Da Silva v. Attorney General

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

第三巡回区

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____________

No. 18-1699 ____________

案号 18-1699 ____________

LUDIMILLA RAMOS DA SILVA

LUDIMILLA RAMOS DA SILVA

a/k/a Lulu Da Silva a/k/a Ludimilla Dasilva,

又名 Lulu Da Silva 又名 Ludimilla Dasilva，

Petitioner v.

申请人 诉

ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

美利坚合众国司法部长，

Respondent

被申请人

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

关于对以下命令的复审申请

Board of Immigration Appeals

移民上诉委员会

(Agency Nos. A208-332-187) Immigration Judge: John B. Carle Argued on July 9, 2019 Before: MCKEE, ROTH and RENDELL, Circuit Judges

（机构案号 A208-332-187） 移民法官：John B. Carle 2019年7月9日辩论 合议庭：MCKEE、ROTH 和 RENDELL 巡回法官

(Opinion filed: January 24, 2020)

（意见书存档日期：2020年1月24日）

Thomas M. Griffin (Argued) Surin & Griffin 718 Arch Street Suite 701N Philadelphia, PA 19106 Counsel for Petitioner Scott G. Stewart (Argued) United States Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20530 Stefanie A. Svoren-Jay United States Department of Justice Office of Immigration Litigation P.O. Box 878 Ben Franklin Station Washington, DC 20044 Counsel for Respondent

Thomas M. Griffin （参与辩论） Surin & Griffin 718 Arch Street Suite 701N Philadelphia, PA 19106 申请人律师 Scott G. Stewart （参与辩论） 美国司法部 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20530 Stefanie A. Svoren-Jay 美国司法部 移民诉讼办公室 P.O. Box 878 Ben Franklin Station Washington, DC 20044 被申请人律师

Appellant Ludimilla Ramos Da Silva petitions for review of her final order of removal. She contends that the Board of Immigration Appeals erred when it concluded that her convictions for assaulting her husband’s mistress were not

上诉人 Ludimilla Ramos Da Silva 就其最终驱逐令申请复审。她主张，移民上诉委员会认定其殴打丈夫情妇的定罪与 她所遭受的极端残忍“无关”，从而使其不符合取消驱逐的资格，这一认定有误。

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“connected to” the extreme cruelty she suffered, rendering her ineligible for cancellation of removal. We agree. For the reasons that follow, we will grant Da Silva’s petition for review and vacate the BIA’s removal order.

我们同意。基于下述理由，我们将批准 Da Silva 的复审申请，并撤销移民上诉委员会的驱逐令。

Da Silva, a native of Brazil, was admitted to the United States in 1994 with a B-2 visa; she was then about two years old. She overstayed her visa and has never left the United States. Da Silva married a United States citizen, Aziim Leach, on April 30, 2012. Leach, a member of the armed services, subjected Da Silva to emotional, psychological, and physical abuse throughout their marriage. For instance, he refused to file immigration paperwork that would provide her with documented status and used her undocumented status as a method to control her. Leach also hit Da Silva’s daughter and pushed Da Silva against a wall multiple times. 1

Da Silva 是巴西人，于1994年持 B-2 签证获准进入美国；当时她大约两岁。她逾期滞留，从未离开美国。Da Silva 于2012年4月30日与美国公民 Aziim Leach 结婚。Leach 是武装部队成员，在婚姻期间对 Da Silva 实施情感、心理和身体虐待。例如，他拒绝提交能为其提供有证件身份的移民文件，并利用她的无证件身份作为控制她的手段。Leach 还殴打 Da Silva 的女儿，并多次将 Da Silva 推撞到墙上。1

Most importantly to this appeal, Leach engaged in numerous extramarital affairs, including one particularly intense relationship with his coworker, L.N. On September 1, 2014, Da Silva discovered sexually explicit text messages

对本次上诉最重要的是，Leach 有多次婚外情，其中与同事 L.N. 的一段关系尤为激烈。2014年9月1日，Da Silva 发现了露骨的性短信

1 Da Silva has been subjected to abuse throughout her life. She was raised by a single mother, who inflicted physical and emotional harm upon her children until she abandoned Da Silva and her siblings. When she was fifteen, she was raped at a friend’s house. She met and married her first husband at age eighteen and he, like Leach, was physically and emotionally abusive. Following her first divorce, Da Silva began seeing a mental health counselor, who diagnosed her with post- traumatic stress disorder.

1 Da Silva 一生都遭受虐待。她由单亲母亲抚养，母亲对其子女实施身体和精神伤害，直至抛弃 Da Silva 及其兄弟姐妹。她十五岁时在朋友家被强奸。她十八岁时结识并嫁给第一任丈夫，他与 Leach 一样，对她实施身体和情感虐待。第一次离婚后，Da Silva 开始接受心理健康咨询师的诊疗，被诊断患有创伤后应激障碍。

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between Leach and L.N. Da Silva questioned Leach about the messages and called L.N. to arrange a meeting at L.N.’s house so they could talk. When Da Silva arrived, L.N. got into Da Silva’s car, and Da Silva confronted L.N. with the text messages. Da Silva claimed she feared that L.N. was about to hit her so she punched L.N. in the nose.

