Matter of Arthur

In a decision dated October 23, 1990, an immigration judge found the respondent deportable on the basis of his concessions at the hearing under section 241(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1988),' as a nonimmigrant who remained in this country longer than permitted, but granted him the privilege of voluntary departure in lieu of deportation until February 24, 1991, with an alternative order of deportation to Nigeria in the event he failed to depart voluntarily within the period specified. The respon- dent did not appeal from that decision. On February 20, 1991, the respondent filed a motion to reopen with the immigration judge based upon a claim of eligibility for adjustment of status under section 245 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1988), as the spouse of a United States citizen. The respondent married his wife on January 18, 1991, subsequent to the immigration judge's decision in the case. An Application for Permanent Residence (Form 1-485) and a Petition for Alien Relative (Form 1-130) were filed simultaneously with the motion to reopen. In order to qualify for adjustment of status under section 245 of the Act, an alien must apply for adjustment, establish that he is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United States for permanent residence, and show that an immigrant visa is immediately available to him at the time his application is filed. Section 245(a) of the Act. Generally speaking, a motion to reopen for consideration of a newly-acquired claim to relief from deportation will not be granted in the absence of a prima facie showing of eligibility for the relief sought upon reopening. INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, (1992); INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94 (1988); Matter of Sipus, 14 I&N Dec. 229 (BIA 1972); Matter of Lam, 14 I&N Dec. 98 (BIA 1972). In a decision dated July 9, 1991, the immigration judge denied the respondent's motion to reopen on the ground that the visa petition filed to accord the respondent immediate relative status as the spouse

在1990年10月23日的决定中，移民法官根据答辩人在听证会上依据《移民与国籍法》第241(a)(2)条，8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)（1988）所作的承认，认定答辩人作为停留超过许可期限的非移民可被驱逐，但给予其自愿离境代替驱逐的特权，期限至1991年2月24日，并附有替代驱逐令，若其未在规定期限内自愿离境则驱逐至尼日利亚。答辩人未对该决定提出上诉。1991年2月20日，答辩人向移民法官提交重新开案动议，主张其作为美国公民配偶有资格依据《法》第245条，8 U.S.C. § 1255（1988）调整身份。答辩人于1991年1月18日与妻子结婚，在移民法官对该案作出决定之后。永久居留申请（Form 1-485）和外籍亲属申请（Form 1-130）与重新开案动议同时提交。为符合《法》第245条调整身份的资格，外国人必须申请调整，证明其有资格获得移民签证且可被接纳为美国永久居民，并表明在其申请提交时移民签证可立即为其所用。《法》第245(a)条。一般而言，在缺乏重新开案后所寻求救济的表面资格证明的情况下，不会准许为审议新获得的免于驱逐救济主张而提出的重新开案动议。INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, (1992)；INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94 (1988)；Matter of Sipus, 14 I&N Dec. 229 (BIA 1972)；Matter of Lam, 14 I&N Dec. 98 (BIA 1972)。在1991年7月9日的决定中，移民法官驳回了答辩人的重新开案动议，理由是授予答辩人美国公民配偶直系亲属身份的签证申请

of a United States citizen had not yet been adjudicated and, unless and until the petition is approved, the respondent may not establish immediate visa availability, a statutory prerequisite to a grant of adjustment of status. The respondent appealed from the denial of his motion. The appeal will be dismissed? In Matter of Garcia, 16 I&N Dec. 653 (BIA 1978), this Board reexamined the general rule that reopening of the proceedings will be denied in the absence of a showing that the statutory requirements for the requested relief have been met, and we carved out an exception to that rule in the case of motions to reopen for consideration of applications for adjustment of status based upon as yet unadjudicated visa petitions. The Board noted that the Immigration and Naturaliza- tion Service had recently amended its regulations to permit an adjustment application filed simultaneously with a visa petition to be accepted for processing, even though the underlying visa petition had not yet been approved, provided the approval of the petition would make an immigrant visa immediately available as of the date the adjustment application was filed. 8 C.F.R. § 2452(a)(2) (1991). Under the amended regulations, if the visa petition is subsequently approved, the adjustment application is deemed to have been filed on the date the accompanying petition was filed. Id. Inasmuch as the date an adjustment application is filed determines whether a visa is immedi- ately available, the regulation allows an applicant who is subsequently found to have been fully qualified for adjustment of status at the time of simultaneous filing to preserve immediate visa availability and, hence, eligibility for adjustment of status, until such time as the visa petition supporting the adjustment application has been reached for adjudication. Id. In order to give appropriate effect to the simultaneous filing provisions of the amended regulations, we determined that a motion to reopen should generally be granted in cases involving an adjustment application supported by an unadjudicated visa petition unless the applicant for adjustment appears clearly ineligible for the preference classification claimed in the underlying petition. Matter of Garcia, supra. Stated another way, a pending prima facie approvable visa petition would be treated as though it were already approved for purposes of reopening. Id.; see also Matter of Guiragossian, 17 I&N Dec. 161, 164 n. 5 (BIA 1979). Inasmuch as the immigration judge denied the respondent's motion to reopen solely on the ground that the visa petition underlying the

