partial reversal, statutory amendment or controlling court ruling may affect its scope.

Complete reference translation, organized by original page and paragraph. Headings, citations and footnotes are retained. The English document is the official text.

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In re Stanislaw PILCH, Respondent In re Sofia PILCH, Respondent

关于Stanislaw PILCH,被申请人 关于Sofia PILCH,被申请人

File A29 603 414 - Sneads File A29 603 413

案卷A29 603 414 - Sneads 案卷A29 603 413

Decided December 3, 1996

1996年12月3日裁定

U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals

美国司法部 移民审查执行办公室 移民上诉委员会

The respondents, husband and wife, failed to show, either individually or cumulatively, fac- tors which demonstrate extreme hardship over and above the normal economic and social dis- ruptions involved in deportation to themselves or to their three United States citizen children in order to establish suspension of deportation under section 244(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1994).

被申请人(夫妻二人)未能单独或累积地证明存在超出驱逐出境对其本人或其三名美国公民子女通常涉及的经济和社会动荡的极端困难因素,以依据《移民与国籍法》第244(a)条、8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1994)确立暂停驱逐出境。

FOR RESPONDENTS: Christopher Buchcar, Esquire, Chicago, Illinois

被申请人代理律师:Christopher Buchcar,Esquire,伊利诺伊州芝加哥

FOR THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE: Joseph M. Yeung, Gen- eral Attorney

移民和归化局代理律师:Joseph M. Yeung,总检察长

BEFORE: Board En Banc: SCHMIDT, Chairman; DUNNE, Vice Chairman; VACCA, HEILMAN, HOLMES, HURWITZ, VILLAGELIU, FILPPU, COLE, MATHON, ROSENBERG, and GUENDELSBERGER, Board Members.

审理法官:全体委员会:SCHMIDT,主席;DUNNE,副主席;VACCA、HEILMAN、HOLMES、HURWITZ、VILLAGELIU、FILPPU、COLE、MATHON、ROSENBERG和GUENDELSBERGER,委员会成员。

MATHON, Board Member:

MATHON,委员会成员:

In a decision dated January 10, 1995, an Immigration Judge found the respondents deportable as charged under section 241(a)(1)(B) of the Immi- gration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(B) (1994), as aliens who remained in the United States for a time longer than permitted, denied their applications for suspension of deportation under section 244(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1994) 1 , but granted their application for voluntary

在1995年1月10日的决定中,一名移民法官认定被申请人依据《移民与国籍法》第241(a)(1)(B)条、8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(B) (1994)作为在美停留超过许可期限的外国人而应被驱逐出境,驳回了他们依据该法第244(a)条、8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1994) 1 提出的暂停驱逐出境申请,但批准了他们的自愿

1 We note that Congress has recently eliminated the relief of suspension of deportation under section 244(a) of the Act and substituted a similar remedy, cancellation of removal, under section 240A(b) of the Act (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)). Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C of Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 304(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-587 (“IIRIRA”). The new provisions for cancellation of removal are effective on April 1, 1997, and are not applicable to these proceedings. IIRIRA § 309(a), 110 Stat. at 3009-625.

1 我们注意到,国会最近取消了该法第244(a)条下的暂停驱逐出境救济,并以该法第240A(b)条(将编入8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b))下的类似救济——取消驱逐出境——取而代之。1996年《非法移民改革和移民责任法》,Pub. L. No. 104-208第C部分,§ 304(a),110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-587(“IIRIRA”)。取消驱逐出境的新规定于1997年4月1日生效,不适用于本程序。IIRIRA § 309(a),110 Stat. at 3009-625。

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departure under section 244(e) of the Act. The respondents have appealed from that decision. The appeal will be dismissed.

