Matter of Cordero-Garcia

Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 652 (BIA 2019) Interim Decision #3964

引用为 27 I&N Dec. 652 (BIA 2019) 临时决定 #3964

U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review

美国司法部 移民审查执行办公室

Board of Immigration Appeals

移民上诉委员会

(1) The crime of dissuading a witness in violation of section 136.1(b)(1) of the California Penal Code is categorically an aggravated felony offense relating to obstruction of justice under section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S) (2012). Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo, 27 I&N Dec. 449 (BIA 2018), followed. (2) The holding in Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo, 27 I&N Dec. 449 (BIA 2018), may be applied retroactively. FOR RESPONDENT: Michael K. Mehr, Esquire, Santa Cruz, California FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Jennifer L. Castro, Assistant Chief Counsel BEFORE: Board Panel: WENDTLAND, GREER, and O’CONNOR, Board Members. WENDTLAND, Board Member:

(1) 违反《加利福尼亚州刑法典》第136.1(b)(1)条的劝阻证人罪，绝对属于《移民与国籍法》第101(a)(43)(S)条、8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S) (2012) 所指的与妨碍司法相关的加重重罪。遵循 Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo, 27 I&N Dec. 449 (BIA 2018)。 (2) Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo, 27 I&N Dec. 449 (BIA 2018) 中的裁定可以追溯适用。 被申请人代表：Michael K. Mehr 律师，加利福尼亚州圣克鲁兹 国土安全部代表：Jennifer L. Castro，助理首席法律顾问 审理者：委员会合议庭：WENDTLAND、GREER 和 O’CONNOR，委员会成员。 WENDTLAND，委员会成员：

In a decision dated June 27, 2012, an Immigration Judge found the respondent removable under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012), as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony, denied his application for cancellation of removal under section 240A(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2012), and ordered him removed from the United States. 1 We dismissed the respondent’s appeal on November 27, 2012, affirming the Immigration Judge’s conclusion that the respondent was convicted of an aggravated felony because dissuading a 1 The Immigration Judge also found that the respondent was removable under section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the Act, as an alien convicted of more than one crime involving moral turpitude. In light of our conclusion that the respondent is removable under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) based on our retroactive application of Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo, 27 I&N Dec. 449 (BIA 2018), we need not address the other charge of removability. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”). However, for purposes of our retroactivity analysis, we will assume that the respondent is not deportable under section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the Act and that his removability turns solely on whether he is convicted of an aggravated felony.

在2012年6月27日的决定中，一名移民法官认定被申请人根据《移民与国籍法》第237(a)(2)(A)(iii)条、8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012) 因作为被判犯有加重重罪的外国人而可被驱逐，驳回了其根据该法第240A(a)条、8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2012) 提出的取消驱逐申请，并命令将其驱逐出美国。1 我们于2012年11月27日驳回了被申请人的上诉，确认了移民法官的结论，即被申请人被判犯有加重重罪，因为劝阻 1 移民法官还认定，被申请人根据该法第237(a)(2)(A)(ii)条因作为被判犯有超过一项涉及道德败坏罪行的人而可被驱逐。鉴于我们根据对 Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo, 27 I&N Dec. 449 (BIA 2018) 的追溯适用得出的被申请人根据第237(a)(2)(A)(iii)条可被驱逐的结论，我们无需处理另一项驱逐指控。见 INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976)（“作为一般规则，法院和机构无需对结果所不需要的问题作出认定。”）。然而，为我们的追溯性分析之目的，我们将假定被申请人根据该法第237(a)(2)(A)(ii)条不可被驱逐，且其可驱逐性仅取决于其是否被判犯有加重重罪。

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witness in violation of section 136.1(b)(1) of the California Penal Code is an offense relating to obstruction of justice under section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S) (2012). 2 In addition, we agreed with the Immigration Judge that the respondent did not meet his burden of showing that he merits a grant of cancellation of removal in the exercise of discretion. We subsequently denied a motion filed by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) to reopen these removal proceedings.

证人违反《加利福尼亚州刑法典》第136.1(b)(1)条，属于该法第101(a)(43)(S)条、8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S) (2012) 所指的与妨碍司法相关的罪行。2 此外，我们同意移民法官的意见，即被申请人未能履行其举证责任，证明其在行使自由裁量权时值得获得取消驱逐。我们随后驳回了国土安全部（“DHS”）提出的重新开启这些驱逐程序的动议。

Pursuant to a motion by the Government, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has remanded this case for us to address whether the crime of dissuading a witness in violation of section 136.1(b)(1) of the California Penal Code is an aggravated felony offense relating to obstruction of justice in light of its decision in Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch, 818 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 2016). This question will determine the respondent’s removability under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act and his eligibility for cancellation of removal under section 240A(a)(3). The respondent’s appeal will again be dismissed.

根据政府的动议，美国第9巡回上诉法院将本案发回重审，要求我们根据其在 Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch, 818 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 2016) 中的裁决，处理违反《加利福尼亚州刑法典》第136.1(b)(1)条的劝阻证人罪是否属于与妨碍司法相关的加重重罪的问题。该问题将决定被申请人根据该法第237(a)(2)(A)(iii)条的可驱逐性及其根据第240A(a)(3)条获得取消驱逐的资格。被申请人的上诉将再次被驳回。

I. AGGRAVATED FELONY Section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act defines an aggravated felony as “an offense relating to obstruction of justice, perjury or subornation of perjury, or bribery of a witness, for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year.” To establish whether the respondent’s conviction is for such an offense, we apply the categorical approach by focusing on whether the elements of section 136.1(b)(1) of the California Penal Code proscribe conduct that categorically falls within the Federal generic definition of an offense relating to obstruction of justice. See Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248 (2016).

I. 加重重罪 该法第101(a)(43)(S)条将加重重罪定义为“与妨碍司法、伪证或教唆伪证、或贿赂证人相关的罪行，且监禁刑期至少为一年。”为确定被申请人的定罪是否属于此类罪行，我们适用绝对方法，重点关注《加利福尼亚州刑法典》第136.1(b)(1)条的要素是否绝对禁止属于联邦通用定义的与妨碍司法相关罪行的行为。见 Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248 (2016)。

We outlined the generic definition of an offense relating to obstruction of justice in Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo (“Valenzuela Gallardo I”), 25 I&N

我们在 Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo（“Valenzuela Gallardo I”），25 I&N

2 At all relevant times, section 136.1(b)(1) of the California Penal Code has provided in pertinent part: Except as provided in subdivision (c), every person who attempts to prevent or dissuade another person who has been the victim of a crime or who is witness to a crime from doing any of the following is guilty of a public offense and shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year or in the state prison:

2 在所有相关时间，《加利福尼亚州刑法典》第136.1(b)(1)条的相关部分规定： 除(c)款规定外，任何人试图阻止或劝阻曾是犯罪受害者或是犯罪证人的人实施以下任何行为，即犯有公共罪行，应处以在县监狱不超过一年的监禁或在州监狱的监禁：

(1) Making any report of that victimization to any peace officer or state or local law enforcement officer or probation or parole or correctional officer or prosecuting agency or to any judge.

