Matter of Koloamatangi

Cite as 23 I&N Dec. 548 (BIA 2003) Interim Decision #3486

引用为 23 I&N Dec. 548 (BIA 2003) 临时决定第3486号

File A26 913 187 - Denver

案卷 A26 913 187 - 丹佛

Decided January 8, 2003

2003年1月8日决定

U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals

美国司法部 移民审查执行办公室 移民上诉委员会

An alien who acquired permanent resident status through fraud or misrepresentation has never been “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” and is therefore ineligible for cancellation of removal under section 240A(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2000).

通过欺诈或虚假陈述获得永久居民身份的外国人从未“合法获准永久居留”，因此没有资格根据《移民与国籍法》第240A(a)条，8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2000)，获得取消递解出境。

FOR RESPONDENT: Laura L. Lichter, Esquire, Boulder, Colorado

被申请人代理律师：Laura L. Lichter 律师，科罗拉多州博尔德

FOR THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE: Weldon S. Caldbeck, Assistant District Counsel

移民与归化局代理：Weldon S. Caldbeck，助理地区法律顾问

BEFORE: Board Panel: GUENDELSBERGER, BRENNAN, and PAULEY, Board Members.

审理：委员会合议庭：GUENDELSBERGER、BRENNAN 和 PAULEY，委员会成员。

PAULEY, Board Member:

PAULEY，委员会成员：

This matter was last before us on December 14, 2001, when we summarily dismissed the respondent’s appeal for failure to file a written brief. On January 11, 2002, the respondent filed a motion to reopen proceedings, seeking to submit his appellate brief and explaining its untimeliness. The motion to reopen will be granted and the respondent’s brief will be accepted. The appeal will be dismissed in part and sustained in part, and the record will be remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings.

本事项上一次由我们审理是在2001年12月14日，当时我们因被申请人未提交书面辩论状而简易驳回了其上诉。2002年1月11日，被申请人提交了重新开启程序的动议，寻求提交其上诉辩论状并解释其逾期原因。重新开启程序的动议将获准，被申请人的辩论状将被接受。上诉将部分驳回、部分支持，案卷将发回移民法官进一步审理。

I. BACKGROUND

I. 背景

In a decision dated January 24, 2001, the Immigration Judge pretermitted the respondent’s application for cancellation of removal under section 240A(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2000), for which only aliens who have been “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” are eligible. This case is before us on the respondent’s motion to reopen, primarily to allow consideration of his application for that relief. 1

在2001年1月24日的决定中，移民法官预先驳回了被申请人根据《移民与国籍法》第240A(a)条，8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2000)，提出的取消递解出境申请，因为只有“合法获准永久居留”的外国人才有资格获得该救济。本案因被申请人的重新开启程序动议而由我们审理，主要是为了审议其该项救济申请。1

1 If the respondent is found ineligible for cancellation of removal under section 240A(a) of the Act, he also seeks, in the alternative, to apply for voluntary departure and cancellation of (continued...)

1 如果认定被申请人没有资格根据该法第240A(a)条获得取消递解出境，他还寻求作为替代方案申请自愿离境和根据第240A(b)条取消 （续...）

548

548

Cite as 23 I&N Dec. 548 (BIA 2003) Interim Decision #3486

引用为 23 I&N Dec. 548 (BIA 2003) 临时决定第3486号

According to the evidence presented at the hearing, the respondent obtained permanent resident status in 1985 by virtue of his “marriage” to a United States citizen, which resulted in the birth of a child in this country in 1988. However, his marriage was knowingly bigamous, as he was then married to a Tongan national. 2 The Immigration Judge determined, in effect, that although the respondent was facially and procedurally in lawful permanent resident status for more than the requisite number of years to qualify for cancellation of removal under section 240A(a), he was never, in a legal sense, an alien “lawfully admitted for permanent residence,” because his acquisition of that status was procured by fraud. We agree.