离境申请,依据该法第244(e)条。被申请人对该决定提出上诉。上诉将被驳回。

I. BACKGROUND

I. 背景

The respondents, husband and wife, are both 36-year-old natives and citi- zens of Poland. The male respondent entered the United States on January 5, 1986, and the female respondent entered the United States on April 25, 1987, both as visitors for pleasure and both authorized to remain in the United States for 6 months. On May 21, 1993, the Immigration and Naturalization Service served each respondent with an Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing (Form I-221), charging them with deportability as nonimmigrants who remained in the United States longer than permitted. The respondents, through counsel, conceded deportability. Thereafter, at a hearing held on Jan- uary 10, 1995, the respondents presented evidence in support of their applica- tions for suspension of deportation. The male respondent testified that he currently lives with his wife and their three United States citizen children. He testified that their oldest son is living in Poland with his wife’s mother. He testified that he has not departed the United States since 1985. He also testified at length regarding his employment. He indicated that he worked as a cabinetmaker before becom- ing a partner in a construction company in 1993. He stated that his business employs 13 people full-time. He also indicated that he owns a $117,000 home (mortgage) and a car. The male respondent further testified that his deportation to Poland would cause hardship to him as well as to his family. He indicated that he is the sole support for his three United States citizen children. He conceded that his chil- dren speak Polish. He also indicated that his brother and sister reside in the United States as lawful permanent residents. He further testified to his involvement with his church and social club. The female respondent testified that she has never been employed and that her husband was the sole financial provider of their family. She testified to the hardship her children would face if they were to return to Poland with her and her husband. She indicated that it would be difficult for the children to acclimate to life in Poland because they were learning English and because their friends were in the United States. She further testified that she and her husband would face hardship if they were deported. She indicated that in Poland it would be hard to find a job and that housing was very expensive. The male respondent’s brother, a lawful permanent resident, testified to the respondents’ good moral character. He also indicated that the respon- dents’ children speak both English and Polish. The male respondent’s sister, a lawful permanent resident, also testified to the respondents’ good moral character. She indicated that she helped her brother when he first arrived in this country. She further testified that their

被申请人(夫妻二人)均为36岁的波兰国民和公民。男性被申请人于1986年1月5日进入美国,女性被申请人于1987年4月25日进入美国,二人均以游客身份入境,均获准在美国停留6个月。1993年5月21日,移民和归化局向每位被申请人送达了出庭通知和听证通知(表格I-221),指控他们作为非移民在美停留超过许可期限而应被驱逐出境。被申请人通过律师承认可被驱逐出境。此后,在1995年1月10日举行的听证会上,被申请人提交了支持其暂停驱逐出境申请的证据。 男性被申请人作证称,他目前与妻子及其三名美国公民子女同住。他作证称,他们的长子与妻子的母亲住在波兰。他作证称,自1985年以来他未曾离开美国。他还详细作证了其就业情况。他表示,在1993年成为一家建筑公司的合伙人之前,他曾是一名橱柜制造商。他称其企业雇用了13名全职员工。他还表示,他拥有一套价值117,000美元的房屋(有抵押贷款)和一辆汽车。 男性被申请人进一步作证称,将其驱逐至波兰将给他及其家庭造成困难。他表示,他是三名美国公民子女的唯一抚养人。他承认其子女会说波兰语。他还表示,他的兄弟和姐妹作为合法永久居民居住在美国。他进一步作证称其参与教会和社交俱乐部活动。 女性被申请人作证称,她从未就业,其丈夫是家庭的唯一经济来源。她作证称,如果子女随她和丈夫返回波兰,他们将面临困难。她表示,子女将难以适应波兰的生活,因为他们正在学习英语,且他们的朋友在美国。她进一步作证称,如果她和丈夫被驱逐出境,他们将面临困难。她表示,在波兰很难找到工作,且住房非常昂贵。 男性被申请人的兄弟(合法永久居民)作证称被申请人品行良好。他还表示,被申请人的子女会说英语和波兰语。 男性被申请人的姐妹(合法永久居民)也作证称被申请人品行良好。她表示,她在其兄弟初到美国时帮助过他。她进一步作证称,他们的

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mother and two siblings were living in Poland, and that she still helps them out financially. A friend of the male respondent testified that he and the male respondent were partners in a construction business. He further expressed his belief that the respondents would face hardship if they were returned to Poland. In support of their testimony, the respondents also provided documentary evidence. The record contains, inter alia, copies of their tax returns, closing documents regarding the purchase of their home, a certificate of title for their car, and copies of various business documents regarding the male respon- dent’s business.