是 Leach 与 L.N. 之间的。Da Silva 就这些短信质问 Leach，并打电话给 L.N.，安排在 L.N. 家见面谈谈。Da Silva 到达后，L.N. 上了 Da Silva 的车，Da Silva 拿短信质问 L.N.。Da Silva 称她害怕 L.N. 要打她，于是打了 L.N. 的鼻子。

Next, L.N. proposed that they go to Da Silva’s house, so they could talk with Leach. When they arrived, L.N. and Leach claimed the affair was over. Da Silva and L.N. then left to return to L.N.’s house but stopped at Da Silva’s friend’s house on the way, where there was a second confrontation regarding the affair. Da Silva testified that L.N. said Leach was still her “daddy,” indicating that L.N. would continue the extramarital affair. 2 In response, Da Silva “exploded” and, in “a blind rage,” struck L.N. in the nose again. 3 The IJ recognized that Da Silva had “been provoked by a woman who was [having] an affair with her husband,” and the BIA noted her violent outburst was “an aberration.” 4 Da Silva was arrested the following morning.

接着，L.N. 提议去 Da Silva 家，以便与 Leach 谈谈。她们到达后，L.N. 和 Leach 声称婚外情已经结束。Da Silva 和 L.N. 随后离开，返回 L.N. 家，但途中在 Da Silva 朋友家停留，在那里就婚外情发生了第二次冲突。Da Silva 作证称，L.N. 说 Leach 仍是她的“daddy”，表明 L.N. 将继续这段婚外情。2 作为回应，Da Silva“爆发了”，在“盲目的愤怒”中再次打了 L.N. 的鼻子。3 移民法官认识到，Da Silva“是被一个与其丈夫有婚外情的女人激怒的”，移民上诉委员会也指出她的暴力爆发是“一次失常”。4 Da Silva 于次日早晨被捕。

On January 19, 2016, Da Silva pleaded guilty to two counts of assault in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(4) and was sentenced to eighteen months’ imprisonment. 5 On July 31, 2017, the government served Da Silva with a Notice to Appear, charging her with removability for overstaying her visa

2016年1月19日，Da Silva 对两项违反 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(4) 的殴打罪认罪，被判处18个月监禁。5 2017年7月31日，政府向 Da Silva 送达出庭通知，指控她因逾期滞留签证而可被驱逐

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pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B). She sought cancellation of removal for battered spouses under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), 6 but was denied relief by both the Immigration Judge and the BIA.

依据 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B)。她依据《暴力侵害妇女法》（VAWA）6 申请受虐配偶取消驱逐，但移民法官和移民上诉委员会均驳回了救济。

Petitioners are eligible for VAWA cancellation under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A) if (1) they have been “battered or subjected to extreme cruelty” by a spouse who is a United States citizen, (2) they have been “physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than [three] years immediately preceding the date of such application,” (3) they have been “a person of good moral character” during the past three years, and (4) “the removal would result in extreme hardship to the alien, the alien’s child, or the alien’s parent.” 7 Da Silva concedes that she cannot satisfy the “good moral character” requirement because, as a result of her assault conviction, she was “confined . . . to a penal institution for an aggregate period of one hundred and eighty days or more.” 8 However, she argues that she qualifies for the exception to the good moral character requirement, which provides that a petitioner is still eligible for VAWA cancellation if the “act or conviction was connected to the alien’s having been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty” and cancellation is otherwise warranted. 9

依据 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)，申请人如果符合以下条件，则有资格获得 VAWA 取消驱逐：（1）他们曾遭受身为美国公民的配偶的“殴打或极端残忍”对待；（2）他们在“申请日期之前紧接的不少于[三]年的连续期间内一直实际居住在美国”；（3）他们在过去三年中一直是“品行良好的人”；以及（4）“驱逐将导致该外国人、该外国人的子女或该外国人的父母极端困难”。7 Da Silva 承认，由于她的殴打定罪，她“被关押在惩教机构，累计期间为一百八十天或以上”，8 因此无法满足“品行良好”要求。但是，她主张自己符合品行良好要求的例外，该例外规定，如果“该行为或定罪与外国人遭受殴打或极端残忍有关”，且取消驱逐在其他方面适当，则申请人仍有资格获得 VAWA 取消驱逐。9

The IJ held that Da Silva’s assault convictions were not “connected to” her husband’s cruelty because she was not

移民法官认定，Da Silva 的殴打定罪与其丈夫的残忍“无关”，因为她并非

6 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A). 7 Id. 8 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(7). 9 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(C) (emphasis added).

6 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A). 7 同上。 8 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(7). 9 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(C)（着重号为原文所加）。

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“encouraged or induced” by him to commit the assault. 10 Rather, they were “connected to her having been provoked by a woman who was carrying on an affair with her husband” and were “a result of her anger toward her husband’s infidelity and anger toward the mistress’ behavior.” 11 The IJ also concluded that she qualified for all other elements of VAWA cancellation. Specifically, the IJ found that Leach subjected her to extreme cruelty because he threatened to take away her children due to her undocumented status, was consistently unfaithful, verbally and physically abused her and her daughter, and refused to allow her to petition for immigration status. The I.J. also found that her removal would result in extreme hardship.

