Immigration precedents

The Regional Service Center denied the petitioner's visa petition for his daughter, and the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed the appeal. The Board held that legitimation under Dominican law must occur before the child turns 18, and that the petitioner failed to establish a bona fide parent-child relationship before the daughter turned 21.

A Laotian refugee was convicted under Iowa law of terrorism and received a suspended indeterminate sentence of up to 5 years; the immigration judge found him deportable and ineligible for asylum. The Board of Immigration Appeals held that under INA section 101(a)(48)(B), the term of imprisonment for immigration purposes is the period ordered by the court regardless of suspension, that the provision applies to convictions and sentences entered before, on, or after September 30, 1996, and that the offense was a crime of violence constituting an aggravated felony, barring asylum and withholding of deportation.

A Polish husband and wife who overstayed sought suspension of deportation, claiming extreme hardship to themselves and their three U.S. citizen children. The Board of Immigration Appeals, sitting en banc, held that ordinary economic detriment, loss of employment, reduced living standards, family separation, and cultural readjustment are normal consequences of deportation and did not establish extreme hardship, and dismissed the appeal.

A mother and her 15-year-old daughter moved to reopen deportation proceedings to apply for suspension of deportation, alleging extreme hardship to themselves and to the mother's 6-year-old U.S. citizen child. The Board of Immigration Appeals, sitting en banc, held that reopening requires only a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits rather than a conclusive showing of eligibility, and that 'extreme' hardship need not be 'unique' but must be assessed by weighing all hardship factors together; it granted reopening and remanded to the Immigration Judge.

A Portuguese lawful permanent resident was charged with deportability as an alien convicted of a firearms violation under a divisible Connecticut weapons statute. The en banc Board held that where the statute is divisible, only the statute, the record of conviction, and documents admissible under 8 C.F.R. § 3.41 may establish a firearms conviction; a police report alone is neither part of the record of conviction nor admissible for that purpose, so deportability was not proven and proceedings were terminated.

A Mexican lawful permanent resident convicted of first-degree sexual assault was found deportable; the immigration judge found extreme hardship to his U.S. citizen wife and children but denied the section 212(h) waiver and adjustment of status in discretion. The Board of Immigration Appeals, sitting en banc, dismissed the appeal, holding that discretion requires balancing adverse and favorable factors, that extreme hardship is only one favorable factor, and that the absence of rehabilitation evidence may be determinative in a serious criminal case.

A U.S. citizen petitioned for his 22-year-old Chinese national daughter, who had been adopted shortly after birth and whose adoption was lawfully terminated in 1992 under Chinese law; the service center denied the petition, reasoning that the adoption irrevocably severed the natural parent-child relationship. The Board of Immigration Appeals, sitting en banc, held that the natural relationship is not irrevocably severed in all cases and remanded for consideration under a four-part test.

The respondent's conditional permanent residence was based on marriage to a U.S. citizen, but the marriage was terminated while the joint petition to remove conditions was pending. The Board of Immigration Appeals held that an alien becomes statutorily ineligible for approval of a joint petition under INA section 216(c)(1) where the marriage has been terminated, other than through the death of a spouse, before adjudication by the immigration judge, and remanded for consideration of a section 216(c)(4) waiver.

The Board held that termination of an alien's conditional permanent resident status is a basis for deportability separate and distinct from a charge of excludability at entry, so the former section 241(f)(1) fraud waiver does not waive deportability under former section 241(a)(9)(B). The Board also held that to preserve a section 216(c)(4) hardship waiver application, the alien must request review before the immigration judge of the Service's denial of that application.

A conditional permanent resident from the Philippines, whose I-752 extreme hardship waiver under section 216(c)(4)(A) was denied, sought alternative waivers under section 216(c)(4)(B) before the immigration judge and section 216(c)(4)(C) on appeal. The BIA held that original jurisdiction over waiver applications lies with the regional service center, that an alien denied one waiver may not seek an alternative waiver before the immigration judge or the Board, and that a continuance may be granted where changed circumstances create eligibility for an additional waiver.

The petitioner, who had been adopted as a child under section 101(b)(1)(E), naturalized and sought a sibling preference visa for his natural sibling; the Service revoked the approval on the ground that the beneficiary was legally ineligible. The Board held that an adoption meeting section 101(b)(1)(E) terminates the natural parent's status as a parent under the Act, so a sibling relationship cannot be recognized through that natural parent, and dismissed the appeal.

A U.S. citizen withdrew her first immediate-relative petition for her Syrian spouse after admitting in a sworn statement that the marriage was entered into as a favor to help him obtain residency, then filed a second petition for the same marriage. The Board of Immigration Appeals held that section 204(c) refers to a prior marriage and does not bar a second petition concerning the same marriage, but the petitioner bore a heavy burden under Matter of Laureano to explain the withdrawal and prove the marriage's bona fides, which she failed to carry, so the appeal was dismissed.