Matter of Chumpitazi

Interim Decision #2679

临时决定第2679号

In Deportation Proceedings

驱逐出境程序

In a decision dated May 1, 1978, an immigration judge granted the respondent's request for asylum and certified his decisions to us for review. The Service has also filed an appeal from the decision. We will sustain the Service's appeal, and reverse the immigration judge's deci- sion. The respondent is a 31-year-old native and citizen of Peru who en- tered the United States on October 16, 1967, as a nonimmigrant visitor. On June 11, 1976, an Order to Show Cause was issued, charging the respondent with deportability under section 241(a)(2) of the Immigra- tion and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(2), as a nonimmigrant who had remained beyond the period of his authorized stay. At a deportation hearing held on June 22, 1976, and March 30, 1977, the respondent conceded deportability as charged in the Order to Show Cause, and applied for suspension of deportation under section 244(a)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1254(a)(1), and/or withholding of deportation under section 243(h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1253(h). On May 17, 1977, the immigration judge denied both applications, and the respondent appealed to this Board. In a decision dated January 26, 1978, we remanded the record for further consideration of the respondent's 243(h) claim in light of the immigration judge's failure to examine the respondent under oath as required by 8 C.F.R. 242.17(c). On April 14, 1978, a new hearing was held, at which the immigration judge granted the respondent asylum 11 deportation to Guatemala, the country designated by the respondent for deportation as provided in 8 C.F.R. 242.17(c), was not possible. The immigration judge then certified his decision to us for review. In his decision, the immigration judge referred to Article 33 of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.' He interpreted Article 33 as allowing the grant of asylum to aliens whose life or freedom -would be threatened on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion_ Hethen stated that he would grant the respondent asylum if his depor- tation to Peru became imminent, i.e., if the country designated by the respondent, Guatemala, did not accept him into its territory or failed to notify the Attorney General within 90 days whether it would or would not accept him. C.F.R. 242.3(a) provides, in part:

在1978年5月1日的决定中，一名移民法官批准了 respondent 的庇护请求，并将其决定提交本委员会审查。服务局亦对该决定提出上诉。我们将支持服务局的上诉，并撤销移民法官的决定。 Respondent 是一名31岁的秘鲁本土公民，于1967年10月16日作为非移民访客进入美国。1976年6月11日，签发了说明理由令，指控 respondent 依据《移民与国籍法》第241(a)(2)条、8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(2)可被驱逐出境，理由是其作为非移民停留超过其获准停留期限。在1976年6月22日和1977年3月30日举行的驱逐出境听证会上，respondent 承认了说明理由令中所指控的可驱逐性，并依据该法第244(a)(1)条、8 U.S.C. 1254(a)(1)申请暂停驱逐出境，和/或依据该法第243(h)条、8 U.S.C. 1253(h)申请暂缓驱逐出境。1977年5月17日，移民法官驳回了这两项申请，respondent 向本委员会提出上诉。 在1978年1月26日的决定中，我们将记录发回，要求根据移民法官未按8 C.F.R. 242.17(c)的要求在宣誓下询问 respondent 的情况，进一步审议 respondent 的243(h)主张。1978年4月14日举行了新的听证会，会上移民法官批准了 respondent 庇护 11 驱逐至危地马拉，即 respondent 依据8 C.F.R. 242.17(c)规定指定的驱逐目的国，不可能。移民法官随后将其决定提交本委员会审查。 在其决定中，移民法官提及了《联合国关于难民地位的公约》第33条。¹ 他将第33条解释为允许向生命或自由会因其种族、宗教、国籍、特定社会团体成员身份或政治见解而受到威胁的外国人授予庇护。他随后表示，如果 respondent 被驱逐至秘鲁变得迫在眉睫，即如果 respondent 指定的国家危地马拉不接受其入境，或未在90天内通知司法部长其是否接受，他将批准 respondent 庇护。 C.F.R. 242.3(a)部分规定：

