Matter of Rodriguez-Tejedor

Cite as 23 I&N Dec. 153 (BIA 2001) Interim Decision #3454

引用为 23 I&N Dec. 153 (BIA 2001) 临时决定第3454号

File A30 212 057 - Huntsville

案卷 A30 212 057 - Huntsville

Decided July 24, 2001

2001年7月24日决定

U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals

美国司法部 移民审查执行办公室 移民上诉委员会

(1) The automatic citizenship provisions of section 320 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1431 (1994), as amended by the Child Citizenship Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-395, 114 Stat. 1631 (“CCA”), are not retroactive and, consequently, do not apply to an individual who resided in the United States with his United States citizen parents as a lawful permanent resident while under the age of 18 years, but who was over the age of 18 years on the CCA effective date.

(1) 《移民与国籍法》第320条，8 U.S.C. § 1431 (1994)，经《2000年儿童公民法》，Pub. L. No. 106-395，114 Stat. 1631（“CCA”）修正后的自动公民身份条款不具有溯及力，因此不适用于以下个人：其作为合法永久居民、在18岁以下时与美国公民父母居住在美国，但在CCA生效之日已超过18岁。

(2) The respondent, who resided in the United States with his United States citizen adoptive parents as a lawful permanent resident while under the age of 18 years, but who was over the age of 18 years on the CCA effective date, is ineligible for automatic citizenship under section 320 of the Act.

(2) 被申请人作为合法永久居民、在18岁以下时与其美国公民养父母居住在美国，但在CCA生效之日已超过18岁，因此不符合该法第320条规定的自动公民身份资格。

FOR RESPONDENT: Nora E. Norman, Esquire, Huntsville, Texas

被申请人代理律师：Nora E. Norman，Esquire，德克萨斯州Huntsville

AMICUS CURIAE 1 : Thomas E. Moseley, Esquire, Newark, New Jersey

法庭之友 1 ：Thomas E. Moseley，Esquire，新泽西州Newark

FOR THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE: Jeffrey L. Romig, Appellate Counsel

移民与归化局代理律师：Jeffrey L. Romig，上诉法律顾问

BEFORE: Board En Banc: SCHMIDT, HURWITZ, VILLAGELIU, GUENDELSBERGER, MATHON, GRANT, MOSCATO, MILLER, BRENNAN, OSUNA, and OHLSON, Board Members. Concurring Opinions: DUNNE, Vice Chairman; joined by SCIALABBA, Acting Chairman; HOLMES, FILPPU, COLE, and JONES, Board Members; ESPENOZA, Board Member. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion: ROSENBERG, Board Member.

审理：委员会全体成员：SCHMIDT、HURWITZ、VILLAGELIU、GUENDELSBERGER、MATHON、GRANT、MOSCATO、MILLER、BRENNAN、OSUNA和OHLSON，委员会成员。协同意见：DUNNE，副主席；SCIALABBA，代理主席加入；HOLMES、FILPPU、COLE和JONES，委员会成员；ESPENOZA，委员会成员。协同与异议意见：ROSENBERG，委员会成员。

GRANT, Board Member:

GRANT，委员会成员：

In a decision dated May 4, 2000, the Immigration Judge found the respondent deportable under section 241(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(iii) (1994), as an alien convicted of an aggravated

在2000年5月4日的决定中，移民法官认定被申请人根据《移民与国籍法》第241(a)(2)(A)(iii)条，8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(iii) (1994)，作为因加重

1 This Board acknowledges with appreciation the thoughtful arguments raised in the brief submitted by amicus curiae.

1 本委员会对法庭之友提交的简报中提出的深思熟虑的论点表示赞赏。

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felony, and under section 241(a)(4) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4) (1988), 2 as an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Finding the respondent ineligible for relief from deportation, the Immigration Judge ordered him deported from the United States to Mexico. The respondent has appealed. Oral argument was heard in this matter on April 26, 2001. The appeal will be dismissed.

重罪而被定罪的alien，以及根据该法第241(a)(4)条，8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4) (1988)，2 作为因涉及道德败坏犯罪而被定罪的alien，应予驱逐。移民法官认定被申请人不符合驱逐救济资格，命令将其从美国驱逐至墨西哥。被申请人已提出上诉。本案于2001年4月26日进行了口头辩论。上诉将被驳回。

I. BACKGROUND

I. 背景

The facts of this case are undisputed. The respondent was born on December 25, 1960, in Mexico. On April 15, 1968, he was adopted by his paternal grandparents. His adoptive father is a United States citizen by birth. His adoptive mother, who died in 1994, was a lawful permanent resident. He entered the United States on or about July 27, 1972, as a lawful permanent resident. On October 25, 1989, the respondent was convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child and voluntary manslaughter, for which offenses he was sentenced to imprisonment for 35 years and 20 years, respectively. Based on these convictions, the Immigration and Naturalization Service issued an Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing (Form I-221) on April 10, 1990, alleging that the respondent was deportable.

本案事实无争议。被申请人于1960年12月25日出生于墨西哥。1968年4月15日，他被其祖父母收养。其养父为出生美国公民。其养母于1994年去世，为合法永久居民。他于1972年7月27日前后作为合法永久居民进入美国。1989年10月25日，被申请人因加重性侵儿童罪和自愿过失杀人罪被定罪，分别被判处35年和20年监禁。基于这些定罪，移民与归化局于1990年4月10日签发了出庭通知及听证通知（表格I-221），指称被申请人应予驱逐。

At his deportation hearing, the respondent denied alienage, claiming that he was eligible for a certificate of citizenship under section 322(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1433(a) (1994). Proceedings were adjourned three times to give the Service an opportunity to adjudicate the respondent’s Application for Certificate of Citizenship (Form N-600), which the record reflects he filed on April 30, 1997. On May 24, 1999, the Service denied the respondent’s application because he was over the age of 18 at the time it was filed.

在驱逐听证中，被申请人否认其alien身份，声称其符合该法第322(a)条，8 U.S.C. § 1433(a) (1994)规定的公民身份证书资格。程序三次延期，以便移民局有机会裁决被申请人的公民身份证书申请（表格N-600），记录显示他于1997年4月30日提交了该申请。1999年5月24日，移民局拒绝了被申请人的申请，因为提交申请时他已超过18岁。

The respondent then claimed to have acquired citizenship under section 301(g) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (1994). The Immigration Judge concluded that the respondent neither acquired citizenship under section 301(g) of the Act nor derived citizenship under section 322(a) of the Act. Having determined that alienage was established, the Immigration Judge found the respondent deportable as charged and ordered him deported from the United States to Mexico. This appeal followed.

被申请人随后声称已根据该法第301(g)条，8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (1994)获得公民身份。移民法官认定被申请人既未根据该法第301(g)条获得公民身份，也未根据该法第322(a)条派生公民身份。在认定alien身份已确立后，移民法官认定被申请人如所指控应予驱逐，并命令将其从美国驱逐至墨西哥。随后提出本上诉。

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL

II. 上诉问题

On appeal, the respondent contends, as he did at the deportation hearing, that he is eligible for a certificate of citizenship under section 322 of the Act and

在上诉中，被申请人如同在驱逐听证中一样主张，其符合该法第322条规定的公民身份证书资格，并且

2 Section 241(a)(4) of the Act was revised and redesignated as section 241(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the Act by section 602(a) of the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978, 5077-80.

2 该法第241(a)(4)条经《1990年移民法》第602(a)条，Pub. L. No. 101-649，104 Stat. 4978，5077-80修订并重新指定为该法第241(a)(2)(A)(ii)条。

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that he acquired citizenship under section 301(g) of the Act. In response, the Service concurs with the Immigration Judge’s decision and urges us to adopt that decision. We will address each issue in turn.

其已根据该法第301(g)条获得公民身份。对此，移民局同意移民法官的决定，并敦促我们采纳该决定。我们将依次处理每个问题。

First, section 322(a), as it was in effect at the time the respondent filed his Application for Certificate of Citizenship, clearly stated that an individual must be under 18 years of age at the time the application for such certificate is filed by the citizen parent of the individual. Similarly, the regulation set forth at 8 C.F.R. § 322.2(a) (1997) clearly states that “a child on whose behalf an application for naturalization has been filed . . . must: (1) Be unmarried and under 18 years of age, both at the time of application and at the time of admission to citizenship . . . .” In the instant case, the respondent did not file his N-600 application until April 1997, when he was 36 years old.

首先，在被申请人提交公民身份证书申请时有效的第322(a)条明确规定，个人在该个人的公民父母提交此类证书申请时必须未满18岁。同样，8 C.F.R. § 322.2(a) (1997)规定的条例明确规定，“代表其提交归化申请的儿童……必须：(1) 在申请时和准入公民身份时均未婚且未满18岁……。”在本案中，被申请人直到1997年4月才提交其N-600申请，当时他36岁。

Second, we concur with the Immigration Judge that the respondent did not acquire United States citizenship under section 301(g) of the Act, because that provision requires that the child be born of a United States citizen. There is no indication that this section applies to an adopted child such as the respondent.

其次，我们同意移民法官的意见，即被申请人未根据该法第301(g)条获得美国公民身份，因为该条款要求儿童出生于美国公民。没有迹象表明该条适用于像被申请人这样的被收养儿童。

The respondent’s appeal would have been promptly dismissed but for the recent enactment of the Child Citizenship Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-395, 114 Stat. 1631 (“CCA”). Depending on the effect given to the CCA’s amendment of section 320 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1431 (1994), pertaining to automatic acquisition of citizenship by foreign-born children adopted by United States citizens, the respondent may or may not be deemed to have acquired United States citizenship at the time of his admission as a lawful permanent resident. We therefore turn to consideration of this issue. 3

若非最近颁布的《2000年儿童公民法》，Pub. L. No. 106-395，114 Stat. 1631（“CCA”），被申请人的上诉本会被迅速驳回。取决于CCA对该法第320条，8 U.S.C. § 1431 (1994)的修正——涉及由美国公民收养的外国出生儿童自动获得公民身份——所赋予的效力，被申请人可能或可能不被视为在其作为合法永久居民入境时已获得美国公民身份。因此，我们转而考虑这一问题。3

As a preliminary matter, we recognize that shortly after we heard oral argument in this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that the CCA did not act to retroactively confer citizenship upon individuals such as the respondent in this case. See Nehme v. INS, 252 F.3d 415 (5th Cir. 2001); accord Hughes v. Ashcroft, 2001 WL 699357 (9th Cir. 2001). Because this case arises within the jurisdiction of the Fifth Circuit, the decision in Nehme is binding regarding our specific holding in this case. See Matter of Anselmo, 20 I&N Dec. 25 (BIA 1989). Nevertheless, because this issue will inevitably arise outside the Fifth Circuit, we proceed, in the interest of establishing a uniform nationwide rule, to set forth our independent analysis of this issue. 4

作为初步事项，我们认识到，在我们听取本案口头辩论后不久，美国第五巡回上诉法院裁定，CCA并未追溯性地授予像本案被申请人这样的个人公民身份。参见 Nehme v. INS，252 F.3d 415 (5th Cir. 2001)；同见 Hughes v. Ashcroft，2001 WL 699357 (9th Cir. 2001)。由于本案发生在第五巡回法院辖区内，Nehme案的裁决对本案的具体裁定具有约束力。参见 Matter of Anselmo，20 I&N Dec. 25 (BIA 1989)。然而，由于该问题不可避免会在第五巡回法院辖区外出现，为了建立统一的全国规则，我们继续提出我们对该问题的独立分析。4

3 For purposes of clarification, we note that the pre-CCA sections 320 and 321 of the Act were not implicated in this case because neither of the respondent’s adoptive parents became United States citizens through naturalization. 4 The parties have each filed a supplemental brief with regard to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Nehme v. INS, supra. The Service argues that the decision is binding on the disposition of this case. The respondent contests this, arguing that the present case is distinguishable

3 为澄清起见，我们指出，CCA之前的该法第320条和第321条与本案无关，因为被申请人的养父母均未通过归化成为美国公民。 4 双方均就第五巡回法院在 Nehme v. INS，supra中的裁决提交了补充简报。移民局主张该裁决对本案的处理具有约束力。被申请人对此提出异议，主张本案可区分

(continued...)

