Administrative precedent · Employment immigration

Matter of Chartier

16 I&N Dec. 284 (BIA 1977)

Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)5 original pages

The Canadian respondent worked in Canada for a Michigan corporation that had no Canadian subsidiary or branch office, entered the United States in 1974 as an L-1 intra-company transferee, and was later placed in deportation proceedings on the ground that he did not qualify for L-1 classification. The Board of Immigration Appeals held that section 101(a)(15)(L) does not expressly require the employer to have a subsidiary or other legal entity abroad and that such a requirement should not be implied in deportation proceedings, reversing the immigration judge and terminating the proceedings.

Rule cited

Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act does not expressly require the employer to have a subsidiary or other legal entity abroad, and such a requirement should not be implied in the context of a deportation proceeding; an alien may be admitted as an intra-company transferee even though the petitioning employer has no subsidiary or other legal entity abroad.

Scope of application

Applies to L-1 intra-company transferee eligibility, particularly where the petitioning employer has no subsidiary or branch office abroad; it is a 1977 Board of Immigration Appeals precedent decision and applies only insofar as its rule has not been altered by later legislation or decisions.

Official citation and verification records

Checked:2026-11-04 · Official decision source

The records identify official use of the cited rule. A partial reversal, statutory amendment or controlling court ruling may affect its scope.

Complete reference translation, organized by original page and paragraph. Headings, citations and footnotes are retained. The English document is the official text.

Original page 1

Interim Decision #2602

临时决定第2602号

MATTER OF CHARTIER

查蒂尔案

In Deportation Proceedings

驱逐出境程序

A-20927428

A-20927428

Decided by Board August 3, 1977

由委员会于1977年8月3日裁定

(1) Respondent, a native and citizen of Canada was employed in Canada by the subsidiary of a United States corporation located in Michigan. Respondent worked directly for that company, which had no subsidiary or branch office in Canada. Respondent was admitted to the United States in 1974 as an intra-company transferee under section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. In 1976 respondent filed an application for labor certification and the Service instituted an investigation which culminated in deportation proceedings under section 241(a)(1) of the Act predicated on the ground that the respondent was not entitled to L-1 classification. (2) Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act does not expressly require the employer to have a subsidiary or other legal entity abroad. In the context of a deportation proceeding, such a requirement should riot be implied. (3) An alien may be admitted into the United States as an intra-company transferee under section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act even though the petitioning employer has no subsidiary or other legal entity abroad.

(1) 被申请人系加拿大国民及公民,受雇于一家位于密歇根州的美国公司在加拿大的子公司。被申请人直接为该加拿大公司工作,而该公司在加拿大并无子公司或分支机构。被申请人于1974年依据《移民与国籍法》第101(a)(15)(L)条以公司内部调任人员身份获准进入美国。1976年,被申请人提交了劳工证申请,移民局随即展开调查,最终依据该法第241(a)(1)条启动驱逐出境程序,理由是被申请人不享有L-1类别的资格。 (2) 该法第101(a)(15)(L)条并未明确要求雇主在境外设有子公司或其他法律实体。在驱逐出境程序的语境下,不应推定存在此种要求。 (3) 即使申请雇主在境外没有子公司或其他法律实体,外国人仍可依据该法第101(a)(15)(L)条以公司内部调任人员身份获准进入美国。

CHARGE:

指控:

Order: Act of 1952—Section 241(a)(1) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(1)]--Excludable at time of entry under section 212(a)(26)—Nonimmigrant not in possession of valid nonimmigrant visa Act of 1952—Section 241(a)(1) (8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(1))--Excludable at time of entry under section 212(a)(20)—Immigrant not in possession of immi- grant visa

裁定:1952年法——第241(a)(1)条 [8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(1)]——入境时依据第212(a)(26)条属不可入境——非移民未持有有效非移民签证 1952年法——第241(a)(1)条 (8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(1))——入境时依据第212(a)(20)条属不可入境——移民未持有移民签证

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: ON BEHALF OF SERVICE: Daniel N. King, Esquire George Indelicate McClintock, Donovan, Carson & Roach Apellate Trial Attorney 2150 Guardian Building- Detroit, Michigan 48226