The text of Articles 32 and 33 of the Convention was stated in full in Matter of Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec. 310 (BIA 1973). There, we reviewed the provisions of the Convention and found that they did not significantly change the immigration laws of the United States. Specifically, we found that Article 32 was limited by its terms to aliens "lawfully" within the United States. Thus, an alien refugee who entered lawfully us a nonimmigrant and remained unlawfully could not claim the relief of Article 32. This result has also been reached by the courts which have considered the issue. See, e.g., Yan Wo Cheng v. Rinaldi, 389 F. Supp. 583 (D. N.J. 1975); Chim Ming v. Marks, 367 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. N.Y. 1973), affd, 505 F.2d 1170 (2 Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 911 (1975); Kan Kam Lin v. Rinaldi, 361 F. Supp. 177 (D. N.J. 1973), affd, 493 F.2d 1229 (3 Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974). Therefore, the finding that the respondent is deportable as an overstayed visitor precludes him from establishing lawful presence for the purposes of Article 32 relief. In determining the effect of Article 33 on our immigration laws, we carefully reviewed the history of the Convention's adoption by the united States in Matter of Dunar, supra. We there held that there is no substantial difference in the coverage of section 243 (h) of the Act and Article 33, and that any distinctions in terminology 2 were insignificant and could be handled on a case-by-case basis. We reaffirm our holding in Matter of Dunar and find that the provisions of Article 33 of the Convention have not changed the rights and remedies of an alien in deportation proceedings who believes that deportation to a particular country would cause him to suffer persecution on the basis of race, religion, or political opinion. See also Matter of Francois, Interim Deci- sion 2458 (BIA 1975). There is no provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended, 8 U.S.C. 1101 et. seq., for the granting of "asylum" to aliens who are seeking to enter or have entered the United States. Nor does the Refugee Convention declare that a contracting government must grant asylum to an alien refugee. The Convention goes no farther than to prohibit a contracting government from sending that alien back to a particular place where he will be persecuted. Since the alien could be deported immediately to any other territory that would accept him, it is inappropriate to characterize relief under Article 33 as a grant of asylum, which connotes governmental consent for some period of time to the alien's continued presence in the United States. The only provi-

《公约》第32条和第33条的文本在Matter of Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec. 310 (BIA 1973)中已全文载明。在该案中，我们审查了《公约》的各项规定，并认定这些规定并未实质性改变美国的移民法。具体而言，我们认定第32条依其条款限于“合法”在美国境内的外国人。因此，以非移民身份合法入境但非法居留的外国难民不能主张第32条的救济。审议该问题的法院也得出相同结论。参见，例如，Yan Wo Cheng v. Rinaldi, 389 F. Supp. 583 (D. N.J. 1975)；Chim Ming v. Marks, 367 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. N.Y. 1973), affd, 505 F.2d 1170 (2 Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 911 (1975)；Kan Kam Lin v. Rinaldi, 361 F. Supp. 177 (D. N.J. 1973), affd, 493 F.2d 1229 (3 Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974)。因此，认定答辩人作为逾期居留访客可被驱逐出境，即排除其为第32条救济之目的确立合法居留。 在确定第33条对我国移民法的影响时，我们在Matter of Dunar, supra中仔细审查了美国通过《公约》的历史。我们在该案中认定，《移民与国籍法》第243(h)条与第33条在涵盖范围上并无实质差异，术语上的任何区别2均无关紧要，可逐案处理。我们重申在Matter of Dunar中的裁定，并认定《公约》第33条的规定并未改变驱逐出境程序中外国人的权利和救济，该外国人认为被驱逐至某一特定国家将使其因种族、宗教或政治见解而遭受迫害。另参见Matter of Francois, Interim Decision 2458 (BIA 1975)。 经修正的1952年《移民与国籍法》，8 U.S.C. 1101 et. seq.，没有规定向寻求进入或已进入美国的外国人给予“庇护”。《难民公约》也未宣布缔约国政府必须给予外国难民庇护。《公约》的规定仅限于禁止缔约国政府将该外国人送回其将遭受迫害的特定地点。由于该外国人可被立即驱逐至任何愿意接受他的其他领土，将第33条下的救济定性为给予庇护并不恰当，因为庇护意味着政府同意该外国人在美国继续居留一段时间。唯一的规—