(1) 向任何治安官员或州或地方执法官员或缓刑或假释或惩教官员或起诉机构或向任何法官报告该受害情况。

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Dec. 838 (BIA 2012). The Ninth Circuit declined to defer to our definition, concluding that it was impermissibly vague. Valenzuela Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 812–13, 823–24. While this appeal was pending, we clarified the generic definition of an aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act, stating that an offense relating to obstruction of justice

Dec. 838 (BIA 2012) 中概述了与妨碍司法相关罪行的通用定义。第9巡回法院拒绝遵从我们的定义，认为其过于模糊。Valenzuela Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 812–13, 823–24。在本上诉待决期间，我们澄清了该法第101(a)(43)(S)条下加重重罪的通用定义，指出与妨碍司法相关的罪行

consists of offenses covered by chapter 73 of the Federal criminal code[, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1521 (2012),] or any other Federal or State offense that involves (1) an affirmative and intentional attempt (2) that is motivated by a specific intent (3) to interfere either in an investigation or proceeding that is ongoing, pending, or reasonably foreseeable by the defendant, or in another’s punishment resulting from a completed proceeding. Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo (“Valenzuela Gallardo II”), 27 I&N Dec. 449, 460 (BIA 2018). We further held that the crime of accessory to a felony under section 32 of the California Penal Code is an aggravated felony offense relating to obstruction of justice. Id. at 461. The California accessory statute required “a violator to aid the principal, with knowledge that the principal has committed a crime, and with the specific intent to interfere in the principal’s arrest, trial, conviction, or punishment.” Id. (citing People v. Nuckles, 298 P.3d 867, 870 (Cal. 2013)).

包括联邦刑法典第73章[, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1521 (2012),]所涵盖的罪行，或任何其他联邦或州罪行，该罪行涉及(1) 积极且故意的尝试 (2) 出于特定意图 (3) 干扰被告正在进行的、待决的或合理可预见的调查或程序，或干扰因已完成的程序而产生的对他人的惩罚。 Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo（“Valenzuela Gallardo II”），27 I&N Dec. 449, 460 (BIA 2018)。 我们进一步裁定，违反《加利福尼亚州刑法典》第32条的重罪从犯罪属于与妨碍司法相关的加重重罪。Id. at 461。加利福尼亚州从犯法规要求“违者协助主犯，明知主犯已实施犯罪，并具有干扰主犯被捕、审判、定罪或惩罚的特定意图。”Id.（引用 People v. Nuckles, 298 P.3d 867, 870 (Cal. 2013)）。

To obtain a conviction under section 136.1(b)(1) of the California Penal Code, the State must prove that “(1) the defendant has attempted to prevent or dissuade a person (2) who is a victim or witness to a crime (3) from making [a] report . . . to any peace officer or other designated officials.” People v. Navarro, 152 Cal. Rptr. 3d 109, 117–18 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting People v. Upsher, 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 481, 488 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007)). “The prosecution must also establish that ‘the defendant’s acts or statements [were] intended to affect or influence a potential witness’s or victim’s testimony or acts.’” Id. at 118 (alteration in original) (quoting People v. McDaniel, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 306, 309 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)). According to this California case law, section 136.1(b)(1) requires a specific intent to interfere in an investigation or proceeding. Where an individual attempts to prevent or dissuade a victim or witness from making a report of a crime to a peace officer or other designated official, an investigation or proceeding would necessarily be either ongoing, pending, or reasonably foreseeable. In other words, there would be little reason for a person to try to prevent or dissuade a victim or witness from reporting the crime to appropriate authorities unless there was an investigation in progress or one was reasonably foreseeable. We therefore conclude that dissuading a witness in violation of section 136.1(b)(1) of the California Penal Code is categorically an aggravated felony offense relating to obstruction of justice

要根据《加利福尼亚州刑法典》第136.1(b)(1)条获得定罪，州必须证明“(1) 被告试图阻止或劝阻某人 (2) 该人是犯罪的受害者或证人 (3) 向任何治安官员或其他指定官员作出报告……。”People v. Navarro, 152 Cal. Rptr. 3d 109, 117–18 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013)（原文有改动）（引用 People v. Upsher, 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 481, 488 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007)）。“控方还必须证明‘被告的行为或陈述[是]意图影响或左右潜在证人或受害人的证词或行为。’”Id. at 118（原文有改动）（引用 People v. McDaniel, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 306, 309 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)）。 根据这一加利福尼亚州判例法，第136.1(b)(1)条要求具有干扰调查或程序的特定意图。当个人试图阻止或劝阻受害人或证人向治安官员或其他指定官员报告犯罪时，调查或程序必然要么正在进行、待决，要么合理可预见。换言之，除非有调查正在进行或合理可预见，否则一个人几乎没有理由试图阻止或劝阻受害人或证人向有关当局报告犯罪。因此，我们得出结论，违反《加利福尼亚州刑法典》第136.1(b)(1)条的劝阻证人罪，绝对属于与妨碍司法相关的加重重罪

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under section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act pursuant to the criteria that we outlined in Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo II, 27 I&N Dec. at 460. 3

根据该法第101(a)(43)(S)条，依据我们在 Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo II, 27 I&N Dec. at 460 中概述的标准。3

II. RETROACTIVITY

II. 追溯性

The respondent argues that the standard for obstruction of justice we set forth in Valenzuela Gallardo II may not be applied retroactively to his conviction, which occurred before our decisions in Valenzuela Gallardo I and II were issued. Therefore, we must also determine whether the standard for obstruction of justice we set forth in Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo II can be retroactively applied to the respondent’s conviction. In this regard, we recognize the well-established principle that agencies may adjudicate new rules and apply them retroactively.

被申请人主张，我们在 Valenzuela Gallardo II 中设定的妨碍司法标准不能追溯适用于其定罪，该定罪发生在我们的 Valenzuela Gallardo I 和 II 裁决发布之前。因此，我们还必须确定我们在 Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo II 中设定的妨碍司法标准是否可以追溯适用于被申请人的定罪。在这方面，我们认可机构可以裁决新规则并追溯适用这一既定原则。

[T]he choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency.