代表被申请人: 代表移民局: Daniel N. King, Esquire George Indelicate McClintock, Donovan, Carson & Roach 上诉审判律师 2150 Guardian Building- Detroit, Michigan 48226

BY: Milhollan, Chairman; Wilson, Maniatis, Appleman, and Maguire, Board Members

由:Milhollan,主席;Wilson、Maniatis、Appleman和Maguire,委员会成员

In a decision dated November 18, 1976, the respondent was found deportable upon the charges contained in the Order to Show Cause, but granted the privilege of departing voluntarily in lieu of deportation. The immigration judge has certified his decision to us for review, in accor- dance with the provisions of 8 C.F.R. 3.1(e). We have decided to reverse the immigration judge's decision. The respondent is a 52 year old native and citizen of Canada. Im- mediately preceding the time of his application for admission to the

在1976年11月18日的决定中,被申请人被认定依据《说明理由令》所载指控可被驱逐出境,但获准以自愿离境代替驱逐出境的特权。移民法官依据8 C.F.R. 3.1(e)的规定,将其决定提交本委员会复核。本委员会决定撤销移民法官的决定。 被申请人系52岁的加拿大国民及公民。在其申请获准进入

284

284

Original page 2

Interim Decision #2602

临时决定第2602号

United States, the respondent had been employed in Canada, as Cana- dian Manager of Technical Services, by Grow Chemical Company, a Michigan corporation. Grow Chemical Company is a wholly owned subsidiary of Grow Chemi- cal Corporation, headquartered in New York City. The parent corpora- tion had sales of $92.8 million in 1975. The Michigan company forms part of the Automotive Group of the parent corporation. Other subsidiaries, which are part of this Automotive Group, are located in California and Thalginm Grow Chemical Company manufactures and sells high efficiency thin- ners, solvents and specialty coatings for industrial applications. Its principal customers are manufacturers of automobiles, trucks and au- tomotive parts in the United States, Canada and Western Europe. Grow Chemical Company's sales to Canadian customers are approxi- mately one million dollars a year. Despite this substantial Canadian business, the company has never established a Canadian subsidiary or even an office in Canada. Nor is the company officially licensed to do business in Canada. However, the company has stated that it intends to establish a Canadian sales and service subsidiary at some point, when market conditions and the supply of raw materials permit this. When the respondent was employed by Grow in Canada, he worked out of his home. His job involved visiting automotive assembly plants on a regular basis to make sure that Grow's' paint products were being applied properly.' In 1974, Grow decided to transfer the respondent to the United States, in order to perform similar services here. The company filed a visa petition to classify the respondent as an intra-company transferee under section 1O1(a)(15)(L) of the Immigra- tion and Nationality Act. The petition was approved by the District Director in Detroit, Michigan. The respondent entered the United States on June 14, 1974, with an L-1 nonimmigrant visa. He received extensions of stay, in the same status, until May 18, 1976. On Sep- tember 17, 1974, the respondent brought his wife and four children from Etibicoke, Ontario, to Walled Lake, Michigan, to join him. In July, 1975, the respondent filed an application for a labor certifica- tion from the Department of Labor. This event precipitated an investi- gation into the respondent's immigation status by the. Immigration and Naturalization Service office in Detroit.

