Matter of Lozada

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: ON BEHALF OF SERVICE: Mark L. Galvin, Esquire John M. Furlong Watt & Galvin General Attorney 110 Chestnut Street Providence, Rhode Island 02903

代表 respondent： 代表服务局： Mark L. Galvin 律师 John M. Furlong Watt & Galvin 总律师 110 Chestnut Street Providence, Rhode Island 02903

On March 13, 1985, an immigration judge found the respondent deportable as charged on the basis of his concessions at the hearing under section 241(aX4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §125.1(a)(4) (1982), as an alien who was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within 5 years of entry and

1985年3月13日，一名移民法官根据答辩人在听证会上的承认，依据《移民与国籍法》第241(aX4)条、8 U.S.C. §125.1(a)(4) (1982)，认定答辩人作为在入境后5年内犯有涉及道德败坏罪行的外国人，可按指控予以驱逐，并且

was sentenced to confinement for 1 year or more, denied his appli- cations for relief under section 212(c) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1982), and for voluntary departure under section 244(e) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e) (1982), and ordered him deported to the Domini- can Republic. That same day, the respondent filed a Notice of Appeal (Form I-290A), indicating that he would be filing a separate written brief or statement in support of his appeal. No such brief or statement was forthcoming. On July 8, 1986, over a year after the immigration judge had entered his decision in the case, the Board summarily dismissed the appeal, noting that the respondent had in no meaningful manner identified the claimed error in the immigration judge's comprehensive decision of March 13, 1985. On January 20, 1987, the respondent, through present counsel,' filed a motion to reopen the proceedings, alleging (1) that prior counsel's failure to submit a written brief or statement explaining the basis for appeal constituted ineffective assistance of counsel and (2) that the immigration judge erred as a matter of law and discretion in deciding the case. The respondent also filed a petition for review of the Board's decision with the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The court has stayed action on. the petition for review pending the Board's resolution of the motion to reopen. The motion will be denied. Any right a respondent in deportation proceedings may have to counsel is grounded in the fifth amendment guarantee of due proc- ess. Magallanes-Damian v. INS, 783 F.2d 931 (9th Cir. 1986); Paul v. INS, 521 F.2d 194 (5th Cir- 1975). Ineffective assistance of counsel in a deportation proceeding is a denial of due process only if the proceeding was so fundamentally unfair that the alien was pre- vented from reasonably presenting his case. Ramirez-Durazo v. INS, 794 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1986); Lopez v. INS, 775 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Magallanes-Damian v. INS, supra (alien must show not merely ineffective assistance of counsel, but assistance which is so ineffective as to have impinged upon the fundamental fairness of the hearing in -violation of the fifth amendment due process clause). One must show, moreover, that he was prejudiced by his representative's performance. Mohsseni Behbahani v. INS, 796 F.2d 249 (9th Cir. 1986). See generally Matter of Santos, 19 I&N Dec. 105 (BIA 1984). The Government maintains that the fact that prior counsel did not submit a brief does not in itself amount to deprivation of due process. We agree.

被判处1年或以上监禁，驳回了其根据该法第212(c)条，8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1982) 申请救济以及根据该法第244(e)条，8 U.S.C. § 1254(e) (1982) 申请自愿离境的请求，并命令将其驱逐至多米尼加共和国。同日，respondent 提交了上诉通知（表格 I-290A），表明其将另行提交书面简报或陈述以支持其上诉。但并未提交此类简报或陈述。1986年7月8日，在移民法官对该案作出决定一年多之后，委员会简易驳回了上诉，指出 respondent 未以任何有意义的方式指明移民法官1985年3月13日全面决定中所称的错误。1987年1月20日，respondent 通过现任律师'提交了重开程序的动议，声称(1) 前任律师未提交解释上诉依据的书面简报或陈述构成无效律师协助，以及(2) 移民法官在法律和自由裁量权上错误地裁决了该案。respondent 还向美国第一巡回上诉法院提交了复审委员会决定的申请。法院已中止复审申请的行动，等待委员会对重开动议的解决。该动议将被驳回。 驱逐程序中的 respondent 可能拥有的律师权利基于第五修正案的正当程序保障。Magallanes-Damian v. INS, 783 F.2d 931 (9th Cir. 1986)；Paul v. INS, 521 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1975)。驱逐程序中的无效律师协助只有在程序如此根本不公平以致外国人被阻止合理陈述其案件时才构成正当程序之剥夺。Ramirez-Durazo v. INS, 794 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1986)；Lopez v. INS, 775 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1985)；另见 Magallanes-Damian v. INS, 同上（外国人必须证明不仅是无效律师协助，而且是如此无效以致侵犯了听证会基本公平性、违反第五修正案正当程序条款的协助）。此外，必须证明其因代理人的表现而受到损害。Mohsseni Behbahani v. INS, 796 F.2d 249 (9th Cir. 1986)。一般参见 Matter of Santos, 19 I&N Dec. 105 (BIA 1984)。 政府主张，前任律师未提交简报这一事实本身并不构成正当程序之剥夺。我们同意。