[在]通过一般规则还是通过个别的、临时的诉讼之间作出的选择，主要属于行政机构的知情裁量权。

. . . That [an agency] action might have a retroactive effect [i]s not necessarily fatal to its validity. Every case of first impression has a retroactive effect, whether the new principle is announced by a court or by an administrative agency. But such retroactivity must be balanced against the mischief of producing a result which is contrary to a statutory design or to legal and equitable principles. If that mischief is greater than the ill effect of the retroactive application of a new standard, it is not the type of retroactivity which is condemned by law. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (citation omitted). We acknowledge, however, that “[a]s a general rule, ‘[r]etroactivity is not favored in the law.’” Velasquez-Garcia v. Holder, 760 F.3d 571, 579 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988)). In this regard, at least one circuit has indicated that agency “rules . . . should be presumed prospective in operation unless Congress has clearly authorized retroactive application.” De Niz Robles v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1165, 1172 (10th Cir. 2015) (emphasis added); see also Betansos v. Barr, 928 F.3d 1133, 1143–46 (9th Cir. 2019) (noting that a retroactivity analysis “should be conducted with ‘the presumption of prospectivity’” where the court has given deference to our decision pursuant to National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005), but deciding

……[行政机关]的行为可能具有溯及效力，[这]并不必然导致其无效。每个初次印象的案件都具有溯及效力，无论新原则是由法院还是由行政机关宣布。但这种溯及力必须与产生违背法定设计或法律与衡平原则的结果的危害相权衡。如果该危害大于新标准溯及适用所带来的不良影响，则不属于法律所谴责的溯及力类型。 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947)（引文省略）。 然而，我们承认，“作为一般规则，‘法律不赞成溯及力。’” Velasquez-Garcia v. Holder, 760 F.3d 571, 579 (7th Cir. 2014)（引用 Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988)）。在这方面，至少有一个巡回法院指出，行政机关的“规则……应被推定为面向未来适用，除非国会明确授权溯及适用。” De Niz Robles v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1165, 1172 (10th Cir. 2015)（强调为原文所加）；另见 Betansos v. Barr, 928 F.3d 1133, 1143–46 (9th Cir. 2019)（指出在法院根据 National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005) 对我们的决定给予尊重的情况下，溯及力分析“应以‘面向未来的推定’进行”，但决定

3 The Immigration Judge found that a violation of section 136.1(b)(1) of the California Penal Code was not a categorical aggravated felony offense relating to obstruction of justice, but he applied the modified categorical approach to determine that the respondent’s conviction was for an aggravated felony. In light of our holding that dissuading a witness under California law is categorically an aggravated felony, we will not address the Immigration Judge’s finding in this regard.

3 移民法官认定，违反《加利福尼亚州刑法典》第136.1(b)(1)条的行为不属于与妨碍司法相关的当然加重重罪，但他适用了修正的当然方法，认定被申请人的定罪属于加重重罪。鉴于我们裁定根据加利福尼亚州法律劝阻证人当然属于加重重罪，我们将不处理移民法官在这方面的认定。

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to apply the decision retroactively (quoting Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1144 (10th Cir. 2016))). However, Congress has “indicate[d] unambiguously its intention to apply [the aggravated felony provisions] retroactively.” INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 318–19 & n.43 (2001) (stating that the aggravated felony definition itself clearly provides that it applies retroactively). In enacting section 101(a)(43) of the Act, Congress expressly stated its intent that “the term [aggravated felony] applies regardless of whether the conviction was entered before, on, or after the date of enactment.” Accordingly, in our informed discretion, we conclude that we may apply our decisions retroactively after proper consideration of the relevant factors, consistent with SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. at 209 (upholding the agency’s determination, despite its retroactive effect, and recognizing it as “the product of administrative experience, appreciation of the complexities of the problem, realization of the statutory policies, and responsible treatment of the uncontested facts”).

溯及适用该决定（引用 Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1144 (10th Cir. 2016)））。 然而，国会“明确表示其意图溯及适用[加重重罪条款]。” INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 318–19 & n.43 (2001)（指出加重重罪定义本身明确规定其溯及适用）。在颁布该法第101(a)(43)条时，国会明确表示其意图是“[加重重罪]一词适用于定罪是在颁布之日之前、之日或之后作出的情况。”因此，经明智裁量，我们得出结论，在适当考虑相关因素后，我们可以溯及适用我们的决定，符合 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. at 209（维持行政机关的认定，尽管具有溯及效力，并承认其为“行政经验、对问题复杂性的认识、对法定政策的理解以及对无争议事实的负责任处理的产物”）。

A. Change in Law Before we decide whether to apply Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo II retroactively, we must consider whether our holding in that case is a change in law, which the Ninth Circuit has stated is required before a retroactivity analysis is necessary. See Olivas-Motta v. Whitaker, 910 F.3d 1271, 1276 (9th Cir. 2018). A “retroactivity analysis is only applicable when ‘an agency consciously overrules or otherwise alters its own rule or regulation,’ or ‘expressly considers and openly departs from a circuit court decision.’” Id. at 1277 (quoting Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder, 702 F.3d 504, 518–19 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc)). The Ninth Circuit remanded Valenzuela Gallardo I for “consideration of a new construction or application of the interpretation” of obstruction of justice that we had outlined in Matter of Espinoza, 22 I&N Dec. 889 (BIA 1999), to which the court previously deferred in Trung Thanh Hoang v. Holder, 641 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2011). Valenzuela Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 812–13 (emphasis added). Not all Board precedents clarifying prior decisions are necessarily changes in the law. The Ninth Circuit has rejected as “contrary to settled law” the assertion that “the mere existence of a new published decision on an issue would always trigger retroactivity analysis.” Olivas-Motta, 910 F.3d at 1276. Moreover, a new Board precedent that resolves prior, potentially inconsistent unpublished decisions is not a change in the law, because “[u]npublished decisions are not precedential and ‘do not bind future parties.’” Id. at 1278 (quoting Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc)).

A. 法律变更 在我们决定是否溯及适用 Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo II 之前，我们必须考虑我们在该案中的裁定是否属于法律变更，第9巡回法院指出这是进行溯及力分析所必需的。见 Olivas-Motta v. Whitaker, 910 F.3d 1271, 1276 (9th Cir. 2018)。“溯及力分析仅在‘行政机关有意识地推翻或以其他方式改变其自身规则或条例’，或‘明确考虑并公开背离巡回法院的决定’时适用。” Id. at 1277（引用 Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder, 702 F.3d 504, 518–19 (9th Cir. 2012)（全体法官审理））。第9巡回法院将 Valenzuela Gallardo I 发回重审，以“考虑我们在 Matter of Espinoza, 22 I&N Dec. 889 (BIA 1999) 中概述的妨碍司法解释的新构建或适用”，法院此前在 Trung Thanh Hoang v. Holder, 641 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2011) 中对该解释予以尊重。Valenzuela Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 812–13（强调为原文所加）。 并非所有澄清先前决定的委员会先例都必然是法律变更。第9巡回法院驳回了“仅仅存在关于某一问题的新公布决定就会总是触发溯及力分析”的主张，认为其“与既定法律相悖”。Olivas-Motta, 910 F.3d at 1276。此外，解决先前可能不一致的未公布决定的新委员会先例不是法律变更，因为“未公布的决定不具有先例效力，且‘不约束未来的当事人’。” Id. at 1278（引用 Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2009)（全体法官审理））。

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As we will discuss in greater detail below, our decision in Valenzuela Gallardo II openly departed from the generic definition that the Ninth Circuit previously approved. Our decision also clarified Valenzuela Gallardo I, but the standard in Valenzuela Gallardo II differs in some respects from our prior definition. We therefore conclude that a retroactivity analysis is appropriate in this case.

