Matter of R-S-J-

Decided June 10, 1999

1999年6月10日裁定

U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals

美国司法部 移民审查执行办公室 移民上诉委员会

In a decision dated May 17, 1996, the Immigration Judge denied the respondent’s applications for suspension of deportation and voluntary departure. 1 The Immigration Judge found that the respondent could not establish that he had been a person of good moral character for the requisite statutory periods because he found that the respondent had provided false testimony in the course of his earlier interview with an asylum officer of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The respondent appeals. The issue raised by the respondent is whether false oral statements made under oath to an asylum officer can constitute “false testimony” under section 101(f)(6) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6) (1994), as defined by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth

在1996年5月17日的一项决定中，移民法官驳回了被申请人关于暂停驱逐和自愿离境的申请。1 移民法官认定，被申请人无法证明其在法定所需期间内一直是品行良好的人，因为其认定被申请人在早先与移民与归化局庇护官员的面谈过程中提供了虚假证言。被申请人提出上诉。被申请人提出的问题是，在宣誓下向庇护官员作出的虚假口头陈述，是否可以构成《移民与国籍法》第101(f)(6)条，8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6) (1994)所指的、由美国联邦第九巡回

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Circuit. The respondent contends that they do not because the asylum offi- cer is not a “tribunal.” We reject this argument and hold that false state- ments under oath to an asylum officer can constitute false testimony for pur- poses of section 101(f)(6) of the Act. The appeal will therefore be dis- missed. However, because it is not clear whether the false statements admit- ted to in this case were made under oath, the record will be remanded.

上诉法院所界定的“虚假证言”。被申请人主张它们不构成，因为庇护官员不是“法庭”。我们驳回这一论点，并裁定在宣誓下向庇护官员作出的虚假陈述可以构成本法第101(f)(6)条所指的虚假证言。因此，上诉将被驳回。然而，由于尚不清楚本案中被承认的虚假陈述是否是在宣誓下作出的，案件记录将被发回重审。

I. FACTS

I. 事实

The relevant facts of this case are straightforward and not in dispute. The respondent filed an Application for Asylum and Withholding of Deportation (Form I-589) with the San Francisco Asylum Office of the Service on October 18, 1995. The application was prepared by another individual. The respondent admitted that he signed the application, after it had been mailed to him in New York, knowing that it was false, “because he told me that under this made up story is [sic] many cases he has filed and they had been successful.” On November 29, 1995, the respondent appeared in San Francisco for an interview on the application before an asylum officer. When questioned about the facts related on the application, the respondent answered according to the false story provid- ed to him. The respondent later admitted to the Immigration Judge that the story he related to the asylum officer “was false.” The asylum officer did not testify before the Immigration Judge regarding what transpired at the interview, and no written record of the interview was presented to the Immigration Judge. The respondent has not alleged that he was not put under oath by the asylum officer, but there is no affirmative evidence that an oath was administered.

本案的相关事实简单明了且无争议。被申请人于1995年10月18日向移民局旧金山庇护办公室提交了庇护和暂缓驱逐申请表（I-589表）。该申请由另一人准备。被申请人承认，他在申请被邮寄到纽约给他之后签署了该申请，明知其是虚假的，“因为他告诉我，在这个编造的故事下，他已经提交了许多案件，而且都成功了。”1995年11月29日，被申请人在旧金山出席了一次由庇护官员主持的关于该申请的面谈。当被问及申请中所述的事实时，被申请人按照提供给他的虚假故事作答。被申请人后来向移民法官承认，他向庇护官员讲述的故事“是虚假的”。庇护官员未就面谈中所发生的情况向移民法官作证，也未向移民法官提交面谈的书面记录。被申请人未声称庇护官员未让其宣誓，但没有肯定性证据表明曾进行宣誓。

II. THE “FALSE TESTIMONY” BAR TO FINDING GOOD MORAL CHARACTER

II. 认定品行良好的“虚假证言”障碍

An alien applying for suspension of deportation bears the burden of establishing statutory eligibility for the relief as well as showing that he warrants a favorable exercise of discretion. See section 244(a)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1994). To be statutorily eligible for suspension of deportation, an alien seeking relief must show that he has been physically

申请暂停驱逐的外国人负有证明法定救济资格以及表明其值得行使有利自由裁量权的举证责任。见本法第244(a)(1)条，8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1994)。要具备暂停驱逐的法定资格，寻求救济的外国人必须表明其在

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present in the United States for a continuous period of not less that 7 years immediately preceding the date of such application; 2 that during such peri- od he was and is a person of good moral character; and that deportation would result in extreme hardship to the alien or his spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for per- manent residence. Id. Section 101(f)(6) of the Act states that “[n]o person shall be regarded as, or found to be, a person of good moral character who . . . has given false testimony for the purpose of obtaining any benefit under this Act.” This provision of the Act has been the subject of numerous judicial and administrative decisions. The Supreme Court has held that section 101(f)(6) of the Act does not impose a materiality requirement for false testimony, but noted that such testimony “is limited to oral statements made under oath . . . with the subjective intent of obtaining immigration benefits.” Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 780 (1988). Hence, false statements which appear in an application, even if the application bears a statement of oath, do not constitute testimony within the meaning of section 101(f)(6) of the Act. Matter of L-D-E-, 8 I&N Dec. 399 (BIA 1959). However, where false statements are uttered orally under oath, they have been held to constitute false testimony within the meaning of section 101(f)(6) of the Act. See, e.g., Matter of Barcenas, 19 I&N Dec. 609, 612 (BIA 1988) (false statements at deportation hearing). Moreover, it has long been held that such statements need not be uttered in administrative or judicial proceedings, but can include statements made under oath to government officials, including Service officers and consular officials. Matter of Namio, 14 I&N Dec. 412, 414 (BIA 1973) (false statement under oath to a border patrol agent); see also, e.g., Liwanag v. INS, 872 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1989) (“false testimony” to a Service officer during an investigation); United States v. Baumann, 764 F. Supp. 1335 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (“false testimony” both in application for a visa at an American consulate and in an application for citizenship); United States v. Koziy, 540 F. Supp. 25 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (same); Matter of Ngan, 10 I&N Dec. 725 (BIA 1964) (“false testimony” to a Service officer in connection with processing a visa petition); Matter of G-L-T-, 8 I&N Dec. 403 (BIA 1959) (“false testimony” to a Service officer in connection with an application

申请之日紧接之前的连续不少于7年期间实际居住在美国；2 在该期间内其曾是并且是品行良好的人；以及驱逐将导致该外国人或其配偶、父母或子女（其为美国公民或合法获准永久居留的外国人）遭受极端困难。同上。 本法第101(f)(6)条规定，“任何人……为获得本法项下任何利益而提供虚假证言的，不得被视为或被认定为品行良好的人。”本法的这一规定已成为众多司法和行政决定的主题。最高法院裁定，本法第101(f)(6)条不对虚假证言施加实质性要求，但指出此类证言“限于在宣誓下作出的口头陈述……且具有获得移民利益的主观意图。”Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 780 (1988)。因此，出现在申请中的虚假陈述，即使申请载有宣誓声明，也不构成本法第101(f)(6)条所指的证言。Matter of L-D-E-, 8 I&N Dec. 399 (BIA 1959)。然而，在宣誓下口头作出的虚假陈述，已被认定构成本法第101(f)(6)条所指的虚假证言。见，例如，Matter of Barcenas, 19 I&N Dec. 609, 612 (BIA 1988)（驱逐听证会上的虚假陈述）。此外，长期以来一直认定此类陈述无需在行政或司法程序中作出，而可以包括在宣誓下向政府官员（包括移民局官员和领事官员）作出的陈述。Matter of Namio, 14 I&N Dec. 412, 414 (BIA 1973)（在宣誓下向边境巡逻人员作出的虚假陈述）；另见，例如，Liwanag v. INS, 872 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1989)（在调查期间向移民局官员作出的“虚假证言”）；United States v. Baumann, 764 F. Supp. 1335 (E.D. Wis. 1991)（在美国领事馆申请签证和申请公民身份时的“虚假证言”）；United States v. Koziy, 540 F. Supp. 25 (S.D. Fla. 1982)（同上）；Matter of Ngan, 10 I&N Dec. 725 (BIA 1964)（在处理签证申请时向移民局官员作出的“虚假证言”）；Matter of G-L-T-, 8 I&N Dec. 403 (BIA 1959)（在有关申请时向移民局官员作出的“虚假证言”

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to replace a certificate of citizenship); cf. Matter of M-, 9 I&N Dec. 118 (BIA 1960) (“false testimony” to an Immigration officer at an airport with voluntary and timely retraction). Likewise, false statements made under oath during an interview regarding an application for naturalization have been consistently held to constitute false testimony. In re Yao Quinn Lee v. United States, 480 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1973); Berenyi v. District Director, INS, 352 F.2d 71 (1st Cir. 1965), aff’d, 385 U.S. 630 (1967); United States v. Abdulghani, 671 F. Supp. 754 (N.D. Ga. 1987); see also Kungys v. United States, supra, at 806 (White, J., dissenting). The Ninth Circuit, in which this case arises, has held that such oral statements must be made “to a court or tribunal.” Phinpathya v. INS, 673 F.2d 1013, 1018-19 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d on other grounds, 464 U.S. 183 (1984). Thus, this requirement by the court adds another element to the analysis whether an alien has given “false testimony” within the scope of section 101(f)(6) of the Act. The respondent contends that his admitted oral misrepresentations to an asylum officer do not constitute “false testi- mony,” because such statements were not made to “a court or a tribunal.” As the respondent acknowledges, the Ninth Circuit has not defined what constitutes “a court or tribunal.” However, in a decision issued while this appeal was pending, the Ninth Circuit held that false statements made under oath during a naturalization examination constitute false testimony within the meaning of section 101(f)(6) of the Act. Bernal v. INS, 154 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 1998). For the reasons set forth below, we find it appropri- ate, consistent with Bernal, to rule that false statements under oath to an asylum officer, whose authority to administer oaths and take testimony is parallel to that of a naturalization examiner, and whose authority to grant benefits under the Act is arguably greater, likewise constitute “false testi- mony” for purposes of section 101(f)(6) of the Act.

以更换公民身份证书）；参见Matter of M-, 9 I&N Dec. 118 (BIA 1960)（在机场向移民官员作出的“虚假证言”，并自愿及时撤回）。同样，在有关入籍申请的面谈中在宣誓下作出的虚假陈述一直被认定构成虚假证言。In re Yao Quinn Lee v. United States, 480 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1973)；Berenyi v. District Director, INS, 352 F.2d 71 (1st Cir. 1965), aff'd, 385 U.S. 630 (1967)；United States v. Abdulghani, 671 F. Supp. 754 (N.D. Ga. 1987)；另见Kungys v. United States, supra, at 806（White大法官异议意见）。 本案所 arising 的第九巡回法院裁定，此类口头陈述必须“向法院或法庭”作出。Phinpathya v. INS, 673 F.2d 1013, 1018-19 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 464 U.S. 183 (1984)。因此，法院的这一要求为分析外国人是否提供了本法第101(f)(6)条范围内的“虚假证言”增加了另一要素。被申请人主张，其承认的向庇护官员作出的口头虚假陈述不构成“虚假证言”，因为此类陈述并非向“法院或法庭”作出。正如被申请人所承认的，第九巡回法院尚未界定什么构成“法院或法庭”。然而，在本上诉待决期间发布的一项决定中，第九巡回法院裁定，在入籍审查期间在宣誓下作出的虚假陈述构成本法第101(f)(6)条所指的虚假证言。Bernal v. INS, 154 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 1998)。基于下述理由，我们认为，与Bernal一致，裁定在宣誓下向庇护官员作出的虚假陈述同样构成本法第101(f)(6)条所指的“虚假证言”是适当的，该庇护官员主持宣誓和采集证言的权限与入籍审查员相当，而其授予本法项下利益的权限可以说更大。

III. WHETHER THE ASYLUM OFFICE CONSTITUTES A “TRIBUNAL”

III. 庇护办公室是否构成“法庭”

The respondent argues that asylum officers cannot constitute a “tribu- nal” because they are not “judges” and “have not been given judicial power as has been conferred upon them by law as an immigration judge.” However, it is clear both that the definition of a tribunal is broader than the scope of those holding judicial office, and that Immigration Judges are not the only “tribunal” within the immigration system. Webster’s Dictionary defines “tribunal” as “a person or body of persons having authority to hear and decide.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2441 (P. Gove ed. 1986). According to Black’s Law Dictionary 46 (6th ed. 1990), an “administrative tribunal” is “a particular administra- tive agency before which a matter may be heard or tried as distinguished

被申请人主张，庇护官员不能构成“法庭”，因为他们不是“法官”，且“未被赋予法律赋予移民法官那样的司法权力”。然而，显然法庭的定义比担任司法职务者的范围更广，且移民法官并非移民系统内唯一的“法庭”。 韦氏词典将“法庭”定义为“有权审理和裁决的一个人或一群人”。Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2441 (P. Gove ed. 1986)。根据Black's Law Dictionary 46 (6th ed. 1990)，“行政法庭”是“某一特定行政机构，事项可在其面前审理或审判，以区别于