Failure to specify reasons for an appeal is grounds for summary dismissal under 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(1-aXi) (1988). See generally Matter of Valencia, 19 I&N Dec. 354 (131A 1986). It would be anomalous to hold that the same action or, more accurately, inaction that gives rise to a summary dismissal of an appeal could, without more, serve as the basis of a motion to reopen. To allow such anomaly would permit an alien to circumvent at will the appeals process, with its regulatory time constraints, by the simple expedient of failing to properly pursue his appeal rights, then claiming ineffec- tive assistance of counsel. Litigants are generally bound by the con- duct of their attorneys, absent egregious circumstances. LeBlanc v. INS, 715 F.2d 685 (1st Cir. 1983). No such egregious circumstances have been established in this case. A motion based upon a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel should be supported by an affidavit of the allegedly aggrieved re- spondent attesting to the relevant facts. In the case before us, that affidavit should include a statement that sets forth in detail the agreement that was entered into with former counsel with respect to the actions to be taken on appeal and what counsel did or did not represent to the respondent in this regard. Furthermore, before allegations of ineffective assistance of former counsel are presented to the Board, former counsel must be informed of the allegations and allowed the opportunity to respond. Any subsequent response from counsel, or report of counsel's failure or refusal to respond, should be submitted with the motion. Finally, if it is asserted that prior counsel's handling of the case involved a violation of ethical or legal responsibilities, the motion should reflect whether a com- plaint has been filed with appropriate disciplinary authorities re- garding such representation, and if not, why not. The high standard announced here is necessary if we are to have a basis for assessing the substantial number of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that come before the Board. Where essential information is lacking, it is impossible to evaluate the substance of such claim. In the-iri-stant-case;-for-example, the-respondent has not alleged, let alone established, that former counsel ever agreed to prepare a brief on appeal or was engaged to undertake the task. Then, too, the potential for abuse is apparent where no mechanism exists for allowing former counsel, whose integrity or competence is being impugned, to present his version of events if he so chooses, thereby discouraging baseless allegations. The requirement that disciplinary authorities he notified of breaches of professional con- duct not only serves to deter meritless claims of ineffective repre- sentation but also highlights the standards which should be expect- ed of attorneys who represent persons in immigration proceedings,

未说明上诉理由的，构成根据8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(1-aXi) (1988)作出简易驳回的理由。一般参见Matter of Valencia, 19 I&N Dec. 354 (131A 1986)。如果认定导致上诉被简易驳回的同一行为，或者更准确地说，同一不作为，在无其他情节的情况下可以作为重新开案动议的依据，那将是反常的。允许这种反常现象，将使外国人能够通过简单地不适当行使上诉权、然后声称律师无效协助这一简便手段，随意规避带有监管时限约束的上诉程序。除存在恶劣情形外，诉讼当事人一般受其律师行为的约束。LeBlanc v. INS, 715 F.2d 685 (1st Cir. 1983)。本案中未确立任何此类恶劣情形。 基于律师无效协助主张的动议，应当由据称受损害的 respondent 出具宣誓书，证明相关事实。在提交本局的案件中，该宣誓书应当包括一项陈述，详细载明与前任律师就上诉中应采取的行动所达成的约定，以及律师在此方面向 respondent 作出或未作出何种陈述。此外，在向 Board 提出前任律师无效协助的指控之前，必须将指控告知前任律师，并给予其回应的机会。律师随后的任何回应，或关于律师未回应或拒绝回应的报告，应当随动议一并提交。最后，如果主张先前律师处理案件涉及违反道德或法律责任，动议应当反映是否已就此代理行为向适当的纪律主管机构提出投诉；如未提出，应说明原因。 如果我们要有依据评估提交到 Board 的大量律师无效协助主张，此处宣布的高标准是必要的。在缺乏关键信息的情况下，无法评估此类主张的实质内容。例如，在-iri-stant-case;-for-example, 中，respondent 并未声称——更不用说确立——前任律师曾同意准备上诉状或受聘承担该任务。此外，在不存在任何机制允许其诚信或能力受到质疑的前任律师自行选择陈述其事件版本的情况下，滥用可能性显而易见，从而遏制毫无根据的指控。要求将违反职业行为的情况通知纪律主管机构，不仅有助于阻止无根据的无效代理主张，还凸显了在移民程序中代表他人时应期待律师达到的标准，