Moreover, 8 C.F.R. 108.2 does not permit an appeal from the District Director's decision. These regulations, as well as the Operations In- structions implementing them, were discussed in our decision in Matter of Exantus and Pierre, Interim Decision 2622 (BIA 1977). There, we held that where an alien requested asylum during the pendency of a deportation hearing, the immigration judge was required, under the provisions of Operations Instructions 242.13 ' and 108.1(f)(2) 3 , to ad- journ the deportation proceedings until after a decision had been ren- dered on the asylum request by the District Director. See generally Yan Wo Cheng v. Rinaldi, supra. In dictum, Matter of Exantus and Pierre stated that an application for relief from deportation under Articles 32 and 33 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees constitutes an application for "asylum" within the meaning of 8 C. F.R. 108. However, nothing con- tained in 8 C.F.R. 242.8(a), the regulation setting forth the specific and general powers of decision conferred on immigration judges in deporta- tion proceedings, has given them the authority to grant or deny asylum requests. Since the regulations vest the sole power to grant asylum in the District Director, an immigration judge lacks the power to rule upon applications for asylum as that terns is used in 8 C.F.R. 108. We expressly disapprove of any language to the contrary in Matter of Exantus and Pierre, id. Proceeding to consideration of the case before us, the immigration indge purported to grant the respondent "asylum" if deportation to

此外，8 C.F.R. 108.2不允许对地区主任的决定提出上诉。这些法规以及实施这些法规的《操作指令》，已在我们对Matter of Exantus and Pierre案（临时决定2622，BIA 1977）的裁决中讨论过。在该案中，我们裁定：如果外国人在驱逐听证进行期间请求庇护，则根据《操作指令》242.13条'和108.1(f)(2)条3的规定，移民法官必须将驱逐程序延期，直至地区主任对庇护请求作出决定之后。参见Yan Wo Cheng v. Rinaldi案，同上。 Matter of Exantus and Pierre案在附带意见中称，根据《关于难民地位的公约》第32条和第33条提出的免于驱逐的救济申请，构成8 C.F.R. 108所指的"庇护"申请。然而，8 C.F.R. 242.8(a)（该条规定了授予移民法官在驱逐程序中的具体和一般裁决权）中没有任何内容赋予他们批准或拒绝庇护请求的权力。由于这些法规将批准庇护的唯一权力授予地区主任，移民法官无权对8 C.F.R. 108中所使用的"庇护"申请作出裁决。我们明确不认可Matter of Exantus and Pierre案（同上）中任何相反的表述。 在审议本案时，移民法官意图批准被申请人"庇护"，如果驱逐至

Peru became imminent. This, however, was incorrect. As we have previously stated, the immigration judge has no authority to grant asylum to an alien in deportation proceedings. A respondent in deporta- tion proceedings may apply for relief from deportation under Article 33 of the Convention and/or section 243(h) of the Act, although there are no significant differences between the coverage of the two provisions. Matter of Francois, supra. We proceed now to examine whether the immigration judge's grant of "asylum" in this case was a proper grant of withholding of deportation under section 243(h) of the Act. The respondent bases his claim that he would be persecuted if he were returned to Peru on two grounds: first, that he would be fined 200 soles for every day that he has spent outside of Peru and second, that he fears a return to the dictatorship in Peru after the time he has spent in the United States. It appears from the record that the respondent applied to the District Director in 1971 for political asylum. The trial attorney stated at the respondent's deportation hearing on June 22, 1976, that the District Director denied the respondent's application on May 7, 1976, (Tr. p. 5). There is no letter from the District Director to this effect in the record; however, there is a letter, dated January 21, 1977, stating that the District Director reconsidered the respondent's asylum claim and again denied it. We find that the respondent has not established a claim to withhold- ing of deportation under section 243(h) of the Act, which is available to those aliens in deportation proceedings who have a well-founded fear of persecution in the country of deportation on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political belief. Matter of Dunar, supra; Matter of Bohinwald, 14 I. & N. Dec. 408 (BIA 1973). See also Cheng Kai Fu v. INS, 386 F.2d 750 (2 Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1003 (1968). Additionally, the evidence presented has not demonstrated a clear probability of persecution directed at the individual respondent. Cheng Kai Fu v. INS, id. In the present case, the respondent has not produced any evidence that would lead us to conclude that the asserted "fine" of 200 soles 6 a day would be assessed against him for any of the reasons enumerated in section 243(h). The respondent, at the hearing held on April 14, 1978, stated that neither he nor any member of his family had been involved in any way in political activities in Peru (Tr. p . 19). Moreover, the record contains a letter from the Vice Consul in charge of the Peruvian Consu- late General which sets out the amount and terms of the tax levied on citizens of Peru travelling outside of that country which establishes that