（续……）

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We also recognize that, since we heard oral argument in this case, the Service has issued an interim rule implementing Title I of the CCA. Children Born Outside the United States; Applications for Certificate of Citizenship, 66 Fed. Reg. 32,138 (2001). Consistent with our decision in this case, the Supplementary Information section specifically provides that Title I of the CCA does not apply to foreign-born children who are 18 years or older on February 27, 2001. 66 Fed. Reg. at 32,139. The interim rule at 8 C.F.R. § 320.2(a)(2) provides that individuals must meet all statutory requirements, including the age requirement, on or after February 27, 2001, to be eligible for citizenship under section 320 of the Act. 66 Fed. Reg. at 32,144. Because the Board has independently reached the same conclusion as the Service, we need not address the issue, raised at oral argument, whether Service regulations interpreting a statutory provision are binding on this Board. We do not share the concerns expressed in the separate opinion of Board Member Rosenberg that the Service’s actions in promulgating this regulation suggest an “inherent conflict” between its status as both a rule-making agency and a litigant before this Board, and that such actions call into question the integrity of our quasi-judicial role. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(g) (2001). The Service’s motion to hold these proceedings in abeyance pending the publication of its regulations implementing Title I of the CCA will be denied as moot.

我们还认识到，自我们听取本案口头辩论以来，移民局已发布实施CCA第一编的临时规则。Children Born Outside the United States; Applications for Certificate of Citizenship，66 Fed. Reg. 32,138 (2001)。与我们在本案中的决定一致，补充信息部分明确规定，CCA第一编不适用于2001年2月27日已满18岁或以上的外国出生儿童。66 Fed. Reg. at 32,139。8 C.F.R. § 320.2(a)(2)的临时规则规定，个人必须在2001年2月27日或之后满足所有法定要求，包括年龄要求，才有资格根据该法第320条获得公民身份。66 Fed. Reg. at 32,144。由于委员会已独立得出与移民局相同的结论，我们无需处理口头辩论中提出的问题，即解释法定条款的移民局条例是否对本委员会具有约束力。我们不认同委员会成员Rosenberg单独意见中表达的关切，即移民局在颁布该条例时的行为表明其作为规则制定机构和本委员会诉讼当事人两种身份之间存在“内在冲突”，且此类行为使我们准司法角色的完整性受到质疑。参见 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(g) (2001)。移民局要求在其实施CCA第一编的条例公布前中止本程序的动议将因无实际意义而被驳回。

III. CHILD CITIZENSHIP ACT OF 2000

III. 《2000年儿童公民法》

In Title I of the CCA, Congress replaced the automatic citizenship provisions set forth in former sections 320 and 321 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1431 and 1432 (1994), with a more generous provision now codified at section 320 of the Act. Section 321 of the Act was repealed. With these amendments, Congress intended to “streamline” automatic citizenship for children born abroad who are subsequently adopted by a United States citizen parent, or at least one of whose

在CCA第一编中，国会以现在编纂于该法第320条的更宽松条款取代了原该法第320条和第321条，8 U.S.C. §§ 1431和1432 (1994)规定的自动公民身份条款。该法第321条被废止。通过这些修正，国会意图为在国外出生、随后被美国公民父母收养的儿童，或至少其父母一方为

4(...continued) from Nehme because the respondent here is the adopted child of a United States citizen by birth, the precise category of individuals that Congress intended to benefit by enacting the CCA. The respondent in Nehme, by contrast, was the biological child of a father who subsequently became a naturalized citizen. The respondent further argues that the legislative history of the CCA clearly shows an intent to have a retroactive benefit in favor of individuals in the respondent’s position. In response, we see nothing in the text of the CCA’s amendments to the Act, particularly revised section 320, that would differentiate between the adopted children of United States citizens at birth and the biological children of foreign- born parents who later naturalize. Both are covered within the scope of this provision. Regarding the issue of retroactivity, for the reasons set forth in this decision, we disagree with the respondent’s arguments.

4（……续） 与Nehme案不同，因为本案的答辩人是美国公民的收养子女，而该美国公民系因出生而成为公民，这正是国会意图通过制定《儿童公民法》（CCA）予以惠及的确切人群类别。相比之下，Nehme案的答辩人是一名父亲的亲生子女，该父亲后来成为入籍公民。答辩人进一步主张，CCA的立法历史清楚地表明，其意图是对处于答辩人地位的个人给予追溯性利益。对此，我们在CCA对《移民与国籍法》修正条款的文本中——特别是修订后的第320条——没有看到任何内容会区分因出生而成为美国公民者的收养子女与外国出生父母（其后来入籍）的亲生子女。两者均涵盖在该条款的范围内。关于追溯力问题，基于本决定所述理由，我们不同意答辩人的主张。

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parents subsequently naturalized as a United States citizen. H.R. Rep. No. 106-852, at 4 (2000), reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1499, 1500-01; H.R. 2883, 106th Cong. (2000). The four sections of Title I of the CCA are summarized below.

父母后来入籍成为美国公民。H.R. Rep. No. 106-852, at 4 (2000), reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1499, 1500-01；H.R. 2883, 106th Cong. (2000)。CCA第一编的四个条款概述如下。

Section 101 of the CCA amended section 320 of the Act to provide automatic citizenship for a child born outside the United States when all of the following conditions have been fulfilled: (1) at least one parent is a United States citizen; (2) the child is under 18 years old; and (3) the child is residing in the United States in the legal and physical custody of the United States citizen parent pursuant to a lawful admission for permanent residence. This provision applies to a child adopted by a United States citizen, as defined in section 101(b)(1)(E) or (F) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(E) or (F) (1994). 5

CCA第101条修正了《移民与国籍法》第320条，规定对于在美国境外出生的子女，在满足以下所有条件时自动获得公民身份：（1）至少一名父母是美国公民；（2）子女未满18岁；且（3）子女依据合法永久居留的入境许可，在美国境内与美国公民父母共同居住并由其行使法定和实际监护权。该条款适用于美国公民收养的子女，如《移民与国籍法》第101(b)(1)(E)或(F)条所定义，8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(E)或(F) (1994)。5

Section 102 of the CCA amended section 322 of the Act to provide for the issuance of a certificate of naturalization to a child born outside the United States when the following conditions are met: (1) at least one parent is a United States citizen who has met certain physical presence requirements or has a citizen parent who has met such requirements; (2) the child is under 18 years of age; (3) the child is residing outside the United States in the legal and physical custody of the citizen parent, is temporarily present in the United States pursuant to a lawful admission, and is maintaining such lawful status.

CCA第102条修正了《移民与国籍法》第322条，规定对于在美国境外出生的子女，在满足以下条件时签发入籍证书：（1）至少一名父母是美国公民，且该父母已满足某些实际居留要求，或拥有一名已满足此类要求的公民父母；（2）子女未满18岁；（3）子女在美国境外与该公民父母共同居住并由其行使法定和实际监护权，依据合法入境许可暂时在美国境内，并维持该合法身份。

Section 103 of the CCA repealed the derivative citizenship provisions of former section 321 of the Act. This subject matter is now addressed by section 320 of the Act, as revised by the CCA.

CCA第103条废除了《移民与国籍法》原第321条中的派生公民身份条款。该事项现由经CCA修订的《移民与国籍法》第320条处理。

Section 104 of the CCA set forth the effective date provision for Title I:

CCA第104条规定了第一编的生效日期条款：

The amendments made by this title shall take effect 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and shall apply to individuals who satisfy the requirements of section 320 or 322 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as in effect on such effective date.

本编所作的修正应自本法颁布之日起120天后生效，并应适用于在该生效日期满足《移民与国籍法》第320条或第322条（按该生效日期时的有效文本）要求的个人。

5 A comparison of new section 320 of the Act with former sections 320 and 321 of the Act demonstrates the streamlining effect of these amendments. In the case of a child born abroad to alien parents, the subject of former section 321 of the Act, new section 320 allows that child to acquire citizenship upon the naturalization of one such parent, as opposed to the requirement in former section 321 that both parents (or a sole surviving parent in the case of death, or a sole parent having legal custody in the case of a legal separation, or the mother if the child was born out of wedlock and the paternity of the child has not been established by legitimation) be naturalized. In the case of a child born abroad and adopted by United States citizen parents, new section 320 effectively eliminates the requirement set forth in former section 322 of the Act that the adoptive parents apply for a certificate of citizenship for the child prior to the child reaching the age of 18 years. Also, in order to trigger former sections 320 and 321, the parent or parents had to acquire citizenship by naturalization, not birth. Under the CCA amendments, the citizen parent may have acquired citizenship by birth or naturalization.

5 将《移民与国籍法》新第320条与原第320条和第321条进行比较，可以看出这些修正的简化效果。对于外国父母在美国境外所生子女（原第321条的调整对象），新第320条允许该子女在其中一名父母入籍时获得公民身份，而原第321条则要求父母双方（或在死亡情况下唯一尚存的父母，或在合法分居情况下拥有法定监护权的单方父母，或子女为非婚生且亲子关系尚未通过认领确立时的母亲）均须入籍。对于美国公民父母在国外出生并收养的子女，新第320条实际上取消了原第322条中要求养父母在子女年满18岁之前为该子女申请公民身份证书的规定。此外，为触发原第320条和第321条，父母一方或双方必须通过入籍而非出生获得公民身份。根据CCA修正，公民父母可以通过出生或入籍获得公民身份。

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IV. APPLICABILITY OF THE CCA

四、CCA的适用性

A. Positions of the Parties

A. 双方的立场

We must decide whether the CCA applies to the instant case. The respondent and amicus curiae contend that the CCA is retroactive in application. That is, they argue that the intent of Congress, as set forth in the plain language of sections 101 and 104 of the CCA, was to permit aliens, such as the respondent, to be deemed to have acquired citizenship as long as they met the first and third requirements of revised section 320—namely, that at least one parent is a United States citizen and that the child is residing in the United States in the legal and physical custody of the United States citizen parent pursuant to a lawful admission for permanent residence—prior to their 18th birthday, even if they were 18 or older on the date that the CCA came into effect. Under this view, the CCA’s effective date marks the time after which such a claim to citizenship may be formally recognized under the Act. It does not, however, impose a requirement that an alien meet all of the requisites of section 320—including being under the age of 18—on or after February 27, 2001.