受其“鼓励或诱导”而实施殴打。10 相反，这些定罪“与她被一个与其丈夫有婚外情的女人激怒有关”，并且是“她对丈夫不忠的愤怒以及对情妇行为的愤怒的结果”。11 移民法官还认定，她符合 VAWA 取消驱逐的所有其他要件。具体而言，移民法官认定，Leach 对她实施了极端残忍，因为他威胁要因其无证件身份夺走她的孩子，一贯不忠，对她及其女儿实施言语和身体虐待，并拒绝让她申请移民身份。移民法官还认定，驱逐她将导致极端困难。

Da Silva appealed to the BIA, and the government filed for summary affirmance of the IJ’s decision. In a nonprecedential opinion, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision, agreeing that, although she had been subjected to extreme cruelty, the assault convictions were not “connected to” the cruelty. The BIA reasoned that Leach did not “ask, encourage, compel, or coerce” her to commit the assault and that she “did not commit the assault on behalf of or for her husband.” 12 Da Silva timely appeals, arguing that she is eligible for cancellation of removal because her convictions are “connected to” the cruelty. The government has filed a motion to remand to the BIA so that it may conduct a more thorough analysis of the term “connected to.” In the alternative, the government asks that we deny the petition, arguing that the BIA properly interpreted and applied “connected to.”

Da Silva 向移民上诉委员会提出上诉，政府申请简易维持移民法官的决定。移民上诉委员会在一份非判例意见中维持了移民法官的决定，同意尽管她遭受了极端残忍，但殴打定罪与残忍“无关”。移民上诉委员会的理由是，Leach 没有“要求、鼓励、强迫或胁迫”她实施殴打，而且她“并非代表其丈夫或为其丈夫实施殴打”。12 Da Silva 及时提出上诉，主张她符合取消驱逐的资格，因为她的定罪与残忍“有关”。政府提出将案件发回移民上诉委员会的动议，以便其更全面地分析“有关”一词。或者，政府请求我们驳回申请，主张移民上诉委员会正确解释并适用了“有关”。

10 A.R. 94. 11 A.R. 94. 12 A.R. 4.

10 A.R. 94. 11 A.R. 94. 12 A.R. 4.

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We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). Where, as here, the BIA expressly adopts portions of the IJ’s decision, we review both the BIA and IJ decisions. 13 We review findings of fact “under the deferential substantial evidence standard,” 14 and we review legal conclusions de novo, subject to established rules of deference. 15 The BIA’s decision is not entitled to Chevron deference because it is nonprecedential. 16

我们依据 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) 享有管辖权。在移民上诉委员会明确采纳移民法官决定部分内容的情况下（如本案），我们同时审查移民上诉委员会和移民法官的决定。13 我们“依据尊重性实质证据标准”审查事实认定，14 并在遵守既定尊重规则的前提下，对法律结论进行重新审查。15 移民上诉委员会的决定因其非判例性质，不享有 Chevron 尊重。16

Our analysis proceeds in two parts. First, we address the government’s motion to remand to the BIA and conclude that remand is not appropriate here. Next, we apply our principles of statutory interpretation to the term “connected to.” We hold that the term has a clear and unambiguous meaning and that the BIA’s construction of “connected to” was overly narrow and contrary to the plain language of the statute.

我们的分析分两部分进行。首先，我们处理政府将案件发回移民上诉委员会的动议，并认定本案不宜发回。接下来，我们将法定解释原则适用于“有关”一词。我们认定该词具有清晰明确的含义，且移民上诉委员会对“有关”的解释过于狭窄，违背了法条的平实语言。

A. The Motion to Remand to the BIA is Denied.

A. 将案件发回移民上诉委员会的动议被驳回。

The government urges us to remand to the BIA so that it may re-interpret the term “connected to.” The government does not concede that the BIA’s construction of the term was improper but rather argues that remand is warranted to permit

政府敦促我们将案件发回移民上诉委员会，以便其重新解释“有关”一词。政府并不承认移民上诉委员会对该词的解释不当，而是主张发回是适当的，以便

13 Xie v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 239, 242 (3d Cir. 2004). 14 Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 483 (3d Cir. 2001). 15 Borges v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 398, 404 (3d Cir. 2005). 16 See Mahn v. Att’y Gen., 767 F.3d 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2014).

13 Xie v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 239, 242 (3d Cir. 2004). 14 Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 483 (3d Cir. 2001). 15 Borges v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 398, 404 (3d Cir. 2005). 16 参见 Mahn v. Att’y Gen., 767 F.3d 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2014).

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the BIA an opportunity to fully consider the “ambiguous” phrase “connected to.” We decline the government’s invitation to remand because the factors supporting remand are not present here. Indeed, we conclude that the phrase “connected to” is unambiguous, leaving no statutory gaps for the BIA to fill.