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from a judicial forum.” In United States ex rel. Alaska Smokeless Coal Co. v. Lane, 250 U.S. 549, 551 (1919), the Supreme Court found that the General Land Office is a tribunal, not merely a ministerial office, because “like any other tribunal[,] its institution and purpose defin[e] and measur[e] its power, the determining elements being those of fact and law, upon which necessarily judgment must be passed.” Thus, the fundamental attributes of an administrative tribunal are its authority to hear and decide; its administrative nature; and its authority to render judgments in accordance with the facts and the law. Based on these characteristics, we can readily determine that the Asylum Office, which is a division of the Office of International Affairs in the Immigration and Naturalization Service, see 8 C.F.R. §§ 100.2(d)(3)(ii), 100.4(f) (1999), constitutes a form of “administrative tribunal.” The asylum officers assigned to each Asylum Office are designated as “immigration officers” and are “authorized to exercise the powers and duties of such officer as specified by the Act and [by regulation].” 8 C.F.R. § 103.1(j) (1999). Among those powers and duties are those set forth in per- tinent part in section 235(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a) (1994), prior to its amendment by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C of Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (“ IIRIRA”):

脱离司法论坛。”在United States ex rel. Alaska Smokeless Coal Co. v. Lane, 250 U.S. 549, 551 (1919)中，最高法院认定土地总局是一个裁判庭，而不仅仅是一个行政办公室，因为“如同任何其他裁判庭一样，其设立和目的界定并衡量其权力，决定要素为事实和法律，必然须对其作出判断。” 因此，行政裁判庭的基本属性是：其听取和裁决的权限；其行政性质；以及其依照事实和法律作出裁判的权限。基于这些特征，我们可以轻易认定，庇护办公室——即移民和归化局国际事务司的一个部门，见8 C.F.R. §§ 100.2(d)(3)(ii), 100.4(f) (1999)——构成一种“行政裁判庭”。 分配到各庇护办公室的庇护官员被指定为“移民官员”，并“被授权行使该官员由本法案及[法规]所规定的权力和职责”。8 C.F.R. § 103.1(j) (1999)。这些权力和职责包括本法案第235(a)条、8 U.S.C. § 1225(a) (1994)在经1996年《非法移民改革和移民责任法》（Pub. L. No. 104-208 C编，110 Stat. 3009-546，“IIRIRA”）修正之前的相关部分所规定的内容：

The successor provisions to section 235(a) of the Act grant similar authority to immigration officers. See sections 235(d)(3),(4) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(d)(3), (4) (Supp. II 1996). Furthermore, the status of asy- lum officers as “immigration officer[s] who . . . ha[ve] had professional training in country conditions, asylum law, and interview techniques” is now specifically recognized in section 235(b)(1)(E)(i) of the Act. The first highlighted clause in the preceding excerpt from section 235(a) of the Act establishes that the authority of asylum officers, as immigration officers, extends to administering oaths and taking and con- sidering oral evidence. Since “testimony” is the form of evidence that consists of oral statements made under oath, Kungys v. United States, supra, asylum officers, like other immigration officers, are empowered to take testimony. The final highlighted clause, referring to the power to

本法案第235(a)条的后续条款授予移民官员类似权力。见本法案第235(d)(3)、(4)条，8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(d)(3), (4) (Supp. II 1996)。此外，庇护官员作为“在国情、庇护法和面谈技巧方面受过专业培训的移民官员”的地位，现已在法案第235(b)(1)(E)(i)条中得到明确承认。 上文摘自本法案第235(a)条的文字中第一个加重的从句确立，庇护官员作为移民官员的权限延伸至主持宣誓以及录取和审议口头证据。由于“证言”是由在宣誓下作出的口头陈述所构成的证据形式，Kungys v. United States, supra，庇护官员与其他移民官员一样，被授权录取证言。最后一个加重的从句提及通过

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compel “testimony” by subpoena, confirms this authority. 3 Yet, the authority of the asylum officer extends further, to that of deter- mining whether an alien is eligible under the law and merits a favorable exercise of discretion to be granted asylum under section 208 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (Supp. II 1996), or whether the alien is entitled to withhold- ing of deportation under section 243(h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1994). See 8 C.F.R. § 208.14 (1999); 8 C.F.R. § 208.16 (1997). Such deci- sions are guided by statute, a detailed series of regulations, the precedent decisions of this Board, and any binding precedents of the federal courts. An asylum officer’s decision to grant such relief is, subject to supervisory review within the Asylum Office, final and unreviewable. Further evidence of the adjudicative role of the asylum officers is found in the language of the statute. Section 235(b)(1)(E)(i) of the Act identifies asylum officers under sections 235 and 208 of the Act as “adjudicators” of asylum applica- tions. See also 8 C.F.R. § 103.1(g)(3)(ii) (1999) (giving asylum officers “authority to hear and adjudicate”). These factors lead us readily to con- clude that the Asylum Office is a “tribunal” as that term is employed in the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Phinpathya v. INS, supra. 4 Although the concurring and dissenting opinion argues to the contrary, the weight of Ninth Circuit precedent supports the conclusion that the

传票强制取得“证言”的权力，证实了这一权限。3 然而，庇护官员的权限延伸得更远，直至裁定外国人是否有资格依法获得庇护、是否值得行使有利的自由裁量权而根据本法案第208条、8 U.S.C. § 1158 (Supp. II 1996)获得庇护，或外国人是否有权根据本法案第243(h)条、8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1994)获得暂缓驱逐。见8 C.F.R. § 208.14 (1999)；8 C.F.R. § 208.16 (1997)。此类决定受法规、一系列详细规章、本委员会的判例决定以及联邦法院任何具有约束力的判例的指导。庇护官员给予此类救济的决定，在庇护办公室内部监督审查的前提下，是终局的且不可复审。庇护官员裁决作用的进一步证据见于法规文本。本法案第235(b)(1)(E)(i)条将本法案第235条和第208条下的庇护官员确定为庇护申请的“裁决者”。另见8 C.F.R. § 103.1(g)(3)(ii) (1999)（赋予庇护官员“听取和裁决的权限”）。这些因素使我们轻易得出结论：庇护办公室是第9巡回法院在Phinpathya v. INS, supra一案裁决中所使用的“裁判庭”一词意义上的“裁判庭”。4 尽管 concurring and dissenting opinion 持相反论点，第9巡回法院判例的权重支持以下结论：

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Asylum Office, like other administrative decision-making bodies, consti- tutes a “tribunal.” The Ninth Circuit has found that oral statements under oath before an Immigration Judge constitute false testimony for purposes of section 101(f)(6) of the Act. See, e.g., Paredes-Urrestarazu v. INS, 36 F.3d 801 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that false oral statements given before an Immigration Judge constitute “false testimony”); see also Matter of Barcenas, supra. An alien appearing before an asylum officer has many rights similar to an alien in deportation proceedings before an Immigration Judge. In proceedings before Immigration Judges and asylum officers, an alien has the right to be represented by counsel and to have an opportunity to present evidence, witnesses, and testimony. Compare 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.9(b), (d)-(g) (1999) with 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.16, 3.31, 3.34, 3.37 (1999). The regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (1999), which clearly apply to asylum officers as well as to Immigration Judges, refer to statements made by asy- lum applicants as “testimony.” In addition, like an Immigration Judge, an asylum officer has the authority to administer oaths, to receive evidence, including testimony, to maintain a record, to consider the evidence, and, most importantly, to decide the merits of the asylum application. Compare 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.9(c)-(f) with 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.31-3.37 (1999). Given that Immigration Judges and asylum officers have analogous authority over asy- lum claims, we find that there is sufficient support for concluding that an alien’s sworn false oral statements before an asylum officer, like sworn false oral statements to an Immigration Judge, can constitute “false testimony” as defined by the Ninth Circuit. Phinpathya v. INS, supra. 5 Further support is found in case law regarding sworn oral statements before naturalization examiners. In Bernal v. INS, supra, at 1022-23, the Ninth Circuit found that false oral statements given under oath to Service officers during naturalization examinations constitute “false testimony” for

庇护办公室与其他行政决策机构一样，构成“裁判庭”。第9巡回法院认定，在移民法官面前作出的宣誓口头陈述构成本法案第101(f)(6)条意义上的虚假证言。见，例如，Paredes-Urrestarazu v. INS, 36 F.3d 801 (9th Cir. 1994)（认定在移民法官面前作出的虚假口头陈述构成“虚假证言”）；另见Matter of Barcenas, supra。在庇护官员面前出现的外国人享有许多与在移民法官面前驱逐程序中的外国人相似的权利。在移民法官和庇护官员面前的程序中，外国人有权由律师代理，并有机会提交证据、证人和证言。比较8 C.F.R. §§ 208.9(b), (d)-(g) (1999)与8 C.F.R. §§ 3.16, 3.31, 3.34, 3.37 (1999)。8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (1999)的规章明确适用于庇护官员以及移民法官，其将庇护申请人所作的陈述称为“证言”。此外，与移民法官一样，庇护官员有权主持宣誓、接收包括证言在内的证据、维持记录、审议证据，并且最重要的是，裁决庇护申请的实体问题。比较8 C.F.R. §§ 208.9(c)-(f)与8 C.F.R. §§ 3.31-3.37 (1999)。鉴于移民法官和庇护官员对庇护申请拥有类似权限，我们认定有充分支持得出结论：外国人在庇护官员面前作出的宣誓虚假口头陈述，如同向移民法官作出的宣誓虚假口头陈述一样，可以构成第9巡回法院所定义的“虚假证言”。Phinpathya v. INS, supra。5 关于在归化审查官面前作出的宣誓口头陈述的判例法提供了进一步支持。在Bernal v. INS, supra, at 1022-23中，第9巡回法院认定，在归化审查期间向本局官员宣誓作出的虚假口头陈述构成“虚假证言”，用于

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purposes of section 101(f)(6) of the Act, and it cited favorably this Board’s holding in Matter of Ngan, supra, at 729, that a respondent’s oral false state- ments, under oath, before an officer of the Service in connection with the processing of a visa petition, constitute “false testimony” under section 101(f)(6) of the Act. See also, e.g., United States v. Ciurinskas, 148 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 1998), aff’g 976 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D. Ind. 1997); Yao Quinn Lee v. United States, supra; In re Haniatakis, 376 F.2d 728, 730 (3d Cir. 1967); Aboud v. INS, 876 F. Supp. 938 (S.D. Ohio 1994); United States v. Schiffer, 831 F. Supp. 1166 (E.D. Pa. 1993), aff’d, 31 F.3d 1175 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Abdulghani, supra; United States v. Palciauskus, 559 F. Supp. 1294 (M.D. Fla. 1983), aff’d, 734 F.2d 625 (11th Cir. 1984); Petition of K, 174 F. Supp. 343, 344 (D. Md. 1959). In Bernal v. INS, supra, the Ninth Circuit held that a Service officer is “authorized ‘to take testimo- ny concerning any matter touching or in any way affecting the admissibili- ty of any applicant for naturalization, [and] to administer oaths.’ 8 U.S.C. § 1446(b). Thus, the statements made by an applicant in a naturalization examination are ‘testimony’ within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6).” 6 Id. at 1023. The Ninth Circuit further found that “false oral statements made under oath in a question-and-answer statement before an INS officer in con- nection with any stage of the processing of a visa constitute false testimony within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1106(f)(6).” Id. We note that a naturalization examiner and an asylum officer both pre- side over proceedings in which they have authority to administer oaths, take testimony, and receive evidence. See section 235(a) of the Act; compare 8 C.F.R. § 208.9(c) with 8 C.F.R. § 335.11(b) (1999). However, the asylum officer has authority which exceeds that of the naturalization examiner. Naturalization examiners merely recommend a course of action, 8 C.F.R. § 335.12 (1999), whereas asylum officers may grant relief and, under certain circumstances, deny relief. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.14(b)(1), (4). Thus, the status of asylum officers as part of a decision-making tribunal is at least as firmly established as that of naturalization examiners. Bernal v. INS, supra; Phinpathya v. INS, supra; see also Kungys v. United States, supra; United States ex rel. Alaska Smokeless Coal Co. v. Lane, supra. Accordingly, we conclude that an asylum officer is a member of a “tri- bunal” for purposes of the false testimony bar to establishing good moral