秘鲁的返回变得迫在眉睫。然而，这是不正确的。正如我们先前所述，移民法官无权给予处于驱逐出境程序中的外国人庇护。驱逐出境程序中的答辩人可以根据《公约》第33条和/或该法第243(h)条申请免于驱逐出境，尽管这两项规定的覆盖范围之间没有重大差异。Matter of Francois，同上。我们现在接着审查移民法官在本案中给予的“庇护”是否是根据该法第243(h)条正确给予的驱逐出境暂缓。 答辩人主张如果被遣返秘鲁将遭受迫害，其依据有两点：第一，他将因在秘鲁境外度过的每一天被处以200索尔的罚款；第二，他担心在美国度过一段时间后返回秘鲁的独裁统治。从记录来看，答辩人于1971年向地区主任申请政治庇护。初审律师在1976年6月22日答辩人的驱逐出境听证会上陈述，地区主任于1976年5月7日驳回了答辩人的申请（Tr. p. 5）。记录中没有地区主任就此发出的信函；然而，有一封日期为1977年1月21日的信函，称地区主任重新考虑了答辩人的庇护申请并再次予以驳回。 我们认定，答辩人未能确立根据该法第243(h)条获得驱逐出境暂缓的请求，该条适用于因种族、宗教、国籍、特定社会团体成员身份或政治信仰而在驱逐出境目的国具有充分理由畏惧迫害的驱逐出境程序中的外国人。Matter of Dunar，同上；Matter of Bohinwald，14 I. & N. Dec. 408（BIA 1973）。另见Cheng Kai Fu v. INS，386 F.2d 750（2 Cir. 1967），cert. denied，390 U.S. 1003（1968）。此外，所提交的证据未能证明存在针对答辩人个人的明确迫害可能性。Cheng Kai Fu v. INS，同上。 在本案中，答辩人未提供任何证据使我们得出结论，即所称每天200索尔的“罚款”6会因第243(h)条所列的任何理由而对其征收。答辩人在1978年4月14日举行的听证会上陈述，他及其任何家庭成员均未以任何方式参与秘鲁的政治活动（Tr. p. 19）。此外，记录中有一封来自秘鲁总领事馆主管副领事的信函，其中列明了对在秘鲁境外旅行的秘鲁公民征收的税款金额和条件，该信函证明

it is levied on all Peruvian citizens. Therefore, the respondent has not established that this tax is a form of "persecution" directed at him individually. See generally Cheng _Kai Fu v. INS, id. Similarly, the respondent's assertion that he does not wish to return to Peru because of the dictatorship in power there does not bring him within the terms of section 243(h): His claim in this regard amounts to no more than generalized undocumented assertions. The only evidence introduced by the respondent are newspaper articles referring to politi- cal conditions in Peru during a recent strike. We note that an alien who claims the relief of section 243(h) of the Act bears the burden of demon- strating a clear probability that he will be persecuted if deported. Kashani v. INS, 547 F.2d 376 (7 Cir. 1977). We find that the respon- dent's testimony, standing alone, is insufficient in this case to sustain that burden with regard to the likelihood of his being persecuted if returned to Peru. See generally Pereira-Diaz v. INS, 551 F.2d 1149 (9 Cir. 1977). We believe that our decision in this case is supported by the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Coriolan v. INS, 559 F.2d 993 (5 Cir. 1977). There, the court reversed and remanded a Board decision denying 243(h) relief to two Haitian citizens in light of new evidence brought to the court's attention in the form of an Amnesty International Report. However, the court there found that the report, unavailable to them until after our decision had been rendered, was material to the respondents' cases. The respondent in the present case has presented no material evidence that would support his claim that the present leadership in Peru would persecute him We also note that the Coriolan court implicitly recog- nized that a travel tax on all citizens would not amount to political persecution when it stated— It is not political persecution, for instance, to punish for violation of a fairly adminis- tered passport law.