让移民上诉委员会有机会全面审议“模糊”短语“有关”。我们拒绝政府的发回邀请，因为支持发回的因素在本案中并不存在。事实上，我们认定“有关”一词含义明确，没有留下任何供移民上诉委员会填补的法定空白。

Remand is appropriate where an agency has yet to consider the issue presented to the court. For instance, in I.N.S. v. Orlando Ventura, 17 the Supreme Court held that the Ninth Circuit “committed clear error” when it decided a question itself in the first instance rather than remanding to the BIA. 18 Remand is also called for where there has been a change in law or an intervening event. 19 Neither factor is present in this case.

在行政机关尚未审议提交法院的问题时，发回是适当的。例如，在 I.N.S. v. Orlando Ventura 17 案中，最高法院认定，第九巡回法院自行首次裁决一个问题而非发回移民上诉委员会，构成“明显错误”。18 在法律发生变化或发生介入事件时，也应发回。19 本案中这两个因素均不存在。

17 537 U.S. 12 (2002). 18 Id. at 17; see also, Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 186 (2006) (where the “matter requires determining the facts and deciding whether the facts as found fall within a statutory term,” the BIA, not a court of appeals, should make the initial determination); Okeke v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 585, 595 n.14 (3d Cir. 2005) (“We thus may not raise the issue [of whether the petitioner was convicted of a controlled substance offense] sua sponte and decide it de novo. Rather, we must remand so that the BIA may have the first opportunity to address the issue.”). 19 See, e.g., Leia v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 427, 438-39 (3d Cir. 2005) (remanding for reconsideration in light of a released opinion that had not been available to either the IJ or BIA at the time of their respective decisions); SKF USA Inc. v. United States, 254 F.3d 1022, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he agency may seek a remand because of intervening events outside of the agency’s control, for example, a new legal decision or the passage of new legislation.”).

17 537 U.S. 12 (2002)。 18 同上，第17页；另见 Gonzales v. Thomas，547 U.S. 183, 186（2006）（当“该事项需要确定事实并判定所认定的事实是否属于某一法定术语的范围”时，应由BIA而非上诉法院作出初步认定）；Okeke v. Gonzales，407 F.3d 585, 595 n.14（第3巡回法院2005年）（“因此，我们不得依职权主动提出[申请人是否被判犯有管制物质犯罪]这一问题并对其进行重新审查。相反，我们必须发回重审，以便BIA有机会首先处理该问题。”）。 19 参见，例如，Leia v. Ashcroft，393 F.3d 427, 438-39（第3巡回法院2005年）（发回重审，以便根据一份已发布的意见重新考虑，该意见在IJ或BIA各自作出裁决时均无法获得）；SKF USA Inc. v. United States，254 F.3d 1022, 1028（联邦巡回法院2001年）（“[该]机构可以因机构控制之外的介入事件而请求发回重审，例如新的法律裁决或新立法的通过。”）。

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The BIA has already interpreted and applied the term “connected to,” and thus, we would not be conducting a de novo inquiry as in Ventura and its progeny. Moreover, there has been no change in law or intervening event that would affect the BIA’s analysis. The government asked the BIA to summarily affirm the IJ’s decision. If it wanted the BIA to conduct a re-analysis of “connected to,” it should have asked the BIA to do so the first time around. 20

BIA已经解释并适用了“connected to”一词，因此，我们不会像在Ventura及其后续案件那样进行重新审查。此外，法律没有发生变化，也没有发生会影响BIA分析的介入事件。政府要求BIA简易维持IJ的裁决。如果它希望BIA对“connected to”进行重新分析，它本应在第一次就要求BIA这样做。20

We might be more inclined to remand if the BIA’s subsequent, precedential interpretation of “connected to” would receive Chevron deference. 21 But it would not. Under Chevron step one, we determine “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue of law in the case.” 22 If the statute is unambiguous, there are no statutory

如果BIA随后对“connected to”作出的具有先例效力的解释将获得Chevron遵从，我们可能更倾向于发回重审。21 但情况并非如此。根据Chevron第一步，我们要确定“该法规对本案中的具体法律问题是否沉默或含糊不清。”22 如果法规明确无歧义，则不存在供机构填补的法定

20 We have denied requests to remand to the BIA under similar circumstances. See Ildefonso-Candelario v. Att’y Gen., 866 F.3d 102, 106-07 (3d Cir. 2017) (refusing request for a remand to the BIA because there was no “emerging case law” that justified “giving the BIA a second bite at the apple” when it committed error on the first try); Borrome v. Att’y Gen., 687 F.3d 150, 156 n.4 (3d Cir. 2012) (rejecting a request for a remand to the BIA when the government asked for a summary affirmance but then changed its “tune” and gave “no good reason why the BIA should have a second chance to consider the issues” when, at the “[g]overnment’s insistence, [it] chose not to do so” the first time). 21 See SKF USA Inc., 254 F.3d at 1029-30 (where courts defer to agency constructions of ambiguous statutes under Chevron “we believe a remand to the agency is required, absent the most unusual circumstances verging on bad faith”). 22 Lin–Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 557 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir.