根据听证时提交的证据，被申请人于1985年凭借其与美国公民的“婚姻”获得了永久居民身份，该婚姻导致1988年在本国生育了一名子女。然而，其婚姻是明知的重婚，因为他当时与一名汤加国民结婚。2 移民法官实际上认定，尽管被申请人在表面和程序上处于合法永久居民身份的时间超过根据第240A(a)条获得取消递解出境资格所需的年限，但他在法律意义上从未是“合法获准永久居留”的外国人，因为其获得该身份是通过欺诈取得的。我们同意。

II. DISCUSSION

II. 讨论

This case turns on the meaning of the term “lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” The term is defined in section 101(a)(20) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (2000), to mean “the status of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws, such status not having changed.” The regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 1.1(p) (2002) contain a definition of the same term that repeats verbatim the statutory definition and, pursuant to a 1996 amendment, includes the following sentence: “Such status terminates upon entry of a final administrative order of exclusion or deportation.” See also Executive Office for Immigration Review; Motions and Appeals in Immigration Proceedings, 61 Fed. Reg. 18,900, 18,904 (1996).

本案取决于“合法获准永久居留”一词的含义。该词在该法第101(a)(20)条，8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (2000)中定义为“根据移民法合法给予外国人作为移民在美国永久居留的特权之身份，该身份未发生变化”。8 C.F.R. § 1.1(p) (2002)的法规包含同一术语的定义，逐字重复了法定定义，并且根据1996年修正案，包含以下句子：“该身份在最终行政驱逐或递解出境令作出后终止。”另见移民审查执行办公室；移民程序中的动议和上诉，61 Fed. Reg. 18,900, 18,904 (1996)。

Relying on this final sentence, the respondent argues that he has accrued the necessary 5 or more years of lawful admission as a permanent resident to qualify for cancellation of removal under section 240A(a) of the Act, because no final administrative order was entered depriving him of that status. We disagree.

被申请人依据该最后一句主张，他已累积作为永久居民合法入境所需的5年或以上时间，有资格根据该法第240A(a)条获得取消递解出境，因为没有作出剥夺其该身份的最终行政命令。我们不同意。

Nearly a half century ago, long before the final sentence was added to the regulatory definition of the term “lawfully admitted for permanent residence,” the Board and the Attorney General determined that an alien who acquires permanent resident status through fraud or misrepresentation has not made a lawful entry upon which to base eligibility for relief. Matter of T-, 6 I&N Dec. 136 (BIA, A.G. 1954); see also Matter of Wong, 14 I&N Dec. 12 (BIA 1972). The Immigration Judge cited Matter of T-, supra, but thought it was “not on point” because it involved relief under former section 212(c) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994). To the contrary, we find that the holding in

近半个世纪前，远在最后一句被加入“合法获准永久居留”一词的法规定义之前，委员会和司法部长就认定，通过欺诈或虚假陈述获得永久居民身份的外国人没有作出合法入境，不能作为获得救济资格的基础。Matter of T-, 6 I&N Dec. 136 (BIA, A.G. 1954)；另见 Matter of Wong, 14 I&N Dec. 12 (BIA 1972)。移民法官引用了 Matter of T-, supra，但认为它“不相关”，因为它涉及该法前第212(c)条，8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994)下的救济。相反，我们认为该案的裁决

1 (...continued) removal under section 240A(b). See infra note 7. 2 At the time of the hearing before the Immigration Judge, the respondent was divorced from both wives.

1 （...续） 根据第240A(b)条取消递解出境。见下文注7。 2 在移民法官听证时，被申请人已与两位妻子离婚。

549

549

Cite as 23 I&N Dec. 548 (BIA 2003) Interim Decision #3486

引用为 23 I&N Dec. 548 (BIA 2003) 临时决定第3486号

that case is clearly applicable to the respondent’s situation despite the fact that it involved another form of relief.

尽管该案涉及另一种形式的救济，但其裁决明显适用于被申请人的情况。

Consistent with Matter of T-, supra, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Ninth Circuits each decided that the term “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” did not apply to aliens who had obtained their permanent resident status by fraud, or had otherwise not been entitled to it. See Monet v. INS, 791 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1986); Matter of Longstaff, 716 F.2d 1439, 1441-42 (5th Cir. 1983); cf. Biggs v. INS, 55 F.3d 1398, 1401 (9th Cir. 1995). The courts reasoned that the aliens’ proposed interpretation of the term—identical to that advanced by the respondent—“distorts” the term’s meaning, because “‘lawfully’ denotes compliance with substantive legal requirements, not mere procedural regularity.” Matter of Longstaff, supra, at 1441; see also Monet v. INS, supra, at 753. To our knowledge, no federal appellate authority or any subsequent Board precedent has held to the contrary.