尚未裁定，且除非申请获得批准，答辩人不能证明即时签证可用性，而这是准予调整身份的法定前提。答辩人对驳回其动议提出上诉。上诉将被驳回？在Matter of Garcia案，16 I&N Dec. 653 (BIA 1978)中，本委员会重新审查了在未证明所请求救济的法定要求已满足的情况下将拒绝重新开案的一般规则，并在基于尚未裁定的签证申请提出调整身份申请而请求重新开案的动议案件中，对该规则创设了例外。委员会指出，移民和归化局最近修订了其法规，允许与签证申请同时提交的调整申请被接受处理，即使基础签证申请尚未批准，只要申请的批准将使移民签证在调整申请提交之日即可立即使用。8 C.F.R. § 2452(a)(2) (1991)。根据修订后的法规，如果签证申请随后获得批准，调整申请被视为在随附申请提交之日已提交。同上。由于调整申请提交之日决定签证是否可立即使用，该法规允许随后被认定在同时提交时完全符合调整身份资格的申请人保留即时签证可用性，从而保留调整身份资格，直至支持调整申请的签证申请被轮到裁定之时。同上。为适当落实修订后法规的同时提交条款，我们认定，在涉及由未裁定签证申请支持的调整申请的案件中，通常应当准许重新开案，除非调整身份申请人明显不符合基础申请中所主张的优先类别资格。Matter of Garcia案，同上。换言之，待决的表面可批准签证申请为重新开案之目的将被视为已获批准。同上；另见Matter of Guiragossian, 17 I&N Dec. 161, 164 n. 5 (BIA 1979)。鉴于移民法官仅以基础签证申请

respondent's adjustment application had not been adjudicated, the immigration judge's decision is inconsistent with our holding in Matter of Garcia, supra. However, recent amendments to the Act invite us to revisit Garcia. In 1986, Congress enacted the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3537 ("1986 Amendments"), legislation designed to deter fraud by aliens seeking to acquire lawful permanent residence in the United States through marriage to a United States citizen or a lawful permanent resident alien. The 1986 Amendments, among other provisions, precluded an applicant from adjusting his status based on a marriage that was entered into after the commencement of proceedings to determine his right to enter or remain in the United States and barred the approval of a visa petition to accord immediate relative or preference status based on such marriage until after the beneficiary of the petition had resided outside the United States for a 2-year period following the marriage. See sections 5(a) and (b) of the 1986 Amendments, 100 Stat. at 3543 (codified as amended at sections 204(h) and 245(e) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1154(h) and 1255(e) (Supp. IV 1986)). 3 The Act was again amended by the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 ("1990 Act"), to exempt Qualifying aliens from the 2-year foreign residence requirement and the bar to adjustment of status imposed by the 1986 Amendments. The 1990 Act provides in pertinent part that the foreign residence requirement and the section 245(e) bar to adjustment shall not apply in the case of an alien who establishes "by clear and convincing evidence to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the marriage was entered into in good faith and _ .. was not entered into for the purpose of procuring the alien's entry as an immigrant." Section 702 of the 1990 Act, 104 Stat. at 5086 (codified as amended at section 245(e) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(e) (Supp. II 1990)). The "clear and convincing evi- dence" standard is, of course, more stringent than the "preponderance of the evidence" standard ordinarily required to establish a claimed relationship between a petitioner and a beneficiary. See Matter of Patel, 19 I&N Dec. 774, 782-83 (BIA 1988). By first enacting an absolute bar to adjustment of status based upon a marriage entered into during the pendency of proceedings and to the approval of a visa petition based upon such marriage unless the marriage first survived a 2-year separation, and then by requiring a substantially heightened showing to establish the bona fides of the