the outcome of which may, and often does, have enormous signifi- cance for the person. The respondent's motion is wholly insufficient in light of the foregoing guidelines. We note, moreover, that no prejudice was shown to have resulted from prior counsel's failure to or decision not to file a brief in support of the appeal. The respondent received a full and fair hearing at which he was given every opportunity to present his case. We do not find, and the respondent does not allege, any inadequacy in the quality of prior counsel's representa- tion at the hearing. The immigration judge considered and proper- ly evaluated all the evidence presented, and his conclusions that the respondent did not merit a grant of section 212(c) relief as a matter of discretion and that he was ineligible for voluntary depar- ture as a matter of law are supported by the record. The allegations of error ascribed to the immigration judge in the respondent's motion are unfounded. Contrary to present counsel's contention, it is clear from the transcript of hearing and the immi- gration judge's decision that the immigration judge was well aware that the respondent committed the offense of obtaining money under false pretenses several years prior to his conviction of that offense. And contrary to counsel's contention, the immigration judge correctly determined that the respondent was not eligible for a grant of voluntary departure. By the express terms of section 244(e) of the Act, an alien deportable under section 241(a)(4) of the Act is ineligible for voluntary departure unless he qualifies under the provisions of section 244(a)(2) of the Act, which in the case of criminal offenders requires, inter alia, that the alien have been physically present in this country, and a person of good moral character, for a continuous period of not less than 10 years follow- ing his conviction. See generally Matter of 13—, 6 I&N Dec. 788 (BIA 1955). The 10-year period is measured from the date of conviction, not the date the offense was committed, since it is the conviction, not the commission of the offense, that renders the alien deport- able. Id. Since 10 years from the date of the conviction constituting the ground of deportation have not yet elapsed, the respondent is unable to demonstrate statutory eligibility for voluntary departure. The respondent has shown no basis for reopening or reconsider- ation.. His motion will be denied. ORDER: The motion is denied.

其结果可能、且往往确实对该人具有巨大意义。 鉴于上述准则，答辩人的动议完全不足。此外，我们注意到，未显示先前律师未能或决定不提交支持上诉的辩护状造成了任何损害。答辩人获得了完整而公正的听证，在听证中他获得了一切机会陈述其案件。我们未认定、答辩人亦未主张先前律师在听证中的代理质量存在任何不足。移民法官审议并适当评估了所提交的全部证据，其关于答辩人作为裁量事项不值得给予第212(c)条救济、以及其作为法律事项不符合自愿离境资格的结论均有记录支持。 答辩人动议中归于移民法官的错误指控缺乏依据。与现任律师的主张相反，从听证记录和移民法官的决定中可以清楚看出，移民法官完全知悉答辩人在因以虚假借口获取金钱罪被定罪之前数年即已实施该罪行。并且，与律师的主张相反，移民法官正确认定答辩人不符合获得自愿离境批准的资格。根据该法第244(e)条的明确条款，依据该法第241(a)(4)条可被驱逐的外国人无资格获得自愿离境，除非其符合该法第244(a)(2)条的规定，而该条在刑事犯罪人的情况下要求，除其他事项外，该外国人须在其被定罪后连续不少于10年的期间内实际身在美国且品行良好。参见 generally Matter of 13—, 6 I&N Dec. 788 (BIA 1955)。该10年期间自定罪之日起算，而非自犯罪实施之日起算，因为使该外国人可被驱逐的是定罪，而非犯罪的实施。Id. 由于自构成驱逐理由的定罪之日起10年尚未届满，答辩人无法证明自愿离境的法定资格。 答辩人未显示任何重新开启或重新考虑的依据。其动议将被驳回。 命令：动议被驳回。