我们必须裁定CCA是否适用于本案。答辩人和法庭之友主张CCA具有追溯适用力。也就是说，他们主张，国会通过CCA第101条和第104条的明确语言所表达的意图是，允许诸如答辩人这样的外国人被视为已获得公民身份，只要他们在18岁生日之前满足修订后第320条的第一项和第三项要求——即至少一名父母是美国公民，且子女依据合法永久居留的入境许可在美国境内与该美国公民父母共同居住并由其行使法定和实际监护权——即使他们在CCA生效之日已年满18岁或以上。根据这一观点，CCA的生效日期标志着此类公民身份主张可依据《移民与国籍法》获得正式承认的时间起点。然而，该条款并不要求外国人在2001年2月27日或之后满足第320条的所有要件——包括未满18岁。

The respondent and amicus curiae argue further that such an interpretation is consistent with the amendatory language of section 101 of the CCA, which states that “a child born outside the United States automatically becomes a citizen of the United States when all of the following conditions have been fulfilled,” and with the language of section 104, which provides that the amendments “shall apply to individuals who satisfy the requirements of section 320.” (Emphasis added.) They specifically contend that by choosing the word “individual” rather than “child” in section 104, Congress expressed an intent to apply the amendments to all persons who have met the requirements of revised section 320 of the Act, regardless of whether they were still “children” on the effective date of those amendments. Thus, they argue, the plain meaning of the language in sections 101 and 104 evidences Congress’ intent to apply the CCA amendments to any individual who met the statutory criteria prior to attaining the age of 18 years, regardless of when the individual turns or has turned 18.

答辩人和法庭之友进一步主张，这种解释与CCA第101条的修正语言一致，该条规定“在美国境外出生的子女在满足以下所有条件时自动成为美国公民”，也与第104条的语言一致，该条规定修正“应适用于满足第320条要求的个人”。（着重号为原文所加。）他们特别主张，通过在第104条中选择“个人”一词而非“子女”，国会表达了将修正适用于所有已满足《移民与国籍法》修订后第320条要求的人的意图，无论他们在这些修正的生效日期是否仍为“子女”。因此，他们主张，第101条和第104条语言的明确含义证明国会意图将CCA修正适用于任何在年满18岁之前满足法定标准的个人，无论该个人何时年满或已年满18岁。

In response, the Service contends that the CCA is not retroactive in the sense argued by the respondent. The Service asserts that the plain meaning of the language in sections 101 and 104 of the CCA supports the position that the CCA amendments apply only to those individuals who meet all of the statutory requirements, including the age requirement, in effect on or after February 27, 2001. According to the Service, section 104 of the CCA not only specifies the Act’s effective date—that is, February 27, 2001, which is 120 days after the date of enactment of the CCA—but also contains an instruction as to which individuals can claim the benefits of the Act: namely, those individuals who satisfy all of the requirements of section 320 of the Act, including being under

对此，移民局主张CCA并非答辩人所主张意义上的追溯性法律。移民局声称，CCA第101条和第104条语言的明确含义支持以下立场：CCA修正仅适用于在2001年2月27日或之后满足所有法定要求（包括年龄要求）的个人。根据移民局的观点，CCA第104条不仅规定了《移民与国籍法》的生效日期——即2001年2月27日，也就是CCA颁布之日后120天——还包含了一项关于哪些个人可以主张该法利益的指示：即那些满足《移民与国籍法》第320条所有要求（包括在该生效日期或之后未满

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the age of 18, on or after such effective date. The word “individual” in section 104 was chosen, according to the Service, because the term “child,” as defined in section 101(c)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(c)(1) (Supp. V 1999), means “an unmarried person under 21 years of age.”

18岁）的个人。据移民局称，第104条选择“个人”一词，是因为《移民与国籍法》第101(c)(1)条（8 U.S.C. § 1101(c)(1) (Supp. V 1999)）所定义的“子女”一词意为“未满21岁的未婚人士”。

The respondent and amicus curiae also argue that our decision in Matter of Fuentes, 21 I&N Dec. 893 (BIA 1997), resolves the issue in the instant case. We disagree. In Fuentes, we determined that amendments to former sections 320 and 321 of the Act, increasing the qualifying age for automatic derivative citizenship from 16 to 18 years of age, were to be applied retroactively to the effective date of the Act. See Act of Oct. 5, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-417, 92 Stat. 917 (“1978 Amendments”). The 1978 Amendments were far narrower in scope than the substantial provisions before us in this case. Also, unlike the CCA, the 1978 Amendments did not contain an effective date provision and there was no apparent controversy between the parties as to their retroactive effect. None of these circumstances obtain in the present case. Accordingly, we proceed to an independent analysis of the provisions before us.

答辩人和法庭之友还主张，我们在Matter of Fuentes案（21 I&N Dec. 893 (BIA 1997)）中的裁定解决了本案的问题。我们不同意。在Fuentes案中，我们认定，对《移民与国籍法》原第320条和第321条的修正——将自动派生公民身份的合格年龄从16岁提高到18岁——应追溯适用于该法的生效日期。参见1978年10月5日法，Pub. L. No. 95-417, 92 Stat. 917（“1978年修正”）。1978年修正的范围远窄于本案所涉的实质性条款。此外，与CCA不同，1978年修正没有包含生效日期条款，且双方对其追溯效力没有明显争议。这些情况在本案中均不存在。因此，我们着手对面前的条款进行独立分析。

B. Plain Language

B. 明确语言

The starting point in statutory construction is the language of the statute. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987); INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 189 (1984) (stating that the starting point in cases involving statutory construction must be the language employed by Congress, and that it is assumed that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used).

法律解释的起点是法规的语言。INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987)；INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 189 (1984)（指出涉及法律解释的案件必须以国会所使用的语言为起点，并假定立法目的通过所用词语的通常含义来表达）。

We disagree with the assertion of each party that the language of sections 101 and 104 of the CCA clearly supports its respective position. Section 320 of the Act, as amended by section 101 of the CCA, is clear regarding the requirements that must be met for automatic acquisition of citizenship. However, it does not state the point in time at which those requirements must be met. For that, we turn to section 104 of the CCA, the central provision disputed by the parties. We find that this provision, although plainly stating the date on which the CCA amendments took effect, does not unambiguously resolve whether all of the requirements, including being under the age of 18, must be met on or after that date, or whether such requirements could be met prior to that date as well. As evidenced by the parties’ conflicting but reasonable positions, the impact of section 104 on this critical issue is susceptible to more than one interpretation. See C&H Nationwide, Inc. v. Norwest Bank Texas NA, 208 F.3d 490, 495 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating that a statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible to more than one legitimate meaning). But see Nehme v. INS, supra, at 431 (holding that section 104 “contains an explicit command” that the revisions to section 320 of the Act shall apply only to alien children who satisfy the statutory conditions, including being under 18 years of age, on or after the February 27, 2001,

我们不同意各方关于《儿童公民法》（CCA）第101条和第104条的措辞明确支持其各自立场的断言。经《儿童公民法》第101条修订的该法第320条，对于自动取得公民身份必须满足的要求是明确的。然而，该条并未说明必须满足这些要求的时间点。为此，我们转向《儿童公民法》第104条，即各方争议的核心条款。我们认为，该条款虽然明确说明了《儿童公民法》修正案生效的日期，但并未明确解决是否所有要求（包括未满18岁）必须在该日期当日或之后满足，还是这些要求也可以在该日期之前满足。正如各方相互冲突但合理的立场所证明的那样，第104条对这一关键问题的影响可以有不止一种解释。参见C&H Nationwide, Inc. v. Norwest Bank Texas NA, 208 F.3d 490, 495 (5th Cir. 2000)（指出如果一项法规可以有不止一种合法含义，则该法规存在歧义）。但参见Nehme v. INS, supra, at 431（认定第104条“包含一项明确命令”，即对该法第320条的修订仅适用于在2001年2月27日当日或之后满足法定条件（包括未满18岁）的外国人子女，

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effective date). Accordingly, the task before us is to determine the temporal scope of the CCA’s automatic citizenship provisions by recourse to other tools of statutory construction. 6

生效日期）。因此，我们面前的任务是通过借助其他法定解释工具，确定《儿童公民法》自动公民身份条款的时间适用范围。6

C. Legislative History

C. 立法历史

When the statutory language is unclear, as in this case, we look next to legislative history. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984) (stating that where resolution of a question of federal law turns on a statute and the intention of Congress, a court looks first to statutory language and then to legislative history if the meaning of the statutory language is unclear). Although the legislative history of the CCA sheds light on the reasons for revising the automatic citizenship provisions, nowhere does it precisely state whether individuals who met the requirements of revised section 320 prior to its effective date, but who also turned 18 years of age prior to that effective date, were intended to be beneficiaries of this amendment. Indeed, we have searched the CCA’s legislative history in vain for a single clear statement which indicates that the automatic citizenship provisions were intended to apply to such individuals.

当法规语言不明确时，如本案，我们接下来考察立法历史。参见Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984)（指出当联邦法律问题的解决取决于一项法规和国会的意图时，法院首先考察法规语言，如果法规语言的含义不明确，则考察立法历史）。尽管《儿童公民法》的立法历史阐明了修订自动公民身份条款的原因，但其中没有任何地方准确说明，在修订后的第320条生效日期之前满足其要求、但在该生效日期之前也已年满18岁的个人，是否被意图作为该修正案的受益人。事实上，我们遍查《儿童公民法》的立法历史，也未找到一份明确表明自动公民身份条款意图适用于此类个人的陈述。

We find the absence of such a statement, particularly in light of the context of the legislative intent and debates thereon, to be illustrative of the most plausible legislative intent. For example, during the debate in the House of Representatives, Representative Delahunt, who authored key portions of the CCA, cited examples of the types of individuals this legislation was intended to benefit. He referred to two individuals born abroad who were adopted by United States citizens. Their adoptive parents did not complete the certificate of citizenship process under former section 322 of the Act prior to their reaching the age of 18. Consequently, each individual was later deported from the United States after committing a deportable criminal offense. Conspicuously, neither Representative Delahunt nor the other sponsors stated or indicated in any way that, once the CCA was enacted, such individuals would be eligible to return to the United States as citizens. 146 Cong. Rec. H7774 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 2000)

我们认为，此类陈述的缺失，特别是结合立法意图及其相关辩论的背景来看，恰恰说明了最合理的立法意图。例如，在众议院的辩论中，起草了《儿童公民法》关键部分的Delahunt众议员列举了该立法意图惠及的个人类型的例子。他提到两名在国外出生、被美国公民收养的个人。他们的养父母未能在他们年满18岁之前完成该法前第322条规定的公民身份证书程序。因此，每名个人后来在犯下可驱逐的刑事罪行后从美国被驱逐出境。值得注意的是，Delahunt众议员和其他提案人均未以任何方式陈述或表示，一旦《儿童公民法》颁布，此类个人将有资格作为公民返回美国。146 Cong. Rec. H7774（每日版，2000年9月19日）

The presumption against retroactivity and the ensuing interpretive rules enunciated in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 270 (1994), do not apply to this case. In Landgraf, the Supreme Court held that this presumption occurs only when the statute would “impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed.” Id. at 280. Rather than impair rights, increase liabilities, or impose new duties, the CCA liberalizes the automatic citizenship provisions and has no negative effect on any prior grant of citizenship or other immigration status. In Nehme v. INS, supra, the Fifth Circuit briefly noted the Landgraf presumption against retroactivity in its analysis of the CCA. However, the court did not find it necessary to apply the presumption because of its view that Congress explicitly stated the temporal reach of the automatic naturalization provisions in section 104 of the CCA.