母亲和两名兄弟姐妹住在波兰,她仍在经济上帮助他们。 男性被申请人的一位朋友作证称,他与男性被申请人是建筑业务合伙人。他进一步表示,他认为如果被申请人返回波兰,他们将面临困难。 为支持其证词,被申请人还提供了书面证据。记录中包含(除其他外)他们的纳税申报表副本、购买房屋的成交文件、汽车所有权证书以及有关男性被申请人业务的各种商业文件副本。

II. THE IMMIGRATION JUDGE’S DECISION

II. 移民法官的决定

In his decision, the Immigration Judge found that the respondents had not demonstrated statutory eligibility for suspension of deportation, inasmuch as they had not demonstrated that their return to Poland would create extreme hardship to themselves or to their United States citizen children. However, he granted their requests for voluntary departure.

在其决定中,移民法官认定被申请人未证明符合暂停驱逐出境的法定资格,因为他们未证明返回波兰将对其本人或其美国公民子女造成极端困难。然而,他批准了他们的自愿离境请求。

III. ISSUE ON APPEAL

III. 上诉问题

In their Notice of Appeal (Form EOIR-26) and appellate brief, the respon- dents argue that the Immigration Judge failed to give proper weight to the evidence presented. The respondents assert that their request is based not only on economic hardship, but also on strong family ties in the United States. Thus, the issue is whether the respondents in this case have demon- strated that their deportation would cause extreme hardship to themselves or to their United States citizen children.

在其上诉通知(表格EOIR-26)和上诉状中,被申请人主张移民法官未对提交的证据给予适当权重。被申请人声称,其请求不仅基于经济困难,还基于在美国的牢固家庭关系。因此,问题是被申请人在本案中是否证明其驱逐出境将对其本人或其美国公民子女造成极端困难。

IV. SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION

IV. 暂停驱逐出境

Aliens applying for suspension of deportation bear the burden of estab- lishing statutory eligibility for the relief as well as showing that they warrant a favorable exercise of discretion. See section 244(a)(1) of the Act. In order to establish statutory eligibility, aliens must prove that they have been physi- cally present in the United States for a continuous period of at least 7 years, that they have been persons of good moral character during such period, and that their deportation would result in extreme hardship to themselves or to their spouse, parent, or child who is a citizen or lawful permanent resident of the United States. Id. We agree with the Immigration Judge’s finding that the male respondent has met the continuous physical presence requirement necessary for suspen- sion of deportation. 2 We further agree that the respondents have met the good

申请暂停驱逐出境的外国人承担证明符合该救济法定资格的责任,并须表明他们值得行使有利的自由裁量权。见该法第244(a)(1)条。为确立法定资格,外国人必须证明他们已在美国连续实际居住至少7年,在此期间品行良好,且其驱逐出境将对其本人或其配偶、父母或身为美国公民或合法永久居民的子女造成极端困难。同上。 我们同意移民法官的认定,即男性被申请人已满足暂停驱逐出境所需的连续实际居住要求。2 我们还同意被申请人已满足良

2 With respect to the female respondent’s continuous physical presence, we need not interpret the effect of section 240A(d)(1) of the Act (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)),

2 关于女性被申请人的连续实际居住,我们无需解释该法第240A(d)(1)条(将编入8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1))的效力,