美国,受访人曾受雇于密歇根州公司Grow Chemical Company,在加拿大担任加拿大技术服务经理。 Grow Chemical Company是总部位于纽约市的Grow Chemical Corporation的全资子公司。母公司1975年的销售额为92.8 million美元。该密歇根公司构成母公司汽车集团的一部分。属于该汽车集团的其他子公司位于加利福尼亚州和Thalginm。 Grow Chemical Company制造并销售用于工业应用的高效稀释剂、溶剂和特种涂料。其主要客户是美国、加拿大和西欧的汽车、卡车和汽车零部件制造商。 Grow Chemical Company对加拿大客户的销售额约为每年one million美元。尽管有这一可观的加拿大业务,该公司从未在加拿大设立子公司,甚至从未在加拿大设立办事处。该公司也未获正式许可在加拿大开展业务。然而,该公司表示,其打算在某一时点、当市场条件和原材料供应允许时,设立一家加拿大销售和服务子公司。 当受访人受雇于Grow在加拿大工作时,他以自己的住所为工作地点。其工作涉及定期走访汽车装配厂,以确保Grow的'涂料产品得到正确施工。' 1974年,Grow决定将受访人调往美国,以便在此提供类似服务。 该公司提交了一份签证申请,请求根据《移民与国籍法》第1O1(a)(15)(L)条将受访人归类为公司内部调任人员。该申请获密歇根州底特律地区局长批准。受访人于1974年6月14日持L-1非移民签证进入美国。他以相同身份获得停留延期,直至1976年5月18日。1974年9月17日,受访人将其妻子和四名子女从安大略省Etibicoke接到密歇根州Walled Lake与其团聚。 1975年7月,受访人向劳工部提交了劳工证申请。这一事件促使底特律的移民与归化局办公室对受访人的移民身份展开调查。

' In his affidavit of December 12, 1975, Leslie Stott, Vice-President and General Sales Manager of Grow Chemical Company, stated: "The painting of an automobile is an extremely complex process, and our technical service representative is required to know the process in detail, to know the chemical and other properties of the material being' coated, and the coating materials as well as the conditions under which paints and lacquers are prepared and applied in the automotive plants."

' 在1975年12月12日的宣誓书中,Grow Chemical Company副总裁兼销售总经理Leslie Stott表示:“汽车喷漆是一个极其复杂的过程,我们的技术服务代表必须详细了解该过程,了解被涂覆材料的化学及其他特性,了解涂料材料以及汽车工厂中油漆和清漆配制与施用的条件。”

285

285

Original page 3

Interim Decision #2602

临时决定第2602号

The District Director now decided that he had made a mistake in approving an L-1 visa petition in behalf of the respondent. The respon- dent was informed that he was not qualified for L-1 nonimmigrant status, and that he would be required to leave the United States. The respondent contested the District Director's interpretation of the law, and refused to leave the country voluntarily. An Order to Show Cause was issued on November 14, 1975. In it, the Service charged that the respondent was not entitled to his L-1 visa classification because he was "not the representative of a foreign sub- sidiary or entity conducting business in Canada." By this inartful language, what the Service meant to say was that the respondent's company did not have a subsidiary or affiliate in Canada, and that therefore he did not qualify as an intra-company transferee. The wording of the Order to Show Cause did not, however, cause any confusion. Because he did not,qualify as an intra-company transferee, continued the Order to Show Cause, the respondent was deportable under section 241(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, in that, at the time of his entry he was within one or more of the classes of aliens excludable by the law, to wit, aliens who are nonimmigrants not in possession of a valid nonimmigrant visa, as described in section 212(a)(26) of the Act. The Order to Show Cause also charged that the respondent was excludable under section 212(0(20) of the Act as an hinnigrinit not hi possession of a valid, unexpired immigrant visa. In charging that the respondent entered the United States as an immigrant, the Service was alleging, somewhat redundantly, that, at the time of his entry, the respondent did not come within any of the defined classes of nonimmi- grants set out in section 101(a)(15) of the Act. That same section of the Act defines the term "immigrant" as every alien who does not come within one of the defined classes of nonimmigrants. The respondent denied deportability, claiming that, under a correct interpretation of section 101(a)(15)(L), he did qualify as an intra- company transferee. The respondent also argued that, even if the Ser- vice's interpretation of the Act was correct, it should be equitably estopped from deporting him, since it had approved his L-1 visa peti- tion, and he had relied on that approval to his substantial detriment. On April 7, 1970, the 91st Congress amended the Immigration and Nationality Act, to facilitate the entry of certain aliens into the 'United States, by creating additional categories of nonimmigrants. See Public Law 91-225. This law added section 101(a)(15)(L) to the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(L). It reads as follows:

地区主任现在认定,他在批准代表 respondent 的 L-1 签证申请时犯了错误。respondent 被告知他不具备 L-1 非移民身份的资格,并将被要求离开美国。respondent 对地区主任对法律的解释提出异议,并拒绝自愿离境。 1975年11月14日签发了《说明理由令》。在该令中,移民局指控 respondent 无权获得其 L-1 签证分类,因为他“不是在一个在加拿大经营业务的外国子公司或实体的代表”。 通过这一不严谨的措辞,移民局想表达的是,respondent 的公司没有在加拿大的子公司或关联公司,因此他不符合公司内部调职人员的资格。然而,《说明理由令》的措辞并未引起任何混淆。 《说明理由令》继续指出,由于他不符合公司内部调职人员的资格,respondent 根据《移民与国籍法》第241(a)(1)条可被驱逐出境,因为在他入境时,他属于法律规定的可排除外国人中的一个或多个类别,即《该法》第212(a)(26)条所述的不持有有效非移民签证的非移民外国人。 《说明理由令》还指控,respondent 根据《该法》第212(0(20)条作为不持有有效、未过期移民签证的 hinnigrinit not hi possession 可被排除。在指控 respondent 作为移民进入美国时,移民局有些重复地声称,在他入境时,respondent 不属于《该法》第101(a)(15)条规定的任何非移民类别。同一节《该法》将“移民”一词定义为不属于任何已定义非移民类别的每一个外国人。 respondent 否认可被驱逐出境,声称根据对第101(a)(15)(L)条的正确解释,他确实符合公司内部调职人员的资格。respondent 还辩称,即使移民局对《该法》的解释是正确的,也应基于衡平法禁止其将他驱逐出境,因为移民局已批准了他的 L-1 签证申请,而他基于该批准遭受了重大不利。 1970年4月7日,第91届国会修订了《移民与国籍法》,通过创设额外的非移民类别,便利某些外国人进入美国。见 Public Law 91-225。该法律将第101(a)(15)(L)条添加到《该法》中,8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(L)。其内容如下:

(L) an alien who, immediately preceding the time of his application for admission into the United States, has been employed continuously for one year by a thin or Luiporation or other legal entity or an affiliate or subsidiary thereof and who seeks to enter the

(L) 在其申请获准进入美国之前,已连续受雇于一家商号或公司或其他法律实体或其关联公司或子公司满一年的外国人,且其寻求临时进入

286

286

Original page 4

Interim Decision #2602

临时决定第2602号

United States temporarily in order to continue to render his services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial, executive, or involves specialized knowledge, and the alien spouse and minor children of any such alien if accompanying him or following to join him.

美国,以便继续以管理、行政或涉及专门知识的身份为同一雇主或其子公司或关联公司提供服务,以及任何此类外国人的配偶和未成年子女,如果随行或随后与其团聚。

The Service concedes that the express statutory language does not require the employer to have a subsidiary or other legal entity abroad. The Service argument is that such a requirement should be implied from the statutory requirement that the employment in the United States be temporary. The service contends that if the corporation has no estab- lished foreign branch, there is no place for the alien to return to, and therefore his employment in the United States cannot be deemed tem- porary. There are several reasons why this argument fails to convince us.. In the first place, we are reluctant to read implied restrictions into the statute, particularly in the context of a deportation proceeding. It is settled doctrine that deportation statutes must be'construed in favor of the alien. "Since the stakes are considerable for the individual, we not assume that Congress meant to trench on his freedom beyond that which is required by the narrowest of several possible meanings of the words used." Lennon v. INS, 527 F.2d 187, 193 (2 Cir. 1975). See Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 459 (1963); Bonetti v. Rogers, 356 U.S. 691, 699 (1958); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948). Furthermore, the Service has given us no reason to believe that its interpretation of the statute accords with Congress' intent. Section 101(a)(15)(L) was added to the Act in order to make it easier for corporations doing business in the United States to bring key foreign employees here to work. 2 The Service's interpretation of the statute would restrict the ability of companies such as Grow, which have not gone through the formalities of establishing subsidiaries or branch offices abroad, to bring their execu- tives or technical specialists to the United States. 3 We. see no reason why a distinction should be made between United States companies