反对溯及适用的推定以及Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 270 (1994)中阐明的后续解释规则不适用于本案。在Landgraf案中，最高法院认定，该推定仅在法规将“损害当事人在其行为时享有的权利、增加当事人对过去行为的责任，或对已经完成的交易施加新义务”时才发生。Id. at 280。与其损害权利、增加责任或施加新义务，《儿童公民法》放宽了自动公民身份条款，并且对任何先前授予的公民身份或其他移民身份没有负面影响。在Nehme v. INS, supra案中，第5巡回法院在其对《儿童公民法》的分析中简要提到了Landgraf反对溯及适用的推定。然而，该法院认为没有必要适用该推定，因为其认为国会在《儿童公民法》第104条中明确规定了自动归化条款的时间范围。

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(remarks of Rep. Delahunt). This would be the case, of course, if such individuals were now deemed to have become United States citizens at some point prior to their deportation. Rather, the CCA was referred to as a preventive measure, intended to ensure that such injustices are not repeated.

（Delahunt众议员的发言）。当然，如果此类个人现在被视为在其被驱逐出境之前的某个时间点已成为美国公民，情况就会如此。相反，《儿童公民法》被视为一项预防措施，旨在确保此类不公正不会重演。

We must also consider, however, that at key points in the legislative history, there is reference to the CCA “retroactively” conferring citizenship. The House Judiciary Committee Report on H.R. 2883, as well as the opening floor statement of Lamar Smith, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, in moving to pass H.R. 2883 in the House of Representatives, stated that the bill would amend the Immigration and Nationality Act “to confer United States citizenship automatically and retroactively on certain foreign-born children adopted by citizens of the United States.” H.R. Rep. No. 106-852, at 1; 146 Cong. Rec. H7774 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 2000) (remarks of Rep. Smith) (emphasis added). The respondent and the Service each find support for their respective positions in this language.

然而，我们也必须考虑到，在立法历史的关键节点，有提及《儿童公民法》“溯及地”授予公民身份。众议院司法委员会关于H.R. 2883的报告，以及众议院移民与索赔小组委员会主席Lamar Smith在众议院提出通过H.R. 2883时的开场发言，均指出该法案将修订《移民与国籍法》，“以自动且溯及地授予某些由美国公民收养的外国出生子女美国公民身份”。H.R. Rep. No. 106-852, at 1; 146 Cong. Rec. H7774（每日版，2000年9月19日）（Smith众议员的发言）（着重号为后加）。被申请人和移民局均在该措辞中找到了支持其各自立场的依据。

The respondent asserts that Chairman Smith’s use of the term “retroactively” was intended to convey that the CCA provisions should be retroactive in application, to include persons like himself who met the material conditions of new section 320 of the Act—including being under the age of 18 years—prior to its effective date. The Service disagrees. It asserts that the term “retroactively” was intended not to expand the category of intended beneficiaries of the CCA to those over 18, but, rather, to clarify that those under the age of 18 on the date the CCA came into effect, and who had previously met the requirements of revised section 320 of the Act, would be deemed to have automatically acquired United States citizenship as of the date on which the last of these requirements was fulfilled.

被申请人主张，Smith主席使用“溯及地”一词意在传达《儿童公民法》条款应在适用上具有溯及力，包括像他本人这样在该法新第320条的生效日期之前满足实质性条件（包括未满18岁）的人。移民局不同意。移民局主张，“溯及地”一词并非意在将《儿童公民法》的预期受益人范围扩大到18岁以上者，而是意在澄清，在《儿童公民法》生效之日未满18岁、且此前已满足修订后该法第320条要求的人，将被视为在这些要求中最后一项得到满足之日自动取得美国公民身份。

On review, we find that the legislative history supports the Service’s position. It is well settled that there are two sources of United States citizenship, birth and naturalization. See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 422 (1998) (citing United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 702-03 (1898)). The bill, as originally introduced, amended the citizenship at birth provision at section 301 of the Act, as opposed to the naturalization provisions at sections 320 and 321 of the Act. Under these provisions, foreign-born children adopted by United States citizens would have derived United States citizenship automatically, retroactive to the date of birth. Both the Departments of Justice and State objected to the bill as originally drafted because it confused the fundamental distinction between acquisition of citizenship at birth and through naturalization. See H.R. Rep. No. 106-852, at 5, 9-13. In response to the Administration’s concerns, the Committee modified the bill to amend the naturalization provisions and grant automatic citizenship, retroactive to the date that the statutory requirements are met.

经审查，我们认为立法历史支持移民局的立场。公认的是，美国公民身份有两个来源：出生和归化。参见Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 422 (1998)（引述United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 702-03 (1898)）。该法案最初提出时，修订的是该法第301条的出生公民身份条款，而非该法第320条和第321条的归化条款。根据这些条款，被美国公民收养的外国出生子女将自动取得美国公民身份，溯及至出生之日。司法部和国务院均反对最初起草的法案，因为它混淆了出生取得公民身份与通过归化取得公民身份之间的根本区别。参见H.R. Rep. No. 106-852, at 5, 9-13。针对行政部门的关切，委员会修改了法案，以修订归化条款并授予自动公民身份，溯及至满足法定要求之日。

Therefore, the issue of retroactivity is referenced solely in the context of when citizenship would vest, i.e., at birth or at the time the statutory conditions

因此，溯及力问题仅在公民身份何时归属的语境中被提及，即在出生时或在满足法定条件时

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are met. There is no evidence of a discussion regarding the potential conferral of benefits on those over the age of 18 at the time the CCA would come into effect. In light of the views expressed by the Administration and the Committee, we find that Representative Smith’s reference to “retroactivity” alludes to the point in time at which a qualifying individual would be deemed to have automatically acquired United States citizenship.

。没有证据表明曾讨论过在《儿童公民法》生效时向18岁以上者潜在授予利益的问题。鉴于行政部门和委员会表达的观点，我们认为Smith众议员对“溯及力”的提及是指合格个人被视为自动取得美国公民身份的时间点。

D. Structural Analysis of Section 104 of the CCA

D. 对《儿童公民法》第104条的结构分析

We also find it useful to consider the language and the placement of section 104 in the overall structure of the CCA. See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (holding that construction of language that takes into account the design of the statute as a whole is preferred).

我们还认为，考察第104条的措辞及其在《儿童公民法》整体结构中的位置是有益的。参见K Mart Corp. v. Cartier Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988)（认定优先采用顾及法规整体设计的语言解释）。

Section 104 sets forth the effective date for Title I of the CCA. Title II of the CCA, which addresses aliens who have improperly voted in federal, state, or local elections, or who have represented themselves as citizens for the purpose of obtaining benefits under the Act, has its own effective date provisions. For example, sections 201(b)(3) and (c)(3) of Title II of the CCA, 114 Stat. at 1634, 1635, provide that the amendments made shall apply to “voting occurring before, on, or after September 30, 1996.” These effective date provisions are retroactive in application. Had Congress intended Title I of the CCA to apply retroactively, it would have employed similar language.

第104条规定了《儿童公民法》第一编的生效日期。《儿童公民法》第二编涉及在联邦、州或地方选举中不当投票的外国人，或为根据该法获得利益而自称公民的外国人，有其自身的生效日期条款。例如，《儿童公民法》第二编第201(b)(3)条和第(c)(3)条，114 Stat. at 1634, 1635，规定所作修订应适用于“在1996年9月30日之前、当日或之后发生的投票”。这些生效日期条款在适用上具有溯及力。如果国会意图让《儿童公民法》第一编溯及适用，它本会采用类似的措辞。

In fact, Congress considered and rejected an effective date provision that would have made the automatic citizenship provisions retroactive in application. The bill, as originally introduced in the House, contained an effective date provision stating that the amendments made “shall apply with respect to persons adopted before, on, or after the date of enactment of this Act.” See H.R. 2883 (introduced in the House by Representative Lamar Smith on September 21, 1999).

事实上，国会审议并否决了一项本会使自动公民身份条款在适用上具有溯及力的生效日期条款。该法案最初在众议院提出时，包含一项生效日期条款，规定所作修订“应适用于在本法颁布之日之前、当日或之后被收养的人”。参见H.R. 2883（由Lamar Smith众议员于1999年9月21日在众议院提出）。

In sum, we conclude that if Congress had intended the CCA to apply to individuals who were over the age of 18 on February 27, 2001, but who had met the requirements while under the age of 18, Congress would have so stated. Nor do we find Congress’ decision to postpone the effective date of Title I of the CCA until 120 days after enactment to have any relevance to the issue of whether the CCA is retroactive in application. In the absence of a clear congressional statement and in light of the limited legislative history, we cannot find that the automatic citizenship provisions were intended to be retroactive in application.

总之，我们的结论是，如果国会曾意图使《儿童公民法》（CCA）适用于2001年2月27日时已年满18岁、但在未满18岁时已满足各项要求的人，国会本会如此明文规定。我们也不认为国会决定将《儿童公民法》第一编的生效日期推迟至颁布后120天，与《儿童公民法》是否具有追溯适用效力的问题有任何关联。在缺乏国会明确表述且立法史有限的情况下，我们不能认定自动公民身份条款被意图赋予追溯适用效力。

E. Structural Analysis of Title III of the Act

E. 本法第三编的结构分析

Our reading of sections 320 and 322 of the Act, as amended by the CCA, is consistent with the statutory scheme set forth in Title III of the Act. See King v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991) (stating that a statute is to

我们对经《儿童公民法》修正后的本法第320条和第322条的解读，与本法第三编所规定的法定体系相一致。参见King v. St. Vincent's Hospital, 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991)（指出 statute is to

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be read as a whole, because the meaning of the statutory language, plain or not, depends on context).