就《移民与国籍法》第101(f)(6)条而言，并有利地援引了本委员会在Matter of Ngan, supra, at 729中的裁定，即答复人在移民局官员面前、就签证申请处理事宜、在宣誓下所作的口头虚假陈述，构成该法第101(f)(6)条下的“虚假证词”。另见，例如，United States v. Ciurinskas, 148 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 1998), aff’g 976 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D. Ind. 1997)；Yao Quinn Lee v. United States, supra；In re Haniatakis, 376 F.2d 728, 730 (3d Cir. 1967)；Aboud v. INS, 876 F. Supp. 938 (S.D. Ohio 1994)；United States v. Schiffer, 831 F. Supp. 1166 (E.D. Pa. 1993), aff’d, 31 F.3d 1175 (3d Cir. 1994)；United States v. Abdulghani, supra；United States v. Palciauskus, 559 F. Supp. 1294 (M.D. Fla. 1983), aff’d, 734 F.2d 625 (11th Cir. 1984)；Petition of K, 174 F. Supp. 343, 344 (D. Md. 1959)。在Bernal v. INS, supra中，第9巡回法院裁定，移民局官员“有权‘就任何涉及或以任何方式影响任何入籍申请人准入性的事项取证，[并]主持宣誓。’8 U.S.C. § 1446(b)。因此，申请人在入籍审查中所作陈述属于8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6)意义上的‘证词’。”6 Id. at 1023。第9巡回法院进一步认定，“在移民局官员面前、就签证处理的任何阶段、在问答式陈述中在宣誓下所作的虚假口头陈述，构成8 U.S.C. § 1106(f)(6)意义上的虚假证词。”Id. 我们注意到，入籍审查员与庇护官员均主持其有权主持宣誓、取证和接收证据的程序。见该法第235(a)条；比较8 C.F.R. § 208.9(c)与8 C.F.R. § 335.11(b) (1999)。然而，庇护官员的权力超过入籍审查员。入籍审查员仅建议行动方案，8 C.F.R. § 335.12 (1999)，而庇护官员可以给予救济，并在某些情况下拒绝救济。8 C.F.R. §§ 208.14(b)(1), (4)。因此，庇护官员作为决策法庭一部分的地位至少与入籍审查员同样牢固确立。Bernal v. INS, supra；Phinpathya v. INS, supra；另见Kungys v. United States, supra；United States ex rel. Alaska Smokeless Coal Co. v. Lane, supra。 据此，我们认定，就确立良好道德品行的虚假证词障碍而言，庇护官员是“法庭”的成员

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character under section 101(f)(6) of the Act, as that provision has been con- strued in the Ninth Circuit.

该法第101(f)(6)条意义上的品行，按照第9巡回法院对该条款的解释。

IV. WHETHER THE RESPONDENT’S STATEMENTS CONSTITUTE “TESTIMONY”

IV. 答复人的陈述是否构成“证词”

Under Phinpathya v. INS, supra, and other precedents construing sec- tion 101(f)(6) of the Act, “false testimony” must not only have been made to a “tribunal,” and thus not include written statements or applications, but must also have been made under oath. Id. at 1019; see also Bernal v. INS, supra, at 1022-23; Matter of Ngan, supra, at 729. As noted, an asylum offi- cer has the authority to administer oaths, 8 C.F.R. § 208.9(c), and state- ments made by an asylum applicant to an asylum officer are described as “testimony” in 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a). However, there is no evidence in the record, nor any contention on appeal, regarding whether an oath was admin- istered in this case. Thus, while we affirm the Immigration Judge’s finding that the false statements admittedly made in this case were made to a “tri- bunal” for purposes of Ninth Circuit law, we cannot, on the basis of this record, determine whether such statements constitute “false testimony.” Accordingly, we will remand the record for consideration of this question. The dissenting and concurring opinion appears to argue, however, that even if an oath was administered in this case and there is no factual dispute over the nature of the respondent’s false statements to the asylum officer, the respondent’s false statements cannot constitute “testimony” because they were not recorded verbatim by a disinterested transcriber, as in judicial proceedings, or set forth in a written question-and-answer format. However, given the provisions of 8 C.F.R. § 208.9, it is unclear that the respondent’s asylum interview was not conducted in a manner at least as formal as that which apparently occurred in Bernal v. INS, supra. 7 The chief characteristics of “testimony” are that it be delivered by a competent witness under oath. “Testimony is a particular kind of evidence that comes to a tribunal through live witnesses speaking under oath or affir- mation in presence of tribunal, judicial or quasi-judicial.” Black’s Law Dictionary, supra, at 1476. There is no requirement that such evidence be transcribed in order to be counted as testimony. The contrary contention is somewhat startling, especially in the context of immigration proceedings. Immigration Judges customarily render decisions on the basis of oral testi- mony, immediately at the conclusion of such testimony, without the benefit

根据Phinpathya v. INS, supra以及解释该法第101(f)(6)条的其他先例，“虚假证词”不仅必须向“法庭”作出，因而不得包括书面陈述或申请，而且还必须在宣誓下作出。Id. at 1019；另见Bernal v. INS, supra, at 1022-23；Matter of Ngan, supra, at 729。如前所述，庇护官员有权主持宣誓，8 C.F.R. § 208.9(c)，且庇护申请人在庇护官员面前所作陈述在8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a)中被描述为“证词”。然而，记录中没有证据，上诉中也没有任何主张，说明本案中是否主持了宣誓。因此，尽管我们维持移民法官的认定，即本案中承认作出的虚假陈述是就第9巡回法院法律而言向“法庭”作出的，但基于本记录，我们无法确定此类陈述是否构成“虚假证词”。据此，我们将发回记录以审议该问题。 然而，反对与协同意见似乎主张，即使本案中主持了宣誓，且对答复人向庇护官员所作虚假陈述的性质不存在事实争议，答复人的虚假陈述也不能构成“证词”，因为它们并非如司法程序那样由无利害关系的记录员逐字记录，也未以书面问答形式列明。然而，鉴于8 C.F.R. § 208.9的规定，尚不清楚答复人的庇护面谈未以至少与Bernal v. INS, supra中显然发生的方式同样正式的方式进行。7 “证词”的主要特征是，它由有能力的证人在宣誓下提供。“证词是一种特定类型的证据，通过证人在法庭、司法或准司法机构面前在宣誓或确认下口头陈述而到达法庭。”Black’s Law Dictionary, supra, at 1476。没有要求此类证据必须被转录才能算作证词。相反的主张有些令人吃惊，尤其是在移民程序的背景下。移民法官通常根据口头证词，在此类证词结束时立即作出决定，而无须

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of any transcription other than their personal notes. The fact that such testi- mony has been tape-recorded and thus is capable of being transcribed is irrelevant. Once the witness is sworn before the Immigration Judge, as before any tribunal, what is then said by the witness constitutes testimony. The tapes of testimony remain untranscribed unless an appeal is taken to this Board. Neither the act of transcription nor the existence of a written transcript confers testimonial character upon the evidence. The same is true in judicial proceedings, particularly criminal trials. While a verbatim record is kept and a transcript may thereafter be prepared by a court reporter, jurors may render their decision solely upon their rec- ollection of testimony presented by the witnesses and other competent evi- dence. Jurors may request “read-backs” of selected portions of the pro- ceedings, but testimony so recalled attains no greater weight than that recalled through the conventional exercise of memory. Other tribunals, such as small- claims courts and traffic courts, render thousands of adjudications yearly on the basis of sworn, but untranscribed, testimony. The dissent’s argument seems more directed at the burden of proving whether false testimony has occurred in the course of an asylum officer inter- view. Here, there is no question that false statements were made. The respon- dent acknowledged that he was aware of the falsity of the asylum claim. However, he filed the “made up” asylum claim because it had been “success- ful.” The respondent further admitted that when he was interviewed by the asylum officer, he repeated the false asylum claim. See In re Haniatakis, supra (finding that where an alien’s false written answers were repeated as sworn oral testimony at a preliminary naturalization investigation, such state- ments constituted false testimony). The record clearly establishes that the respondent had the intent to deceive the asylum officer by making false oral statements for the purpose of obtaining asylum relief, a benefit under the Act. See Kungys v. United States, supra; Bernal v. INS, supra. Other cases, however, may present more difficult questions of proof regarding what transpired at the interview. It may be necessary to present the testimony of the asylum officer before the Immigration Court, together with notes and other evidence of what was said under oath. In many cases, the Immigration Judge may find that there is insufficient evidence to estab- lish that false testimony was presented. But, presuming that an oath was administered, the issue in such cases will be not whether the asylum appli- cant’s statements were “testimony,” but rather, whether they were “false.” That question is not contested in this case. 8

任何除其个人笔记以外的转录。此类证词已被录音因而能够被转录这一事实无关紧要。一旦证人在移民法官面前宣誓，如同在任何法庭面前一样，证人随后所说的话即构成证词。证词录音带在未向本委员会提出上诉之前保持未转录状态。无论是转录行为还是书面转录本的存在，都不赋予证据以证词性质。 司法程序，尤其是刑事审判中也是如此。虽然保留逐字记录，且此后可由法庭记录员准备转录本，但陪审员可以仅凭其对证人提供的证词和其他有资格证据的记忆作出决定。陪审员可以要求“复读”程序的选定部分，但如此回忆的证词并不比通过常规记忆活动回忆的证词具有更大分量。其他法庭，如小额索赔法院和交通法院，每年基于宣誓但未转录的证词作出数千项裁决。 反对意见的论点似乎更多针对的是证明在庇护官员面谈过程中是否发生虚假证词的负担。在此，虚假陈述已被作出这一点毫无疑问。答复人承认他知道庇护申请是虚假的。然而，他提交“编造”的庇护申请是因为它“成功”了。答复人进一步承认，当他在庇护官员面前面谈时，他重复了虚假的庇护申请。见In re Haniatakis, supra（认定在外侨的虚假书面回答在初步入籍调查中作为宣誓口头证词重复时，此类陈述构成虚假证词）。记录清楚表明，答复人意图通过作出虚假口头陈述以欺骗庇护官员，目的是获得庇护救济，即该法下的一项利益。见Kungys v. United States, supra；Bernal v. INS, supra。 然而，其他案件可能就面谈中所发生之事提出更困难的证明问题。可能有必要向移民法院提交庇护官员的证词，连同笔记和其他关于宣誓下所说内容的证据。在许多案件中，移民法官可能认定没有足够证据证明提出了虚假证词。但是，假定主持了宣誓，此类案件中的问题将不是庇护申请人的陈述是否为“证词”，而是它们是否“虚假”。该问题在本案中没有争议。8

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V. CONCLUSION

五、结论

False oral statements made under oath to an asylum officer for the pur- pose of obtaining an immigration benefit, i.e., asylum or withholding of deportation or removal, are made to a “court or tribunal” for purposes of Ninth Circuit case law and thus constitute “false testimony” for purposes of section 101(f)(6) of the Act. Accordingly, the respondent’s appeal will be dismissed. Because there is no evidence in this case whether the admitted false statements to the asylum officer were made under oath, however, the record will be remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the respondent was under oath at the time he gave his false testimony. ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. FURTHER ORDER: The record is remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion and the entry of a new decision.

为获得移民利益（即庇护或暂缓驱逐或遣返）而在庇护官员面前宣誓作出的虚假口头陈述，就第9巡回法院判例法而言，是向“法院或法庭”作出的，因此构成《移民与国籍法》第101(f)(6)条意义上的“虚假证言”。据此，应驳回被申请人的上诉。然而，由于本案中没有证据表明向庇护官员承认的虚假陈述是否系宣誓作出，因此将案件发回重审，以进一步程序确定被申请人在作出虚假证言时是否处于宣誓状态。 命令：上诉驳回。 进一步命令：案件发回移民法官，按照上述意见进行进一步程序并作出新决定。

Board Member Anthony C. Moscato did not participate in the decision in this case.

委员会成员Anthony C. Moscato未参与本案决定。

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION: Fred W. Vacca, Board Member, in which Paul W. Schmidt, Chairman; Michael J. Heilman, Gustavo D. Villageliu, Patricia A. Cole, and Lory D. Rosenberg, Board Members, joined

协同与异议意见： Fred W. Vacca，委员会成员，加入者包括Paul W. Schmidt，主席；Michael J. Heilman、Gustavo D. Villageliu、Patricia A. Cole和Lory D. Rosenberg，委员会成员

I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. I concur in the majority’s conclusion that this case must be remanded to the Immigration Judge for a new decision. However, I believe that the proper interpretation of the law requires the Immigration Judge to consider substantially more than is indicated by the majority’s opinion. The majority finds that an interview before an asylum officer consti- tutes testimony before a “tribunal” and concludes that false statements made under oath before such a “tribunal” constitute “false testimony,” pre- cluding a finding of good moral character under section 101(f)(6) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6) (1994). I do not find either of these premises to be a correct reading of the statute or the law relating to “false testimony.” Consequently, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that, if the respondent’s testimony before the asylum officer was provided under oath, he cannot establish good moral character, which is required to establish statutory eligibility for either suspension of deportation under section 244(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1994), or voluntary departure under section 244(e) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e) (1994). Because false state- ments on an asylum application or before an asylum officer may be consid- ered in the exercise of discretion, I conclude that the respondent’s case

我部分协同、部分异议。 我同意多数意见的结论，即本案必须发回移民法官重新决定。然而，我认为对法律的正确解释要求移民法官考虑的事项远多于多数意见所示。 多数意见认定，在庇护官员面前的面谈构成在“法庭”面前的证言，并得出结论认为，在此类“法庭”面前宣誓作出的虚假陈述构成“虚假证言”，从而根据《移民与国籍法》第101(f)(6)条，8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6) (1994)，排除良好道德品行的认定。我认为这两个前提均非对法规或有关“虚假证言”的法律的正确解读。 因此，我不同意多数意见的结论，即如果被申请人在庇护官员面前的证言系宣誓提供，则他不能确立良好道德品行，而这是确立根据《移民与国籍法》第244(a)条，8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1994)，暂缓驱逐出境或根据第244(e)条，8 U.S.C. § 1254(e) (1994)，自愿离境的法定资格所必需的。由于庇护申请中或庇护官员面前的虚假陈述可在行使自由裁量权时予以考虑，我认为被申请人的案件

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should be remanded for a determination by the Immigration Judge as to whether the respondent has established good moral character as a matter of discretion and is otherwise eligible for suspension of deportation or volun- tary departure.