移民局承认,明确的法定语言并不要求雇主在海外设有子公司或其他法律实体。移民局的论点是,这种要求应当从“在美国的雇佣必须是临时性的”这一法定要求中默示推定出来。移民局主张,如果公司没有设立海外分支机构,外国人就没有可返回的地方,因此其在美国的雇佣不能被认定为临时性的。 这一论点不能说服我们,理由有几点。首先,我们不愿将默示限制解读进法规,尤其是在驱逐出境程序的语境下。既定原则是,驱逐出境法规必须作有利于外国人的解释。“由于对个人而言利害关系重大,我们不能假定国会意在超出所用词语几种可能含义中最狭窄者所要求的范围而侵犯其自由。”Lennon v. INS, 527 F.2d 187, 193 (2 Cir. 1975)。参见 Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 459 (1963);Bonetti v. Rogers, 356 U.S. 691, 699 (1958);Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948)。此外,移民局未向我们提供任何理由使我们相信其对法规的解释符合国会的意图。第101(a)(15)(L)条被增补进该法,是为了使在美国经营业务的公司更容易将其关键的外国雇员带到美国工作。2 移民局对法规的解释将限制像Grow这样未办理在海外设立子公司或分支办事处手续的公司将其高管或技术专家带到美国的能力。3 我们认为没有理由在美国公司

a See House Report No. 91-851. The respondent has argued that such a result, in this particular ease, would be inconsistent with the public policy expressed in the Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965, 19 U.S.C. section 2001 et seq., which implements the United States-Uanachan Automobile Agreement of January 16, 1965. The Act sets forth a policy of encouraging the development of a single, unified, North American automobile industry uninhibited by tariffs. It gives United States vehicle and parts manufacturers the opportunity to make their operations more efficient by obviating the need for duplicate production facilities in Canada. The Act thereby makes it possible for some American lams to avoid setting up subsidiaries or extensive facilities in Canada. In view of our general interpretation of section 101(a)(15)(L), we need not decide what, if any, weight should be given here to the policy set forth in the Automotive Products Trade Act.

a 参见众议院第91-851号报告。 答辩人主张,在本案的具体情形下,这样的结果将与1965年《汽车产品贸易法》(19 U.S.C. 第2001条及以下)所表达的政策不一致,该法实施了1965年1月16日的《美国-加拿大汽车协定》。该法确立了鼓励发展单一、统一的北美汽车工业、不受关税阻碍的政策。它使美国整车和零部件制造商有机会通过免除在加拿大重复建设生产设施的需要而使其运营更加高效。该法从而使一些美国公司能够避免在加拿大设立子公司或大规模设施。 鉴于我们对第101(a)(15)(L)条的一般解释,我们无需裁定此处应赋予《汽车产品贸易法》所确立的政策何种(如有)权重。

287

287

Original page 5

Interim Decision #2602

临时决定第2602号

with subsidiaries abroad and United States companies with employees abroad who work directly for the parent company. The Service contends that this distinction is necessary to guarantee that the employee's stay in the United States be temporary. However, the Service ignores the possibility of sending the respondent back to his previous job in Canada. It also ignores the fact that Grow has an affiliate in Belgium to which the respondent could be sent after his sojourn in the United States. Finally, the Service itself has consistently interpreted section 101(a)(15)(L) generously, so as to facilitate intra-company transfers. 4 The Service appears to be concerned by the fact that the respondent has applied for a labor certification, which may indicate that he intends to become a permanent resident if he can. However, there is nothing in the law which prevents the respondent from seeking to change his status to that of a lawful permanent resident. In fact, section 245 of the Act, which enables an alien to adjust his status to that of a lawful permanent resident without having to leave the United States to obtain an immigrant visa abroad, is designed to facilitate such changes of status. 5 In view of our interpretation of section 101(a)(15)(L), we need not reach the estoppel issue raised by the respondent. ORDER: The decision of the immigration judge is reversed. The deportation proceeding will be terminated.