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moral character requirement. However, we find that they have failed to dem- onstrate that their deportation would cause extreme hardship to themselves or to their United States citizen children. Extreme hardship is not a definable term of fixed and inflexible meaning, and the elements to establish extreme hardship are dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case. See Matter of Chumpitazi, 16 I&N Dec. 629 (BIA 1978); Matter of Kim, 15 I&N Dec. 88 (BIA 1974); Matter of Sangster, 11 I&N Dec. 309 (BIA 1965). However, the Board has enunciated factors relevant to the issue of the extreme hardship determination. These factors include: the length of the alien’s presence over the minimum requirement of 7 years; the alien’s age, both at entry and at the time of application for relief; the presence of lawful permanent resident or United States citizen family ties to this country; the alien’s family ties outside the United States; the condi- tions in the country or countries to which the alien is returnable and the extent of the alien’s ties to such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the alien will return; and, lastly, the possibility of other means of adjustment of status or future entry into this country. Matter of Anderson, 16 I&N Dec. 596 (BIA 1978). The Supreme Court has indicated that a narrow interpretation of the phrase “extreme hardship” is consistent with the exceptional nature of suspension relief. INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981); see also Hernandez- Cordero v. INS, 819 F.2d 558 (5th Cir. 1987); Ramirez-Durazo v. INS, 794 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1986); Bu Roe v. INS, 771 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1985). Nonetheless, as we stated in Matter of L-O-G-, 21 I&N Dec. 413 (BIA 1996), a restrictive view of extreme hardship is not mandated either by the Supreme Court or by our published case law. Even applying a flexible approach to extreme hardship, our finding that the respondents have not demonstrated extreme hardship to themselves or to their United States citizen children resulting from their deportation to Poland is consistent with our published case law.

好品行要求。然而,我们认定他们未能证明其驱逐出境将对其本人或其美国公民子女造成极端困难。 极端困难并非一个具有固定和僵化含义的可定义术语,确立极端困难的要素取决于每个案件的事实和情况。见Matter of Chumpitazi,16 I&N Dec. 629(BIA 1978);Matter of Kim,15 I&N Dec. 88(BIA 1974);Matter of Sangster,11 I&N Dec. 309(BIA 1965)。然而,委员会已阐明了与极端困难认定问题相关的因素。这些因素包括:外国人在超过7年最低要求之外的停留时间;外国人在入境时和申请救济时的年龄;在美国存在合法永久居民或美国公民家庭关系;外国人在美国境外的家庭关系;外国人可返回的国家的情况及外国人与这些国家的联系程度;离开美国的经济影响;重大健康状况,特别是当与外国人将返回的国家缺乏适当医疗服务相关时;以及最后,其他调整身份或未来进入美国途径的可能性。Matter of Anderson,16 I&N Dec. 596(BIA 1978)。 最高法院已指出,对“极端困难”一词的狭义解释符合暂停救济的例外性质。INS v. Jong Ha Wang,450 U.S. 139(1981);另见Hernandez-Cordero v. INS,819 F.2d 558(5th Cir. 1987);Ramirez-Durazo v. INS,794 F.2d 491(9th Cir. 1986);Bu Roe v. INS,771 F.2d 1328(9th Cir. 1985)。尽管如此,正如我们在Matter of L-O-G-,21 I&N Dec. 413(BIA 1996)中所言,最高法院或我们已公布的判例法均未强制要求对极端困难采取限制性观点。即使对极端困难采用灵活方法,我们认定被申请人未证明因被驱逐至波兰而对其本人或其美国公民子女造成极端困难,这与我们已公布的判例法一致。

A. Respondents - extreme hardship

A. 被申请人——极端困难

Turning specifically to the respondents’ claim of extreme hardship, we find the testimony and evidence insufficient to demonstrate that their depor- tation would cause extreme hardship to themselves. The respondents’ claims are largely based on the general economic conditions of Poland and not on any condition or circumstance unique to them. Although economic factors are relevant in any analysis of extreme hardship, economic detriment alone is insufficient to support a finding of extreme hardship within the meaning of

具体转向被申请人的极端困难主张,我们认定证词和证据不足以证明其驱逐出境将对其本人造成极端困难。被申请人的主张主要基于波兰的一般经济状况,而非任何其特有的条件或情况。尽管经济因素在任何极端困难分析中均相关,但仅经济损害不足以支持在……含义内认定极端困难

which was added by section 304(a) of the IIRIRA, 110 Stat. at 3009-587, since we are denying the claims of both respondents on the basis of their failure to establish extreme hardship.