正如我们将在下文更详细讨论的，我们在 Valenzuela Gallardo II 中的决定公开背离了第9巡回法院先前批准的通用定义。我们的决定也澄清了 Valenzuela Gallardo I，但 Valenzuela Gallardo II 中的标准在某些方面与我们先前的定义不同。因此，我们得出结论，在本案中进行溯及力分析是适当的。

B. Test for Retroactivity Next, we must determine the appropriate test for ascertaining whether Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo II may be applied retroactively. The Ninth Circuit applies the factors outlined in Montgomery Ward & Co. v. FTC (“Montgomery Ward”), 691 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. 1982). Garfias-Rodriguez, 702 F.3d at 514–23 (applying these factors in favor of retroactive applicability). This test was first set forth in Retail, Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union v. NLRB (“Retail Union”), 466 F.2d 380, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (involving a labor dispute before the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) between a company and union workers). The Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits also apply this test. See Microcomputer Tech. Inst. v. Riley, 139 F.3d 1044, 1050 n.4 (5th Cir. 1998) (collecting cases); see also De Niz Robles, 803 F.3d 1177–80 (following the “balancing” test the Tenth Circuit set forth in Stewart Capital Corp. v. Andrus, 701 F.2d 846, 848 (10th Cir. 1983)). The Eighth Circuit applies a similar test. Ryan Heating Co. v. NLRB, 942 F2d 1287, 1289 (8th Cir. 1991). By contrast, the Fifth Circuit weighs “the disadvantages of retroactivity—frustration of parties’ expectations—against the detrimental effect of prospectivity—partial frustration of what we have now determined is the proper statutory interpretation.” Microcomputer Tech. Inst., 139 F.3d at 1051. In light of the courts’ overwhelming adoption of the test outlined in Retail Union (known as the Montgomery Ward test in the Ninth Circuit), we will employ that test, not only in cases arising in the Ninth Circuit, where we are bound to use it, but throughout the country. See Matter of J-H-J-, 26 I&N Dec. 563, 564 (BIA 2015) (acceding to the majority view of the circuits). 4 In addition to considering the desirability of applying the immigration laws with nationwide uniformity, we must also recognize that the circuit courts use this test in reviewing decisions from numerous other agencies. In our opinion, it would therefore be incongruous for us to employ a different test.

B. 溯及力检验标准 接下来，我们必须确定用于查明 Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo II 是否可以溯及适用的适当检验标准。第9巡回法院适用 Montgomery Ward & Co. v. FTC（“Montgomery Ward”）, 691 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. 1982) 中概述的因素。Garfias-Rodriguez, 702 F.3d at 514–23（适用这些因素支持溯及适用）。该检验标准首次在 Retail, Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union v. NLRB（“Retail Union”）, 466 F.2d 380, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1972) 中提出（涉及全国劳资关系委员会（“NLRB”）之前公司与工会工人之间的劳资纠纷）。 第2、第3、第4、第6、第7和第10巡回法院也适用该检验标准。见 Microcomputer Tech. Inst. v. Riley, 139 F.3d 1044, 1050 n.4 (5th Cir. 1998)（收集案例）；另见 De Niz Robles, 803 F.3d 1177–80（遵循第10巡回法院在 Stewart Capital Corp. v. Andrus, 701 F.2d 846, 848 (10th Cir. 1983) 中提出的“权衡”检验标准）。第8巡回法院适用类似的检验标准。Ryan Heating Co. v. NLRB, 942 F2d 1287, 1289 (8th Cir. 1991)。相比之下，第5巡回法院权衡“溯及力的不利之处——使当事人的期望受挫——与面向未来的不利影响——部分挫败我们现在所确定的正确法定解释。” Microcomputer Tech. Inst., 139 F.3d at 1051。 鉴于法院绝大多数采纳了 Retail Union 中概述的检验标准（在第9巡回法院称为 Montgomery Ward 检验标准），我们将采用该检验标准，不仅在第9巡回法院产生的案件中，我们必须使用它，而且在全国范围内。见 Matter of J-H-J-, 26 I&N Dec. 563, 564 (BIA 2015)（遵从各巡回法院的多数观点）。4 除了考虑以全国统一性适用移民法的可取性外，我们还必须认识到，巡回法院在审查来自众多其他机关的决定时使用该检验标准。我们认为，因此我们采用不同的检验标准将是不协调的。

4 To the extent that a court of appeals applies a different test, however, Immigration Judges and the Board should follow the law of that circuit. See Matter of Anselmo, 20 I&N Dec. 25, 31 (BIA 1989).

4 然而，如果上诉法院适用不同的检验标准，移民法官和委员会应遵循该巡回法院的法律。见 Matter of Anselmo, 20 I&N Dec. 25, 31 (BIA 1989)。

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C. Application The test for retroactivity requires us to consider the following factors:

C. 适用 溯及力检验标准要求我们考虑以下因素：

(1) whether the particular case is one of first impression, (2) whether the new rule represents an abrupt departure from well established practice or merely attempts to fill a void in an unsettled area of law, (3) the extent to which the party against whom the new rule is applied relied on the former rule, (4) the degree of the burden which a retroactive order imposes on a party, and (5) the statutory interest in applying a new rule despite the reliance of a party on the old standard.

(1) 特定案件是否为初次印象案件；(2) 新规则是否代表对既定实践的突然背离，或仅仅是试图填补法律未决领域的空白；(3) 新规则所适用的一方在多大程度上依赖了旧规则；(4) 溯及性命令对一方施加的负担程度；以及 (5) 尽管一方依赖旧标准，适用新规则的法定利益。

Montgomery Ward, 691 F.2d at 1333 (quoting Retail Union, 466 F.2d at 390). The Ninth Circuit has recognized that the first factor may not be well suited to the context of proceedings to remove an alien because Retail Union involved litigation between private parties in labor disputes before the NLRB. See Garfias-Rodriguez, 702 F.3d at 520–21 (noting that the first factor often does not favor either side in removal proceedings, where the Government is always a party); Miguel-Miguel v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 941, 951 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he first factor is directed towards maintaining an incentive for litigants to raise novel claims by allowing a litigant who successfully argues for a new rule to get the benefit of that rule.”). However, the court has recognized that this factor favors the alien where the agency has “confronted the problem before, ha[s] established an explicit standard of conduct, and now attempts to punish conformity to that standard under a new standard subsequently adopted.” Miguel-Miguel, 500 F.3d at 951 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Retail Union, 466 F.2d at 391). Those circumstances were not present in Valenzuela Gallardo II, which was issued after decades of rulings by the Board and the Ninth Circuit interpreting the aggravated felony ground of removal relating to obstruction of justice. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has noted in regard to the first factor that “any question of unfairness in applying a new rule . . . , such as surprise or detrimental reliance, is fully captured in the second and third Montgomery Ward factors.” Garfias-Rodriguez, 702 F.3d at 521. Based on the circumstances of this case, we agree. As the Ninth Circuit has stated regarding the question of unsettled law,