20 我们曾在类似情况下驳回向BIA发回重审的请求。参见 Ildefonso-Candelario v. Att’y Gen.，866 F.3d 102, 106-07（第3巡回法院2017年）（拒绝向BIA发回重审的请求，因为不存在“新兴判例法”可为“给BIA第二次机会”提供正当理由，而BIA在第一次尝试时犯了错误）；Borrome v. Att’y Gen.，687 F.3d 150, 156 n.4（第3巡回法院2012年）（驳回向BIA发回重审的请求，当时政府要求简易维持，但随后改变了“腔调”，并且“没有给出充分理由说明为什么BIA应当有第二次机会审议这些问题”，而在“[政府]坚持下，[它]第一次选择不这样做”）。 21 参见 SKF USA Inc.，254 F.3d 第1029-30页（当法院根据Chevron遵从机构对含糊法规的解释时，“我们认为，除非存在近乎恶意的极不寻常情形，否则必须将案件发回该机构”）。 22 Lin–Zheng v. Att’y Gen.，557 F.3d 147, 155（第3巡回法院

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gaps for the agency to fill, and our inquiry ends. 23 Only where the statute is ambiguous do we move to step two and determine if the agency’s interpretation of the statute is reasonable and thus entitled to deference. 24

空白供机构填补，我们的审查即告结束。23 只有当法规含糊不清时，我们才进入第二步，确定机构对法规的解释是否合理，从而是否应获得遵从。24

As a threshold matter, we are not convinced that the Chevron framework applies here because interpreting “connected to” does not implicate the BIA’s “expertise in a meaningful way,” 25 Rather it appears to be “a pure question of statutory construction for the courts to decide.” 26 Even if the Chevron framework did apply, “connected to” is unambiguous as discussed below and therefore, the meaning of “connected to” is resolved under the first step of Chevron.

作为门槛问题，我们并不确信Chevron框架在此适用，因为解释“connected to”并不以有意义的方式涉及BIA的“专门知识”，25 相反，它似乎是“一个应由法院裁决的纯法规解释问题。”26 即使Chevron框架确实适用，如下文所述，“connected to”也是明确无歧义的，因此，“connected to”的含义应根据Chevron第一步来解决。

2009) (en banc) (internal quotation and citation omitted). 23 Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). 24 Id. 25 Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F.3d 225, 239 (3d Cir. 1999). 26 INS v. Cardoza–Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987). The term “connected to” sounds in causality and does not implicate the BIA’s expertise in immigration law. The courts are better positioned than the BIA to construe statutory language related to causation. See Singh v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 144, 151 (3d Cir. 2004) (declining to defer to the BIA’s interpretation of “aggravated felon” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) because the “interpretation and exposition of criminal law is a task outside the BIA’s sphere of special competence”); Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 239 (explaining that the BIA’s decision as to the effective date of a statute does not receive Chevron deference because the issue “is not one that implicates agency expertise in a meaningful way”).

2009年）（全体庭审）（内部引文和引注省略）。 23 Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.，467 U.S. 837, 842-43（1984）。 24 同上。 25 Sandoval v. Reno，166 F.3d 225, 239（第3巡回法院1999年）。 26 INS v. Cardoza–Fonseca，480 U.S. 421, 446（1987）。“connected to”一词涉及因果关系，并不涉及BIA在移民法方面的专门知识。法院比BIA更有能力解释与因果关系有关的法定语言。参见 Singh v. Ashcroft，383 F.3d 144, 151（第3巡回法院2004年）（拒绝遵从BIA根据8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)对“加重重罪”的解释，因为“刑法解释和阐述是BIA特殊能力范围之外的任务”）；Sandoval，166 F.3d 第239页（解释称，BIA关于法规生效日期的裁决不获得Chevron遵从，因为该问题“并非以有意义的方式涉及机构专门知识的问题”）。

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Accordingly, we will deny the government’s motion to remand to the BIA to re-interpret “connected to.”

因此，我们将驳回政府要求发回BIA重新解释“connected to”的动议。

B. “Connected to” is Unambiguous, and the BIA’s

B. “Connected to”明确无歧义，而BIA对该术语的

Construction of the Term is at Odds With its Unambiguous Meaning. We employ well-established principles of statutory interpretation to determine the meaning of “connected to,” first asking whether the term has a plain and unambiguous meaning. 27 If the statutory language is unambiguous, our inquiry ends because courts must presume that Congress “says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.” 28 In determining whether language is unambiguous, we “read the statute in its ordinary and natural sense.” 29

解释与其明确无歧义的含义相冲突。 我们采用公认的法规解释原则来确定“connected to”的含义，首先询问该术语是否具有平实且明确无歧义的含义。27 如果法定语言明确无歧义，我们的审查即告结束，因为法院必须推定国会“在法规中表达其意，并在法规中表达其所言。”28 在确定语言是否明确无歧义时，我们“以通常和自然的含义解读法规。”29

To ascertain the ordinary meaning of words, “[w]e refer to standard reference works such as legal and general dictionaries.” 30 Dictionaries define the word “connected” similarly. Miriam-Webster defines it as “having the parts or elements logically linked together;” 31 the Oxford English

为确定词语的通常含义，“我们参考标准参考工具书，如法律词典和通用词典。”30 词典对“connected”一词的定义类似。Miriam-Webster将其定义为“各部分或要素在逻辑上相互关联；”31 《牛津英语

27 Dobrek v. Phelan, 419 F.3d 259, 263 (3d Cir. 2005). 28 In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 304 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992)). 29 Harvard Secured Creditors Liquidation Trust v. I.R.S., 568 F.3d 444, 451 (3d Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). 30 United States v. Geiser, 527 F.3d 288, 294 (3d Cir. 2008) (using dictionary definitions of “persecution” to hold that the term is unambiguous). 31 Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/connected (last visited July 26, 2019).