作为整体来解读，因为法定语言的含义，无论是否平义，均取决于上下文）。

Over time, Congress has periodically revised the nationality provisions in Title III of the Act to change the statutory requirements for acquired and derivative citizenship. Thus, the first step in determining whether an individual acquired or derived United States citizenship is to ascertain the applicable law. In determining whether an individual acquired citizenship at birth, the statute in effect at the time of the person’s birth is generally controlling. See Runnett v. Shultz, 901 F.2d 782, 783 (9th Cir. 1990) (“The applicable law for transmitting citizenship to a child born abroad when one parent is a United States citizen is the statute that was in effect at the time of the child’s birth.”).

随着时间的推移，国会定期修订本法第三编中的国籍条款，以改变取得公民身份和派生公民身份的法定要求。因此，确定个人是否取得或派生美国公民身份的第一步是查明适用的法律。在确定个人是否在出生时取得公民身份时，通常以该人出生时有效的法规为准。参见Runnett v. Shultz, 901 F.2d 782, 783 (9th Cir. 1990)（“当父母一方为美国公民时，向在国外出生的子女传递公民身份的适用法律是该子女出生时有效的法规。”）。

Similarly, in determining whether an individual derived citizenship by naturalization, the law in effect when the last material condition (naturalization, age, residence) is met is generally controlling. See Matter of L-, 7 I&N Dec. 512 (R.C. 1957); see also INS Interpretations § 320.1(a)(1) (“Thus, the combination of elements need to be completed during the validity of the statute which provided for derivative status by reason of such combination.”).

同样，在确定个人是否通过归化派生公民身份时，通常以最后一项实质条件（归化、年龄、居住）满足时有效的法律为准。参见Matter of L-, 7 I&N Dec. 512 (R.C. 1957)；另见INS Interpretations § 320.1(a)(1)（“因此，各项要素的组合须在规定了因该组合而获得派生身份的法规有效期内完成。”）。

Applying these rules to the instant case, we find that the respondent did not derive citizenship under pre-CCA sections 320, 321, or 322 of the Act. Nor are we persuaded that he can establish a derivative citizenship claim under post-CCA section 320. Under section 320 of the Act, as amended by the CCA, an individual will automatically derive citizenship when the last material condition has been met. The age requirement is a material condition, so if an individual, such as the respondent, is over 18 years of age during the validity of the statute now in effect, he cannot meet the material conditions for automatic citizenship.

将这些规则适用于本案，我们认定被申请人在《儿童公民法》颁布前的本法第320条、第321条或第322条下未派生公民身份。我们也不认为他能够依据《儿童公民法》颁布后的第320条确立派生公民身份主张。根据经《儿童公民法》修正的本法第320条，个人在最后一项实质条件满足时将自动派生公民身份。年龄要求是一项实质条件，因此，如果个人（如被申请人）在现行有效法规的有效期内已年满18岁，则其不能满足自动公民身份的实质条件。

Our conclusion is bolstered by the fact that amendments to the citizenship and naturalization provisions of the Act are generally prospective in nature. For example, the Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416, 108 Stat. 4305 (“INTCA”), rewrote section 322 of the Act. The changes were prospective in nature. On the other hand, when Congress intends that certain changes apply retroactively, it explicitly provides for such retroactive application. See INTCA § 101, 108 Stat. at 4306 (providing that new section 301(h) of the Act shall apply retroactively).

我们的结论得到以下事实的支持：本法公民身份和归化条款的修正通常具有前瞻性。例如，《1994年移民和国籍技术修正法》，Pub. L. No. 103-416, 108 Stat. 4305（“INTCA”），改写了本法第322条。这些变更具有前瞻性。另一方面，当国会意图某些变更具有追溯适用效力时，它会明确规定此类追溯适用。参见INTCA § 101, 108 Stat. at 4306（规定本法新的第301(h)条应追溯适用）。

Furthermore, acceptance of the respondent’s argument would require us to interpret section 102 of the CCA, repealing section 321 of the Act, as having retroactive effect, perhaps as far back as the enactment of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. Thus, all claims to derivative citizenship previously addressed under former section 321 would be subject to reconsideration under the new provisions of section 320. Such a radical change in naturalization law would require a far clearer statement of congressional intent than can be found either in the plain language or the legislative history of the CCA.

此外，接受被申请人的论点将要求我们将《儿童公民法》第102条（废除本法第321条）解释为具有追溯效力，或许可追溯至1952年《移民和国籍法》的颁布之时。因此，此前依据原第321条处理的所有派生公民身份主张都将根据第320条的新规定重新审议。归化法中的如此根本性变更将需要比《儿童公民法》的平义或立法史中所能找到的更为明确的国会意图表述。

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V. CONCLUSION

V. 结论

In deportation proceedings, evidence of foreign birth gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of alienage, and the burden shifts to the respondent to prove citizenship. Matter of Leyva, 16 I&N Dec. 118, 119 (BIA 1977). Upon evaluating and weighing the arguments developed by both the Service and the respondent, we find that the respondent’s claim of derivative citizenship is not supported by a preponderance of credible evidence. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

在驱逐程序中，外国出生的证据产生可反驳的外国人身份推定，举证责任转移至被申请人以证明公民身份。Matter of Leyva, 16 I&N Dec. 118, 119 (BIA 1977)。在评估和权衡移民局与被申请人双方提出的论点后，我们认定被申请人的派生公民身份主张未得到优势可信证据的支持。因此，上诉将被驳回。

CONCURRING OPINION: Mary Maguire Dunne, Vice Chairman; in which Lori L. Scialabba, Acting Chairman; David B. Holmes, Lauri Steven Filppu, Patricia A. Cole, and Philemina McNeill Jones, Board Members, joined

协同意见：Mary Maguire Dunne，副主席；Lori L. Scialabba，代理主席；David B. Holmes、Lauri Steven Filppu、Patricia A. Cole和Philemina McNeill Jones，委员会成员，加入

I respectfully concur. The text and content of the effective date provision of the Child Citizenship Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-395, 114 Stat. 1631 (“CCA”), make clear the intent of Congress. In order for an individual to satisfy the requirements of the effective date provision and qualify for citizenship under the terms of the CCA, Congress stated that the individual must “satisfy the requirements . . . on such effective date.” CCA § 104, 114 Stat. at 1633. One of those requirements is being a “child . . . under the age of eighteen years.” CCA § 102, 114 Stat. at 1632. The language of the statute is, in my opinion, clear and unambiguous and, although the legislative history supports such a conclusion, I see no need to look to the legislative history to determine Congress’ intent. See Nehme v. INS, 252 F.3d 415 (5th Cir. 2001); see also Hughes v. Ashcroft, 2001 WL 699357 (9th Cir. 2001).

我恭敬地表示协同。 《2000年儿童公民法》，Pub. L. No. 106-395, 114 Stat. 1631（“CCA”），其生效日期条款的文本和内容明确表明了国会的意图。为使个人满足生效日期条款的要求并有资格根据《儿童公民法》的条款获得公民身份，国会规定该个人必须“在该生效日期……满足各项要求”。《儿童公民法》第104条，114 Stat. at 1633。其中一项要求是成为“未满十八岁的儿童”。《儿童公民法》第102条，114 Stat. at 1632。在我看来，法规语言清晰明确，尽管立法史支持这一结论，但我认为无需查阅立法史来确定国会意图。参见Nehme v. INS, 252 F.3d 415 (5th Cir. 2001)；另见Hughes v. Ashcroft, 2001 WL 699357 (9th Cir. 2001)。

CONCURRING OPINION: Cecelia M. Espenoza, Board Member

协同意见：Cecelia M. Espenoza，委员会成员

I respectfully concur in the separate opinions of Mary Maguire Dunne, Vice Chairman, and Lory Diana Rosenberg, Board Member, to the extent that each finds that the pertinent language of the Child Citizenship Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-395, 114 Stat. 1631, is plain, and that our decision is controlled by circuit precedent.

我恭敬地就Mary Maguire Dunne副主席和Lory Diana Rosenberg委员会成员的单独意见表示协同，就各自认定《2000年儿童公民法》，Pub. L. No. 106-395, 114 Stat. 1631的相关语言为平义，且我们的裁决受巡回法院先例约束而言。

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CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION: Lory Diana Rosenberg, Board Member

协同与异议意见：Lory Diana Rosenberg，委员会成员

I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. It is undisputed that a federal agency is obligated to follow United States circuit court precedent in applicable cases originating within that circuit. NLRB v. Ashkenazy Prop. Management Corp., 817 F.2d 74, 75 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1217 (1991); Allegheny General Hospital v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 970 (3d Cir. 1979) (“A decision by this court, not overruled by the United States Supreme Court, is . . . binding on all inferior courts and litigants in the [circuit], and also on administrative agencies.”). Administrative agencies are not free to refuse to follow circuit court precedent in cases originating within the circuit, unless the agency has a good faith intention to seek review of the particular proceeding by the Supreme Court. Lopez v. Heckler, 572 F. Supp. 26 (C.D. Cal. 1983), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 725 F.2d 1489, 1503 (9th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 469 U.S. 1082 (1984).

我恭敬地部分协同、部分异议。 无可争议的是，联邦机构有义务在源自该巡回法院的适用案件中遵循美国巡回法院的先例。NLRB v. Ashkenazy Prop. Management Corp., 817 F.2d 74, 75 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1217 (1991)；Allegheny General Hospital v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 970 (3d Cir. 1979)（“本法院未被美国最高法院推翻的裁决……对[巡回法院]内所有下级法院和诉讼当事人以及行政机构具有约束力。”）。行政机构不得拒绝在源自该巡回法院的案件中遵循巡回法院先例，除非该机构有善意意图寻求最高法院对特定程序的复审。Lopez v. Heckler, 572 F. Supp. 26 (C.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 725 F.2d 1489, 1503 (9th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 469 U.S. 1082 (1984)。

We adhere to the principle that we are bound to acquiesce to the controlling decisions of the federal circuit courts of appeals, and we have historically followed circuit court precedent in cases arising in that circuit. See Matter of K-V-D-, Interim Decision 3422, at 9-10 (BIA 1999) (citing Matter of K-S-, 20 I&N Dec. 715, 719-20 (BIA 1993)); Matter of Anselmo, 20 I&N Dec. 25, 31-32 (BIA 1989). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in which this case arises, has “conclude[d] that § 104 contains an explicit command that the amended automatic naturalization provisions only be applied to alien children who satisfy the statute’s conditionson or after February 27, 2001, the relevant effective date.” Nehme v. INS, 252 F.3d 415, 431 (5th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added) (referring to section 320 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1431)). 1

我们坚持以下原则：我们有义务遵从联邦巡回上诉法院的约束性裁决，并且我们历来在源自该巡回法院的案件中遵循巡回法院先例。参见Matter of K-V-D-, 临时决定3422，第9-10页（BIA 1999）（引用Matter of K-S-, 20 I&N Dec. 715, 719-20 (BIA 1993)）；Matter of Anselmo, 20 I&N Dec. 25, 31-32 (BIA 1989)。本案所源自的美国第五巡回上诉法院已“认定第104条包含明确命令，即修正后的自动归化条款仅适用于在相关生效日期2001年2月27日或之后满足法规条件的外国儿童。”Nehme v. INS, 252 F.3d 415, 431 (5th Cir. 2001)（着重号为原文所加）（指《移民和国籍法》第320条（将编纂于8 U.S.C. § 1431））。1

Accordingly, the outcome in this case is determined by Nehme v. INS: the respondent cannot qualify as a United States citizen because, although he qualifies in all respects with the conditions of section 320 of the Act, as amended by the Child Citizenship Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-395, 114 Stat. 1631 (“CCA”), he was over 18 before February 27, 2001. Nehme v. INS, supra, at 431. Therefore, I concur in the result reached by the majority in this case.