该条由IIRIRA第304(a)条添加,110 Stat. at 3009-587,因为我们基于两名被调查人均未能证明极端困难而驳回其请求。

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section 244(a) of the Act. Palmer v. INS, 4 F.3d 482, 488 (7th Cir. 1993); Mejia-Carrillo v. United States INS, 656 F.2d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1981); Mat- ter of O-J-O-, 21 I&N Dec. 381 (BIA 1996); Matter of Ige, 20 I&N Dec. 880 (BIA 1994). Moreover, the mere loss of current employment, the inability to maintain one’s present standard of living or to pursue a chosen profession, separation from a family member, or cultural readjustment do not constitute extreme hardship. See Marquez-Medina v. INS, 765 F.2d 673 (7th Cir. 1985); Bueno-Carrillo v. Landon, 682 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1982); Chokloikaew v. INS, 601 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1979); Banks v. INS, 594 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1979); Matter of Anderson, supra; Matter of Kojoory, 12 I&N Dec. 215 (BIA 1967). The male respondent’s claim of difficulty in finding employment and inability to find employment in his trade or profession, although a relevant factor, is not sufficient to justify a grant of relief in the absence of other sub- stantial equities. See Hernandez-Patino v. INS, 831 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1987); Santana-Figueroa v. INS, 644 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981); Matter of Ander- son, supra. The additional factors needed to combine with economic detri- ment in order to characterize the hardship as extreme are missing in this case. The record indicates that the male respondent possesses characteristics which should help him find work in his homeland. Specifically, he is 36 years old, skilled, healthy, and physically able to maintain employment. We note that he worked as a carpenter in Poland. Moreover, the loss of his business, although unfortunate, does not entail extreme economic hardship, but, instead, is a normal occurrence when an alien is deported. See Marquez- Medina v. INS, supra (holding that the loss on sale of a home and loss of pres- ent employment and its benefits did not constitute extreme hardship, but were normal occurrences of deportation). In any case, there is minimal evidence that he would be unable to recoup his investment in the business he and his partner established in 1993. Furthermore, the male respondent in this case, unlike the respondent in Matter of O-J-O-, supra, has not spent most of his life in the United States (he arrived in this country as an adult, age 25) and will not return to a country where economic and political conditions are difficult. Finally, emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation. See INS v. Jong Ha Wang, supra; Marquez-Medina v. INS, supra. Although we recognize that the male respon- dent has spent 11 years in the United States and the female respondent 9 years, we note that their return to Poland will reunite them with their son, both their mothers, the female respondent’s father, and their siblings. The record further reflects that their numerous family members in Poland may be able to provide an emotional base during their time of readjustment. See Kuciemba v. INS, 92 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 1996). Thus, we find that the respon- dents failed to establish extreme hardship to themselves which would result from their deportation to Poland.

该法第244(a)条。Palmer v. INS, 4 F.3d 482, 488 (7th Cir. 1993);Mejia-Carrillo v. United States INS, 656 F.2d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1981);Matter of O-J-O-, 21 I&N Dec. 381 (BIA 1996);Matter of Ige, 20 I&N Dec. 880 (BIA 1994)。此外,仅仅失去当前工作、无法维持现有生活水平或无法从事所选职业、与家庭成员分离或文化上的重新适应,均不构成极端困难。See Marquez-Medina v. INS, 765 F.2d 673 (7th Cir. 1985);Bueno-Carrillo v. Landon, 682 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1982);Chokloikaew v. INS, 601 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1979);Banks v. INS, 594 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1979);Matter of Anderson, supra;Matter of Kojoory, 12 I&N Dec. 215 (BIA 1967)。 男性被调查人关于难以找到工作以及无法在其行业或职业中找到工作的主张,虽然是一个相关因素,但在缺乏其他实质性衡平因素的情况下,不足以证明给予救济的正当性。See Hernandez-Patino v. INS, 831 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1987);Santana-Figueroa v. INS, 644 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981);Matter of Anderson, supra。本案中缺少将经济损害与其它因素结合以将困难定性为极端困难所需的额外因素。 记录表明,男性被调查人具备应有助于其在本国找到工作的特征。具体而言,他36岁,有技能,健康,且身体上能够维持就业。我们注意到他曾在波兰做过木匠。此外,其生意的损失虽然不幸,但并不带来极端经济困难,而是外国人被驱逐出境时的一种正常现象。See Marquez-Medina v. INS, supra(裁定出售房屋的损失以及失去当前工作及其福利不构成极端困难,而是驱逐出境的正常现象)。无论如何,几乎没有证据表明他无法收回其与合伙人在1993年所建立生意中的投资。此外,本案中的男性被调查人与Matter of O-J-O-, supra中的被调查人不同,他并未在美国度过其一生的大部分时间(他成年后25岁来到美国),也不会回到一个经济和政治状况困难的国家。 最后,因切断家庭和社区联系而造成的情感困难是驱逐出境的常见结果。See INS v. Jong Ha Wang, supra;Marquez-Medina v. INS, supra。尽管我们认识到男性被调查人已在美国度过11年,女性被调查人已度过9年,但我们注意到他们返回波兰将使他们与儿子、双方的母亲、女性被调查人的父亲以及他们的兄弟姐妹团聚。记录进一步反映,他们在波兰的众多家庭成员可能在其重新适应期间提供情感基础。See Kuciemba v. INS, 92 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 1996)。因此,我们认定被调查人未能证明其被驱逐至波兰将对其自身造成极端困难。