与 Matter of T-, supra 一致，美国第五和第九巡回上诉法院均判定，“合法获准永久居留”一词不适用于通过欺诈获得永久居民身份或原本无权获得该身份的外国人。见 Monet v. INS, 791 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1986)；Matter of Longstaff, 716 F.2d 1439, 1441-42 (5th Cir. 1983)；cf. Biggs v. INS, 55 F.3d 1398, 1401 (9th Cir. 1995)。法院的理由是，外国人所提议的该词解释——与被申请人所提出的相同——“扭曲”了该词的含义，因为“‘合法’表示遵守实体法律要求，而不仅仅是程序上的合规。”Matter of Longstaff, supra, at 1441；另见 Monet v. INS, supra, at 753。据我们所知，没有任何联邦上诉权威或任何后续委员会先例作出相反裁定。

We find that the reasoning in these decisions is sound and survives the 1996 amendments to the regulations. Indeed, in 1996 Congress abolished the section 212(c) waiver, which was available only to lawful permanent residents, and substituted similar requirements for the comparable relief of cancellation of removal under section 240A(a) of the Act. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C of Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 304, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-594, 3009-597. It is illogical that Congress could have intended that an alien who committed fraud in order to obtain such status, and whose fraud was not discovered until more than 5 years had passed, could rely on having obtained such status “lawfully” to claim eligibility for relief.

我们认为这些决定中的推理是合理的，并且在1996年法规修正后仍然成立。事实上，1996年国会废除了仅适用于合法永久居民的第212(c)条豁免，并为该法第240A(a)条下类似的取消递解出境救济替换了类似要求。见《1996年非法移民改革和移民责任法》，Pub. L. No. 104-208 第C编，§ 304, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-594, 3009-597。国会不可能意图让一名为获得该身份而实施欺诈、且其欺诈在超过5年后才被发现的外国人，可以依赖“合法”获得该身份来主张救济资格，这是不合逻辑的。

Nothing in the regulation’s final sentence changes the above analysis. The explanatory materials that accompanied the 1996 amendment of 8 C.F.R. § 1.1(p) make clear that the final sentence was added to codify our decision in Matter of Lok, 18 I&N Dec. 101 (BIA 1981), aff’d, 681 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1982), where we held that an alien’s permanent resident status, which had been lawfully obtained, terminated with the entry of a final administrative order of deportation. 61 Fed. Reg. at 18,900-01. The regulation was also intended to overcome certain decisions of the Second and Ninth Circuits that had held, in the context of a motion to reopen, that lawful permanent resident status did not terminate until an alien physically departed the United States. Id. 3 There is no indication that the addition of the final sentence was intended to undermine the long-standing decisions holding that an alien was not “lawfully” admitted for permanent resident status if, at the time such status was accorded, he or she was not entitled to it.

法规最后一句中的任何内容都不改变上述分析。伴随1996年对8 C.F.R. § 1.1(p)修正的解释材料明确表明，最后一句是为了编纂我们在 Matter of Lok, 18 I&N Dec. 101 (BIA 1981), aff’d, 681 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1982)中的裁决，我们在该案中认定，合法获得的外国人永久居民身份在最终行政递解出境令作出后终止。61 Fed. Reg. at 18,900-01。该法规还旨在推翻第二和第九巡回法院的某些裁决，这些裁决在重新开启程序动议的背景下认定，合法永久居民身份直到外国人实际离开美国才终止。Id. 3 没有迹象表明增加最后一句意在削弱长期以来的裁决，即如果外国人在被给予永久居民身份时无权获得该身份，则其并非“合法”获准永久居留。

3 Butros v. United States INS, 990 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1993); Vargas v. INS, 938 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1991).

3 Butros v. United States INS, 990 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1993)；Vargas v. INS, 938 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1991)。

550

550

Cite as 23 I&N Dec. 548 (BIA 2003) Interim Decision #3486

引用为 23 I&N Dec. 548 (BIA 2003) 临时决定第3486号

Similarly, nothing in our latest decision regarding the term “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” is to the contrary. Matter of Ayala, 22 I&N Dec. 398 (BIA 1998). That decision was rendered in the context of determining eligibility for a waiver under section 212(h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (Supp. II 1996). Our statement therein that “the respondent, who does not yet have a final order of deportation, still enjoys the status of an alien who has been ‘lawfully admitted for permanent residence’” was made in a factual setting similar to that in Matter of Lok, supra, where it was not alleged that the alien had acquired his permanent resident status unlawfully, 4 but he had subsequently been convicted of a federal offense that might cause him to lose his status. Matter of Ayala, supra, at 402. Thus, the Board properly observed that the