27 Dobrek v. Phelan，419 F.3d 259, 263（第3巡回法院2005年）。 28 In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC，599 F.3d 298, 304（第3巡回法院2010年）（引用 Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain，503 U.S. 249, 253-54（1992））。 29 Harvard Secured Creditors Liquidation Trust v. I.R.S.，568 F.3d 444, 451（第3巡回法院2009年）（引注省略）。 30 United States v. Geiser，527 F.3d 288, 294（第3巡回法院2008年）（使用“persecution”的词典定义来认定该术语明确无歧义）。 31 Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary，https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/connected（最后访问日期2019年7月26日）。

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Dictionary defines it as “related, associated (in idea or nature);” 32 and Black’s Law Dictionary defines it as “to associate as in occurrence or in idea.” 33 Together, these definitions indicate that the term “connected to” means “having a causal or logical relationship.” 34

词典将其定义为“相关的、关联的（在观念或性质上）；”32 《布莱克法律词典》将其定义为“在发生或观念上相关联。”33 综合来看，这些定义表明“connected to”一词意为“具有因果或逻辑关系。”34

The government argues that the plain meaning of “connected to” is too broad to be unambiguous; however, “a term in a statute is not ambiguous merely because it is broad in scope.” 35 Application of the plain, expansive meaning of “connected to” is called for as long as it is supported by the “broader context of the statute as a whole,” 36 and, indeed, the statutory context does support such application. Two other VAWA-based provisions in the INA are instructive because Congress expressly limited the broad scope of “connection” in

政府主张，“connected to”的平实含义过于宽泛，因而不能算明确无歧义；然而，“法规中的术语并不因其范围宽泛就含糊不清。”35 只要“connected to”的平实、宽泛含义得到“法规整体更广泛语境”36 的支持，就应适用该含义，而且，法定语境确实支持这种适用。INA中另外两项基于VAWA的条款具有指导意义，因为国会明确限制了“connection”的宽泛范围，

32 Oxford English Online Dictionary, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/39329?rskey=nSSxs9&resu lt=2&isAdvanced=false#eid (last visited July 26, 2019). 33 Black’s Law Dictionary 302 (6th ed. 1990). 34 We came to a similar conclusion in United States v. Loney. In that case, we held that the phrase “in connection with” had a plain and ordinary meaning and “expresse[d] some relationship or association, one that can be satisfied in a number of ways such as a causal or logical relation or other type of relationship.” 219 F.3d 281, 283-84 (3d Cir. 2000) (emphasis added). 35 In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d at 310; see also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980) (“Broad general language is not necessarily ambiguous when congressional objectives require broad terms.”). 36 Contreras Aybar v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 916 F.3d 270, 273 (3d Cir. 2019).

32 Oxford English Online Dictionary，https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/39329?rskey=nSSxs9&result=2&isAdvanced=false#eid（最后访问日期2019年7月26日）。 33 Black’s Law Dictionary 302（第6版1990年）。 34 我们在 United States v. Loney 一案中得出了类似结论。在该案中，我们认定“in connection with”一语具有平实和通常的含义，并“表达某种关系或关联，这种关系或关联可以通过多种方式满足，例如因果或逻辑关系或其他类型的关系。”219 F.3d 281, 283-84（第3巡回法院2000年）（着重号为原文所加）。 35 In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC，599 F.3d 第310页；另见 Diamond v. Chakrabarty，447 U.S. 303, 315（1980）（“当国会目标需要宽泛术语时，宽泛的一般性语言未必含糊不清。”）。 36 Contreras Aybar v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.，916 F.3d 270, 273（第3巡回法院2019年）。

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those provisions. Under the first statute, battered spouses are exempt from a certain ground of inadmissibility if they can show, inter alia, that “there was a substantial connection between the battery or cruelty . . . and the alien’s unlawful entry into the United States.” 37 A second statute, which applies to VAWA self-petitioners who are divorced from their abusive spouses, requires petitioners to demonstrate “a connection between the legal termination of the marriage within the past 2 years and battering or extreme cruelty.” 38 Both of these provisions reveal that Congress knew how to narrow the otherwise expansive term “connection”—either by including a modifier like “substantial” or a temporal requirement—but chose not to for VAWA cancellation of removal.