应发回移民法官裁定被申请人是否作为自由裁量事项确立了良好道德品行，以及是否在其他方面符合暂缓驱逐出境或自愿离境的资格。

I. “FALSE TESTIMONY” IN IMMIGRATION ADJUDICATIONS

一、移民裁决中的“虚假证言”

The concept of “testimony” as used in section 101(f)(6) of the Act, which provides that “one who has given false testimony for the purpose of obtaining any benefits under this Act,” is not as straightforward as the majority would make it out to be. As the Supreme Court stated in Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637, 641 (1954), “While it is true that statutory lan- guage should be interpreted whenever possible according to common usage, some terms acquire a special technical meaning by a process of judi- cial construction.” See also Ippolito v. United States, 223 F.2d 154, 157 (5th Cir. 1955) (concluding that “technical words are always interpreted in their technical sense unless this is inconsistent with a manifested different mean- ing”). Consequently, “the word testimony, technically construed, refers solely to the oral utterances of witnesses under oath, and in interpreting statutes, words having a technical meaning are to be so construed.” Sharaiha v. Hoy, 169 F. Supp. 598, 601 (S.D. Cal. 1959) (citing Barber v. Gonzales, supra, at 641). 1 In Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759 (1988), the Supreme Court recognized that the term “testimony,” as used in section 101(f)(6) of the Act, clearly was circumscribed in certain respects. The Court stated:

《移民与国籍法》第101(f)(6)条中使用的“证言”概念——该条规定“为获得本法案下任何利益而作出虚假证言的人”——并不像多数意见所认为的那样直截了当。正如最高法院在Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637, 641 (1954)中所指出的，“虽然法规语言在可能时应按通常用法解释，但某些术语通过司法建构过程获得了特殊的技术含义。”另见Ippolito v. United States, 223 F.2d 154, 157 (5th Cir. 1955)（结论认为“技术词语总是按其技术含义解释，除非这与所表明的不同含义不一致”）。因此，“证言一词，按技术性解释，仅指证人在宣誓下的口头陈述，而在解释法规时，具有技术含义的词语应如此解释。”Sharaiha v. Hoy, 169 F. Supp. 598, 601 (S.D. Cal. 1959)（引用Barber v. Gonzales, supra, at 641）。1 在Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759 (1988)中，最高法院承认，《移民与国籍法》第101(f)(6)条中使用的“证言”一词在某些方面显然受到限制。法院指出：

Id. at 780. The Supreme Court’s recognition of the limits that apply to deter- mining what constitutes “testimony” is consistent with the decisions of the

同上，第780页。最高法院对确定何为“证言”所适用限制的承认，与以下决定一致：

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United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Phinpathya v. INS, 673 F.2d 1013, 1018-19 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d on other grounds, 464 U.S. 183 (1984), and in Bernal v. INS, 154 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 1998). In Phinpathya v. INS, supra, the Ninth Circuit ruled that “[t]he term tes- timony does not encompass all statements, or even all statements made under oath. Testimony means a statement made by a witness under oath for the purpose of establishing proof of a fact to a court or tribunal. It is dis- tinguished from statements made under different circumstances, and from evidence derived from writings and other sources.” Id. at 1018-19 (empha- sis added) (citations omitted); see also Matter of L-D-E-, 8 I&N Dec. 399, 401 (BIA 1959) (citing Sharaiha v. Hoy, supra, and holding that false state- ments that appear in a written application, whether or not under oath, do not constitute testimony within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6)). Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit in Bernal v. INS, supra, relying on the dis- tinction it had made in Phinpathya v. INS, supra, ruled that false statements regarding marital status made under oath before a naturalization examiner, who was empowered by statute to conduct such examinations and render judgments based on the sworn testimony taken in such examinations, con- stituted false testimony. Thus, before concluding that every statement, or even every statement made under oath, constitutes “testimony,” we must examine the pertinent section of the statute and any applicable regulations to determine whether the authority of the Immigration and Naturalization Service officer, as well as the nature and conduct of the adjudication, war- rant classifying the adjudication as one occurring before a “tribunal.” The majority acknowledges that the Ninth Circuit, within whose juris- diction this appeal arises, has not explicitly determined what type of decid- ing body constitutes a “tribunal.” Although the majority cites a popular dic- tionary definition for the term “tribunal,” the term is a technical one defined by legal authorities as “[t]he seat of a judge; a court of law; the place where he administers justice. The whole body of judges who compose a jurisdic- tion; a judicial court; the jurisdiction which the judges exercise.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1506 (6th ed. 1990). An “administrative tribunal” is defined as “[a] particular administrative agency before which a matter may be heard or tried as distinguished from a judicial forum.” Id. at 46. Moreover, although the majority cites United States ex rel. Alaska Smokeless Coal Co. v. Lane, 250 U.S. 549, 550 (1919), for the proposition that being empowered to approve applications somehow endows an entity with the status of a “tribunal,” such a designation is inapposite to the issue at hand. That an adjudicator’s function goes beyond “mere yielding to and registry of any demand” does not mean that he or she constitutes a tribunal, in the sense of a formal decision-making body. Id. at 550. Instead, the char- acterization of an adjudicator as a “tribunal” depends as much or more on the existence of “procedural safeguards, such as the right to counsel and a hearing before an impartial tribunal, that are present when a court or an

美国第9巡回上诉法院在Phinpathya v. INS, 673 F.2d 1013, 1018-19 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d on other grounds, 464 U.S. 183 (1984)，以及Bernal v. INS, 154 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 1998)中的决定。 在第9巡回法院于Phinpathya v. INS, supra案中裁定，“证言一词并不涵盖所有陈述，甚至不涵盖所有宣誓作出的陈述。证言是指证人在宣誓下为向法院或法庭证明某一事实而作出的陈述。它与在不同情况下作出的陈述以及从书面材料和其他来源获得的证据相区别。”同上，第1018-19页（强调 added）（引文省略）；另见Matter of L-D-E-, 8 I&N Dec. 399, 401 (BIA 1959)（引用Sharaiha v. Hoy, supra，并裁定出现在书面申请中的虚假陈述，无论是否宣誓，均不构成8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6)意义上的证言）。 随后，第9巡回法院在Bernal v. INS, supra案中，依据其在Phinpathya v. INS, supra案中所作的区分，裁定在入籍审查员面前宣誓作出的关于婚姻状况的虚假陈述构成虚假证言，该审查员经法规授权进行此类审查并根据此类审查中采集的宣誓证言作出判断。因此，在得出结论认为每一项陈述、甚至每一项宣誓陈述均构成“证言”之前，我们必须审查法规的相关条款和任何适用条例，以确定移民和归化局官员的权限以及裁决的性质和进行方式，是否足以将该裁决归类为在“法庭”面前进行的裁决。 多数意见承认，本案上诉所来自的管辖区的第9巡回法院尚未明确确定何种类型的裁决机构构成“法庭”。尽管多数意见引用了“法庭”一词的通俗词典定义，但该术语是一个技术性术语，法律权威将其定义为“[法官的席位；法院；他主持正义的地方。组成一个管辖区的全体法官；司法法院；法官行使的管辖权。”Black’s Law Dictionary 1506 (6th ed. 1990)。“行政法庭”被定义为“[一个特定的行政机构，事项可在其面前听取或审理，区别于司法论坛。”同上，第46页。 此外，尽管多数意见引用United States ex rel. Alaska Smokeless Coal Co. v. Lane, 250 U.S. 549, 550 (1919)来支持以下命题：被授权批准申请不知何故赋予某一实体“法庭”地位，但这种指定与当前问题不相干。裁决者的职能超出“仅仅顺从和登记任何要求”并不意味着他或她构成正式决策机构意义上的法庭。同上，第550页。相反，将裁决者定性为“法庭”取决于——甚至更多取决于——是否存在“程序保障，例如律师权和在公正法庭面前听证的权利，这些保障在法院或

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agency adjudicates individual rights.” INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 966 (1983) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). In INS v. Chadha, supra, the Court emphasized that the exercise of quasi-judicial agency authority “is sub- ject to the procedural safeguards, including judicial review, provided by the Administrative Procedure Act.” Id. at 966 n.10 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 140-41 (1976)). Because the absence of a formal hearing structure, the absence of a record, and the lack of access to judicial review in relation to interviews conducted before asylum officers are beyond dispute, the majori- ty’s conclusion that an asylum officer constitutes a “tribunal” is questionable.

机构裁决个人权利时存在。”INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 966 (1983)（强调 added）（脚注省略）。在INS v. Chadha, supra案中，法院强调，准司法机构权力的行使“受《行政程序法》提供的程序保障，包括司法审查的约束。”同上，第966页 n.10（引用Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 140-41 (1976)）。由于在庇护官员面前进行的面谈缺乏正式听证结构、缺乏记录以及缺乏司法审查途径是无可争议的，多数意见关于庇护官员构成“法庭”的结论值得质疑。

The majority seeks to analogize the authority of asylum officers who conduct asylum interviews to that of naturalization officers who conduct naturalization examinations, citing Bernal v. INS, supra. In Bernal, howev- er, the Service officer was a naturalization examiner, who not only was authorized by the statute to take sworn testimony in support of a natural- ization application, but also conducted the interview in a formal and struc- tured manner, using a “Q & A” format, recording each of the applicant’s answers on the interview form and annotating the form in a different color ink. Id. at 1022-23; see Matter of Ngan, 10 I&N Dec. 725 (BIA 1964) (find- ing a visa applicant’s false oral statements made under oath in a question- and-answer statement before a Service officer to constitute false testimony within the meaning of section 101(f)(6) of the Act). In reaching its conclusion that the false statements made by the appli- cant constituted false testimony within the meaning of section 101(f)(6) of the Act, the court relied on the statute governing naturalization examina- tions. Bernal v. INS, supra, at 1022-23. The statute provides that a Service officer is authorized “to take testimony concerning any matter touching or in any way affecting the admissibility of any applicant for naturalization, [and] to administer oaths.” Section 335(b) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1994). Notably, the Attorney General has designated immigration examin- ers, and delegated authority to designate other officers, to conduct natural- ization investigations, administer oaths, hold hearings, and conduct exami- nations. 8 C.F.R. § 332.1 (1996). Any comparison of the role and function of a Service official designat- ed as a naturalization examiner with that of an asylum officer must take into account the framework within which naturalization examinations are con- ducted, as well as the historic function of the naturalization examiner. The framework of such examinations is the naturalization process, which is essentially a judicial responsibility. See United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 613 (1931) (recognizing that under section 3 of the Naturalization Act, “jurisdiction to naturalize aliens is conferred upon the District Courts

多数意见试图将进行庇护面谈的庇护官员的权力，类比于进行入籍审查的入籍官员的权力，并援引Bernal v. INS, supra。然而，在Bernal案中，该局官员是一名入籍审查员，其不仅经法规授权为支持入籍申请而主持宣誓证言，而且还以正式和结构化的方式进行面谈，采用“问答”格式，将申请人的每一回答记录在面谈表格上，并用不同颜色的墨水在表格上作批注。Id. at 1022-23；见Matter of Ngan, 10 I&N Dec. 725 (BIA 1964)（认定签证申请人在该局官员面前以问答陈述形式在宣誓下作出的虚假口头陈述构成该法第101(f)(6)条意义上的虚假证言）。 在得出申请人所作虚假陈述构成该法第101(f)(6)条意义上的虚假证言的结论时，法院依据的是规范入籍审查的法规。Bernal v. INS, supra, at 1022-23。该法规规定，该局官员经授权“就任何涉及或以任何方式影响任何入籍申请人可入境性的任何事项主持证言，[并]主持宣誓。”该法第335(b)条，8 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1994)。值得注意的是，司法部长已指定移民审查员，并授权指定其他官员进行入籍调查、主持宣誓、举行听证和进行审查。8 C.F.R. § 332.1 (1996)。 将被指定为入籍审查员的该局官员的角色和职能与庇护官员的角色和职能进行任何比较，都必须考虑到进行入籍审查所依据的框架，以及入籍审查员的历史职能。此类审查的框架是入籍程序，该程序本质上是一项司法职责。见United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 613 (1931)（承认根据《入籍法》第3条，“入籍外国人的管辖权授予美国联邦地区法院