同样，我们最近关于“合法获准永久居留”一词的裁决中也没有任何相反内容。Matter of Ayala, 22 I&N Dec. 398 (BIA 1998)。该裁决是在确定该法第212(h)条，8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (Supp. II 1996)下豁免资格的背景下作出的。我们在其中称“尚未有最终递解出境令的被申请人仍享有‘合法获准永久居留’的外国人身份”，这一陈述是在与 Matter of Lok, supra 类似的事实背景下作出的，在该案中并未指称外国人非法获得其永久居民身份，4 但他后来因可能致其失去身份的联邦罪行被定罪。Matter of Ayala, supra, at 402。因此，委员会恰当地指出，

fact that the respondent’s criminal behavior may, in the future, prevent him from continuing to enjoy his status as one lawfully admitted for permanent residence does not confer on him the preferential treatment implicit in the current language of section 212(h), accruing to an alien who has not previously been admitted as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.

被申请人的犯罪行为可能在未来阻止其继续享有合法获准永久居留的身份，这一事实并不赋予其第212(h)条当前语言所隐含的优惠待遇，该待遇属于此前未被作为合法获准永久居留的外国人准入的外国人。

Id. The instant case is different, because here the respondent obtained his permanent resident status fraudulently and was therefore never “lawfully” accorded the status required to establish eligibility for cancellation of removal under section 240A(a).

Id. 本案不同，因为被申请人以欺诈方式获得其永久居民身份，因此从未“合法”被给予建立第240A(a)条下取消递解出境资格所需的身份。

In sum, the added regulatory sentence regarding when an alien’s lawful permanent resident status “terminates” is inapposite to the issue at hand, because the respondent never “lawfully” acquired such status, although he reaped its benefits until his fraud was discovered. Consistent with Matter of T-, supra, and the Fifth and Ninth Circuit decisions cited above, we hold that the correct interpretation of the term “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” is that an alien is deemed, ab initio, never to have obtained lawful permanent resident status once his original ineligibility therefor is determined in proceedings. We perceive no basis for concluding that the Tenth Circuit, which appears not to have confronted this question, would reach a different outcome. 5

总之，关于外国人合法永久居民身份何时“终止”的附加法规句子与当前问题无关，因为被申请人从未“合法”获得该身份，尽管他在欺诈被发现之前一直享有其利益。与 Matter of T-, supra 以及上述第五和第九巡回法院裁决一致，我们认定，“合法获准永久居留”一词的正确解释是，一旦外国人在程序中其原本不具备资格被认定，即视为自始从未获得合法永久居民身份。我们认为没有依据得出结论，即似乎尚未面对此问题的第十巡回法院会得出不同结果。5

4 Although the respondent in Ayala claimed that he had been engaged in undisclosed criminal activities at the time he became a permanent resident and was therefore not “lawfully” admitted so as to render him ineligible for a waiver, we rejected that argument based on the language of section 212(h). 5 In its recent decision in Hoang v. Comfort, 282 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2002), the court observed that the respondent’s lawful permanent resident status had not been terminated because there was no final administrative order of removal against him. But the court had no occasion to address the issue in this case: whether an alien who obtained permanent resident status by fraud may be deemed, for purposes of eligibility for cancellation of removal, ever to

4 尽管Ayala案中的受访者声称，在他成为永久居民时曾从事未披露的犯罪活动，因此并非“合法”入境，从而使其无资格获得豁免，但我们基于第212(h)条的语言驳回了该论点。 5 在其近期于Hoang v. Comfort, 282 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2002) 作出的判决中，法院指出，受访者的合法永久居民身份并未被终止，因为不存在针对他的最终行政驱逐令。但法院在该案中没有机会处理这一问题：即通过欺诈获得永久居民身份的外国人，为取消驱逐的资格目的，是否可被视为从未

(continued...)