因此，本案的结果由Nehme v. INS确定：被申请人不能取得美国公民身份，因为尽管他在各方面均符合经《2000年儿童公民法》，Pub. L. No. 106-395, 114 Stat. 1631（“CCA”）修正的本法第320条的条件，但他在2001年2月27日之前已年满18岁。Nehme v. INS, supra, at 431。因此，我协同多数派在本案中达成的结果。

Two additional considerations cause me to concur in the result reached by the majority. First, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which also has

另有两项考虑使我协同多数派达成的结果。第一，第九巡回上诉法院，该法院也拥有

1 Section 320 of the Act provides automatic citizenship for a child born outside the United States “when all of the following conditions have been fulfilled”: (1) at least one parent is a United States citizen; (2) the child is under 18 years old; and (3) the child is residing in the United States in the legal and physical custody of the United States citizen parent pursuant to a lawful admission for permanent residence. Child Citizenship Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-395, § 101(a), 114 Stat. 1631, 1631 (emphasis added).

1 本法第320条规定，对于在美国境外出生的儿童，“当以下所有条件均已满足时”自动获得公民身份：(1) 至少父母一方为美国公民；(2) 该儿童未满18岁；以及 (3) 该儿童在美国境内居住，由美国公民父母合法和实际监护，且系依据合法永久居留入境。《2000年儿童公民法》，Pub. L. No. 106-395, § 101(a), 114 Stat. 1631, 1631（着重号为原文所加）。

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addressed the question before us, has concluded, “In short, the CCA granted automatic citizenship only to those children who were under the age of 18, and who met the other criteria, on February 27, 2001.” Hughes v. Ashcroft, 2001 WL 699357, at *7 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added). The principle of acquiescence articulated above mandates that we apply the result reached by the majority to cases arising in the Ninth Circuit. Although none of the remaining 10 circuits have ruled expressly as to the scope of section 320, as amended by the CCA, interests of federal uniformity militate strongly in favor of our following a consistent approach in our adjudications nationwide. See Matter of Crammond, 23 I&N Dec. 9, 15 (BIA 2001) (“Important policy considerations favor applying a uniform federal standard in adjudicating removability . . . under the Act.”); Matter of Manrique, 21 I&N Dec. 58, 64 (BIA 1995) (applying a Ninth Circuit decision nationwide, “[i]n the interest of uniform and fair application of the immigration laws”); see also Nehme v. INS, supra, at 422 (citing Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 43 (1989) (recognizing the preference for nationwide application of federal statutes)).

处理了我们面前的问题，并得出结论：“简而言之，CCA仅将自动公民身份授予那些在2001年2月27日未满18岁且符合其他标准的子女。”Hughes v. Ashcroft, 2001 WL 699357, at *7 (9th Cir. 2001)（着重号为原文所加）。上述阐述的默许原则要求我们将多数意见所得出的结果适用于在第9巡回法院辖区内产生的案件。尽管其余10个巡回法院均未明确裁定经CCA修订的第320条的范围，但联邦统一性的利益强烈支持我们在全国范围内的裁决中遵循一致的方法。见Matter of Crammond, 23 I&N Dec. 9, 15 (BIA 2001)（“重要的政策考虑因素支持在根据该法裁决驱逐出境事宜时适用统一的联邦标准……”）；Matter of Manrique, 21 I&N Dec. 58, 64 (BIA 1995)（在全国范围内适用第9巡回法院的裁决，“为了统一和公平地适用移民法”）；另见Nehme v. INS, supra, at 422（引用Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 43 (1989)（承认倾向于在全国范围内适用联邦法规））。

Second, the Immigration and Naturalization Service has issued an interim rule, effective June 13, 2001, which addresses the issue that is the subject of our decision. See Children Born Outside the United States; Applications for Certificate of Citizenship, 66 Fed. Reg. 32,138, 32,144 (2001) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 320.2(a)(2)). 2 This interim rule, which purports to implement Title I of the CCA, specifies that individuals must meetall the statutory requirements, including the age requirement, on or after February 27, 2001, to be eligible for citizenship under section 320 of the Act.

其次，移民和归化局发布了一项临时规则，于2001年6月13日生效，该规则涉及我们裁决的主题事项。见Children Born Outside the United States; Applications for Certificate of Citizenship, 66 Fed. Reg. 32,138, 32,144 (2001)（将编纂于8 C.F.R. § 320.2(a)(2)）。2 该临时规则旨在实施CCA第一章，规定个人必须在2001年2月27日或之后满足所有法定要求，包括年龄要求，才有资格根据该法第320条获得公民身份。

Although the interim rule issued by the Service warrants consideration, its effect, if any, on our ruling remains to be determined. Matter of Rodriguez- Tejedor, 23 I&N Dec. 153, 154-55 (BIA 2001). 3 Nevertheless, we are bound by “[r]egulations with the force and effect of law.” United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 265 (1954) (citing Bridges v. Wixon,

尽管该局发布的临时规则值得考虑，但其对我们裁决的影响（如果有的话）仍有待确定。Matter of Rodriguez-Tejedor, 23 I&N Dec. 153, 154-55 (BIA 2001)。3 尽管如此，我们受“具有法律效力的法规”的约束。United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 265 (1954)（引用Bridges v. Wixon,

2 I am troubled by the fact that the Service, which is a party in the litigation before us, can attempt to make its litigation position dispositive through the regulatory process. The Service’s ability to do so suggests an inherent conflict in its shared authority with the Board as a delegate of the Attorney General and calls into question the integrity of the quasi-judicial adversary process we follow. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d) (2001). 3 The Board’s authority is created and delegated by the Attorney General. See section 103(a)(4) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(4) (Supp. V 1999); 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.1(a)(1), (b); see also United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 266 (1954); Matter of Ponce De Leon, 21 I&N Dec. 154, 158 (BIA 1996, 1997; A.G. 1997) (vacated on other grounds on remand from the Attorney General) (citing Matter of Anselmo, supra; Matter of Medina, 19 I&N Dec. 734, 742, 746 (BIA 1988)). According to that authority, the decisions of the Board are binding on all employees of the Service, as well as on Immigration Judges. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(g).

2 我感到不安的是，作为我们面前诉讼一方当事人的该局，可以通过监管程序试图使其诉讼立场具有决定性。该局这样做的能力表明，其作为司法部长代表与委员会共享权力存在内在冲突，并使我们所遵循的准司法对抗程序的完整性受到质疑。见8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d) (2001)。 3 委员会的权力由司法部长设立并授予。见该法第103(a)(4)条，8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(4) (Supp. V 1999)；8 C.F.R. §§ 3.1(a)(1), (b)；另见United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 266 (1954)；Matter of Ponce De Leon, 21 I&N Dec. 154, 158 (BIA 1996, 1997; A.G. 1997)（在司法部长发回重审后基于其他理由被撤销）（引用Matter of Anselmo, supra; Matter of Medina, 19 I&N Dec. 734, 742, 746 (BIA 1988)）。根据该授权，委员会的决定对该局所有雇员以及移民法官具有约束力。见8 C.F.R. § 3.1(g)。

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326 U.S. 135, 150-56 (1945); United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 155 (1923) (“One under investigation with a view to deportation is legally entitled to insist upon the observance of rules promulgated by the Secretary pursuant to law.”); see also section 103(a)(3) of the Act; United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 695 (1974) (“So long as this regulation is extant it has the force of law.”). Furthermore, the Service’s regulation, which requires that an individual reach the age of 18 only after the amendment to section 320 takes effect to qualify for automatic citizenship, is consistent with the rulings of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits. See 8 C.F.R. § 320.2(a)(2).

326 U.S. 135, 150-56 (1945)；United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 155 (1923)（“因驱逐出境而接受调查的人在法律上有权坚持遵守部长依法颁布的规则。”）；另见该法第103(a)(3)条；United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 695 (1974)（“只要该法规仍然存在，它就具有法律效力。”）。此外，该局的法规要求个人仅在修订后的第320条生效后才年满18岁才有资格获得自动公民身份，这与第5和第9巡回法院的裁决一致。见8 C.F.R. § 320.2(a)(2)。

Although I feel bound to concur, I cannot agree with the reasoning provided by the majority in support of its decision. Interpretation of statutory language begins with the terms of the statute itself. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987). Section 104 of the CCA, 114 Stat. at 1633, provides that on the effective date, February 27, 2001, its provisions apply to those “individuals who satisfy the requirements of section 320 or 322 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as in effect on such effective date.” (Emphasis added.) I note, in addition, that the terms of section 320 itself refer to conditions that “have been fulfilled.” Section 320(a) of the Act, as amended by CCA § 101(a), 114 Stat. at 1631 (emphasis added) (referencing an event occurring in the past).

尽管我觉得必须同意，但我不能同意多数意见为其裁决提供的理由。法规语言的解释始于法规本身的条款。INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987)。CCA第104条，114 Stat. at 1633规定，在生效日期2001年2月27日，其条款适用于那些“满足《移民和国籍法》第320条或第322条要求，且在该生效日期时有效的个人。”（着重号为原文所加。）此外，我注意到第320条本身的条款提及“已经完成”的条件。经CCA § 101(a)修订的该法第320(a)条，114 Stat. at 1631（着重号为原文所加）（提及过去发生的事件）。

If those terms, on their face, constitute a plain expression of congressional intent, they must be given effect. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). In making this determination, the words used should be given their “‘ordinary or natural’” meaning. Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995) (quoting Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228-29 (1993)); INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 189 (1984). The question before us, therefore, is what is meant by the phrases “individuals who satisfy” and “as in effect on [the] effective date.” CCA § 104.