在海外设有子公司的公司,与在海外有直接为母公司工作的雇员的美国公司之间,不应作出区分。 移民局主张,这一区分对于保证雇员在美国的停留是临时性的而言是必要的。然而,移民局忽略了将答辩人送回其在加拿大的先前工作岗位的可能性。它也忽略了Grow在比利时设有一家关联公司、答辩人在美国逗留后可被派往该公司这一事实。 最后,移民局自身一直对第101(a)(15)(L)条作宽泛解释,以便利公司内部调动。4 移民局似乎对答辩人已申请劳工证这一事实感到关切,这可能表明他若有可能便打算成为永久居民。然而,法律中没有任何规定阻止答辩人寻求将其身份变更为合法永久居民。事实上,该法第245条——该条使外国人能够无需离开美国到海外取得移民签证即可将其身份调整为合法永久居民——正是为便利此类身份变更而设计的。5 鉴于我们对第101(a)(15)(L)条的解释,我们无需触及答辩人提出的禁反言问题。 命令:移民法官的决定被撤销。驱逐出境程序将予终止。

4 See Matter of Pozzoli, 14 I. & N. Dec. 569 (R. C. 1974); Matter of Continental Grain Company, 14 I. & N. Dec. 140 (D. D. 1972); Matter of L..e Blanc, 13 I. & N. Dec. 816 (R. C. 1971); Matter of Vaillancourt, 13 I. & N. Dec. 654 (It. C. 1970); Matter of Bocris, 13 I. & N. Dec. 601 (R. C. 1970); Matter of Realise, 13 I. & N. Dec. 618 (R. C. 1970). The l.st two cases, in particular, appear to be inconsistent with the position of the Service here.

4 参见 Matter of Pozzoli, 14 I. & N. Dec. 569 (R. C. 1974);Matter of Continental Grain Company, 14 I. & N. Dec. 140 (D. D. 1972);Matter of L..e Blanc, 13 I. & N. Dec. 816 (R. C. 1971);Matter of Vaillancourt, 13 I. & N. Dec. 654 (It. C. 1970);Matter of Bocris, 13 I. & N. Dec. 601 (R. C. 1970);Matter of Realise, 13 I. & N. Dec. 618 (R. C. 1970)。 尤其是最后两个案件,似乎与移民局在此的立场不一致。

4 The Service has not raised the issue of the respondent's subjective intent when he applied for his L-1 nonimmigrant visa. If the Service h ad claimed that the respondent was really an intending immigrant when he entered the United States, and therefore not entitled to a nonimmigrant visa, it would have to prove more than the mere fact (assuming it is a fact) that he hoped from the beginning to be able to adjust his status to that of a lawful permanent resident. See Bong Young Choy v_ Barber, 279 F.2d 642, 646 (9 Cir. 1960); Brownell v. Carija, 254 F.2d 78 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Chrysrikos v. Commissioner of Immigration, 3 F.2d 372 (2 Cir. 1924);.Matter of Hosseinpour, Interim Decision 2349 (BIA 1975); Matter of Wellitufer, 12 1. & N. Dec. 522 (R.C. 1907); Matter of , 7 I. & N. Dec. 651 (R.C. 1958). See also Matter of Bocris, supra.

4 移民局未提出答辩人在申请其L-1非移民签证时主观意图的问题。如果移民局主张答辩人在进入美国时实际上是意图移民者,因而无权获得非移民签证,那么它必须证明的不只是他自始就希望能够将其身份调整为合法永久居民这一单纯事实(假设这是事实)。参见 Bong Young Choy v_ Barber, 279 F.2d 642, 646 (9 Cir. 1960);Brownell v. Carija, 254 F.2d 78 (D.C. Cir. 1957);Chrysrikos v. Commissioner of Immigration, 3 F.2d 372 (2 Cir. 1924);Matter of Hosseinpour, 临时决定 2349 (BIA 1975);Matter of Wellitufer, 12 1. & N. Dec. 522 (R.C. 1907);Matter of , 7 I. & N. Dec. 651 (R.C. 1958)。另参见 Matter of Bocris, 同上。

288

288

免费评估

选择评估方式

从你的经历和目标出发,了解下一步怎么准备。

现在可用

人工评估

移民规划师一对一

结合你的个人经历、申请目标和现有材料,梳理申请方向与准备重点。

即将上线

ImmiClaw

AI 智能评估

AI 评估服务正在准备中,开放后可在这里开始。现在可先与规划师沟通。

你的移民计划,从一次免费评估开始。