（续……）

551

551

Cite as 23 I&N Dec. 548 (BIA 2003) Interim Decision #3486

引用为 23 I&N Dec. 548 (BIA 2003) 临时决定 #3486

III. CONCLUSION

III. 结论

We find that the respondent is ineligible for cancellation of removal under section 240A(a) of the Act because he was never lawfully admitted for permanent residence. We will therefore dismiss his appeal in regard to his eligibility for that relief. However, the respondent, who has a United States citizen child, would appear to be eligible to apply for a waiver under section 237(a)(1)(H) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H) (2000). Despite doubts expressed by the Immigration Judge relating to the respondent’s good moral character, he may also be eligible for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b). 6 We will therefore sustain the appeal in part and remand the record to the Immigration Judge.

我们认定，受访者无资格根据该法第240A(a)条获得取消驱逐，因为他从未合法获准成为永久居民。因此，我们将就其获得该救济的资格驳回其上诉。然而，受访者有一名美国公民子女，似乎有资格根据该法第237(a)(1)(H)条，8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H) (2000)，申请豁免。尽管移民法官对受访者的良好道德品质表示怀疑，他可能也有资格根据第240A(b)条获得取消驱逐。6 因此，我们将部分支持上诉，并将记录发回移民法官。

ORDER: The motion to reopen is granted. FURTHER ORDER: The appeal is dismissed in part and sustained in part, and the record is remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

命令：重新开放的动议获准。 进一步命令：上诉部分驳回、部分支持，记录发回移民法官，按照本意见进行进一步程序。

5 (...continued) have been lawfully in such status. Instead, the Tenth Circuit was considering the constitutionality of the mandatory detention provisions of section 236 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (2000), as applied generally to lawful permanent residents. Citing 8 C.F.R. § 1.1(p), the court simply noted in its opinion that although the aliens in that case were deportable by virtue of their criminal records, they remained “lawful permanent residents until such time as they are finally ordered deported.” Hoang v. Comfort, supra, at 1256. The court concluded that as lawful permanent residents, the aliens in that case were persons within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment and were entitled to due process of law. Id. That decision is of no comfort to the respondent, as it is merely consistent with the general rule announced in Matter of Lok, supra, and has no bearing on the issue posed here. 6 The Immigration Judge denied voluntary departure on the ground that the respondent knew that there was an impediment to his adjustment of status in 1985 (i.e., his prior undisclosed marriage) and continued to maintain the deception for many years. Although the Immigration Judge stated at the hearing that he would entertain a motion to reopen to allow the respondent to apply for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b) of the Act, he indicated that he would likely find the respondent ineligible for that relief as well, based on his lack of good moral character. We do not construe this statement as precluding the respondent from applying for such relief. We note, however, that there is a separate question whether, as a result of his misrepresentation and bigamy, the respondent is barred from establishing eligibility by the stop-time provisions of section 240A(d)(1)(B), which relate to the commission of certain offenses, including crimes involving moral turpitude. In the event the Immigration Judge finds the respondent eligible for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b), he may also wish to reconsider his denial of voluntary departure.

5 （……续） 合法处于该身份。相反，第十巡回法院正在审议该法第236条，8 U.S.C. § 1226 (2000)，的强制拘留条款在普遍适用于合法永久居民时的合宪性。法院引用8 C.F.R. § 1.1(p)，仅在其意见中指出，尽管该案中的外国人因其犯罪记录而可被驱逐，他们仍是“合法永久居民，直至最终被命令驱逐出境。” Hoang v. Comfort, supra, at 1256。法院得出结论，作为合法永久居民，该案中的外国人是第五修正案所指的人，有权获得正当法律程序。Id. 该判决对受访者并无安慰，因为它仅与Matter of Lok, supra中宣布的一般规则一致，与这里提出的问题无关。 6 移民法官拒绝了自愿离境，理由是受访者知道1985年他的调整身份存在障碍（即他先前未披露的婚姻），并多年来继续维持欺骗。尽管移民法官在听证会上表示，他会考虑重新开放的动议，以允许受访者根据该法第240A(b)条申请取消驱逐，但他表示，基于受访者缺乏良好道德品质，他很可能也会认定受访者无资格获得该救济。我们不将此陈述解释为阻止受访者申请此类救济。但我们注意到，还有一个单独的问题：由于他的虚假陈述和重婚，受访者是否因第240A(d)(1)(B)条的停止时间规定而被禁止确立资格，该规定涉及某些犯罪的实施，包括涉及道德败坏的犯罪。如果移民法官认定受访者有资格根据第240A(b)条获得取消驱逐，他可能也希望重新考虑其拒绝自愿离境的决定。

552

552