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B. United States citizen children - extreme hardship

B. 美国公民子女——极端困难

With respect to the extreme hardship to the respondents’ United States cit- izen children, we note that this is an important factor which must receive close attention in evaluating a suspension claim. Casem v. INS, 8 F.3d 700 (9th Cir. 1993). However, although we find that there will be hardship to the children in the event of their parents’ deportation, we do not find that it rises to the level of extreme hardship as required under section 244(a)(1) of the Act. We initially note that the fact that an alien has a United States citizen child does not of itself justify suspension of deportation. See Israel v. INS, 710 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984); Diaz-Salazar v. INS, 700 F.2d 1156 (7th Cir), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983); see also Bueno-Carrillo v. Landon, supra; Balani v. INS, 669 F.2d 1157 (6th Cir. 1982); Ayala-Flores v. INS, 662 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1981); Banks v. INS, supra; Davidson v. INS, 558 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1977); Matter of Kim, 15 I&N Dec. 88 (BIA 1974). An alien illegally in the United States does not gain a favored status by the birth of a child in this country. Ramirez-Durazo v. INS, supra; Marquez-Medina v. INS, supra; Bueno-Carillo v. Landon, supra. Even though the child may face difficulties adjusting to life in his parent’s homeland, these problems do not materially differ from those encountered by other children who relocate with their parents, especially at a young age. Marquez-Medina v. INS, supra. The fact that economic and educational opportunities for the child are better in the United States than in the alien’s homeland does not establish extreme hardship. Matter of Kim, supra; see also Ramirez-Durazo v. INS, supra (stating that the disadvantage of reduced educational opportunities is insufficient to constitute extreme hardship). Finally, the fact that medical facilities in the alien’s homeland may not be as good as they are in this country does not establish extreme hardship to the child. Matter of Correa, 19 I&N Dec. 130 (BIA 1984). With respect to hardship to the children, we are unpersuaded by the evi- dence of record that they would suffer unique or severe hardship if they were to depart the United States with their parents. The oldest child is 6 years old. The other children are 5 and 4 years old. All three children have been exposed to the Polish language by their parents. There is no evidence that the children suffer from any physical or mental disabilities. Moreover, there is no evi- dence that they would be deprived of educational opportunities if they go to Poland. We also note that the children will have a strong support system of family members when they arrive in Poland, including a brother, grandpar- ents, uncles, and aunts. On this record, we do not find that the children would suffer extreme hardship if they were to reside in Poland with their parents. With respect to the children remaining in the United States without their parents, no evidence was presented. We note, however, that any hardship the children might face if they remain in this country is the result of parental