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of the United States and other enumerated courts of record. U.S.C. title 8, § 357”). The Supreme Court noted that “[a]s early as 1830, in Spratt v. Spratt, 4 Pet. 393, 407 . . ., Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for the court, said: ‘The various acts upon the subject submit the decision on the right of aliens to admission as citizens to courts of record. They are to receive testimony, to compare it with the law, and to judge on both law and fact.’ United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 649, 73 L. Ed. 889, 49 S. Ct. 448.” Id. at 617. The examiner’s function is “intended to be of assistance to the courts.” Petition of Cardines, 366 F. Supp. 700, 708 (D. Guam 1973) (citing Petition of De Leo, 75 F. Supp. 896 (W.D. Pa. 1948)). As recognized in Petition of De Leo, supra, at 900, the Act “empowers the designated naturalization examin- ers to conduct preliminary examinations upon petitions for naturalization to any naturalization court and to make recommendations thereon to such court.” Petition of Cardines, supra, at 708. Furthermore, in conjunction with the nat- uralization examiner’s special relationship to the federal court, “such exam- iners are authorized to take testimony concerning any matter touching or in any way affecting the admissibility of any petitioner for naturalization.” Id.; see also United States v. Best, 73 F. Supp. 654 (D. Mass. 1947). If the case before us fell squarely within the terms of the situation addressed by the Ninth Circuit in Bernal v. INS, supra, I would not necessar- ily disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the statements made under oath in an asylum interview constitute testimony before a tribunal. However, the distinction between the statutory delegation of authority to take testimo- ny that is extended to naturalization examiners and the absence of any com- parable delegation to asylum officers, discussed below, deserves specific emphasis, particularly in relation to the majority’s reliance on Bernal v. INS, supra, as a basis to conclude that the statements made by an asylum applicant before an asylum officer constitute “testimony.” In addition, the Board’s treatment in Matter of Ngan, supra, of a false statement made before an immi- gration examiner as “testimony” was specifically limited to circumstances in which the statement was oral and not written, and in which the proceedings could be characterized as “quasi judicial” because “the respondent was placed under oath by an immigrant inspector and was examined in the presence of counsel.” Id. at 729. Consequently, I do not find the statutory authority extended to naturalization examiners to be transferable to the asylum inter- view context, nor do I find the specific “Q & A” format relied upon in Matter of Ngan, supra, to reflect the character of an interview before an asylum offi- cer, either generally or on the specific record before us.

及其他列举的存卷法院。U.S.C. 第8编，§ 357”）。最高法院指出，“早在1830年，在Spratt v. Spratt, 4 Pet. 393, 407 . . . 一案中，首席大法官Marshall代表法院表示：‘关于此主题的各项法案将外国人获准成为公民的权利的决定提交给存卷法院。它们接收证言，将其与法律相比较，并依法与依事实作出判断。’United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 649, 73 L. Ed. 889, 49 S. Ct. 448。”Id. at 617。审查员的职能是“旨在协助法院。”Petition of Cardines, 366 F. Supp. 700, 708 (D. Guam 1973)（援引Petition of De Leo, 75 F. Supp. 896 (W.D. Pa. 1948)）。正如Petition of De Leo, supra, at 900一案所承认的，该法“授权指定的入籍审查员就向任何入籍法院提出的入籍申请进行初步审查，并向该法院提出相关建议。”Petition of Cardines, supra, at 708。此外，结合入籍审查员与联邦法院的特殊关系，“此类审查员经授权就任何涉及或以任何方式影响任何入籍申请人可入境性的任何事项主持证言。”Id.；另见United States v. Best, 73 F. Supp. 654 (D. Mass. 1947)。 如果摆在我们面前的案件完全属于第9巡回法院在Bernal v. INS, supra一案中所处理情形的范围，我不一定会不同意多数意见的结论，即庇护面谈中在宣誓下作出的陈述构成在裁判庭面前的证言。然而，授予入籍审查员的法定主持证言授权与庇护官员缺乏任何可比授权之间的区别（下文讨论），值得特别强调，尤其是相对于多数意见依赖Bernal v. INS, supra作为依据来认定庇护申请人在庇护官员面前作出的陈述构成“证言”。 此外，委员会在Matter of Ngan, supra一案中将移民审查员面前作出的虚假陈述视为“证言”的处理，明确限于以下情形：该陈述是口头的而非书面的，且该程序可被定性为“准司法性”，因为“被置于移民检查员主持的宣誓之下，并在律师在场的情况下接受了审查。”Id. at 729。因此，我认为授予入籍审查员的法定授权不能转用于庇护面谈情境，我也不认为Matter of Ngan, supra一案所依赖的特定“问答”格式反映了庇护官员面前面谈的特征，无论是总体上还是在我们面前的具体记录上。

An interview before an asylum officer and the asylum officer’s role and function in the course of that interview are governed solely by the specific provisions of the statute and regulations that relate to the adjudication of

庇护官员面前的面谈以及庇护官员在该面谈过程中的角色和职能，完全由与庇护申请裁决相关的法规和条例的具体规定所规范

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asylum applications. It is these provisions to which we must look to deter- mine whether statements made under oath before an asylum officer consti- tute “testimony.” Congress has not designated either the position of “asylum officer” or the full scope of authority to be exercised by an individual that the Attorney General has assigned to act as an “asylum officer.” An asylum officer’s authority derives principally from the Attorney General’s author- ization to “establish a procedure” for an alien in the United States to seek asylum. Section 208(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (Supp. II 1996). An asylum officer, i.e., an officer of the Office of Refugees, Asylum, and Parole, is authorized according to the authority delegated to the Attorney General to “conduct the interview in a nonadversarial manner.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.9(b) (1999). The asylum officer, in connection with his or her func- tions under the statute, is exclusively authorized by the Attorney General only to “administer oaths, verify the identity of the applicant . . ., verify the identity of any interpreter, present and receive evidence, and question the applicant and any witnesses.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.9(c).

。我们必须审视这些规定，以确定在庇护官员面前在宣誓下作出的陈述是否构成“证言”。 国会既未指定“庇护官员”的职位，也未指定司法部长指派担任“庇护官员”的个人所应行使的全部权力范围。庇护官员的权力主要源自司法部长为在美國的外国人寻求庇护而“建立程序”的授权。该法第208(a)条，8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (Supp. II 1996)。庇护官员，即难民、庇护和假释办公室的官员，根据授予司法部长的权力，经授权“以非对抗方式主持面谈。”8 C.F.R. § 208.9(b) (1999)。庇护官员在其根据该法所承担的职能方面，仅经司法部长专门授权“主持宣誓、核实申请人的身份……、核实任何翻译人员的身份、出示和接收证据，以及询问申请人和任何证人。”8 C.F.R. § 208.9(c)。

At no place in the statute or regulations are asylum officers delegated authority by Congress or the Attorney General to take “testimony.” The major- ity’s effort to bootstrap the regulatory designation of an asylum officer as an immigration officer, in order to impose a syllogism supporting the conclusion that the asylum officer has statutory authority to “take testimony” in an asylum interview, and therefore to construe the interview as a tribunal, is unavailing. First, the regulation cited by the majority says no more than that an asylum officer is an immigration officer, who is “authorized to exercise the powers and duties of such officer as specified by the Act and [the regulations].” 8 C.F.R. § 103.1(j) (1999) (emphasis added). Second, the current version of section 235(d) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(d) (Supp. II 1996), to which the majority looks as the source of an asylum officer’s purported authority to take testimo- ny, is entitled “Authority Relating to Inspections.” It states no more than that, in the course of investigatory, enforcement-related functions, certain immi- gration officers may administer oaths and take and consider evidence, and that such officers may subpoena “the attendance and testimony” of witnesses before immigration officers. Sections 235(d)(3), (4) of the Act. Such subpoena authority is universally associated with investigatory functions. United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179 (1956), invoked by the majority in support of its position that any immigration officer has authority to call witnesses and take testimony, actually is inapposite to the issue before us. In that case, the Court stated that the “controlling issue . . . is whether this section empowers an immigration officer to subpoena a naturalized citizen who is the subject of an investigation by the Service, where the purpose of the

在法规或条例中，没有任何地方显示国会或司法部长授权庇护官员主持“证言”。多数意见试图将庇护官员的条例指定为移民官员这一身份加以利用，以强加一个三段论来支持以下结论：庇护官员在庇护面谈中有法定权力“主持证言”，从而将面谈解释为裁判庭，这种努力是徒劳的。首先，多数意见所援引的条例仅仅说明庇护官员是一名移民官员，其“经授权行使该法及[条例]所规定的该官员的权力和职责。”8 C.F.R. § 103.1(j) (1999)（着重号为原文所加）。其次，多数意见视为庇护官员据称主持证言权力来源的该法第235(d)条现行文本，8 U.S.C. § 1225(d) (Supp. II 1996)，标题为“与检查有关的权力”。它仅仅规定，在调查性、与执法相关的职能过程中，某些移民官员可以主持宣誓并接收和考虑证据，且此类官员可以传唤证人“出席和作证”于移民官员面前。该法第235(d)(3)、(4)条。 此类传唤权普遍与调查职能相关联。多数意见为支持其任何移民官员都有权传唤证人和主持证言的立场而援引的United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179 (1956)，实际上与我们面前的问题不相关。在该案中，法院指出，“控制性问题……是本条是否授权移民官员传唤一名作为该局调查对象的归化公民，而该调查的目的是

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investigation is to determine if good cause exists for the institution of denat- uralization proceedings . . . .” Id. at 181 (emphasis added). By contrast, the question before us is not whether an asylum officer has subpoena authority that extends to pre-enforcement investigations or credible fear determinations under former section 235 of the Act, but whether section 235(d) of the Act and 8 C.F.R. § 103.1(j) (including an asylum officer as one of over 30 categories of employees designated as immigration officers) confer on an asylum officer the authority to subpoena witnesses to provide testimony in other contexts. Cf. 8 C.F.R. § 208.9; 8 C.F.R. 208.30 (1999). 2 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit also recognizes both the preference for limited subpoena authority and the enforcement-oriented purpose of section 235 of the Act, ruling in Lee Tin Mew v. Jones, 268 F.2d 376, 379 (1959), that the Government failed to establish the immigration officer’s authority to issue the administrative subpoena and stating the following:

确定是否存在提起剥夺国籍程序的正当理由……”Id. at 181（着重号为原文所加）。相比之下，我们面前的问题不是庇护官员是否拥有延伸至该法前第235条下执法前调查或可信恐惧认定的传唤权，而是该法第235(d)条和8 C.F.R. § 103.1(j)（将庇护官员列为被指定为移民官员的30多个雇员类别之一）是否赋予庇护官员在其他情境下传唤证人提供证言的权力。Cf. 8 C.F.R. § 208.9；8 C.F.R. 208.30 (1999)。2 此外，第9巡回法院也承认对有限传唤权的偏好以及该法第235条的执法导向目的，在Lee Tin Mew v. Jones, 268 F.2d 376, 379 (1959)一案中裁定，政府未能确立移民官员签发行政传唤令的权力，并陈述如下：

Id. at 379 (emphasis added). 3 Section 235 of the Act relates to inspection and admission of aliens, not

Id. at 379（着重号为原文所加）。3 该法第235条涉及外国人的检查和入境，而非

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to substantive claims for asylum, which are distinguished from the question of admissibility and are determined “irrespective of such alien’s status.” See sections 208(a), 235(b)(1)(A)(ii) of the Act. Notably, in pertinent part omitted by the majority, former section 235 of the Act, which was addressed in United States v. Minker, supra, provides that “‘[a]ll aliens arriving at ports of the United States shall be examined by one or more immigration officers at the discretion of the Attorney General and under such regulations as he may prescribe.’” Id. at 180 n.1 (quoting section 235(a) of the Act). This is consistent with the terms of section 101(a)(18) of the Act, which defines “immigration officer” broadly to include “any employee . . . of the Service or of the United States designated by the Attorney General, indi- vidually or by regulation, to perform the functions of an immigration offi- cer.” (Emphasis added.) The regulations set forth at 8 C.F.R. § 103.1(j), which must be read in the context of section 101(a)(18) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(18) (1994), regarding performance of the functions of an immi- gration officer, contains an equally broad listing of over 30 categories of employees who are designated as immigration officers. Asylum officers do not exercise subpoena authority in the context of asylum interviews under either section 208 of the Act or 8 C.F.R. pt. 208. Neither do asylum officers carry out pre-enforcement investigative func- tions in the context of conducting asylum interviews under those sections. Cf. section 235(b)(1)(A)(ii) of the Act; section 208(a) of the Act. The recent amendment to the statute, including asylum officers in the inspection and admission process under section 235 of the Act, did not exist in the statute prior to September 30, 1996, and no such investigatory authority to take tes- timony was extended, even for that limited purpose, when this respondent was interviewed by an asylum officer. Certainly, it cannot be claimed that by virtue of the authority in section 235 of the Act and 8 C.F.R. § 103.1(j) alone, asylum officers are designated to perform the functions of a chief patrol agent or district director to issue subpoenas under 8 C.F.R. § 287.4 (1999). Significantly, other than supervisory asylum officers, asylum offi- cers are not authorized to perform the functions of many other immigration officers “acting in such capacity [of one performing an inspection to deter- mine admissibility]” to issue notices to appear under 8 C.F.R. § 239.1(a) (1999). Furthermore, I doubt that the majority would contend that an air- craft pilot, helicopter pilot, detention guard, contact representative, legal- ization assistant, fingerprint specialist, or immigration information officer, each of whom is listed along with the position of asylum officer under 8 C.F.R. § 103.1(j) as an immigration officer, is an officer to whom the authority to subpoena and take testimony automatically extends. The Supreme Court’s reference in United States v. Minker, supra, at 185, to the “full range of subjects covered by the statute” and the signifi- cance of individual section headings, seized upon by the majority as justifi- cation for its position that Minker authorizes asylum officers to take testi-