该税是对所有秘鲁公民征收的。因此，答辩人未能证明该税是针对其个人的一种“迫害”形式。一般见Cheng Kai Fu v. INS，同上。 同样，答辩人声称因秘鲁当权独裁统治而不愿返回秘鲁，这并未使其符合第243(h)条的范围：其在这方面的主张不过是泛泛的无据断言。答辩人提交的唯一证据是提及秘鲁近期罢工期间政治状况的报纸文章。我们注意到，主张该法第243(h)条救济的外国人负有证明其若被驱逐出境将遭受迫害的明确可能性的责任。Kashani v. INS，547 F.2d 376（7 Cir. 1977）。我们认定，答辩人的证词在本案中单独不足以支持其若返回秘鲁将遭受迫害的可能性的举证责任。一般见Pereira-Diaz v. INS，551 F.2d 1149（9 Cir. 1977）。 我们认为，本案的裁决得到第五巡回法院在Coriolan v. INS，559 F.2d 993（5 Cir. 1977）中意见的支持。在该案中，法院鉴于以大赦国际报告形式提请法院注意的新证据，撤销并发回委员会拒绝给予两名海地公民243(h)救济的决定。然而，该法院认定该报告（在委员会裁决作出之前他们无法获得）对答辩人的案件具有实质性。本案答辩人未提交任何实质性证据支持其关于秘鲁现任领导层将迫害他的主张。我们还注意到，Coriolan法院隐含承认对所有公民征收的旅行税不构成政治迫害，其表述为—— 例如，因违反公平执行的护照法而受惩罚并非政治迫害。

5 69 F.2d at 1000. We find no support in Coriolan v. INS for the rEspondent's 243(h) claim. We will, therefore, reverse the decision of tine immigration judge and sustain the Service's appeal filed in this case. On appeal, the respondent also seeks to have us find that the Immi- gration and Naturalization Service should be estopped from deporting him because of their five-year delay in adjudicating his application for asylum. In INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5 (1973), the Supreme Court implied that affirmative misconduct on the part of the Government might estop it from denying immigration benefits. However, we do not believe that the delay of the Service in acting upon the respondent's asylum applica- tion in this case is "affirmative misconduct." The respondent was not directly deprived of any entitlement he had under the immigration laws, aid he was given the opportunity to fully elucidate the bases for his fear

5 69 F.2d at 1000。我们在Coriolan v. INS中未找到对答辩人243(h)主张的支持。因此，我们将撤销移民法官的裁决并维持移民局在本案中提交的上诉。 在上诉中，答辩人还请求我们认定移民和归化局应因其在裁决其庇护申请方面拖延五年而被禁止将其驱逐出境。在INS v. Hibi，414 U.S. 5（1973）中，最高法院暗示政府的积极不当行为可能使其被禁止拒绝给予移民福利。然而，我们认为移民局在本案中对答辩人庇护申请采取行动的延迟不构成“积极不当行为”。答辩人并未被直接剥夺其在移民法下享有的任何权利，且其在驱逐出境听证会上获得了充分阐明其在秘鲁畏惧迫害的理由的机会