这些条款中的“connection”范围。根据第一项法规，受虐待配偶如果能够证明，除其他事项外，“殴打或残忍行为……与该外国人非法进入美国之间存在实质性联系”，则可豁免某一不准入境理由。37 第二项法规适用于与施虐配偶离婚的VAWA自我申请人，要求申请人证明“在过去2年内婚姻合法终止与殴打或极端残忍行为之间存在联系。”38 这两项条款都表明，国会知道如何缩小原本宽泛的“connection”一词——或者通过加入“substantial”之类的修饰语，或者通过加入时间要求——但在VAWA取消递解出境中却选择不这样做。

The government also cites the interpretive principle that statutory exceptions should be read narrowly so as not to “swallow” the general rule. 39 Retaining the plain meaning of “connected to” in the exception to the good moral character requirement does not swallow the cancellation of removal statute; rather, it aligns with its purpose. VAWA cancellation of removal is “intended to ameliorate the impact of harsh provisions of immigration law on abused women.” 40 A narrow

政府还援引了解释原则，即法定例外应作狭义解释，以免“吞没”一般规则。39 在良好道德品质要求的例外中保留“connected to”的平实含义，并不会吞没取消递解出境法规；相反，它与该法规的目的相一致。VAWA取消递解出境“旨在减轻移民法严苛条款对受虐待妇女的影响。”40 狭义的

37 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(ii)(III) (emphasis added). 38 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)(II)(aa)(CC)(ccc) (emphasis added). 39 See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 487, 504 n.2 (1999); see also Comm’r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739 (1989) (“[When] a general statement of policy is qualified by an exception, we usually read the exception narrowly in order to preserve the primary operation of the provision.”). 40 Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824, 840 (9th Cir. 2003) (in

37 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(ii)(III)（着重号为原文所加）。 38 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)(II)(aa)(CC)(ccc)（着重号为原文所加）。 39 参见 Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.，525 U.S. 471, 487, 504 n.2（1999）；另见 Comm’r v. Clark，489 U.S. 726, 739（1989）（“当一般政策声明受例外限定时，我们通常对例外作狭义解释，以保留该条款的主要运作。”）。 40 Hernandez v. Ashcroft，345 F.3d 824, 840（第9巡回法院2003年）（在

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construction, like the one the BIA adopted here, would frustrate this statute’s larger goal by limiting the exception to those who committed crimes at the direction of their abuser. There are other reasons for which an abused spouse might commit acts that, absent the abuse, would indicate bad character. We do not need to develop that list in connection with this case, but at the same time we should not limit the applicability of the exception in a way that is contrary to the intent of the statute.

解释——如BIA在此所采用的那种——将把例外限制于那些在施虐者指示下实施犯罪的人，从而阻碍该法规的更大目标。受虐待配偶可能出于其他原因实施一些行为，而这些行为若不存在虐待，则会表明其品格不良。我们无需结合本案来列举该清单，但与此同时，我们不应以违背法规意图的方式限制该例外的适用性。

As the government notes, there are Supreme Court cases stating that the phrase “in connection with” is so broad that it is indeterminate; however, these cases do not compel the same holding here. In those cases, the application of “in connection with” conflicted with the purpose of the statutes at issue. For instance, in Maracich v. Spears, 41 the Court addressed a statute that prohibited the Departments of Motor Vehicles from disclosing personal information except, inter alia, where the information is used “in connection with” judicial and administrative proceedings. 42 The Court held that because the plain meaning of “in connection with” is so broad, a plain meaning interpretation would undercut the purpose of the statute—namely protecting privacy rights. 43 Similarly, in New

正如政府所指出的，有最高法院判例指出，“与……相关”这一表述过于宽泛，以至于具有不确定性；然而，这些判例并不必然导致本案得出相同的裁决。在那些判例中，“与……相关”的适用与所涉法规的目的相冲突。例如，在Maracich v. Spears案中，41 法院处理了一项法规，该法规禁止机动车管理部门披露个人信息，但除其他情形外，信息用于“与”司法和行政程序“相关”的情形除外。42 法院认为，由于“与……相关”的字面含义过于宽泛，按字面含义解释会削弱该法规的目的——即保护隐私权。43 同样，在New

the context of interpreting “extreme cruelty”). 41 570 U.S. 48 (2013). 42 Id. at 52. 43 Id. at 59 (“[In connection with], in literal terms, could be interpreted to its broadest reach to include the personal information that respondents obtained here. But if no limits are placed on the text of the exception, then all uses of personal information with a remote relation to litigation would be exempt under [this provision].”).

解释“极端残忍”的语境下）。 41 570 U.S. 48 (2013)。 42 同上，第52页。 43 同上，第59页（“[与……相关]，按字面理解，可被解释为其最宽泛的适用范围，包括被申请人在此获得的个人信息。但如果不对此例外条款的文本施加任何限制，那么所有与诉讼有遥远关联的个人信息使用都将根据[该条款]获得豁免。”）。

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York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co., 44 the Court held that applying the plain and ordinary meaning of “in connection with” or “related to” would not comport with the objectives of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. 45 Da Silva’s case is distinguishable because, as discussed, a plain meaning application of “connected to” furthers, not undercuts, the objectives of the VAWA cancellation statute.