如果这些条款从表面上看构成国会意图的明确表达，则必须赋予其效力。Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)。在作出这一判断时，所使用的词语应赋予其“‘通常或自然’”的含义。Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995)（引用Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228-29 (1993)）；INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 189 (1984)。因此，我们面前的问题是“满足……的个人”和“在[该]生效日期时有效”这些短语的含义。CCA § 104。

I disagree that this language is not plain or that it is ambiguous because the parties have offered differing readings of the language. Matter of Rodriguez- Tejedor, supra, at 158-59. It should be elementary that statutory language cannot be deemed ambiguous merely because the parties assert that it holds different meanings. But cf. id. If that were a reasonable basis on which to find statutory language ambiguous rather than plain, every statute whose applicability is the subject of litigation would be deemed ambiguous. See Matter of Vasquez-Muniz, Interim Decision 3440 (BIA 2000) (finding the statutory language to be plain, although its meaning was contested); Matter of Ruiz- Romero, Interim Decision 3376 (BIA 1999). Clearly, being susceptible to more than one interpretation does not, in itself, render statutory language ambiguous. 4

我不同意该语言不明确或存在歧义，因为双方对该语言提出了不同的解读。Matter of Rodriguez-Tejedor, supra, at 158-59。应该不言自明的是，不能仅仅因为当事人声称法规语言具有不同含义就认定其存在歧义。但参见同上。如果这是认定法规语言存在歧义而非明确的合理依据，那么每一个其适用性成为诉讼标的的法规都会被认定为存在歧义。见Matter of Vasquez-Muniz, Interim Decision 3440 (BIA 2000)（认定法规语言明确，尽管其含义存在争议）；Matter of Ruiz-Romero, Interim Decision 3376 (BIA 1999)。显然，可能具有不止一种解释本身并不会使法规语言产生歧义。4

4 The majority’s citation to C&H Nationwide, Inc. v. Norwest Bank Texas NA, 208 F.3d (continued...)

4 多数意见引用C&H Nationwide, Inc. v. Norwest Bank Texas NA, 208 F.3d（未完...）

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Both the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, which have reached the same result as the majority, have indicated that they find the language to be plain. I agree that the language is plain, but I do not read it to require that an individual be under 18 only on or after February 27, 2001, to acquire citizenship.

第5和第9巡回法院得出了与多数意见相同的结果，均表示他们认为该语言是明确的。我同意该语言是明确的，但我不认为它要求个人仅在2001年2月27日或之后未满18岁才能获得公民身份。

First, the statutory language plainly states that the qualifications for automatic citizenship under section 320(a) of the Act are met when the specified conditions have been fulfilled. That language strongly indicates that the conditions may have been fulfilled prior to the effective date of the amended provision. Similarly, Congress’ use of the phrase “individuals who satisfy” suggests that the individuals need not be children (i.e., need not be under 18), and that they may satisfy the terms of section 320 now. CCA § 102, 114 Stat. at 1632.

首先，法规语言明确表明，当规定的条件已经完成时，即满足该法第320(a)条规定的自动公民身份资格。该语言强烈表明这些条件可能在修订条款生效日期之前已经完成。同样，国会使用“满足……的个人”这一短语表明，个人不必是子女（即不必未满18岁），并且他们现在就可以满足第320条的条款。CCA § 102, 114 Stat. at 1632。

Second, the effective date provision states that section 320 of the Act applies only “as in effect on [the] effective date.” CCA § 104 (emphasis added). The language “as in effect” refers specifically to the terms of section 320, as amended. In other words, a qualifying individual—one who has fulfilled the statutory conditions—automatically is deemed a citizen only effective February 27, 2001. Automatic citizenship is not conferred retroactively to the individual’s birth and it is not conferred retroactively to the date on which he or she fulfilled all of the conditions. If the respondent qualifies according to the amended provision, automatic citizenship is conferred on him or her according to the law that is in effect as of the February 27, 2001, effective date.

其次，生效日期条款规定该法第320条仅“在[该]生效日期时有效”的情况下适用。CCA § 104（着重号为原文所加）。“在……时有效”这一语言具体指经修订的第320条的条款。换言之，符合条件的个人——即已完成法定条件的人——仅在2001年2月27日生效时才被自动视为公民。自动公民身份不追溯至个人出生时，也不追溯至其满足所有条件之日。如果 respondent 符合修订条款的规定，则根据截至2001年2月27日生效日期有效的法律授予其自动公民身份。

This is consistent with the legislative history, which reflects that Congress modified the statutory amendment in response to concerns raised by the Department of Justice and the Department of State. 5 In particular, Representative Lamar Smith noted that, as amended in the Judiciary Committee, the bill would not extend automatic citizenship to the time of birth. Rather, automatic citizenship was extended to the time the individual satisfied all of the conditions. See H.R. Rep. No. 106-852, at 5 (2000), reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1499, 1501; H.R. 2883, 106th Cong. (2000). It is also consistent

这与立法历史一致，立法历史反映国会修改法定修正案是为了回应司法部和国务院提出的关切。5 特别是，众议员Lamar Smith指出，经司法委员会修订的法案不会将自动公民身份延伸至出生时。相反，自动公民身份延伸至个人满足所有条件之时。见H.R. Rep. No. 106-852, at 5 (2000), reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1499, 1501；H.R. 2883, 106th Cong. (2000)。这也与

4(...continued) 490, 495 (5th Cir. 2000), to support its contention that the statute is ambiguous is inapposite. That opinion was merely correcting an erroneous assumption by the parties in that particular case and clarifying that the assignment of more than one meaning was one possible indicator of ambiguity. Id. (“Appellees misconstrue the language of United Services . . . . We never stated that the mentioned condition was the exclusive indication of ambiguity, as Appellees contend.”).

4（...续） 490, 495 (5th Cir. 2000)，以支持其关于法规存在歧义的主张，是不恰当的。该意见仅仅是在纠正该特定案件中当事人的错误假设，并澄清赋予不止一种含义是歧义的一种可能指标。同上（“被上诉人曲解了United Services案的语言……我们从未像被上诉人主张的那样，称上述条件是歧义的唯一指标。”）。

Contrary to the concurring opinion of Vice Chairman Dunne, we may look to legislative history “to determine . . . whether there is ‘clearly expressed legislative intention’ contrary to that language, which would require us to question the strong presumption that Congress expresses its intent through the language it chooses.” INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, supra, at 432 n.12 (quoting United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 606 (1986); Consumer Product Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)).

与副主席Dunne的同意意见相反，我们可以参考立法历史“以确定……是否存在与该语言相反的‘明确表达的立法意图’，从而要求我们质疑国会通过其选择的语言表达其意图这一强烈推定。”INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, supra, at 432 n.12（引用United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 606 (1986)；Consumer Product Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)）。

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with the statements of Representative Delahunt, who expressed concern that individuals who had been adopted by United States citizens later had been deported because their parent or parents had not completed the certificate of citizen process on their behalf under then-existing law. 146 Cong. Rec. H7774 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 2000) (remarks of Rep. Delahunt).

与众议员Delahunt的发言一致，他表达了对以下情况的关切：被美国公民收养的个人后来因他们的父母根据当时存在的法律未代表他们完成公民证书程序而被驱逐出境。146 Cong. Rec. H7774 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 2000)（众议员Delahunt的发言）。

The effective date provision does not appear to be a limiting provision that restricts automatic citizenship only to those who fulfill the conditions after February 27, 2001. Rather, the entire provision, as amended, is a curative provision. Matter of Fuentes, 21 I&N Dec. 893 (BIA 1997). Nowhere does the statutory language include the words “on or after.” In fact, the clause, “before, on or after,” which was included in the final versions of sections 201(b)(3) and (c)(3) of the CCA, 114 Stat. at 1633, 1634, was omitted from the final version of section 321 of the Act, as amended.

生效日期条款似乎并非将自动公民身份仅限适用于在2001年2月27日之后满足条件者的限制性条款。相反，经修正的整个条款是一项补救性条款。Matter of Fuentes, 21 I&N Dec. 893 (BIA 1997)。法条语言中没有任何地方包含“on or after”（在或之后）字样。事实上，曾纳入《儿童公民法》第201(b)(3)条和第(c)(3)条最终版本（114 Stat. at 1633, 1634）的“before, on or after”（之前、在或之后）一语，在经修正的法案第321条的最终版本中被省略。

Indeed, the Service has had to read this language into its regulation to reach the result that otherwise qualified persons who were under 18 before the amendment took effect now are excluded from its benefits. Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has had to adopt such language in order to reach the result it reaches in Nehme v. INS, supra. But see Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 168 n.16 (1993) (stating that “we may not add terms or provisions where congress has omitted them, see Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 467 (1991); West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 101 (1991)”). 6

的确，移民局不得不将这一语言读入其法规，才能得出如下结果：原本符合条件但在修正案生效前未满18岁的人，现被排除在其利益之外。同样，第5巡回法院也不得不采用此类语言，才能得出其在Nehme v. INS, supra一案中所得出的结果。但参见Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 168 n.16 (1993)（指出“国会省略的条款或规定，我们不得添加，参见Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 467 (1991); West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 101 (1991)”）。6

I recognize that the Fifth Circuit noted, “However, when the bill was taken up for consideration on the House floor, the second clause had been added. Obviously, Congress must have intended that this clause have some effect.” Nehme v. INS, supra, at 432 (referring to the language “as in effect”). Nevertheless, in light of the legislative history, it seems clear that the purpose and effect of the modification was to prevent the provision from operating so that citizenship would be conferred automatically back to the time of an individual’s birth.

我认识到第5巡回法院指出：“然而，当该法案被提交众议院全院审议时，第二款已被添加。显然，国会必定意图该款产生某种效力。”Nehme v. INS, supra, at 432（指“as in effect”（按生效时的规定）一语）。尽管如此，鉴于立法史，似乎清楚的是，该修改的目的和效果是防止该条款运作，以致公民身份自动追溯至个人出生之时。

If Congress had intended that only those persons who turned 18 on or after February 27, 2001, could qualify for automatic citizenship under the CCA, it could have easily so stated. Congress demonstrated only recently that it is well aware of the way to indicate that new laws are to be applicable to events occurring only on or after a given effective date. For example, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C of

如果国会意图只有那些在2001年2月27日或之后年满18岁的人才有资格根据《儿童公民法》获得自动公民身份，它本可以轻易如此规定。国会仅在最近才表明，它十分清楚如何指明新法律仅适用于在特定生效日期或之后发生的事件。例如，1996年《非法移民改革和移民责任法》，C编，

6 Moreover, “[T]his restraint is even more compelling when congress has specifically removed a term from a statute: ‘Few principles of statutory construction are more compelling than the proposition that Congress does not intend sub silentio to enact statutory language that it has earlier discarded.’” Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1359 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 392-93 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoted with approval in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, supra, at 442-43)).