Montgomery Ward, 691 F.2d at 1333（引用 Retail Union, 466 F.2d at 390）。 第9巡回法院已认识到，第一个因素可能不太适合驱逐外国人程序的情境，因为 Retail Union 涉及 NLRB 之前私人当事方之间的劳资纠纷诉讼。见 Garfias-Rodriguez, 702 F.3d at 520–21（指出在驱逐程序中，政府始终是一方，第一个因素通常不偏向任何一方）；Miguel-Miguel v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 941, 951 (9th Cir. 2007)（“[T]第一个因素旨在通过允许成功主张新规则的诉讼当事人获得该规则的利益，来维持诉讼当事人提出新颖主张的积极性。”）。然而，法院已认识到，在行政机关“此前已面对该问题，已确立明确的行为标准，现在试图根据随后采用的新标准惩罚符合该标准的行为”的情况下，该因素有利于外国人。Miguel-Miguel, 500 F.3d at 951（原文有改动）（强调为原文所加）（引用 Retail Union, 466 F.2d at 391）。 这些情况在 Valenzuela Gallardo II 中并不存在，该决定是在委员会和第9巡回法院数十年来解释与妨碍司法相关的加重重罪驱逐理由的裁决之后发布的。此外，第9巡回法院就第一个因素指出，“适用新规则中的任何不公平问题……，如意外或不利依赖，已在 Montgomery Ward 第二和第三因素中充分体现。” Garfias-Rodriguez, 702 F.3d at 521。基于本案情况，我们同意。 正如第9巡回法院就未决法律问题所指出的，

The second and the third factors are closely intertwined. If a new rule “represents an abrupt departure from well established practice,” a party’s reliance on the prior rule is likely to be reasonable, whereas if the rule “merely attempts to fill a void in an unsettled area of law,” reliance is less likely to be reasonable. . . . [T]hese two factors will favor retroactivity if a party could reasonably have anticipated the change in the law such that the new “requirement would not be a complete surprise.”

第二和第三个因素紧密交织。如果一项新规则“代表了对既有成熟实践的突然背离”，则当事人对先前规则的依赖很可能是合理的，而如果该规则“仅仅试图填补法律未决领域的空白”，则依赖不太可能是合理的。……[T]如果当事人能够合理预见法律的变化，以至于新的“要求不会完全出乎意料”，则这两个因素将倾向于溯及适用。

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Id. (citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit has acknowledged that Congress did not clearly define the generic elements of an aggravated felony offense relating to obstruction of justice. Renteria-Morales v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir. 2008). Since 1997, both the Ninth Circuit and the Board have issued decisions defining the outer limits of offenses relating to obstruction of justice. See, e.g., Valenzuela Gallardo, 818 F.3d 808; Trung Thanh Hoang, 641 F.3d 1157; Matter of Espinoza, 22 I&N Dec. 889; Matter of Batista-Hernandez, 21 I&N Dec. 955 (BIA 1997). Recently, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that “an ongoing conversation or a back-and-forth between this Court and the [Board] about the proper interpretation” is an important consideration in a retroactivity analysis. Betansos, 928 F.3d at 1144. A brief review of these decisions reflects that the discussion between the Board and the Ninth Circuit regarding this aggravated felony ground has been ongoing, and the process of defining it has been unsettled, for several decades. In Matter of Batista-Hernandez, 21 I&N Dec. at 961, we concluded that the offense of accessory after the fact in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3 (Supp. V 1993) “clearly relates to obstruction of justice,” notwithstanding the fact that the statute lacked an element of an ongoing investigation or proceeding. Two years later, in Matter of Espinoza, we held that misprision of felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1994) was not an offense relating to obstruction of justice. The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly deferred to a generic definition that it drew from Matter of Espinoza, which, according to the court, required interference with an ongoing proceeding or investigation, although the decision did not itself articulate such a requirement and Batista-Hernandez clearly did not apply one. 5 See Trung Thanh Hoang, 641 F.3d at 1164; Renteria-Morales, 551 F.3d at 1086–87; Salazar-Luviano v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 857, 861–63 (9th Cir. 2008). 6 However, one judge in

同上（引注省略）。 第9巡回法院已承认，国会并未明确界定与妨碍司法有关的加重重罪罪行的通用要素。Renteria-Morales v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir. 2008)。自1997年以来，第9巡回法院和委员会均发布了界定与妨碍司法有关的罪行外部界限的决定。参见，例如，Valenzuela Gallardo, 818 F.3d 808；Trung Thanh Hoang, 641 F.3d 1157；Matter of Espinoza, 22 I&N Dec. 889；Matter of Batista-Hernandez, 21 I&N Dec. 955 (BIA 1997)。最近，第9巡回法院强调，“本法院与[委员会]之间关于正确解释的持续对话或来回交流”是溯及适用分析中的重要考虑因素。Betansos, 928 F.3d at 1144。对这些决定的简要回顾表明，委员会与第9巡回法院之间关于这一加重重罪依据的讨论一直在持续，而界定该依据的过程几十年来一直未决。 在 Matter of Batista-Hernandez, 21 I&N Dec. at 961 中，我们认定，违反 18 U.S.C. § 3 (Supp. V 1993) 的事后从犯罪行“明显与妨碍司法有关”，尽管该法规缺乏正在进行调查或程序的要素。两年后，在 Matter of Espinoza 中，我们认定违反 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1994) 的隐匿重罪不构成与妨碍司法有关的罪行。第9巡回法院多次遵从它从 Matter of Espinoza 中得出的通用定义，据该法院称，该定义要求干扰正在进行的程序或调查，尽管该决定本身并未阐明此类要求，且 Batista-Hernandez 显然未适用该要求。5 参见 Trung Thanh Hoang, 641 F.3d at 1164；Renteria-Morales, 551 F.3d at 1086–87；Salazar-Luviano v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 857, 861–63 (9th Cir. 2008)。6 然而，其中一名法官在

5 We did note the absence of an ongoing criminal investigation or trial in Matter of Espinoza. However, we made the more general observation that misprision of felony does not constitute “obstruction of justice” because “it lacks the critical element of an affirmative and intentional attempt, motivated by a specific intent, to interfere with the process of justice.” Matter of Espinoza, 22 I&N Dec. at 896. In identifying the critical element of specific intent, we did not state that an ongoing criminal investigation or trial was always required, but we subsequently clarified the matter in Valenzuela Gallardo I, 25 I&N Dec. at 841–42. 6 If we were to assess the generic definition of an aggravated felony offense relating to obstruction of justice when the respondent entered his guilty plea in 2009, we would still conclude that the law was unsettled at that time. The Ninth Circuit precedent had not yet analyzed our 1997 decision in Matter of Batista-Hernandez, so a respondent who potentially faced this aggravated felony charge in 2009 would have had to address Matter of Batista-Hernandez and could not merely rely on Renteria-Morales and Salazar-Luviano.