York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.案中，44 法院认为，按“与……相关”或“与……有关”的普通和通常含义适用，将不符合《雇员退休收入保障法》的目标。45 Da Silva的案件有所不同，因为如前所述，按字面含义适用“与……有关”促进而非削弱VAWA取消资格法规的目标。

Lastly, the government cites a U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services interoffice memorandum that addresses the meaning of “connected to.” This memo does not affect our analysis. The memo first defines “connected to” as compulsion or coercion, but then conflates “connected to” with but-for causation. 46 As an initial matter, this memo’s

最后，政府引用了美国公民及移民服务局的一份内部备忘录，该备忘录涉及“与……有关”的含义。该备忘录不影响我们的分析。该备忘录首先将“与……有关”定义为强迫或胁迫，但随后又将“与……有关”与但因果关系相混淆。46 首先，该备忘录的

44 514 U.S. 645 (1995). 45 Id. at 656 (“We simply must go beyond the unhelpful text and the frustrating difficulty of defining its key term, and look instead to the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood would survive.”); see also Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1990 (2015) (narrowing the plain meaning of “related to” in an immigration statute because a “sweeping interpretation departs so sharply from the statute’s text and history that it cannot be considered a permissible reading”). 46 Specifically, the memo says that in order for an act or conviction to be considered sufficiently connected to the battering or extreme cruelty, “the evidence must establish that the battering or extreme cruelty experienced by the self- petitioner compelled or coerced him/her to commit the act or crime for which he/she was convicted. In other words, the evidence should establish that the self-petitioner would not

44 514 U.S. 645 (1995)。 45 同上，第656页（“我们 simply must go beyond the unhelpful text and the frustrating difficulty of defining its key term, and look instead to the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood would survive.”）；另见Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1990 (2015)（缩小移民法规中“与……有关”的字面含义，因为“宽泛的解释如此严重地偏离法规的文本和历史，以至于不能被视为一种允许的解读”）。 46 具体而言，该备忘录称，为使某一行为或定罪被视为与殴打或极端残忍有充分关联，“证据必须证明自我申请人所经历的殴打或极端残忍强迫或胁迫他/她实施了其被定罪的行为或犯罪。换言之，证据应证明自我申请人在没有殴打或极端残忍的情况下不会

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interpretation is not binding on this Court or the BIA, and it is entitled to respect only to the extent it has the power to persuade. 47 It is not persuasive. Its interpretation is at odds with the plain meaning of “connected to” to the extent that it requires compulsion and coercion rather than a causal or logical relationship. It is also internally inconsistent because compulsion/coercion and but-for causation are very different standards.

解释对本法院或BIA不具有约束力，且仅在其具有说服力的情况下才应得到尊重。47 它不具有说服力。其解释与“与……有关”的字面含义不一致，因为它要求强迫和胁迫，而非因果或逻辑关系。它还存在内部不一致，因为强迫/胁迫与但因果关系是非常不同的标准。

Thus, we hold that “connected to” is unambiguous and means “having a causal or logical relationship.” Applying the plain meaning of “connected to” to this case, Da Silva has established that her convictions are connected to the extreme cruelty she suffered. The IJ and the BIA held that Leach’s adultery was part of the extreme cruelty, and Da Silva assaulted L.N. while confronting Leach and L.N. about the affair. This meets the causal or logical relationship standard.

因此，我们裁定“与……有关”含义明确，意指“具有因果或逻辑关系”。将“与……有关”的字面含义适用于本案，Da Silva已证明其定罪与她所遭受的极端残忍有关。IJ和BIA认定Leach的通奸是极端残忍的一部分，而Da Silva在与Leach和L.N.就婚外情对质时袭击了L.N.。这符合因果或逻辑关系的标准。

have committed the act or crime in the absence of the battering or extreme cruelty.” USCIS Interoffice Memorandum, Determinations of Good Moral Character in VAWA-Based Self-Petitions, Yates to Novak, Jan. 19, 2005, https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memor anda/Static_Files_Memoranda/Archives%201998- 2008/2005/gmc_011905.pdf (emphasis added). 47 Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (“[I]nterpretations contained in formats such as opinion letters are ‘entitled to respect’ under our decision in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944), but only to the extent that those interpretations have the ‘power to persuade.’”).

实施该行为或犯罪。” USCIS内部备忘录，Determinations of Good Moral Character in VAWA-Based Self-Petitions, Yates to Novak, Jan. 19, 2005, https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/Static_Files_Memoranda/Archives%201998-2008/2005/gmc_011905.pdf（着重号为原文所加）。 47 Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)（“载于意见函等格式中的解释根据我们在Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)案中的裁决‘有权得到尊重’，但仅限于这些解释具有‘说服力’的范围。”）。

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For these reasons, we will deny the government’s motion to remand to the BIA to reconsider the term “connected to,” grant the petition for review, vacate the BIA’s order of removal, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

基于上述理由，我们将驳回政府将案件发回BIA重新考虑“与……有关”一词的动议，批准复审申请，撤销BIA的驱逐令，并发回根据本意见进行进一步程序。

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