至庇护申请的实体主张，这些主张与不准入境问题相区别，并且“不论该外国人的身份如何”均予以裁定。见该法第208(a)条、第235(b)(1)(A)(ii)条。值得注意的是，在多数意见所省略的相关部分中，该法原第235条（即United States v. Minker, supra一案所处理的条款）规定，“所有抵达美国口岸的外国人应由一名或多名移民官员在司法部长的酌情决定下并按照其可能规定的条例进行审查。”Id. at 180 n.1（引用该法第235(a)条）。这与该法第101(a)(18)条的条款一致，该条对“移民官员”作广义界定，包括“由司法部长个别或通过条例指定履行移民官员职能的……局或美国的任何雇员”。（着重号为原文所加。）规定于8 C.F.R. § 103.1(j)的条例必须结合该法第101(a)(18)条、8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(18) (1994)关于履行移民官员职能的规定来理解，该条例同样宽泛地列举了30多类被指定为移民官员的雇员。 庇护官员在庇护面谈中并不依据该法第208条或8 C.F.R. pt. 208行使传票权限。庇护官员在依据上述条款进行庇护面谈时也不履行执法前调查职能。Cf. 该法第235(b)(1)(A)(ii)条；该法第208(a)条。将该法第235条项下庇护官员纳入检查与入境程序的近期法律修订，在1996年9月30日之前并不存在于法律中，而且在本答辩人接受庇护官员面谈时，即便为这一有限目的，也未扩展授予任何此类取证调查权限。当然，不能主张仅凭该法第235条和8 C.F.R. § 103.1(j)的授权，庇护官员就被指定履行首席巡逻官或地区主任依据8 C.F.R. § 287.4 (1999)签发传票的职能。值得注意的是，除监督庇护官员外，庇护官员无权履行许多其他移民官员“以该身份[即履行检查以确定不准入境性]行事”依据8 C.F.R. § 239.1(a) (1999)签发出庭通知的职能。此外，我怀疑多数意见会主张，飞机驾驶员、直升机驾驶员、拘留警卫、联络代表、合法化助理、指纹专家或移民信息官员——他们每人都与庇护官员职位一起列于8 C.F.R. § 103.1(j)项下作为移民官员——是传票和取证权限自动延伸适用的官员。 最高法院在United States v. Minker, supra, at 185一案中对“该法所涵盖的全部主题范围”以及各条标题重要性的提及——多数意见抓住这一点作为其主张Minker案授权庇护官员取证的依据——

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mony, was made 40 years before the respondent appeared before the Immigration Judge, nearly 30 years before an Asylum Office was estab- lished, and 40 years before asylum officers were included in the inspection procedure under section 235 of the Act. Obviously, the Court’s interpreta- tion of the language of former section 235 of the Act, which only recently has been modified to include asylum officers for a limited purpose, relied only on section 101(a)(18) of the Act, and was not informed by 8 C.F.R. § 103.1(j), which was first promulgated in 1975. See id. Consequently, in the context of section 235(b) of the Act, an asylum officer’s authority to take testimony should depend on the designation of the Attorney General in per- tinent regulations. An asylum officer’s power to subpoena and take testimony, set forth in section 235 of the Act, has been refined by regulations in which the Attorney General specifically designated the role of asylum officers in con- ducting credible fear determinations that are made in the course of the inspection process. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.30, 235.3(b)(4) (1999). Interestingly, the Attorney General has indicated her intent to limit the asy- lum officer’s authority in this context to administering oaths, verifying the identity of the applicant and any interpreter, presenting and receiving evi- dence, and questioning the applicant and any witnesses. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.9(c) (referring to the authority contained in 8 C.F.R. § 208.30. No sub- poena authority or power to take testimony is extended to asylum officers by the Attorney General in this or any other regulation, creating a stark inconsistency when compared to the position taken by the majority. Furthermore, even assuming that notwithstanding the limitations in 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.9 and 208.30, the statute controls the authority extended to all immi- gration officers who participate in the inspection and admission process, such investigatory authority to issue subpoenas or take testimony exists only in the context of the asylum officer’s role in an inspection and admis- sion function, and no more.

是在答辩人出现在移民法官面前40年之前、庇护办公室设立近30年之前、以及庇护官员被纳入该法第235条项下检查程序40年之前作出的。显然，法院对该法原第235条措辞的解释——该条直到最近才为有限目的修改以纳入庇护官员——仅依据该法第101(a)(18)条，并未参考1975年首次颁布的8 C.F.R. § 103.1(j)。See id. 因此，在该法第235(b)条的语境下，庇护官员的取证权限应取决于司法部长在相关条例中的指定。 该法第235条所规定的庇护官员签发传票和取证的权力，已由条例加以细化，司法部长在其中具体指定了庇护官员在检查程序中进行可信恐惧裁定时的角色。See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.30, 235.3(b)(4) (1999)。有趣的是，司法部长已表示其意图将该语境下庇护官员的权限限于主持宣誓、核实申请人及任何口译员的身份、出示和接收证据以及询问申请人和任何证人。See 8 C.F.R. § 208.9(c)（提及8 C.F.R. § 208.30所载权限）。司法部长在本条例或任何其他条例中均未向庇护官员扩展授予任何传票权限或取证权力，与多数意见所采取的立场形成鲜明的不一致。此外，即使假定尽管有8 C.F.R. §§ 208.9和208.30中的限制，该法仍控制扩展至所有参与检查与入境程序的移民官员的权限，此类签发传票或取证的调查权限也仅存在于庇护官员在检查与入境职能中的角色语境下，仅此而已。

In addition, in 1995, the Attorney General amended the regulations and comprehensively restricted the asylum officers’ authority over asylum applications. With the limited exception of nonimmigrants who are present- ly in a lawful status, an asylum officer has been divested of authority to deny an application for asylum and reduced merely to screening and grant- ing all applications in which the applicant is subject to removal, or referring the applicant’s case to an Immigration Judge for an exclusion or deportation hearing. Compare 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(b)(2) (1995) with 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(a) (1994). As the preamble to the 1995 regulations specifically states, “Asylum officers would no longer deny applications from persons who are exclud- able or deportable, but instead would refer such cases directly to an immi-

此外，1995年，司法部长修订了条例，全面限制了庇护官员对庇护申请的权限。除目前处于合法身份的非移民这一有限例外，庇护官员已被剥夺拒绝庇护申请的权限，仅被缩减为筛选并批准申请人面临遣返的所有申请，或将申请人的案件移交移民法官进行不准入境或驱逐出境听证。比较8 C.F.R. § 208.14(b)(2) (1995)与8 C.F.R. § 208.14(a) (1994)。正如1995年条例的序言具体所述，“庇护官员将不再拒绝可被不准入境或可被驱逐出境者的申请，而是将此类案件直接移交移民

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gration judge for adjudication.” 59 Fed. Reg. 62,284, 62,294 (1994) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208). The amendment of the regulations effective- ly removed the two principal functions—preparing a written assessment of the claim and rendering a written decision—that would require, or at least provide an impetus for, in the majority of asylum interviews, an asylum officer to keep an accurate and reliable record of the applicant’s statements during the interview. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(c) (1994). Furthermore, the majority’s contentions that an asylum officer has “analogous authority over asylum claims” as the authority exercised by an Immigration Judge, and specifically, that an asylum officer has authority to “maintain a record” or “most importantly, to decide the merits of the asylum application” are blatantly incorrect. See Matter of R-S-J-, 22 I&N Dec. 3401, at 8 (BIA 1999). First, unlike an Immigration Judge, an asy- lum officer does not conduct a “hearing,” and unlike an asylum applica- tion adjudicated in a hearing conducted before an Immigration Judge, there is no judicial review of the content or result of an asylum interview. Second, in stark contrast to the “interview” conducted by an asylum offi- cer, the regulations mandate that in proceedings before an Immigration Judge, “[t]estimony of witnesses appearing at the hearing shall be under oath or affirmation.” 8 C.F.R. § 3.34 (1999). “The only recording equip- ment permitted in the proceeding will be the equipment used by the Immigration Judge to create the official record.” 8 C.F.R. § 3.28 (1999). Third, recent amendments to the regulations have circumscribed the authority of asylum officers. As noted, with the exception of applications filed by nonimmigrants who presently are in a lawful status, asylum officers no longer have any authority to deny asylum. 8 C.F.R. 208.14(b) (1999). Consequently, the majority is in error when it contends that asylum officers exercise greater authority than naturalization examiners, because the former grant or deny, while, in the majority of cases, the latter only recommend a course of action. To say that an asylum officer’s authority is comparable to that of an Immigration Judge, or that she has greater authority than a naturalization examiner, is utterly without support. Moreover, an asylum officer’s author- ity certainly cannot be said to be “at least as firmly established,” having been restricted just 3 years ago. Matter of R-S-J-, supra, at 10. Significantly, in the vast majority of cases, asylum officers no longer are responsible for preparing and issuing a written “Notice of Intent to Deny,” and no longer are responsible for issuing a written decision address- ing either an applicant’s veracity or credibility or the merits of his or her claim. When an asylum officer is unable to grant asylum based on the appli- cation and the interview, the asylum officer must refer the applicant for a full hearing before an Immigration Judge, at which the applicant may sub- mit an asylum application anew that will be adjudicated on the record. 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(b)(2). The asylum officer keeps no record, makes no rec-

移民主审法官裁决。”59 Fed. Reg. 62,284, 62,294 (1994)（将编入8 C.F.R. pt. 208）。该条例修正案实际上取消了两种主要职能——准备对申请的书面评估和作出书面决定——这两种职能在大多数庇护面谈中会要求、或至少会促使庇护官员准确可靠地记录申请人在面谈期间的陈述。见8 C.F.R. § 208.18(c) (1994)。 此外，多数意见主张庇护官员对庇护申请拥有“类似权力”，如同移民主审法官所行使的权力，特别是主张庇护官员有权“保存记录”或“最重要的是，裁决庇护申请的实体问题”，这些主张公然不正确。见Matter of R-S-J-, 22 I&N Dec. 3401, at 8 (BIA 1999)。第一，与移民主审法官不同，庇护官员不进行“听证”，而且与在移民主审法官主持的听证中裁决的庇护申请不同，对庇护面谈的内容或结果没有司法审查。第二，与庇护官员进行的“面谈”形成鲜明对比，条例规定在移民主审法官主持的程序中，“出庭作证的证人的证言必须经过宣誓或确认。”8 C.F.R. § 3.34 (1999)。“程序中允许使用的唯一录音设备将是移民主审法官用于制作正式记录所使用的设备。”8 C.F.R. § 3.28 (1999)。第三，最近的条例修正案已限制了庇护官员的权力。 如前所述，除目前处于合法身份的非移民提交的申请外，庇护官员不再拥有任何拒绝庇护的权力。8 C.F.R. 208.14(b) (1999)。因此，多数意见主张庇护官员行使比入籍审查员更大的权力是错误的，因为前者批准或拒绝，而在大多数案件中后者仅建议采取某一行动方案。说庇护官员的权力可与移民主审法官的权力相比，或说她比入籍审查员拥有更大的权力，是完全没有任何支持的。此外，庇护官员的权力在仅仅3年前受到限制，当然不能说其权力“至少同样牢固确立”。Matter of R-S-J-, supra, at 10。 重要的是，在绝大多数案件中，庇护官员不再负责准备和签发书面的“拒绝意向通知”，也不再负责签发涉及申请人的真实性或可信度或其申请实体问题的书面决定。当庇护官员无法根据申请和面谈给予庇护时，庇护官员必须将申请人转介至移民主审法官处进行完整听证，在听证中申请人可以重新提交庇护申请，该申请将根据记录进行裁决。8 C.F.R. § 208.14(b)(2)。庇护官员不保存任何记录，不作任何建