答辩人的调整身份申请尚未裁定，移民法官的决定与我们在Matter of Garcia案（同上）中的裁决不一致。然而，《移民与国籍法》近期的修正案促使我们重新审视Garcia案。 1986年，国会颁布了《1986年移民婚姻欺诈修正案》，Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3537（“1986年修正案”），该立法旨在遏制外国人通过与美国公民或合法永久居民外国人结婚以获取美国合法永久居留权的欺诈行为。1986年修正案除其他条款外，禁止申请人基于在确定其入境或居留权利的诉讼程序开始后缔结的婚姻而调整其身份，并禁止批准基于此类婚姻而给予直系亲属或优先类身份的签证申请，直至该申请的受益人在婚姻缔结后在美国境外居住满2年。见1986年修正案第5(a)和(b)条，100 Stat. at 3543（经修正后编纂于《移民与国籍法》第204(h)和245(e)条，8 U.S.C. §§ 1154(h)和1255(e)（Supp. IV 1986））。3 《移民与国籍法》又经《1990年移民法》，Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978（“1990年法”）修正，使合格外国人豁免于1986年修正案所规定的2年外国居住要求和调整身份禁令。1990年法相关部分规定，对于能够“以明确且令人信服的证据使司法部长确信该婚姻系善意缔结且……并非为促使该外国人作为移民入境之目的而缔结”的外国人，外国居住要求和第245(e)条对调整身份的禁令不适用。1990年法第702条，104 Stat. at 5086（经修正后编纂于《移民与国籍法》第245(e)条，8 U.S.C. § 1255(e)（Supp. II 1990））。“明确且令人信服的证据”标准当然比通常用以证明申请人与受益人之间所主张关系的“证据优势”标准更为严格。见Matter of Patel, 19 I&N Dec. 774, 782-83 (BIA 1988)。 国会首先规定了绝对禁止基于在诉讼程序待决期间缔结的婚姻调整身份以及禁止批准基于此类婚姻的签证申请，除非该婚姻首先经受2年分离，随后又要求以实质上更高的证明标准来确立婚姻的善意，

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marriage, Congress rather clearly created a presumption that marriages contracted after the institution of exclusion or deportation proceedings are fraudulent. That presumption may, under present law, be over- come only by a showing of evidence that is "clear and convincing." Section 245(e)(3) of the Act. Matter of Garcia, supra, on the other hand, established a contrary presumption: that is, for purposes of reopening, the relationship claimed on the visa petition supporting the application for adjustment of status is presumed to be bona fide unless clear ineligibility is apparent in the record. See also Matter of Guiragossian, supra. We find that the rule of Garcia is inconsistent and incompatible with Congress' intent as expressed in the 1986 Amend- ments and the 1990 Act. We are concerned, too, with jurisdictional problems that would likely result from attempts on the part of an immigration judge or this Board to square the "clear ineligibility" rule of Garcia with Congress' requirement that the bona fides of a marriage described in section 245(e) of the Act be proved by clear and convincing evidence. An inquiry into whether the evidence submitted in support of a visa petition is sufficient, in light of the heavy burden imposed on the petitioner, to demonstrate prima facie eligibility for the preference sought would necessarily involve an in-depth examination into the merits of the petition. Such examination would, in our view, constitute a substantial and unwarranted intrusion into the district director's authority over the adjudication of visa petitions. See generally Matter of Guiragossian, supra. In light of the foregoing discussion, we shall hereafter decline to grant motions to reopen for consideration of applications for adjust- ment of status based upon unadjudicated visa petitions which fall within the ambit of sections 204(h) [now section 204(g)] and 245(e) of the Act. Our holding in Matter of Garcia, supra, is modified accordingly. In his motion to reopen, the respondent referred us to an unpublished Board decision which, on seemingly similar facts, reached a contrary result. The referenced decision is inapposite inasmuch as the respondent in that case was the beneficiary of an approved visa petition. In any event, the decision is without precedential value. The appeal will be dismissed. ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

国会相当明确地创设了一项推定，即在驱逐出境或递解出境程序启动后缔结的婚姻具有欺诈性。根据现行法律，该推定只能通过“明确且令人信服的”证据予以推翻。《移民与国籍法》第245(e)(3)条。另一方面，Matter of Garcia案（同上）确立了一项相反的推定：即，就重新开案而言，支持调整身份申请的签证申请上所主张的关系被推定为善意，除非记录中明显存在不合格情形。另见Matter of Guiragossian案（同上）。我们认定，Garcia案的规则与国会在1986年修正案和1990年法中所表达的意图不一致且不相容。 我们还关切可能产生的管辖权问题，这些问题很可能源于移民法官或本委员会试图将Garcia案的“明显不合格”规则与国会要求以明确且令人信服的证据证明《移民与国籍法》第245(e)条所述婚姻善意的规定相协调。鉴于施加于申请人的沉重举证责任，对支持签证申请所提交的证据是否足以证明所寻求优先类别的初步资格进行审查，必然涉及对申请实质内容的深入审查。我们认为，此种审查将构成对地区局长裁定签证申请权限的实质性且不当的侵扰。一般见Matter of Guiragossian案（同上）。 鉴于上述讨论，我们此后将拒绝批准基于未裁定的签证申请而重新开案以审议调整身份申请的动议，只要该签证申请属于《移民与国籍法》第204(h)条[现为第204(g)条]和第245(e)条的范围。我们在Matter of Garcia案（同上）中的裁决相应予以修改。 在其重新开案的动议中，答辩人向我们引述了一项未公布的委员会决定，该决定在看似类似的事实上得出了相反的结果。所引述的决定不适用，因为该案中的答辩人是已批准签证申请的受益人。无论如何，该决定不具有先例价值。上诉将被驳回。 命令： 上诉驳回。