5 我们确实注意到在 Matter of Espinoza 中不存在正在进行的刑事调查或审判。然而，我们作出了更一般的观察，即隐匿重罪不构成“妨碍司法”，因为“它缺乏以特定意图为动机、积极且故意试图干扰司法程序的关键要素”。Matter of Espinoza, 22 I&N Dec. at 896。在确定特定意图这一关键要素时，我们并未声明始终需要正在进行的刑事调查或审判，但我们随后在 Valenzuela Gallardo I, 25 I&N Dec. at 841–42 中澄清了此事。 6 如果我们评估在答辩人于2009年认罪时与妨碍司法有关的加重重罪罪行的通用定义，我们仍会得出结论，当时法律尚未决。第9巡回法院的先例尚未分析我们1997年在 Matter of Batista-Hernandez 中的决定，因此，在2009年可能面临这一加重重罪指控的答辩人将不得不处理 Matter of Batista-Hernandez，而不能仅仅依赖 Renteria-Morales 和 Salazar-Luviano。

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Trung Thanh Hoang dissented from the majority’s use of that definition, contending that the court was not limited to applying the definition that it had derived from Matter of Espinoza and should, instead, have followed Matter of Bastista-Hernandez. Trung Thanh Hoang, 641 F.3d at 1165–68 (Bybee, J., dissenting). We subsequently clarified our prior precedents interpreting section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act and held that an offense relating to obstruction of justice must have as an element “the affirmative and intentional attempt, with specific intent, to interfere with the process of justice . . . . [T]he existence of [an ongoing criminal investigation or trial] is not an essential element of ‘an offense relating to obstruction of justice.’” Valenzuela Gallardo I, 25 I&N Dec. at 841 (emphasis added). Concerned that this definition might be impermissibly vague, a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit applied the doctrine of constitutional avoidance and remanded for us to consider a new construction of section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act or to apply our previous interpretation in Matter of Espinoza. See Valenzuela Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 811, 813–24. We clarified our definition again in Valenzuela Gallardo II. The unsettled nature of defining the term “relating to obstruction of justice” in section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act is evidenced by the continuing discussion in these administrative and judicial decisions for more than 20 years. That the question has been unsettled becomes more apparent in light of the reasoning underpinning the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Valenzuela Gallardo, where the court had serious constitutional doubts about the vagueness of the definition we set forth in Valenzuela Gallardo I. As the court noted, “Absent some indication of the contours of ‘process of justice,’ an unpredictable variety of specific intent crimes could fall within it, leaving us unable to determine what crimes make a criminal defendant deportable under [section 101(a)(43)(S)] and what crimes do not.” Valenzuela Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 820. It would be questionable to conclude that an area of law is settled when a court has expressed such concerns about the vagueness of an agency’s interpretation of the relevant statute. Moreover, a construction that requires interference with an ongoing proceeding or investigation brings its own uncertainty. Some of the obstruction of justice crimes that Congress placed in Chapter 73 of the Federal criminal code do not require interference with an ongoing tribunal or investigation. See Valenzuela Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 821 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3) (2012) (“prohibition on tampering with a witness with the intent to hinder or prevent ‘communication to a law enforcement officer’ regarding a Federal offense”); § 1512(d)(2) (“prohibition on harassing someone with the intent to prevent that person from ‘reporting [a federal crime] to a law enforcement officer or judge’”); and § 1519 (2012) (“prohibition on falsifying or destroying a record ‘with the intent to impede, obstruct, or

Trung Thanh Hoang 案的持异议法官反对多数派对该定义的使用，主张法院不应仅限于适用其从 Matter of Espinoza 中得出的定义，而应遵循 Matter of Bastista-Hernandez。Trung Thanh Hoang, 641 F.3d at 1165–68 (Bybee, J., dissenting)。 我们随后澄清了我们先前解释该法第101(a)(43)(S)条的先例，并认定与妨碍司法有关的罪行必须具有以下要素：“以特定意图积极且故意试图干扰司法程序……[正在进行的刑事调查或审判]的存在并非‘与妨碍司法有关的罪行’的必要要素。”Valenzuela Gallardo I, 25 I&N Dec. at 841（强调为原文所加）。由于担心该定义可能过于模糊，第9巡回法院的一个分歧合议庭适用了宪法回避原则，并将案件发回，要求我们考虑对该法第101(a)(43)(S)条的新解释，或适用我们在 Matter of Espinoza 中的先前解释。参见 Valenzuela Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 811, 813–24。我们在 Valenzuela Gallardo II 中再次澄清了我们的定义。 界定该法第101(a)(43)(S)条中“与妨碍司法有关”一词的未决性质，体现在这些行政和司法决定中持续了20多年的讨论。鉴于第9巡回法院在 Valenzuela Gallardo 案中意见的推理依据，该问题未决变得更加明显，在该案中，法院对我们于 Valenzuela Gallardo I 中提出的定义的模糊性存在严重的宪法疑虑。正如该法院所指出的，“在缺乏‘司法程序’轮廓的任何指示的情况下，各种不可预测的特定意图犯罪都可能落入其中，使我们无法确定哪些犯罪使刑事被告可根据[第101(a)(43)(S)条]被驱逐出境，哪些犯罪则不能。”Valenzuela Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 820。当法院对机构对相关法规的解释的模糊性表达了此类担忧时，得出某一法律领域已确定的结论将是有疑问的。 此外，要求干扰正在进行的程序或调查的构造本身也带来了不确定性。国会置于联邦刑法典第73章中的一些妨碍司法罪行并不要求干扰正在进行的法庭或调查。参见 Valenzuela Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 821（引用 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3) (2012)（“禁止以阻碍或阻止向执法官员‘传达’有关联邦罪行的信息为目的而干扰证人”）；§ 1512(d)(2)（“禁止以阻止某人向执法官员或法官‘报告[联邦罪行]’为目的而骚扰该人”）；以及 § 1519 (2012)（“禁止以‘意图妨碍、阻挠或