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ommendation for purposes of a hearing before the Immigration Judge, and enters no substantive adverse decision as a result of the interview conduct- ed. Yet it is the interview underlying such a referral to the Immigration Judge to which the majority would look to conclude that the statements made by an asylum applicant constitute “false testimony.” The informal, nonadversarial procedures followed by asylum officers severely limit the reliability of any statements later alleged to have been made by an asylum applicant during his interview with an asylum officer. Interviews before asylum officers are not conducted in the more formal and structured “Q & A” format that is typical of naturalization examinations, or other highly structured interview situations, which often include a specific recording of the alien’s statements. See, e.g., Stokes v. INS, No. 74 Civ. 1022 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 1976) (final judgment) (requiring the Service to conduct visa petition interviews based on a marriage in a recorded question and answer format). In such cases, the question whether or not “false testimo- ny” may have been presented is not dependent on the vagaries of recollec- tion and subjective interpretation. By contrast, an interview before an asy- lum officer contains neither the formality nor the detail produced by a for- mal “Q & A” or recorded hearing. Consequently, not only are the assur- ances of accuracy and reliability that are present in more structured cases absent, but we are not presented with any tangible record to review. This is a crucial distinction. In Matter of S-S-, 21 I&N Dec. 121 (BIA 1995), we held that in order for the Board to fully and fairly consider the effect of a decision by an asylum officer on a later application before an Immigration Judge, the record of the interview must contain a meaningful, clear, and reliable summary of the statements made by the applicant. In the alternative, we recognized that a record of the interview might be preserved in a handwritten account of the specific questions asked of the applicant and his specific responses, or through transcription of an electronic recording, rejecting the “obviously . . . informal, personal notations of the asylum offi- cer that were never intended to be a formal summary of the interview.” Id. at 123. This is so because, while they were made at the time of the respon- dent’s interview, such notes were “randomly organized, cryptic to all but the note-taker, and partially illegible.” Id. The majority’s concession that deter- mining whether an alien has given “false testimony” before an asylum offi- cer “may present more difficult questions of proof” is telling and raises practical concerns that belie its insistence that we establish a rule that statements before asylum officers constitute “false testimony.” Matter of R- S-J-, supra, at 12. Under circumstances in which there is no record of the interview, and the interviewer lacks any authority to deny the claim, I do not see how we can determine whether the statements were in fact “false testimony,” even if they were made under oath and even if the respondent admits that he affirmed false statements made in his asylum application. I note, in addi-

议供移民主审法官听证之用，也不因所进行的面谈而作出任何实质性的不利决定。然而，多数意见恰恰要依据这种导致转介至移民主审法官的面谈，来认定庇护申请人所作的陈述构成“虚假证言”。 庇护官员遵循的非正式、非对抗性程序严重限制了后来据称庇护申请人在与庇护官员面谈期间所作任何陈述的可靠性。庇护官员面前的面谈不是以入籍审查中典型的、更为正式和结构化的“问答”格式进行的，也不是以其他高度结构化的面谈情形进行的，这些情形通常包括对外国人陈述的具体录音。见，例如，Stokes v. INS, No. 74 Civ. 1022 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 1976)（最终判决）（要求移民局以录音问答格式进行基于婚姻的签证申请面谈）。在此类案件中，是否可能提供了“虚假证言”的问题不取决于记忆的变幻和主观解释。相比之下，庇护官员面前的面谈既不具备正式“问答”或录音听证所产生的正式性，也不具备其细节。因此，不仅更结构化案件中存在的准确性和可靠性保证缺失，而且我们没有任何有形记录可供审查。 这是一个关键区别。在Matter of S-S-, 21 I&N Dec. 121 (BIA 1995)中，我们裁定，为了使委员会充分和公平地考虑庇护官员的决定对后来在移民主审法官处提出的申请的影响，面谈记录必须包含对申请人所作陈述的有意义、清晰和可靠的摘要。作为替代，我们承认面谈记录可以通过手写记录向申请人提出的具体问题及其具体回答，或通过电子录音的转录来保存，同时拒绝“显然……非正式的、庇护官员个人的笔记，这些笔记从未打算作为面谈的正式摘要。”Id. at 123。之所以如此，是因为虽然这些笔记是在被申请人面谈时制作的，但此类笔记“组织随意，除记录者外对所有人都是晦涩难懂的，并且部分难以辨认。”Id. 多数意见承认，确定外国人是否在庇护官员面前提供了“虚假证言”“可能会提出更困难的证明问题”，这一点很能说明问题，并引发了实际关切，这些关切与其坚持我们确立一条规则——即在庇护官员面前的陈述构成“虚假证言”——相矛盾。Matter of R-S-J-, supra, at 12。 在没有面谈记录、且面谈者缺乏任何拒绝申请的权力的情况下，我看不出我们如何能够确定这些陈述事实上是否属于“虚假证言”，即使它们是在宣誓下作出的，即使被申请人承认他确认了其庇护申请中所作的虚假陈述。我还注意

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tion, that the Third Circuit has questioned even the reliability of record “Q & A” statements. See Marincas v. Lewis, 92 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 1996) (find- ing reliance on such records to establish an alien’s incredibility to be inap- propriate); see also Balasubramanrim v. INS, 143 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding reliance on statements given to airport inspectors not dispositive). In the instant case, there is even less of a record upon which to judge whether the respondent made any false statements during the asylum inter- view. Nevertheless, the majority not only would make an adverse credibili- ty finding and conclude that the respondent lacks good moral character as a matter of fact, but would bar the respondent from showing good moral char- acter as a matter of law. This goes much further than the law or this record allows. Every false statement made under oath does not necessarily constitute false testimony that is punishable under the law. As the Ninth Circuit emphasized in Phinpathya v. INS, supra, at 1019, “Had Congress intended sections 1101(f)(6) and 1254(a)(1) to encompass all statements, or even all statements under oath, it would have so provided,” citing the explicit provi- sion in 18 U.S.C. § 1001 that punishes the making or use of any “false, fic- titious or fraudulent statements or representations, or . . . any false writing or document.” The court reasoned:

到，第三巡回法院甚至质疑记录“问答”陈述的可靠性。见Marincas v. Lewis, 92 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 1996)（认定依赖此类记录来确立外国人的不可信是不适当的）；另见Balasubramanrim v. INS, 143 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 1998)（认定依赖向机场检查员所作的陈述不具有决定性）。 在本案中，可用于判断被申请人在庇护面谈期间是否作出任何虚假陈述的记录甚至更少。然而，多数意见不仅会作出不利的可信度认定并作为事实问题裁定被申请人不具备良好道德品质，而且会作为法律问题禁止被申请人证明良好道德品质。这远远超出了法律或本记录所允许的范围。 并非每一项在宣誓下作出的虚假陈述都必然构成依法可惩罚的虚假证言。正如第九巡回法院在Phinpathya v. INS, supra, at 1019中所强调的，“如果国会意图使第1101(f)(6)条和第1254(a)(1)条涵盖所有陈述，甚至所有在宣誓下作出的陈述，它本会如此规定”，并引用了18 U.S.C. § 1001中的明确规定，该条惩罚作出或使用任何“虚假、虚构或欺诈性陈述或表示，或……任何虚假文字或文件”。法院推理道：

Id. The limitations on what types of statements constitute false testimony encompass both the forum in which the statements are made and the format in which they are reported. For example, a material false statement—oral or written—to an executive branch agency regarding a matter within its juris- diction is punishable as a criminal offense. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (Supp. II 1996). However, this must be distinguished from a false statement to a judi- cial branch adjudicator, before whom such a false statement is not punish- able under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. See Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695 (1995). The criminal code explicitly sets forth the crime of making false statements to a naturalization officer. 18 U.S.C. § 1015 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). Of even greater contrast is the requirement that testimony before a tribunal be established to be false to constitute perjury under 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1994). Similarly, to the extent pertinent here, the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (1994), requires the Government, on the defendant’s motion, to produce any “statement” of a “witness called by the United States.” The

Id. 对何种类型的陈述构成虚假证言的限制既涵盖作出陈述的场所，也涵盖报告陈述的格式。例如，向行政机关就其管辖范围内的事项作出重大虚假陈述——无论是口头还是书面——可作为刑事犯罪予以惩罚。18 U.S.C. § 1001 (Supp. II 1996)。然而，这必须与向司法部门裁决者作出的虚假陈述相区别，在后者面前此类虚假陈述不受18 U.S.C. § 1001的惩罚。见Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695 (1995)。刑法典明确规定了向入籍官员作出虚假陈述的罪行。18 U.S.C. § 1015 (1994 & Supp. II 1996)。更为鲜明的对比是，根据18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1994)，在法庭上作出的证言必须被确立为虚假才构成伪证。 同样，就此处相关的范围而言，《Jencks法》18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (1994)要求政府在被告提出动议时出示“美国政府传唤的证人”的任何“陈述”。该

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term “statement” is defined in the Jencks Act as the witness’s signed or adopted written statement, a “substantially verbatim” recording or tran- scription of the witness’s oral statement, or any testimony the witness has given to a grand jury. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e); see also United States v. Sasso, 59 F.3d 341, 351 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Ben M. Hogan Co., 769 F.2d 1293, 1300-01 (8th Cir. 1985) (prosecutor’s witness interview notes containing fragmentary quotes not “statements” covered in their entirety by the Jencks Act). This is pertinent because the Jencks Act distinguishes between types of statements, all of which must have the ring of reliability to them. It is clear from the foregoing provisions that Congress makes a dis- tinction between testimony and other forms of evidence. See also Fed. R. Crim. P. 26; Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(a); Fed. R. Evid. 602, 603, 613. Such distinctions are consistent with the conclusions reached by the Ninth Circuit in the immigration context. The court in Phinpathya v. INS, supra, at 1018-19, referring to a deportation hearing conducted on the record before an Immigration Judge, held that because the petitioner’s false statements were written on her application for suspension of deportation, they were not statements made in that hearing by a witness under oath to establish proof of a fact to a court or tribunal and did not qualify as false testimony. As in Phinpathya, where the court emphasized that the record was unclear as to whether the respondent affirmed the statements made on her application, the transcript before us reflects only that the respondent agreed that he “went accordingly” with the application his attorney had pre- pared. Contrary to the majority’s reading, the respondent does not admit that he actually made statements under oath before the asylum officer in which he lied or even repeated the false information in the application. While he admitted that when he signed the application before the asylum officer he knew the information on the application was false, the respondent acknowledged only equivocally that he answered “according to the story.” This does not establish that “[t]he same false statements, however, were given orally as testimony at the preliminary investigation, and this brings the case clearly within the proscription of the statute. See Matter of G-L-T-, 8 I&N 403 (1959).” In re Haniatakis, 376 F.2d 728, 730 (3d Cir. 1967). In light of the authorities discussed above, and the state of the record before us, I conclude that whether or not the asylum officer placed the respondent under oath, false statements made before an officer who is not expressly authorized by Congress to take testimony and who does not cre- ate a record cannot be deemed “false testimony” precluding the respondent from an opportunity to demonstrate that a discretionary finding of good moral character under section 101(f)(6) of the Act is warranted. This is not to say that the asylum officer did not diligently undertake his or her duties. The annotations on the asylum application constitute the asylum officer’s recollections and impressions of the alien’s statements, not the alien’s actual statements, and the respondent has acknowledged that his

“陈述”一词在《詹克斯法》中的定义是：证人签署或采纳的书面陈述、对证人口头陈述的“实质逐字”录音或转录，或证人向大陪审团提供的任何证言。18 U.S.C. § 3500(e)；另见 United States v. Sasso, 59 F.3d 341, 351 (2d Cir. 1995)；United States v. Ben M. Hogan Co., 769 F.2d 1293, 1300-01 (8th Cir. 1985)（检察官的证人访谈笔记包含片段性引语，不属于《詹克斯法》整体涵盖的“陈述”）。这一点具有相关性，因为《詹克斯法》区分了不同类型的陈述，而所有这些陈述都必须具有可靠性的特征。从上述规定可以清楚看出，国会区分了证言与其他形式的证据。另见 Fed. R. Crim. P. 26；Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(a)；Fed. R. Evid. 602, 603, 613。 此类区分与第9巡回法院在移民语境中得出的结论一致。Phinpathya v. INS, supra, at 1018-19 案中，法院提及在移民法官面前基于记录进行的驱逐听证，认定由于申请人的虚假陈述是写在她的暂停驱逐申请上的，因此它们不是在听证中由证人在宣誓下为向法院或法庭证明某一事实而作出的陈述，不构成虚假证言。正如在 Phinpathya 案中，法院强调记录不清楚被申请人是否确认了其申请上的陈述，而我们面前的转录记录仅反映被申请人同意他“照此办理”其律师准备的申请。与多数意见的解读相反，被申请人并未承认他实际上在庇护官员面前宣誓作出了虚假陈述，或甚至重复了申请中的虚假信息。虽然他承认在庇护官员面前签署申请时他知道申请上的信息是虚假的，但被申请人仅含糊地承认他“按照那套说法”作了回答。这并不能证明“[t]然而，同样的虚假陈述在初步调查中作为证言口头作出，这使本案明确落入法规的禁止范围。见 Matter of G-L-T-, 8 I&N 403 (1959)。” In re Haniatakis, 376 F.2d 728, 730 (3d Cir. 1967)。 鉴于上述讨论的权威依据以及我们面前的记录状况，我得出结论：无论庇护官员是否让被申请人宣誓，在未经国会明确授权取证且不制作记录的官员面前作出的虚假陈述，不能被视为“虚假证言”从而阻止被申请人有机会证明根据该法第101(f)(6)条作出良好道德品行的自由裁量认定是正当的。 这并不是说庇护官员没有勤勉履行职责。庇护申请上的批注构成庇护官员对外国人陈述的回忆和印象，而非外国人的实际陈述，且被申请人已承认他的

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former attorney specifically included false and inaccurate information on his written application. The critical fact is that this is only an application, and it does not constitute testimony. Although it is a false application and a false statement, it is not “false testimony.” I cannot in good conscience impose upon an alien the stigma of “false testimony,” barring any showing of good moral character pursuant to section 101(f)(6) of the Act, under these circumstances. The record is simply not specific and detailed enough to support that conclusion, and the statutory authority designated to an asy- lum officer does not warrant such a conclusion. Accordingly, I would hold that false statements made on an application before an asylum officer do not constitute “false testimony.”