Interim Decision #2679

临时决定#2679

of persecution in Peru at his deportation hearing. We will not, there- fore, find that the Service is estopped from deporting respondent. The respondent has also applied for suspension of deportation under section 244(a)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1254(a)(1). Section 244(a)(1) pro- vides eligiblity for suspension of deportation to an alien who has been continuously physically present in the United States for at least seven years, is a person of good moral character, and whose deportation would cause extreme hardship to himself, or to a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse or child. Although the respondent has established that he has been physically present for the requisite period of time, and that during all that time he has been a person of good moral character, we find that he has not shown that his deportation would result in extreme hardship. The personal privation contemplated in a situation characterized by "extreme hardship" within the meaning of section 244 of the Act is not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning. It necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. Matter of Hwang, 10 I. & N. Dec. 468 (BIA 1964). The hardship requirement encompasses more than the mere economic deprivation that might re- sult from an alien's deportation from the United States. Davidson v. INS, 558 F.2d 1361 (9 Cir. 1977); Matter of Sipus, 14 I. & N. Dec. 229 (BIA 1972). The respondent has claimed that his deportation would cause the loss of his job in the United States by which he supports his mother in Peru. The respondent also asserts that he would have diffi- culty adjusting to life in Peru after his 11-year stay in the United States. We find that the hardship claimed by the respondent is not the type of hardship contemplated by Congress in providing for suspension of de- portation. It has long been clear that the loss of a job and the concomi- tant financial loss incurred is not synonymous with extreme hardship. Lee v. INS, 550 F.2d 554 (9 Cir. 1977) Similarly, the readjustment of an alien to life in his native country after having spent a number of years in the United States is not the type of hardship that we have characterized as extreme, see Matter of Uy, 11 I. & N. Dec. 159 (BIA 1965); it is a type of hardship suffered by most aliens who have spent time abroad. We have carefully considered the record as a whole and find that the respondent is not eligible for any form of relief from deportation other than voluntary departure, for which he is deserving. In accordance with our decision in Matter of Chouliaris, Interim Decision 2572 (BIA 1977), therefore, we will grant the respondent 30 days voluntary departure_ ORDER: The appeal is sustained and the conditional grant of asylum is vacated. FURTHER ORDER: The applications for relief under sections 243(h) and 244(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act are denied_ FURTHER ORDER: The respondent is permitted to depart from

。因此，我们不会认定移民局被禁止驱逐答辩人。 答辩人还根据该法第244(a)(1)条、8 U.S.C. 1254(a)(1)申请暂停驱逐出境。第244(a)(1)条规定，在美国连续实际居住至少七年、品行良好、且其驱逐出境将对其本人或对美国公民或合法永久居民配偶或子女造成极端困难的外国人，有资格获得暂停驱逐出境。尽管答辩人已证明其已实际居住所需期限，且在此期间一直品行良好，但我们认定其未证明其驱逐出境将导致极端困难。 该法第244条含义内“极端困难”情形所设想的个人困苦并非具有固定和僵化内容或含义的可定义术语。它必然取决于每个案件特有的事实和情况。Matter of Hwang，10 I. & N. Dec. 468（BIA 1964）。困难要求涵盖的不仅仅是外国人被驱逐出美国可能导致的单纯经济剥夺。Davidson v. INS，558 F.2d 1361（9 Cir. 1977）；Matter of Sipus，14 I. & N. Dec. 229（BIA 1972）。答辩人声称其驱逐出境将导致其失去在美国的工作，他以此供养在秘鲁的母亲。答辩人还声称其在美国居留11年后将难以适应秘鲁的生活。我们认定，答辩人所声称的困难并非国会规定暂停驱逐出境时所设想的困难类型。长期以来已明确，失去工作及随之产生的经济损失不等同于极端困难。Lee v. INS，550 F.2d 554（9 Cir. 1977）。同样，外国人在美国度过若干年后重新适应其母国生活并非我们定性为极端的那种困难，见Matter of Uy，11 I. & N. Dec. 159（BIA 1965）；这是大多数在国外度过一段时间的外国人所遭受的一种困难。 我们已仔细考虑整体记录，认定答辩人除自愿离境外无资格获得任何形式的驱逐出境救济，而其值得获得自愿离境。因此，根据我们在Matter of Chouliaris，临时决定2572（BIA 1977）中的裁决，我们将给予答辩人30天自愿离境期。 命令：上诉获维持，有条件给予的庇护予以撤销。 进一步命令：根据《移民和国籍法》第243(h)条和第244(a)条提出的救济申请予以驳回。 进一步命令：允许答辩人自本命令之日起30天内自愿离开