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influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter’ within the jurisdiction of the United States”)). An Immigration Judge, practicing attorney, or alien could reasonably question whether these offenses—placed by Congress in a chapter expressly dedicated to obstruction of justice— would qualify as an aggravated felony offense relating to obstruction of justice under the definition previously applied by the Ninth Circuit. Although case-by-case adjudication would likely resolve this issue over time, it is further evidence of unsettled law. We also look beyond the interplay between Board precedent and Ninth Circuit decisions to determine whether the definition of the term “relating to obstruction of justice” is unsettled. The Ninth Circuit’s inquiry has been whether and to what extent it would defer to the Board’s definition under step two of the analysis in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (stating that deference to an agency’s decision depends on whether its statutory interpretation is “based on a permissible construction of the statute”). A court can only reach this second step if the statute is “silent or ambiguous.” Id. at 843. Finding that the Act did not define the phrase “offense relating to obstruction of justice,” the Ninth Circuit has thus addressed this statutory term in the context of Chevron’s step two. 7 See Renteria-Morales, 551 F.3d at 1086. By contrast, the Third Circuit has concluded that the phrase “relating to obstruction of justice” is unambiguous. See Denis v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 633 F.3d 201, 209 (3d Cir. 2011). Applying de novo review, the Third Circuit found our definition of the phrase in Espinoza to be unnecessarily restrictive, and it adopted a broader definition. Id. at 211–13; see also Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo I, 25 I&N Dec. at 843. Judicial disagreement over whether a phrase is plain or ambiguous further demonstrates how unsettled the issue of defining “relating to obstruction of justice” has been. Additionally, we consider significant the contrast between the circuit courts’ assessment of our decisions defining an offense relating to obstruction of justice and those addressing the circumstances under which a theft offense is a crime involving moral turpitude. In Matter of Diaz-Lizarraga, 26 I&N Dec. 847 (BIA 2016), we revisited the standard by which we assessed whether a theft offense is turpitudinous. Previously, from our “earliest days,” we had held that “a theft categorically involves moral turpitude if—and only if—it is committed with the intent to permanently deprive an owner of property.” Id. at 849. Finding it appropriate to “update our existing jurisprudence,” we determined that “a theft offense is a crime involving moral turpitude if it involves an intent to deprive the owner of his

影响美国管辖范围内任何事项的调查或适当管理’为目的而伪造或销毁记录”）。移民法官、执业律师或外国人可以合理地质疑，这些由国会置于明确专门针对妨碍司法的章节中的罪行，是否符合第9巡回法院先前适用的定义下与妨碍司法有关的加重重罪罪行。尽管逐案裁决可能会随着时间的推移解决这一问题，但这进一步证明了法律尚未决。 我们还超越委员会先例与第9巡回法院决定之间的相互作用，来确定“与妨碍司法有关”一词的定义是否未决。第9巡回法院的探究一直是，在 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) 分析第二步下，它是否以及在多大程度上遵从委员会的定义（指出对机构决定的遵从取决于其法规解释是否“基于对法规的允许构造”）。法院只有在法规“沉默或模糊”时才能进入第二步。Id. at 843。由于认定该法未界定“与妨碍司法有关的罪行”这一短语，第9巡回法院因此在 Chevron 第二步的背景下处理了这一法定术语。7 参见 Renteria-Morales, 551 F.3d at 1086。 相比之下，第3巡回法院已得出结论，“与妨碍司法有关”这一短语是明确的。参见 Denis v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 633 F.3d 201, 209 (3d Cir. 2011)。适用重新审查，第3巡回法院认定我们在 Espinoza 中对该短语的定义过于限制性，并采用了更广泛的定义。Id. at 211–13；另见 Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo I, 25 I&N Dec. at 843。关于某一短语是明确还是模糊的司法分歧进一步表明，界定“与妨碍司法有关”的问题一直多么未决。 此外，我们认为各巡回法院对我们界定与妨碍司法有关的罪行的决定与处理盗窃罪行构成涉及道德败坏犯罪的情形之间的评估对比具有重要意义。在 Matter of Diaz-Lizarraga, 26 I&N Dec. 847 (BIA 2016) 中，我们重新审视了我们评估盗窃罪行是否道德败坏的标准。此前，从我们的“最早时期”起，我们一直认定“盗窃 categorically 涉及道德败坏，当且仅当——它以永久剥夺财产所有人财产的意图实施。”Id. at 849。认定“更新我们现有判例”是适当的，我们确定“盗窃罪行是涉及道德败坏的犯罪，如果它涉及剥夺所有人其

7 In Valenzuela Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 815–18, the Ninth Circuit applied the constitutional avoidance doctrine at Chevron’s step one. However, the court also noted that section 101(a)(43)(S) was an “ambiguous statute.” Id. at 824.

7 在 Valenzuela Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 815–18 中，第9巡回法院在 Chevron 第一步适用了宪法回避原则。然而，该法院也指出第101(a)(43)(S)条是一项“模糊法规”。Id. at 824。

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property either permanently or under circumstances where the owner’s property rights are substantially eroded.” Id. at 853. Recently, the Fifth Circuit joined the Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits in declining to apply our decision retroactively, concluding that our new definition “drastically chang[ed] the landscape.” Monteon-Camargo v. Barr, 918 F.3d 423, 431 (5th Cir. 2019); see also Garcia-Martinez v. Sessions, 886 F.3d 1291, 1296 (9th Cir. 2018); Obeya v. Sessions, 884 F.3d 442, 449 (2d Cir. 2018); Lucio-Rayos v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 573, 578 (10th Cir. 2017). We discern no comparable “departure from well established practice” in the context of interpreting the ambiguous phrase “relating to obstruction of justice” in section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act. Montgomery Ward, 691 F.2d at 1333 (citation omitted). The Immigration Courts and the Board routinely encounter a diverse range of criminal statutes containing distinct elements that might relate to obstruction of justice. We must therefore determine whether these State and Federal offenses categorically relate to obstruction of justice. Our prior determinations, such as our holding in Matter of Espinoza that misprision of felony under 18 U.S.C. § 4 does not relate to obstruction of justice, are relevant but not dispositive when examining these other statutes. It was in this context that we made our conclusions in Valenzuela Gallardo I and II that accessory to a felony in violation of section 32 of the California Penal Code is categorically an obstruction of justice offense under section 10l(a)(43)(S) of the Act. Applying the second factor of the Montgomery Ward test, we conclude that these decisions were merely attempts to fill a void in an unsettled area of law and do not represent an abrupt departure from well-established practice. See, e.g., Valenzuela Gallardo I, 25 I&N Dec. at 842 (noting that our prior precedent had not gone “so far as to hold that obstruction offenses must involve interference with an ongoing investigation or proceeding”); Matter of Batista-Hernandez, 21 I&N Dec. 955 (holding that “accessory after the fact” under 18 U.S.C. § 3 qualifies as an offense relating to obstruction of justice, without requiring a pending or ongoing proceeding). Likewise, we cannot discern a settled “former rule” on which the respondent may reasonably have relied under the third factor of the Montgomery Ward test. We will assume that Montgomery Ward’s fourth factor “strongly favors” the respondent. Garfias-Rodriguez, 702 F.3d at 523. Removal of an alien from the United States is a “substantial burden that weighs against retroactive application of an agency adjudication.” Id. (citation omitted). We do not diminish this factor or the hardship that might result from an alien’s removal. “The fifth factor—the statutory interest in applying a new rule—points in favor of the government because non-retroactivity impairs the uniformity of a statutory scheme, and the importance of uniformity in immigration law is