前律师在其书面申请中具体包含了虚假和不准确的信息。关键事实是，这只是一份申请，不构成证言。尽管它是虚假申请和虚假陈述，但它不是“虚假证言”。在这种情况下，我不能凭良心将“虚假证言”的污名强加于一名外国人，从而根据该法第101(f)(6)条阻止其证明良好道德品行。记录根本不够具体和详细，不足以支持该结论，且授予庇护官员的法定权限也不支持该结论。因此，我主张在庇护官员面前就申请作出的虚假陈述不构成“虚假证言”。

II. GOOD MORAL CHARACTER IN THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION

II. 行使自由裁量权中的良好道德品行

The issue of whether the respondent has established good moral char- acter is a matter of discretion that must be determined in the first instance by the Immigration Judge. I do not need to reach and express no opinion as to whether the exercise of discretion is warranted in this case. I note, how- ever, that whether discretionary relief is warranted requires an examination and a balancing of favorable and adverse factors. See Matter of Gamboa, 14 I&N Dec. 244, 248 (BIA 1972) (holding that in exercising discretion on a voluntary departure application, the special inquiry officer may take into account many factors, including the alien’s prior immigration history, the nature of his entry or entries, and compensating elements such as long res- idence, close family ties, or humanitarian needs); see also Matter of S-, 6 I&N Dec. 692 (A.G. 1955). To be considered fair and reasonable, a decision based on the exercise of discretion must contain “‘reasons which show that it has properly considered the facts which bear on its decision.’” Prapavat v. INS, 662 F.2d 561, 562 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting Mejia-Carrillo v. INS, 656 F.2d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1981)). When the Board denies relief as a matter of discretion, it may not exer- cise its discretion arbitrarily. Mattis v. INS, 774 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Patel v. INS, 741 F.2d 1134, 1136 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also Watkins v. INS, 63 F.3d 844, 850 (9th Cir. 1995) (reaffirming that “‘[w]hile agencies must have significant flexibility to adapt their practices to meet changed circumstances or the facts of a particular case . . . [they] abuse their discretion no less by arriving at plausible decisions in an arbitrary fashion than by reaching unreasonable results’” (quoting Yepes-Prado v. INS, 10 F.3d 1363, 1370 (9th Cir. 1993))); Batoon v. INS, 791 F.2d 681, 684 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (upholding review for abuse of discretion). For almost 2 decades, the Ninth Circuit has made clear that discretionary denials must show that the Board, and the Immigration Judges, weighed both favorable

被申请人是否已证明良好道德品行的问题属于自由裁量事项，必须首先由移民法官裁定。我无需触及也并不就本案中行使自由裁量权是否正当发表意见。然而，我注意到，自由裁量救济是否正当需要审查并权衡有利和不利因素。见 Matter of Gamboa, 14 I&N Dec. 244, 248 (BIA 1972)（认定在就自愿离境申请行使自由裁量权时，特别调查官可以考虑许多因素，包括外国人的先前移民历史、其入境或多次入境的性质，以及长期居留、密切家庭关系或人道主义需求等补偿性因素）；另见 Matter of S-, 6 I&N Dec. 692 (A.G. 1955)。为被视为公平合理，基于行使自由裁量权的决定必须包含“‘表明其已适当考虑影响其决定的事实的理由。’” Prapavat v. INS, 662 F.2d 561, 562 (9th Cir. 1981)（引用 Mejia-Carrillo v. INS, 656 F.2d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1981)）。 当委员会作为自由裁量事项拒绝救济时，它不得任意行使自由裁量权。Mattis v. INS, 774 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1985)（引用 Patel v. INS, 741 F.2d 1134, 1136 (9th Cir. 1984)）；另见 Watkins v. INS, 63 F.3d 844, 850 (9th Cir. 1995)（重申“‘虽然机构必须具有重大灵活性以调整其做法以适应变化的情况或特定案件的事实……[它们]以任意方式得出看似合理的决定与得出不合理结果一样，都是滥用自由裁量权’” （引用 Yepes-Prado v. INS, 10 F.3d 1363, 1370 (9th Cir. 1993)））；Batoon v. INS, 791 F.2d 681, 684 (9th Cir. 1986)（全体庭审）（维持对滥用自由裁量权的审查）。近2个世纪以来，第9巡回法院已明确，自由裁量拒绝必须表明委员会和移民法官权衡了有利

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and unfavorable factors. De La Luz v. INS, 713 F.2d 545, 546 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Ahwazi v. INS, 751 F.2d 1120, 1122-23 (9th Cir. 1985) (emphasizing that the Board must state its reasons and show proper consid- eration of all factors when weighing equities and denying relief); Contreras-Buenfil v. INS, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983); Ramirez- Gonzalez v. INS, 695 F.2d 1208, 1213 (9th Cir. 1983); Chae Kim Ro v. INS, 670 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir. 1982); Villena v. INS, 622 F.2d 1352, 1361 n.12 (9th Cir. 1980). Accordingly, the Board has consistently required that all relevant factors must be considered individually and cumulatively. Matter of O-J-O-, 21 I&N Dec. 381 (BIA 1996); Matter of Anderson, 16 I&N Dec. 596 (BIA 1978); Matter of Riccio, 15 I&N Dec. 548 (BIA 1976). Although we need not weigh or balance here any of the positive and adverse factors that must be considered individually or cumulatively, I do note that the record contains evidence that the respondent has been in the United States since 1983, a period of 15 years, that he is 45 years of age, and that he has worked in a stable position at Barrier Oil Company for the past 10 years, starting as a service representative and moving up to the posi- tion of service station supervisor. The record also indicates that the respon- dent suffered a heart attack in 1995, and that he has been taking medication for a heart condition and has suffered additional heart problems requiring hospitalization since that time. The record also contains information that the respondent is a member of a religious group in the United States and has formed meaningful religious and personal ties to that group and its mem- bers. In addition, the respondent has documented the adverse conditions in the Punjab, the region of India to which, as a Sikh, he would return. In addition, the record contains affirmative evidence indicating that the respondent has no criminal record and has not been involved in any crimi- nal activity in the United States, and it contains no information that the respondent ever has sought or received any federal or state public assistance for which he was not eligible. The record contains no information indicat- ing that the respondent has any previous record of immigration violations of any sort. At the same time, the record does contain information that the respondent affirmed false representations made in an asylum application, and that he may have made further statements in the asylum interview that perpetuated the falsehoods contained in the application. The determination whether the respondent has demonstrated good moral character, for pur- poses of establishing his eligibility to apply and be considered for both sus- pension of deportation and voluntary departure, must rest on a considera- tion of all the factors in the record. Arrozal v. INS, 159 F.3d 429, 432-33 (9th Cir. 1998). The initial determination as to whether the respondent has established good moral character is not before us, but is for the Immigration Judge. Therefore, without deciding the burden of proof and discretionary questions raised, regarding either the respondent’s good moral character alone or his

和不利因素。De La Luz v. INS, 713 F.2d 545, 546 (9th Cir. 1983)；另见 Ahwazi v. INS, 751 F.2d 1120, 1122-23 (9th Cir. 1985)（强调委员会在权衡衡平因素和拒绝救济时必须说明其理由并表明适当考虑了所有因素）；Contreras-Buenfil v. INS, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)；Ramirez-Gonzalez v. INS, 695 F.2d 1208, 1213 (9th Cir. 1983)；Chae Kim Ro v. INS, 670 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir. 1982)；Villena v. INS, 622 F.2d 1352, 1361 n.12 (9th Cir. 1980)。因此，委员会一贯要求所有相关因素必须单独和累积考虑。Matter of O-J-O-, 21 I&N Dec. 381 (BIA 1996)；Matter of Anderson, 16 I&N Dec. 596 (BIA 1978)；Matter of Riccio, 15 I&N Dec. 548 (BIA 1976)。 尽管我们在此无需权衡或平衡必须单独或累积考虑的任何积极和不利因素，但我确实注意到记录中包含证据表明被申请人自1983年以来一直在美国，为期15年，他45岁，且过去10年在Barrier Oil Company担任稳定职位，从服务代表开始并晋升至服务站主管职位。记录还表明被申请人于1995年心脏病发作，此后一直服用心脏状况药物并遭受额外心脏问题需要住院治疗。记录还包含信息表明被申请人是美国一个宗教团体的成员，并与该团体及其成员形成了有意义的宗教和个人联系。此外，被申请人记录了旁遮普地区的恶劣条件，作为锡克教徒他将返回印度该地区。 此外，记录包含肯定性证据表明被申请人没有犯罪记录，且未在美国参与任何犯罪活动，且不包含任何信息表明被申请人曾寻求或接受任何他无资格的联邦或州公共援助。记录不包含任何信息表明被申请人有任何类型的先前移民违规记录。同时，记录确实包含信息表明被申请人确认了庇护申请中的虚假陈述，且他可能在庇护面谈中作出进一步陈述以延续申请中的虚假内容。被申请人是否已证明良好道德品行，以确立其申请并有资格被考虑暂停驱逐和自愿离境的资格，必须基于对记录中所有因素的考虑。Arrozal v. INS, 159 F.3d 429, 432-33 (9th Cir. 1998)。 关于被申请人是否已证明良好道德品行的初步裁定不在我们面前，而是由移民法官决定。因此，在不裁定所提出的举证责任和自由裁量问题的情况下，无论是关于被申请人单独的良好道德品行还是其

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ultimate eligibility for suspension of deportation, I would remand this appeal to the Immigration Judge for all purposes. The respondent is entitled to a hearing in which the Immigration Judge assesses the evidentiary fac- tors pertaining to good moral character and makes a legal determination concerning the respondent’s eligibility to apply for suspension of deporta- tion in that regard, as well as in terms of whether the respondent can demon- strate extreme hardship and merits suspension of deportation in the overall exercise of discretion.

最终暂停驱逐资格，我将为所有目的将此上诉发回移民法官。被申请人有权获得听证，其中移民法官评估与良好道德品行相关的证据因素，并就被申请人在这方面申请暂停驱逐的资格作出法律裁定，以及就被申请人是否能证明极端困难并在整体行使自由裁量权中值得暂停驱逐作出裁定。

III. CONCLUSION

III. 结论

I conclude that, as a matter of law, statements provided in the asylum interview cannot constitute the basis for a “false testimony” finding. While the majority would remand this case to the Immigration Judge to determine whether the respondent testified under oath during the interview before the asylum officer, I do not view that determination dispositive, as I conclude that even false statements made under oath before the asylum officer do not constitute false testimony within the meaning of section 101(f)(6) of the Act. Rather, in light of my conclusion that the respondent is not statutorily barred from demonstrating good moral character, the case should be remanded to allow the Immigration Judge to consider both favorable and adverse factors bearing on whether the respondent has demonstrated good moral character and other eligibility for discretionary relief.

我得出结论，作为法律问题，庇护面谈中提供的陈述不能构成“虚假证词”认定的依据。虽然多数意见倾向于将本案发回移民法官，以判定受访者在庇护官员面谈期间是否经宣誓作证，但我并不认为该判定具有决定性，因为我得出结论：即使是在庇护官员面前经宣誓作出的虚假陈述，也不构成该法第101(f)(6)条意义上的虚假证词。相反，鉴于我得出结论认为受访者并未被法定禁止证明其具有良好道德品格，本案应发回重审，以便移民法官同时考虑有利于和不利于受访者是否已证明其具有良好道德品格以及是否符合其他酌情救济资格的因素。

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