6 此外，“当国会明确从法规中删除某一用语时，这种克制更为有力：‘很少有法律解释原则比以下命题更有说服力：国会不打算以沉默方式颁布其先前已摒弃的法定语言。’”Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1359 (2d Cir. 1992)（引用Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 392-93 (1980)（Stewart大法官异议意见）（在INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, supra, at 442-43中获得赞同引用））。

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Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (“IIRIRA”), contains many such express temporal restrictions on the occurrence of events or the filing of applications. INS v. St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. 2271 (2001). 7

Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546（“IIRIRA”），包含许多此类关于事件发生或申请提交的明示时间限制。INS v. St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. 2271 (2001)。7

Congress historically has included such limitations expressly in the naturalization provisions of the Act. See INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875, 882 (1988) (“Moreover, Congress has again exercised its exclusive constitutional power to provide that any petition for naturalization filed on or after September 26, 1961, will be heard and determined under the 1952 Nationality Act, as amended. See § 310(e), 75 Stat. 656, 8 U.S.C. § 1421(e).” (Emphasis added.)); Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 255 n.1 (1980) (“(a) From and after the effective date of this chapter a person who is a national of the United States whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by . . . .” (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1481) (emphasis added)).

国会在历史上曾将此类限制明确纳入该法的归化条款中。参见INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875, 882 (1988)（“此外，国会再次行使其专属宪法权力，规定在1961年9月26日或之后提交的任何归化申请，将依据经修正的1952年《国籍法》进行审理和裁定。参见§ 310(e), 75 Stat. 656, 8 U.S.C. § 1421(e)。”（着重号为添加。））；Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 255 n.1 (1980)（“（a）自本章生效日期起及之后，身为美国国民的人，无论因出生或归化，将因……而丧失其国籍。”（引用8 U.S.C. § 1481）（着重号为添加））。

Perhaps most prominently, in Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 790 n.2 (1977), the Supreme Court recognized that “[t]he 1976 amendments . . . ‘shall not operate to affect the entitlement to immigrant status . . . as in effect on the day before the effective date of this Act . . . .’” (Emphasis added.) In that case, “as in effect” expressly referred to the law in effect before the effective date, specifying that the amendments would not apply to prior qualifications for status. No such limiting language exists here.

或许最突出的是，在Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 790 n.2 (1977)中，最高法院认识到“1976年修正案……‘不得影响在本法生效日期前一日有效的……移民身份资格……’”（着重号为添加。）在该案中，“as in effect”（按生效时的规定）明确指生效日期前有效的法律，指明修正案不适用于先前的身份资格。此处不存在此类限制性语言。

The language of the current statute does not limit automatic citizenship to individuals who have fulfilled the qualifying conditions only after the law took effect, nor does it expressly exclude those who have fulfilled those conditions before the law took effect. Accordingly, in my view, “as in effect on the effective date” clearly refers to the conditions that “have been fulfilled” and exist now. No matter whether these conditions were met previously, or what the

现行法规的语言并未将自动公民身份限于仅在法律生效后满足合格条件的人，也未明确排除在法律生效前已满足这些条件的人。因此，我认为，“as in effect on the effective date”（按生效日期时的规定）显然指“已满足”且现在存在的条件。无论这些条件此前是否已满足，或该

See, e.g., IIRIRA § 344(c), 110 Stat. at 3009-637 (amendment adding false claims of United States citizenship as ground for removal “shall apply to representations made on or after the date” of enactment); IIRIRA § 350(b), 110 Stat. at 3009-640 (amendment adding domestic violence and stalking as grounds for deportation “shall apply to convictions, or violations of court orders, occurring after the date ” of enactment); IIRIRA § 352(b), 110 Stat. at 3009-641 (amendments adding renouncement of citizenship to avoid taxation as a ground for exclusion “shall apply to individuals who renounce United States citizenship on or after the date” of enactment); IIRIRA § 380(c), 110 Stat. at 3009-650 (amendment imposing civil penalties on aliens for failure to depart “shall apply to actions occurring on or after” effective date); IIRIRA § 384(d)(2), 110 Stat. at 3009-653 (amendments adding penalties for disclosure of information shall apply to “offenses occurring on or after the date” of enactment); IIRIRA § 531(b), 110 Stat. at 3009-675 (public charge considerations as a ground for exclusion “shall apply to applications submitted on or after such date”); IIRIRA § 604(c), 110 Stat. at 3009-694 (new asylum provision “shall apply to applications for asylum filed on or after the first day of the first month beginning more than 180 days after the date” of enactment) (emphasis added).

参见，例如，IIRIRA § 344(c), 110 Stat. at 3009-637（增加虚假声称美国公民身份作为驱逐理由的修正案“应适用于在颁布日期或之后作出的陈述”）；IIRIRA § 350(b), 110 Stat. at 3009-640（增加家庭暴力和跟踪骚扰作为驱逐理由的修正案“应适用于在颁布日期之后发生的定罪或违反法院命令的行为”）；IIRIRA § 352(b), 110 Stat. at 3009-641（增加放弃公民身份以逃避税收作为不准入境理由的修正案“应适用于在颁布日期或之后放弃美国公民身份的个人”）；IIRIRA § 380(c), 110 Stat. at 3009-650（对外国人未离境施加民事处罚的修正案“应适用于在生效日期或之后发生的行为”）；IIRIRA § 384(d)(2), 110 Stat. at 3009-653（增加信息披露处罚的修正案应适用于“在颁布日期或之后发生的罪行”）；IIRIRA § 531(b), 110 Stat. at 3009-675（公共负担考虑作为不准入境理由“应适用于在此类日期或之后提交的申请”）；IIRIRA § 604(c), 110 Stat. at 3009-694（新的庇护条款“应适用于在颁布日期后180天以上的次月第一天或之后提交的庇护申请”）（着重号为添加）。

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individual’s status was previously, these are the rules that determine the person’s citizenship status as of the February 27, 2001, effective date, i.e., now.

个人此前的身份如何，这些规则决定了该人在2001年2月27日生效日期（即现在）的公民身份状况。

Accordingly, automatic citizenship is conferred by operation of law as of February 27, 2001, to those individuals who have fulfilled the conditions on that date and to those individuals who may later satisfy the conditions “as in effect on the effective date.” These refer to the conditions listed in section 320 of the CCA, which includes the condition that the individual is under 18. Neither the provision itself, nor its effective date, limits eligibility to those individuals who turn 18 only on or after February 27, 2001.

因此，自动公民身份自2001年2月27日起依法授予那些在该日已满足条件的人，以及那些日后可能满足“按生效日期时的规定”的条件的人。这些指《儿童公民法》第320条所列的条件，其中包括个人未满18岁的条件。该条款本身及其生效日期均未将资格限于仅在2001年2月27日或之后年满18岁的个人。

This is a prospective provision that confers citizenship as of its effective date. Retroactivity, in the sense that we have addressed it when a statute imposes a disability or alters settled expectations, simply does not apply here. See INS v. St. Cyr, supra; Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 273 (1994) (“Even absent specific legislative authorization, application of new statutes passed after the events in suit is unquestionably proper in many situations. When the intervening statute authorizes or affects the propriety of prospective relief, application of the new provision is not retroactive.”). 8 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has specifically held that statutory provisions that alter or affect forms of prospective relief are to be given effect upon the effective date of the legislation and should be applied to pending suits. American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 201 (1921); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 464 (1921); see also Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45 (1969). 9

这是一项自其生效日期起授予公民身份的前瞻性条款。溯及既往——即我们在法规施加不利条件或改变既定预期时所讨论的意义上——在此根本不适用。参见INS v. St. Cyr, supra; Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 273 (1994)（“即使没有具体的立法授权，在许多情况下适用诉讼事件之后通过的新法规无疑是适当的。当介入的法规授权或影响前瞻性救济的适当性时，适用新条款并非溯及既往。”）。8 此外，最高法院特别裁定，改变或影响前瞻性救济形式的法定条款应在立法生效日期生效，并应适用于待决诉讼。American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 201 (1921); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 464 (1921); 另参见Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45 (1969)。9

Although the Fifth Circuit found that “[i]nterpreting § 104 to apply to persons who satisfied the requirements at any time in the past or future would thus render this final clause meaningless,” Nehme v. INS, supra, at 431, I must differ. The critical difference made by the inclusion of “as in effect” in the effective date provision is not that it limits eligibility to those turning 18 after February 27, 2001, but that it makes clear that citizenship is automatic on the

尽管第5巡回法院认定“将§ 104解释为适用于过去或未来任何时候满足要求的人，将使这一最后条款变得毫无意义”，Nehme v. INS, supra, at 431，但我必须持不同意见。在生效日期条款中纳入“as in effect”（按生效时的规定）所造成的关键区别，不在于它将资格限于2001年2月27日之后年满18岁的人，而在于它明确表明公民身份自

8 Similarly, the three separately concurring Justices in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, supra, at 293 (Scalia, J., joined by Kennedy and Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment), emphasized that intervening law was typically applied to pending applications for prospective relief. Id. (“The reason, which has nothing to do with whether it is possible to have a vested right to prospective relief, is that ‘[o]bviously, this form of relief operates only in futuro.’” (quoting Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 464 (1921))). Accordingly, the question of retroactivity, to the extent it is posited in this case, is a red herring. 9 In prior decisions, we also insisted on finding that new provisions of law have a prospective effect only when applied to facts that had been in existence prior to a new law’s enactment. See, e.g., Matter of Gomez-Giraldo, 20 I&N Dec. 957 (BIA 1995); Matter of A-A-, 20 I&N Dec. 492 (BIA 1992); see also Matter of Soriano, 21 I&N Dec. 516 (BIA 1996; A.G. 1997). Nothing in the majority or concurring opinions explains this departure from our prior patterns.

8 同样，在Landgraf v. USI Film Products, supra, at 293中分别 concurring 的三位大法官（Scalia大法官，Kennedy和Thomas大法官附议，对判决结果 concurring）强调，介入法律通常适用于待决的前瞻性救济申请。Id.（“理由与是否可能对前瞻性救济享有既得权利无关，而在于‘显然，这种救济形式仅向将来运作。’”（引用Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 464 (1921)））。因此，就本案提出的溯及既往问题而言，是一个误导性问题。 9 在先前裁决中，我们也坚持认为，新法律条款仅在其适用于新法颁布之前已存在的事实时才具有前瞻效力。参见，例如，Matter of Gomez-Giraldo, 20 I&N Dec. 957 (BIA 1995); Matter of A-A-, 20 I&N Dec. 492 (BIA 1992); 另参见Matter of Soriano, 21 I&N Dec. 516 (BIA 1996; A.G. 1997)。多数意见或 concurring 意见中均未解释这一对我们先前模式的偏离。

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February 27, 2001, date to those individuals who “have fulfilled” the terms of amended section 320 of the Act under the law that is in effect on that date.

2001年2月27日，授予那些根据该日有效的法律“已满足”经修正的法案第320条条款的个人。

As stated, despite my disagreement I am bound to follow the Fifth Circuit’s decision in this case. However, I cannot join the analysis relied upon by the majority in support of the result reached. Accordingly, I dissent from the majority’s reasoning, but feel that I must concur in the result.

如前所述，尽管我有不同意见，但我必须遵循第5巡回法院在本案中的裁决。然而，我无法赞同多数意见为支持所达结果而依赖的分析。因此，我对多数意见的理由持异议，但认为我必须赞同判决结果。

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