永久地或在所有权人的财产权受到实质侵蚀的情况下持有财产。”Id. at 853。最近，第五巡回法院加入了第二、第九和第十巡回法院的行列，拒绝追溯适用我们的裁决，认定我们的新定义“大幅改变了格局”。Monteon-Camargo v. Barr, 918 F.3d 423, 431 (5th Cir. 2019)；另见 Garcia-Martinez v. Sessions, 886 F.3d 1291, 1296 (9th Cir. 2018)；Obeya v. Sessions, 884 F.3d 442, 449 (2d Cir. 2018)；Lucio-Rayos v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 573, 578 (10th Cir. 2017)。在解释该法第101(a)(43)(S)条中含糊的“与妨碍司法有关”一语时，我们看不出有可比的“偏离既定实践”之处。Montgomery Ward, 691 F.2d at 1333（引文省略）。 移民法院和委员会经常遇到各种刑事法规，其构成要件各不相同，可能涉及妨碍司法。因此，我们必须确定这些州和联邦罪行是否绝对与妨碍司法有关。我们此前的裁定，例如我们在 Matter of Espinoza 中认定 18 U.S.C. § 4 项下的重罪隐匿不涉及妨碍司法，在审查这些其他法规时具有相关性，但不具有决定性。正是在这一背景下，我们在 Valenzuela Gallardo I 和 II 中得出结论，违反《加利福尼亚州刑法典》第32条的重罪从犯绝对属于该法第10l(a)(43)(S)条项下的妨碍司法罪行。 适用 Montgomery Ward 检验标准的第二项因素，我们得出结论，这些裁决仅仅是在一个未决的法律领域填补空白的尝试，并不代表对既定实践的突然偏离。参见，例如，Valenzuela Gallardo I, 25 I&N Dec. at 842（指出我们此前的先例并未“走到认定妨碍罪行必须涉及干扰正在进行的调查或程序的地步”）；Matter of Batista-Hernandez, 21 I&N Dec. 955（认定 18 U.S.C. § 3 项下的“事后从犯”属于与妨碍司法有关的罪行，而不要求存在待决或正在进行的程序）。同样，根据 Montgomery Ward 检验标准的第三项因素，我们无法辨别出被申请人可以合理依赖的既定“前规则”。 我们将假定 Montgomery Ward 的第四项因素“强烈有利于”被申请人。Garfias-Rodriguez, 702 F.3d at 523。将外国人驱逐出美国是一项“重大负担，不利于追溯适用机构裁决”。Id.（引文省略）。我们并不贬低这一因素或驱逐外国人可能造成的困难。 “第五项因素——适用新规则的法定利益——有利于政府，因为不溯及既往会损害法定制度的统一性，而统一性在移民法中的重要性是

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well established.” Id. “[T]he Federal immigration laws are intended to have uniform nationwide application and to implement a unitary Federal policy.” Matter of Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I&N Dec. 503, 508 (BIA 2008) (citing Kahn v. INS, 36 F.3d 1412, 1414 (9th Cir. 1994)). As noted, Congress expressly indicated its intention that the aggravated felony definitions in section 101(a)(43) of the Act should apply retroactively. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 318–19. This congressional action further cuts in favor of retroactive application here, although it is not dispositive. Having weighed the factors in the Montgomery Ward test in their totality, we conclude that Valenzuela Gallardo II may be applied retroactively. Our decision has filled a void in what was an unsettled area of law, and while we acknowledge the hardship that retroactive application might cause to the respondent, the national uniformity of our immigration laws is a strong countervailing interest. We reach this conclusion based on the circumstances of this case and the provision of the Act at issue. We do not decide whether or how to apply decisions retroactively in other contexts, including those involving other grounds for removal and discretionary or mandatory relief.

既定的。”Id。“[联邦]移民法旨在具有统一的全国适用性，并实施单一的联邦政策。”Matter of Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I&N Dec. 503, 508 (BIA 2008)（引用 Kahn v. INS, 36 F.3d 1412, 1414 (9th Cir. 1994)）。如前所述，国会明确表示其意图是该法第101(a)(43)条中的加重重罪定义应追溯适用。参见 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 318–19。这一国会行动进一步支持在此追溯适用，尽管它不具有决定性。 在总体权衡 Montgomery Ward 检验标准的各项因素后，我们得出结论，Valenzuela Gallardo II 可以追溯适用。我们的裁决填补了一个未决法律领域的空白，虽然我们承认追溯适用可能对被申请人造成困难，但我们移民法的全国统一性是一项强有力的抵消利益。我们基于本案的情况和所涉该法条款得出这一结论。我们并不决定在其他情况下是否或如何追溯适用裁决，包括涉及其他驱逐理由以及酌情或强制救济的情况。

III. CONCLUSION In sum, the respondent was convicted of dissuading a witness in violation of section 136.1(b)(1) of the California Penal Code, an offense that is categorically an aggravated felony offense relating to the obstruction of justice. We reject his argument that the standard we set forth for defining obstruction of justice in Valenzuela Gallardo II may not be applied retroactively to his conviction, and we conclude that he is removable under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act. Consequently, he is also ineligible for cancellation of removal under section 240A(a)(3) of the Act. 8 Accordingly, the respondent’s appeal will be dismissed.

III. 结论 总之，被申请人因违反《加利福尼亚州刑法典》第136.1(b)(1)条劝阻证人而被定罪，该罪行绝对属于与妨碍司法有关的加重重罪。我们驳回其关于我们在 Valenzuela Gallardo II 中为界定妨碍司法所设定的标准不得追溯适用于其定罪的主张，并得出结论，根据该法第237(a)(2)(A)(iii)条，他可以被驱逐。因此，他也没有资格根据该法第240A(a)(3)条获得取消驱逐。8 据此，被申请人的上诉将被驳回。

8 The respondent summarily argues that both we and the Immigration Judge erred by denying his application for cancellation of removal. This claim, which addresses no new arguments on remand, does not merit any further consideration.

8 被申请人简要主张，我们和移民法官均错误地拒绝了他的取消驱逐申请。这一主张在发回重审时未提出任何新论点，不值得进一步考虑。

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