关于对被调查人的美国公民子女造成的极端困难,我们注意到这是一个在评估暂停驱逐请求时必须密切关注的重要因素。Casem v. INS, 8 F.3d 700 (9th Cir. 1993)。然而,尽管我们认定若其父母被驱逐出境,子女将遭受困难,但我们不认为该困难达到该法第244(a)(1)条所要求的极端困难程度。 我们首先注意到,外国人拥有美国公民子女这一事实本身并不证明暂停驱逐的正当性。See Israel v. INS, 710 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984);Diaz-Salazar v. INS, 700 F.2d 1156 (7th Cir), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983);see also Bueno-Carrillo v. Landon, supra;Balani v. INS, 669 F.2d 1157 (6th Cir. 1982);Ayala-Flores v. INS, 662 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1981);Banks v. INS, supra;Davidson v. INS, 558 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1977);Matter of Kim, 15 I&N Dec. 88 (BIA 1974)。非法在美国的外国人不会因子女在美国出生而获得优先地位。Ramirez-Durazo v. INS, supra;Marquez-Medina v. INS, supra;Bueno-Carillo v. Landon, supra。 即使子女可能面临适应其父母本国生活的困难,这些问题与其他随父母搬迁的子女——尤其是在年幼时——所遇到的问题并无实质不同。Marquez-Medina v. INS, supra。子女在美国的经济和教育机会优于该外国人本国这一事实并不构成极端困难。Matter of Kim, supra;see also Ramirez-Durazo v. INS, supra(指出教育机会减少的不利不足以构成极端困难)。 最后,该外国人本国的医疗设施可能不如美国这一事实并不构成对子女的极端困难。Matter of Correa, 19 I&N Dec. 130 (BIA 1984)。 关于对子女的困难,我们未被记录中的证据所说服,即若他们随父母离开美国将遭受独特或严重的困难。最大的孩子6岁。其他孩子分别为5岁和4岁。三个孩子都通过父母接触过波兰语。没有证据表明子女患有任何身体或精神残疾。此外,没有证据表明他们若前往波兰将被剥夺教育机会。我们还注意到,子女抵达波兰后将拥有强大的家庭成员支持系统,包括一名兄弟、祖父母、叔伯和姑姨。基于此记录,我们不认为子女若与父母居住在波兰将遭受极端困难。 关于子女留在美国而不与父母同住,未提交任何证据。然而,我们注意到,子女若留在美国可能面临的任何困难都是父母

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choice, and not their parents’ deportation. Matter of Ige, supra. We also note that, if the children remain in the United States, they will continue to have family support (uncles, aunts, and cousins).

选择的结果,而非其父母被驱逐出境的结果。Matter of Ige, supra。我们还注意到,若子女留在美国,他们将继续拥有家庭支持(叔伯、姑姨和表兄弟姐妹)。

V. CONCLUSION

V. 结论

We find, for all the foregoing reasons, that the respondents failed to show, either individually or cumulatively, factors which demonstrate extreme hard- ship to themselves or to their United States citizen children. We recognize that the respondents have established themselves in this country. However, they have done so while they were not in lawful immigration status. Congress has required that they establish extreme hardship either to themselves or to their United States citizen children in order to avail themselves of suspension of deportation. Thus, in the final analysis, we find that the requirement of sig- nificant hardships over and above the normal economic and social disrup- tions involved in deportation has not been met in order to warrant a finding of extreme hardship. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed. ORDER: The respondents’ appeal is dismissed. FURTHER ORDER: Pursuant to the Immigration Judge’s order and in accordance with our decision in Matter of Chouliaris, 16 I&N Dec. 168 (BIA 1977), the respondents are permitted to depart from the United States voluntarily within 30 days from the date of this order or any extension beyond that time as may be granted by the district director; and in the event of failure so to depart, the respondents shall be deported as provided in the Immigration Judge’s order.

基于上述所有理由,我们认定被调查人未能单独或累积地证明表明对其自身或其美国公民子女造成极端困难的因素。我们认识到被调查人已在美国立足。然而,他们是在不具有合法移民身份的情况下做到这一点的。国会要求他们证明对其自身或其美国公民子女造成极端困难,才能利用暂停驱逐。因此,归根结底,我们认定,为证明极端困难,超过驱逐出境所涉正常经济和社会扰乱的重要困难要求未得到满足。据此,上诉将被驳回。 命令: 被调查人的上诉被驳回。 进一步命令: 根据移民法官的命令,并依照我们在Matter of Chouliaris, 16 I&N Dec. 168 (BIA 1977)中的裁决,被调查人获准自本命令之日起30日内或地区局长可能批准的延长期限内自愿离开美国;若未能如此离开,被调查人应按照移民法官的命令被驱逐出境。

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